Playing politics with national security

 SPECIAL REPORT : Part 336

September 30, 2020

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Security of a country did not depend on its Defence Secretary. There were various structures and it was a matter of collective action, one-time Defence Secretary, Austin Fernando, told the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (P CoI) on Saturday (26).

The P CoI, appointed by former President Maithripala Sirisena, is inquiring into the Easter Sunday attacks. Sirisena named the Commission several weeks before the end of his five-year term.

Fernando further said: “It is not mandatory for the Defence Secretary to have an intimate knowledge of the role played by the Ministry. If that is the case, a fisherman should be the Secretary to the Ministry of Fisheries, and the Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture should be a farmer.”

Let me examine Austin Fernando’s statement, taking into consideration the direct talks between President Ranasinghe Premadasa and the LTTE, during the period 1989-1990 (the late General D.S. Attygalle served as the Defence Secretary from 15.08.1983 to 16.02.1990), outbreak of Eelam War II (General S.C Ranatunga served as the Secretary Defence from 16.02.1990 to 01.05.1993) and the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) with the LTTE entered into by Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe (Austin Fernando functioned as the Secretary Defence from 21.12.2001 to 03.11.2003).

Hemasiri Fernando, who served as Secretary Defence in the run-up to the April 21, 2019, Easter Sunday attacks, is under investigation for criminal negligence. In all four above-mentioned instances, the government apparatus collectively failed, though the circumstances were different.

The only difference is in the case of the disastrous 2002 CFA. The then President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga cannot be faulted as Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe blindly signed the catastrophic Oslo-drafted 2002 peace initiative, keeping even his cabinet in the dark.

Austin Fernando is absolutely right. Security of a country does not depend on its Defence Secretary. In fact, a single person cannot guarantee national security, regardless of political clout he or she wielded. However, one person can cause irreparable damage, through irrational and unilateral actions/decisions, as in the case of the CFA. The appointment of retired military officers certainly cannot guarantee national security. The late Gen. Attygalle and Gen. Ranatunga facilitated President Premadasa’s ill-fated strategies that weakened the military. Taking Fernando’s assertion into consideration, it would be pertinent to examine how President Premadasa (1989-1990), Premier Wickremesinghe (2002-2003) and President Sirisena and Premier Wickremesinghe (2015-2019) jeopardized the national security. Those who served under them, too, equally contributed to the rapid deterioration of security by simply giving into political dictates, thereby providing tacit support to despicable political agendas.

Sri Lanka paid a huge price for political and military miscalculations. The political environment, created by Sirisena-Wickremesinghe, cannot be scrutinized without taking into consideration previous situations. In the absence of detailed study, the public tend to consider the Easter Sunday security failure as an isolated case. But, the extraordinary Easter Sunday terror project, perhaps, is part of an insidious political strategy to keep Sri Lanka in perpetual anarchy. Those who had perpetrated nearly simultaneous suicide attacks, in three administrative districts, certainly deliberated the political environment before going ahead with the operation. Who exploited the National Thowheed Jamaat (NTJ) to deliver such a devastating message? Did NTJ succumb to external elements? When did India actually infiltrate the NTJ and what is the status of the Indian intelligence gathering operation in Sri Lanka? Why didn’t Indian intelligence share information on NTJ (Zahran Hashim’s gang) much earlier? And, most importantly, why were both Sinhala and Tamil communities targeted?

 

Defence Chiefs play ball with Ranasinghe Premadasa

Having secured the presidency, in January 1989, President Premadasa sought an agreement with the JVP. The UNP leader also made an attempt to reach a consensus with Tamil groups, including the LTTE. The President succeeded in reaching an understanding with all armed Tamil groups, except the LTTE. The presence of one-time militant Douglas Devananda, leader of the EPDP (Eelam People’s Democratic Party), in President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s cabinet of ministers, is evidence of Premadasa’s successful political strategy. In addition to the EPDP, Premadasa brought the EPRLF (Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front), TELO (Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization) and PLOTE (People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam) into the political mainstream. However, Premadasa’s bid to reach an understanding with the LTTE ended disastrously, in the second week of June 1990.

At the time, Premadasa initiated direct negotiations with the LTTE, the late Gen. Attygalle had been the Secretary, Ministry of Defence while Lt. Gen. Hamilton Wanasinghe served as the Commander of the Army (16.09.1988- 15.11.91). Did the President consult the Defence Secretary and the Commander of the Army before initiating negotiations with the JVP and the LTTE? Did they approve of releasing from custody of over thousands of JVP suspects in early 1989? Their release resulted in an immediate stepping up of violence though the police, the military and the government-sponsored civilian death squads crushed the JVP, by the end of 1989.

Having captured JVP leader, Rohana Wijeweera, at Ulapane, in the second week of Nov. 1989, he was brought to Colombo, interrogated and executed. Premadasa knew what befell Wijeweera, who led two insurrections, in 1971 and 1987-89.

However, Premadasa’s apparent unilateral decisions, in respect of the LTTE, caused immense harm. Believing in the possibility of successful conclusion of negotiations with the LTTE, Premadasa, hastily announced the hotly disputed decision to request New Delhi to terminate its military mission in the North-East Sri Lanka. Did Premadasa genuinely consult the Defence Secretary, Commander of the Army or at least his Prime Minister, the late D.B. Wijetunga, before demanding the pull-out of the Indian Peace Keeping Force? Premadasa, obviously didn’t believe in consultations. In his capacity as the leader of the UNP and the President, Premadasa largely believed in unilateral decisions. The catastrophic handling of direct negotiations with the LTTE paved the way for terrorists to launch devastating attacks on the Army after obtaining from the then naïve government military supplies, money, as well as building materials. Clearly, the Secretary Defence and the Commander of the Army played ball with Premadasa. In fact, all cooperated with Premadasa. Officials bent backwards to appease the all-powerful President. The then Election Commissioner, the late Chandrananda de Silva, overnight recognized the PFLT (People’s Front of Liberation Tigers) as a registered political party. The writer was among several local and foreign journalists, invited by the late LTTE theoretician Anton Balasingham, to the Colombo Hilton where he made the announcement. Chain-smoking British passport holder Balasingham declared proudly that their emblem would be a Tiger in a red flag of rectangular shape. Premadasa, or late Chandrananda de Silva, had no qualms in the PFLT receiving political recognition in spite of it being armed. The LTTE received political recognition a couple of months before Velupillai Prabhakaran resumed Eelam War II.

 

Prez playing with fire

Did Premadasa consult the Defence Secretary and Commander of the Army before lifting restrictions imposed on the Northern Province, abandoned Point Pedro and Valvettiturai army detachments, pardoned convicted Maradana bomber Manouri Daniels, along with over a dozen other LTTE cadres, held under the PTA (Prevention of Terrorism Act), and provided weapons and funds to the LTTE. Premadasa did what he wanted to do. The UNP leader was not bothered about security implications. Obviously, his security chiefs remained mum. President felt confident in his political strategy. He was so confident, he ordered law enforcement personnel to surrender after the LTTE surrounded police stations in the East. Premadasa’s decision resulted in the deaths of over 400 officers and men. Did the President consult Gen. Attygalle’s successor Gen. Cyril Ranatunga and the Commander of the Army before the government reached an agreement with the LTTE?

The Army in the East averted a calamity by refusing to surrender, in spite of the senior leadership directing them to do so. General Gerry H. de Silva, who served as the Commander of the Army (1994-1996) in his memoirs titled ‘A most noble profession’ commented on Premadasa’s strategy/the government’s failure to recognize the threat posed by the LTTE. First published in 2011, two years after the successful conclusion of the war against the LTTE, De Silva acknowledged: “We failed to see through the emerging trends and LTTE machinations. Despite constant threats and humiliation meted out to security forces and the police by the militants, the politico-military hierarchy preferred to put up with the ignominy in order not to ‘rock the boat.’

The LTTE capitalized on the situation. A rejuvenated LTTE ‘called the shots,’ and quickly moved into a position of strength, politically and militarily. They were riding the crest of a wave and must have felt that the time was opportune to achieve their goal of Eelam.”

 

The Gemunu Watch officer is the only Commander of the Army to author a book on his career.

Within a week after the resumption of hostilities, in the second week of June 1990, the ill-prepared Army lost the Overland Main Supply Route (MSR) to the Jaffna peninsula. Premadasa’s ‘honeymoon’ with Prabhakaran lasted 14 months. The Tiger Supremo resumed the war, at lightning speed, just two months after India terminated its military mission here. Sri Lanka was left high and dry after the series of follies by Premadasa, at peace making, and the military couldn’t regain the MSR, till January 2009. Premadasa’s Generals turned a blind eye to what was happening on the ground. When fighting erupted, the Army had just one battalion, plus troops in the Jaffna peninsula. In spite of continuing to build up, the top brass ignored the growing threat until it was too late. So, the mere appointing of a retired General as Secretary Defence cannot guarantee rationale thinking. Premadasa’s strategy was nothing but a massive and unprecedented collective failure that almost resulted in capitulation of the Northern forces. Premadasa turned a Nelsonian eye to the LTTE evicting the entire Muslim population from the Northern Province, in Oct 1990. At the behest of Premadasa, the then Army Commander facilitated coordinated LTTE attacks on rival Tamil groups. The LTTE massacred hundreds of people. The response of Premadasa and his chief negotiator, the late A.C.S. Hameed, to the LTTE threat, caused quite an embarrassment to the government, undermined the State and, basically, allowed the LTTE to transform itself to a conventional fighting force. The then Higher Education Minister Hameed never realized ground realities.

Retired General de Silva’s assessment can be applied to all Presidents. except war-winning Mahinda Rajapaksa, who had faith in his younger brother Gotabaya’s capacity to coordinate the war effort against the LTTE.

Generals Attygalle and Ranatunga certainly owed an explanation as regards their failure to prevent the catastrophe in the North. Obviously, no one dared to challenge Premadasa’s dangerous strategies. Having served as the Commander of the Army, for a decade, and Defence Secretary, General Attygalle received appointment as Sri Lanka’s High Commissioner in London where he facilitated Kittu’s (Sathasivam Krishnakumar) arrival there. On the orders of Premadasa, the SLAF brought Kittu to Colombo where the British High Commission made arrangements to send the former LTTE Jaffna Commander to receive treatment for his amputated leg. The Generals had no say and Premadasa had his way.

Can you imagine a government facilitating a terrorist’s travel to London where he took over the LTTE’s International Secretariat responsible for running a massive extortion racket? The funds ultimately ended up with arms suppliers who provided the LTTE a range of weapons, T 56 assault rifles to shoulder fired missiles. General Ranatunga, too, received appointment as Sri Lanka’s High Commissioner in Canberra and then London. Presidential nominees to top diplomatic posts always received parliamentary approval.

 

Security fiasco in 2002

Not having learnt from Premadasa’s stupidities, Ranil Wickremesinghe too plunged headlong into a similar folly with Austin Fernando et al in tow.

Ranil Wickremesinghe picked experienced administrative service officer Austin Fernando as Secretary Defence within days after winning the Dec 2001 parliamentary election. Wickremesinghe also brought in one-time Attorney General Tilak Marapana on the National List as the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence. Wickremesinghe adopted a simple strategy. The UNP leader advocated a policy of appeasement, thereby jeopardizing the entire security apparatus. The LTTE brazenly exploited the situation to its advantage. Prabhakaran stepped up training, recruitment of fresh cadres, as well as forcible conscription of children. The government did nothing. The LTTE intensified protests opposite security forces bases, restricted/interfered with police and military movements whereas the government repeatedly reiterated its commitment to the Oslo-led peace process like a mantra. Wickremesinghe dismissed intelligence assessment as regards the rapid LTTE built up. Wickremesinghe told a hastily arranged Temple Trees meeting, attended by senior officers responsible for intelligence services et al their assessment of the LTTE training 6,000 cadres at the onset of the CFA was wrong. The Premier contradicted his own intelligence apparatus on the basis of what the Indians told him. The then Defence Advisor Senior DIG Merril Gunaratne, who had been among those invited by the Premier, had the strength to stand by his report, based on information/analysis provided by all services. Obviously, Wickremesinghe hadn’t been in a mood to listen to anyone who questioned Prabhakaran’s motives though the continuing LTTE build up was evident.

Wickremesinghe followed his policy of appeasement. In his capacity as Secretary Defence Austin Fernando had no option but to go along with the Premier who authorized the finalization of CFA without proper consultations with the military top brass or the intelligence services.

The then Defence Secretary also provided some hilarious side shows like carrying a basket of fruits to a terrorist receiving treatment at a Colombo hospital.

Fernando himself claimed at the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) in August 2010 that he hadn’t been involved in the process leading to the finalization of the document. However, top SCOPP (Secretariat for Coordinating Peace Process) Dr. John Gooneratne subsequently revealed before the LLRC how Norway rejected four proposals made by Sri Lanka. Had those proposals been accommodated in the CFA perhaps Eelam War IV could have been avoided, Gooneratne told the late C.R. de Silva’s Commission. The writer covered the entire LLRC proceedings. Gooneratne revealed the hitherto unknown proposals namely (a) CFA to pave the way for a negotiated settlement (b) prohibition of smuggling of arms, ammunition and equipment (c) freedom of movement for other political parties in areas under the LTTE control and finally (d) halt to forcible recruitment. Sri Lanka never received the backing of Peace Co-Chairs, the US, Norway, EU and Japan to get those just proposals included in the CFA.

The UNP never revealed rejection of its proposals until Gooneratne took advantage of the LLRC to set the record straight. Austin Fernando and SCOPP Chief Bernard Goonetilleke, who appeared before the LLRC could have revealed the truth. The UNP remained mum. Throughout the CFA period, Premier Wickremesinghe tried to suppress information that may have caused embarrassment to his government, the Norwegians and the LTTE. Obviously there hadn’t been any proper consultations among members of the cabinet, parliamentary group or the military top brass regarding the Oslo-led process.

Austin Fernando cannot absolve himself of the responsibility for the UNP government’s actions during the CFA. The person who served as Secretary Defence cannot claim lack of knowledge of a particular situation. The same applies to the Defence Minister. During Marapana’s tenure as the Defence Minister Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI)-run operation was exposed to the whole world with media scenes. In spite of strong protests by the Army, the UNP went ahead with its political project. The exposure of the operation led to the deaths of several operatives. The LTTE also hunted police officers engaged in anti-terrorist operations. When Defence Advisor Merril Gunaratne blamed the LTTE for the killing of Inspector Thabrew at the Dehiwela police station, Premier Wickremesinghe himself questioned the veteran law enforcement officer’s assessment.

The UNP allowed the LTTE to bring in undeclared cargo via the Bandaranaike International Airport (BIA). LTTE delegations returning from negotiations with Wickremesinghe’s delegations from various foreign venues and others brought large packages. The foolish government provided air transport. The LTTE brazenly used the opportunity to its advantage. The CFA provided the organization required protection. The LTTE exploited the Oslo arranged CFA, the same way it used direct talks with Premadasa to achieve its targets. High profile assassination of TULF leader Appapillai Amirthalingham is a case in point. Prabhakaran moved a hit team in an SLAF chopper that brought LTTE delegates from the Vanni to Colombo in 1989.

Both political and military leaderships should accept responsibilities for lapses. During Austin Fernando’s tenure as the Defence Secretary, the military was ordered to stop issuing situation reports, suspended ‘Wanni Sevaya’ (special radio that catered to the military and the police), subjected military reports to civilian approval and basically succumbed to LTTE tactics. While closing down ‘Wanni Sevaya’, the government permitted the LTTE to import state-of-the-art radio equipment to upgrade its own propaganda and communication facilities.

If not for the then President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s intervention in late 2003, the UNP could have allowed the LTTE build up to continue until it was too late to take counter action. The UNP permitted the deterioration of the situation to such an extent, the LTTE by early 2003 felt confident enough to brazenly quit the negotiating table. The LTTE quit talks in late April 2003 to set the stage for an all-out war. By late 2005, the LTTE was confident it could overwhelm the Army in a large-scale conventional confrontation. The assassination of much-loved Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, in early August 2005, indicated their readiness to take on the government. Had the LTTE succeeded in assassinating Army Chief Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka and Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, in late April and early Oct, 2006, the LTTE, perhaps could have achieved Eelam. There cannot be any dispute as regards the role played by the Army Commander and the Defence Secretary to bring the war to a successful conclusion. There had never been previous attempts on the lives of the Army Commander and Secretary Defence. The LTTE knew the government strategy could be aborted by assassinating the two most important men. Their failure brought the war to an end three years later with the LTTE militarily annihilated. If the LTTE succeeded, Sri Lanka’s unitary status could have been jeopardized by now. The Sirisena-Wickremesinghe coalition proved the danger in pulling in different directions, lack of vision and strategy as well as pursuing of political agendas inimical Sri Lanka State.

Pursuing political agendas at the expense of national security

 SPECIAL REPORT : Part 335 

 September 23, 2020

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Yahapalana President Maithripala Sirisena recently contradicted former Defence Secretary Hemasiri Fernando as regards the latter’s statements before the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (P CoI) probing 2019 April 21 Easter Sunday attacks.

It was, in fact, Sirisena who appointed the P CoI several weeks before the end of his term.

Without realising the possibility of being pulled up for contempt of the PCoI, in a statement issued on Sept 19, the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) Polonnaruwa District lawmaker, who is also the leader of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) rejected Fernando’s damning accusations, pertaining to the former President’s culpability as regards his government’s failure to thwart the deadly attacks.

There had never been an instance of a former President having to contradict a Defence Secretary, he himself appointed.

Fernando, who had been President Sirisena’s Chief of Staff squarely, faulted the President for lapses, as well as a brazen bid to cover up the humiliating failure to prevent nearly simultaneous suicide attacks.

Referring to a meeting, he had with President Sirisena on April 24, 2019, Fernando alleged that the President attempted to bribe disgraced IGP Pujitha Jayasundara.

During Sirisena’s tenure, as the President, he appointed no less than five Secretaries to the Ministry of Defence. That too must be a record for any Sri Lankan President. Hemasiri Fernando had been the fourth to serve as Secretary Defence during the disastrous yahapalana rule, followed by retired Army Commander Shantha Kottegoda, who received the appointment in the wake of the Easter Sunday attacks. It would be pertinent to mention that President Sirisena held the defence portfolio by special arrangement, though his successor was to be deprived of the privilege in terms of the 19th Amendment to the Constitution.

Having won the 2015 January 8 presidential election, Sirisena named one-time environment and renewable energy Secretary B.M.U.D. Basnayake as Secretary to the Ministry of Defence (11.01.2015-08.09.2015). Subsequently, Karunasena Hettiarachchi (09.09.2015-05.07.2015), Kapila Waidyaratne (06.07.2017-30.10.2018), Hemasiri Fernando (30.10.2018-25.04.2019) and Gen. Shantha Kottegoda (24.04.2019-19-11.2019) received appointment as the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, amidst the massive turmoil caused by the Easter carnage.

 

Ex-top cop replaces ‘intel’ veteran

The yahapalana leaders also appointed a retired DIG as the Chief of National Intelligence (CNI) – a special post created by President Mahinda Rajapaksa, in late 2006, on the advice of the then Defence Secretary, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, to oversee all intelligence services, including the SIS (State Intelligence Service).

The Rajapaksas created the post of CNI, by way of a cabinet paper, especially for Maj. Gen. Kapila Hendavitharana, in the wake of his retirement. Hendavitharana, who had been deeply involved in clandestine operations against terrorists, knew what was going on in the war zone, elimination of high profile LTTE targets, or overall attempts to intercept LTTE arms shipments on the high seas et al. Even after the successful conclusion of the war, in May 2009, the CNI continued to play a significant role in the previous Rajapaksa government’s security strategy.

An operation, involving the Office of the CNI, and the Navy, to seize an LTTE ship, anchored in a foreign harbour, as well as apprehending Prabhakaran’s successor Kumaran Pathmanathan, alias ‘KP’, in Malaysia, and whisking him back to Colombo, under a web of secrecy, were some of the notable operations undertaken by them.

The yahapalana lot came to power determined to dismantle the security apparatus. The Office of CNI was handed over to the retired DIG Sisira Mendis, an experienced investigator, though he lacked experience in running such a high profile operation. On top of that, the yahapalana administration, on its own, worked overtime to undermine the intelligence services. Even the new CNI lacked swift access to political leadership.

The yahapalana administration was bent on destroying the intelligence outfits. Selected officers were used in the yahapalana administration, much to the dismay of the armed forces. Senior security forces officers were harassed. Among those who had been targeted was the then Commodore D.K.P. Dassanayake, who was recalled from overseas where he was taking part in a US-sponsored programme.

The SIS was brought under SSP Nilantha Jayawardena, in the first week of March 2015. The appointment was made by the then IGP N.K. Illangakoon, obviously on the instructions of the yahapalana grandees. Two years later, the National Police Commission cleared Jayawardena to hold the rank of DIG. The SIS Chief received the promotion, just a couple of weeks before the Easter Sunday carnage. In spite of him being implicated in the overall intelligence failure, rightly or wrongly, it did not prevent the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) government in having Jayawardena as Senior DIG, in charge of the Eastern Range – a hot bed of Muslim extremism.

 

Geneva betrayal

The Defence Ministry, during Sirisena’s tenure as the President, simply turned a blind eye to what was going on with the political leadership, working overtime to haul up the war-winning Sri Lankan military before the Geneva-based Human Rights Council. The Geneva betrayal was far worse than the intelligence failure that allowed the National Thowheed Jamaat (NTJ) to mount a coordinated terror campaign, in April 2019. The Defence Ministry conveniently refrained from representing the interests of the armed forces and the police. Instead, the Defence Ministry provided the backing required for the political leadership to proceed, with a despicable operation that finally led to President Sirisena’s government co-sponsoring an accountability resolution against one’s own country. In spite of President Sirisena, publicly blaming it on the UNP, on numerous occasions, he did nothing to reverse the Geneva process. The government failure to thwart the Easter Sunday attacks shouldn’t be examined in isolation. Instead, the Easter Sunday catastrophe should be studied as part of a comprehensive study on the Yahapalana government’s defence policy/strategy.

Perhaps, the P CoI should scrutinize the overall security failure to recognize what really went wrong on April 21, 2019. Having won the presidential election in January 2015, the UNP, in spite of not having 50 members in parliament, received the premiership. The badly shaken UPFA handed over parliamentary control to the UNP, while President Sirisena took over the SLFP.

The stage was set for the first mega Treasury bond scam, in late Feb 2015, after the dissolution of parliament, in late June 2015, and the general election, two months later. The June 2015 dissolution was meant to save the UNP from a massive embarrassment, in case the parliamentary watchdog committee, COPE, handed over its report on the first Treasury bond scam to parliament. President Sirisena delivered a stunning blow to his own party by declaring that Mahinda Rajapaksa wouldn’t be appointed the Premier, even if they won the 2015 August general election.

The President’s contemptible announcement, almost on the eve of the election, obviously even discouraged some UPFA supporters from casting their vote. The President’s bid was meant to give the UNP an advantage over his own party. The treacherous move could be only compared with Sirisena switching allegiance to UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe, in Dec 2014, to bring an end to the Rajapaksa era.

Having won the general election, with rival leader Sirisena’s support, the UNP formed a coalition that betrayed the armed forces, in Geneva, a few weeks later, with the President conveniently looking the other way. The UNP-SLFP coalition should take the responsibility for the Geneva betrayal, though the SLFP always denied having a hand in it. Those who masterminded the Easter Sunday massacre must have taken the political situation into consideration in planning the terror project.

 

A role for the late Mano

The UNP-SLFP coalition created a special post for overseeing the Geneva operation. The late Mano Tittawella, in his capacity as the Secretary General of the Secretariat for Coordinating Reconciliation Mechanisms (SCRM), instructed Sri Lanka’s Permanent Representative in Geneva, A. L. A. Azeez, in March 2019, to accept resolution 40/1 on behalf of the government of Sri Lanka.

Tittawella received his appointment, on March 29, 2016, around the time the UNP perpetrated the second and much bigger Treasury bond scam.

The UNP-UPFA coalition established the SCRM, under the Prime Minister’s Office in terms of a Cabinet decision, dated Dec 18, 2015.

The Secretary General reported directly to Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe.

Knowing Tittawella was carrying out Wickremesinghe’s directives, the President lambasted him publicly, but never challenged Wickremesinghe’s authority, granted by way of a cabinet decision. Addressing a public gathering at Meegahatenna, in late March 2019, President Sirisena accused Azeez of having betrayed the country and its armed forces.

The Oct 01, 2015 resolution had been endorsed by Ambassador Azeez’s predecessor, Ravinatha Aryasinha (our next Ambassador to Washington). Azeez took over the Geneva mission, in April 2018. Aryasinha signed the March 2017 resolution, which gave Sri Lanka two more years to fulfill its Geneva commitments.

Mangala Samaraweera functioned as the Foreign Minister (January 2015 to May 2017), followed by Ravi Karunanayake (May 2017 to August 2017), Tilak Marapana PC (Aug 2017 to Oct 2018), Dr. Sarath Amunugama (Oct 2018 to Dec 2018) and Minister Marapana took over again before the change of government, in Nov 2019.

Both Defence and Foreign Ministries actively contributed to the campaign against the war-winning armed forces. By the time NTJ mounted its deadly operations, the State security apparatus was in chaos. In late January 2019, Defence Secretary Fernando caused quite a controversy when he called for Tamil Diaspora to cooperate with government investigations into alleged war crimes, as well as other high profile cases, such as the disappearance of 11 Tamils, blamed on the Navy. Fernando, an old boy of Nalanda College, called for Tamil Diaspora support at an event organized by the Nalanda College Ranaviru Society to felicitate him. Thereby, the former Volunteer Navy officer reiterated the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe government policy as regards the post-war accountability issues though, by then, the yahapalana arrangement was in tatters.

 

A Defence Secy. before LLRC

Hemasiri Fernando’s accusations, directed at former President Sirisena, reminded the writer of one of Fernando’s predecessors, Austin Fernando, appearing before the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC), in August 2010. One time top civil servant, Austin Fernando, acknowledged that there hadn’t been proper consultations between the government and the military before the finalization of Oslo-arranged Ceasefire Agreement (CFA). Testifying before LLRC, headed by one-time Attorney General C.R. de Silva, Austin Fernando claimed in spite of him being the Secretary Ministry of Defence he didn’t enjoy the authority to intervene, though the CFA dealt with national security matters. Fernando also denied having a hand in preparing the CFA. Fernando took up the position that, in spite of serious concerns expressed by the top brass, the UNF government of Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe went ahead with the Norwegian hatched project regardless of the consequences.

The writer covered the LLRC throughout its sittings at the Kadirgamar Institute. At one point when Fernando claimed that he hadn’t been involved in drafting the CFA, LLRC Chairman shot back “no Sri Lankan was involved in the process.” Austin Fernando also blamed the Norwegians and the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) for failing to implement the CFA properly (Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission: Now ex-Defence Secy slams CFA – The Island, August 19, 2010).

The UNP proceeded with the CFA agreement, at the expense of national security, and jeopardising the country’s fate. The government bent backwards to appease the LTTE, following the signing of the CFA. The government, on March 31, 2002, closed down ‘Wanni Sevaya’ which was in operation for the benefit of the armed forces and the police, while allowing the LTTE to import state-of-the-art equipment to expand its radio.

When Security Forces Commander, Jaffna Maj. Gen. Sarath Fonseka strongly opposed the reduction of high security zones in the north, without the required security guarantees, from the LTTE, the government engaged a retired Indian General to review the ground situation in the Jaffna peninsula. The government move drew widespread condemnation though Wickremesinghe blindly pushed ahead with it, believing the self-appointed international community.

 

Merril G on security fiasco

The UNP took national security lightly. The party played politics with vital security issues. The handling of matters, related to the CFA et al, was quite knowledgeably discussed by retired Senior DIG Merril Gunaratne, who had also functioned as the Director General of Intelligence during his long police career. Gunaratne’s ‘COP IN THE CROSSFIRE’ first launched in 2011, expertly dealt with the perilous way the UNP handled national security matters. The Chapter titled ‘On the Ministry of Defence with Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe’ described the Premier’s response to security matters. Gunaratne should send a copy of ‘COP IN THE CROSSFIRE’ to the P CoI. Perusing Gunaratne’s work would certainly help those interested in knowing the truth or understanding the ground situation at the time of the Easter Sunday attacks, as well as the UNP thinking. The writer focused on the Premier and the Secretary Defence.

The Sirisena-Wickremesinghe government refused to take action against extremist Muslim groups for political reasons, between the 2015 and 2019 period, leading to the massive Easter Sunday attacks.

Similarly, Wickremesinghe, at the onset of the CFA, declined to act on information provided by his own intelligence services. Gunaratne explained how the Premier dismissed their assessment as regards the rapid LTTE build-up on the basis of what the Indian Intelligence told him. Gunaratne quoted Wickremesinghe as having told a special security meeting; “even the Indians think the numbers were highly exaggerated.”

Gunaratne criticized Wickremesinghe over leaking of intelligence reports by way of a weekly column in the ‘Sunday Observer’ as well as opening up regular sensitive intelligence meetings, to a foreigner, at the expense of national security. The situation during the periods 2002 to 2003 (UNF) and 2015 to 2019 (yahapalana) administrations, can be easily compared. During the Oslo-run CFA, the UNP was seriously scared of the LTTE quitting the negotiating table. Wickremesinghe believed the success of his political future depended on having the LTTE at the negotiating table, at any cost. The UNP felt comfortable even after the LTTE forced the Illankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi-led Tamil National Alliance to recognize them as the sole representative of Tamils. Although the TULF later pulled out of the coalition, it remained loyal to the LTTE until the group’s annihilation militarily on the Vanni east front.

 

Athaulla’s warning

During the yahapalana fiasco, the UNP, and even President Sirisena, didn’t want to do anything to ruffle the feathers of Muslim political parties, as well as those outside parliament, but wielded immense power. National Congress leader A.L.M. Athaulla’s somewhat controversial assertion that those who had a hand in engineering Mahinda Rajapaksa’s defeat, at the 2015 presidential, were also responsible for the Easter Sunday attacks, should be carefully examined. Western powers are alleged to have pushed for Rajapaksa’s ouster, in 2015, as part of their efforts to counter the growing Chinese influence in Colombo. Addressing the media last Sunday, lawmaker Athaulla explained how violence, directed at the Muslim community, in June 2014, transformed the Muslim community into an anti-Rajapaksa movement. Perhaps, the post-Easter Sunday situation should be examined, taking into consideration the ‘Mission Impossible’ type internal and external engineering, by hidden forces, that may have contributed to an explosive situation – causing unprecedented chaos, a decade after the conclusion of the war.

20 A: Govt. takes a step back…

SPECIAL REPORT : Part 334 

September 16, 2020

Justice Minister Ali Sabry, PC, receiving his letter of appointment from President Gotabaya Rajapaksa.

 

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Samagi Jana Balavegaya (SJB) National List nominee, Attorney-at-law Shiral Lakthilaka, teamed up with the editor of Anidda, Attorney-at-law K.W. Janaranjana, on August 9, 2020, on Derana ‘Aluth Parlimenthuwa’ to target the proposed 20th Amendment to the Constitution. They took on former President of the Sri Lanka Bar Association (BASL) U.R. de Silva PC, and Attorney-law-Kanishka Vitharana.

The writer participated in the live two-hour discussion, anchored by Attorney-at-law Sanka Amarjith. The programme dealt with 19th and 20th Amendments.

During the debate, both De Silva and Vitharana acknowledged the need to amend the proposed draft 20th Amendment. The former President of the BASL revealed that Justice Minister Ali Sabry PC accepted the need to retain Article 53 of the Constitution which required Ministers to take an oath against separatism. De Silva said so in response to the writer seeking an explanation why such a dangerous lapse was allowed to slip through by the SLPP (Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna).

The writer pointed out even the treacherous yahapalana administration, that betrayed the war-winning armed forces, in Geneva, in Oct 2015, didn’t let through something so obvious.

The National Joint Committee (NJC), in a statement issued on Sept. 6, 2020, raised the issue in respect of Article 53 of the Constitution. The NJC said: “We are astonished at the decision of the Government to amend Article 53 of the Constitution which mandatorily requires Ministers to take the oath against supporting and promoting a separate state, (i.e. the 7th Schedule introduced by the sixth amendment) and by restricting it to the original oath prescribed in the fourth schedule. Article 61D of the proposed amendment; too, require the public officers to take the fourth schedule oath that existed in the original Constitution and not the oath prescribed in the seventh schedule introduced by the sixth amendment.”

The NJC also emphasized the urgent need to repeal the 13th and 16th Amendments. The Sept. 6 statement was the second issued by the NJC, on the same matter.

The writer, on Sept, 10, 2020, raised serious concerns expressed by the National Joint Committee (NJC), Federation of National Organizations (FNO) and Manohara de Silva, PC, at the post-cabinet media briefing, at the Government Information Department. The media received an assurance from Co-cabinet spokesperson and Pivithuru Hela Urumaya (PHU) Leader Udaya Gammanpila that the government would definitely look into concerns expressed by nationalist groups and Sri Lanka’s Ambassador in Myanmar Prof. Nanlin de Silva.

Cabinet spokesperson Keheliya Rambukwella and other co-cabinet spokesperson Dr. Ramesh Pathirana did not comment on the matter. Prof. De Silva strongly criticized some sections of the 20th Amendment. The academic, in a statement sent to The Island, alleged that the media didn’t provide sufficient coverage to his concerns.

 

SJB et al exploit 20 A

The continuing controversy over the 20th Amendment drastically changed the political situation. Unexpected opposition from even those who campaigned against the yahapalana administration, throughout its rule, really unsettled the SLPP. The badly depleted Opposition received a tremendous boost, by way of the 20th Amendment, replete with obvious flaws. The main Opposition SJB swiftly exploited the situation to its advantage.

Lakthilaka, who had been an advisor to the then President Maithripala Sirisena, before switching allegiance to the SJB, expertly demolished the draft 20th Amendment. The prominent civil society activist, however, repeatedly emphasized that he solidly stood for the presidential system of governance though he strongly disliked, what he termed, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s move to secure dictatorial powers for himself, at the expense of the Parliament.

The writer asked those who backed the 19th Amendment whether the public demanded an elected President, deprived of the right to hold a defence portfolio? Having pointed out that the draft 20th Amendment accommodated some key features in the 19th Amendment, such as five-year terms for both the President and Parliament and two-term limit for a person to hold presidency, the writer reiterated concerns expressed by those who backed Gotabaya Rajapaksa and the SLPP at the Nov. 2019 presidential and Aug 2020 general election, respectively.

Dr. Gunadasa Amarasekera, on behalf of the FNO, on Sept. 09, 2020, requested President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to review the proposed 20th Amendment to the Constitution. Dr. Amarasekera requested the President not to abolish Article 53 of the Constitution and raised matters related to the formulation of a new Constitution.

The FNO asked the SLPP government to establish a mechanism to (1) accept public proposals as regards a new Constitution (11) suspend Provincial Council polls until the enactment of the new Constitution and (111) far reaching alterations to the proposed 20th Amendment approved by the Attorney General before the Government Printer issued the relevant gazette.

The FNO also called for rectification of technical and wrongful policy decisions, in addition to members of the cabinet given an opportunity to provide comments, in writing. Having rectified mistakes, the government would have to amend the draft 20th Amendment and re-gazette it, Dr. Amarasekera told the writer.

The civil society group emphasized that it would be a mistake to bring in amendments at the committee stage as it could create a situation, similar to that of the passage of the 19th Amendment.

The FNO also requested the following provisions altered: (1) do away with the proposal in the 20th Amendment to reduce the number of days from 14 to seven available for the public in respect of enactment of urgent bills (ii) abolish provisions relating to the enactment of urgent bills as successive administrations abused them (iii) rescind the proposal to amend Article 53 of the Constitution which required members of Parliament to take an oath against supporting and promoting a separate State (iv) remove proposal to allow dual citizens to enter Parliament. In addition, it urged the government to extend that law to cover the Governor of the Central Bank, Attorney General, IGP, Auditor General, Service Commanders, Judges of the Supreme Court, and Secretaries to Ministries and (v) abolish the move to do away with the National Audit Commission and also to ensure that no state institution is exempted from audits.

The FNO appreciated the SLPP decision to retain the two-term limits on presidency as well as the five-year terms for both the President and the Parliament.

 

BASL, PM step in

Interventions made by nationalist organizations didn’t receive sufficient coverage in both the print and electronic media. Some sections of the media conveniently refrained from reporting their concerns.

Amidst growing opposition to the much touted 20A, because of its glaring flaws, the BASL, on Sept. 11, 2020, appointed a special 14-member committee, headed by Nihal Jayamanne PC, to inquire into the 20th Amendment. Secretary to the BASL, Rajeev Amarasuriya, in a statement, explained that the Jayamanne committee would also address law’s delays and other related matters undermining the administration of justice. The committee also comprises Ikram Mohamed PC, M.M. Zuhair PC, L.M.K. Arulanandam PC, Prasantha Lal de Alwis PC, Nihal Jayawardene PC, Nalin Ladduwahetty PC, Maithri Wickramasinghe PC, Uditha Egalahewa PC, Anura Medagoda PC, Mohan Weerakoon PC, S.T. Jayanaga PC, Priyal Wijayaweera PC, and Maurapada Gunawansha,PC. Ravi Algama and Shantha Jayawardena are its convenors.

Among the group, M.M. Zuhair is the only former Member of Parliament. Zuhair represented the People’s Alliance (PA) as a National List member, during Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s tenure as the President. It wouldn’t be too hard to reach a consensus on required amendments to the proposed 20th Amendment.

The current political leadership, the Opposition and the BASL, should take into consideration concerns raised not only by nationalist groups but those who backed the enactment of the 19th Amendment to the Constitution, in early 2015. Having made the UNP project to dilute powers of the President, by way of the 19th Amendment, a reality, SLFP leader Maithripala Sirisena, as a candidate at the 2020 general election, campaigned for the abolition of the same.

Let us hope that the Executive Committee of the BASL and the Bar Council act on recommendations made by Jayamanne’s committee. The BASL announcement made it clear that the 20th Amendment is a flawed document, though the Attorney General cleared it, in terms of the Constitution. The AG asserted that the 20th Amendment could be adopted by a two-thirds majority in Parliament, sans a referendum.

Regardless of that, in addition to the Opposition, and some sections of the civil society, the government, too, realized the rapidly developing crisis, caused by the draft 20th Amendment.

Despite having secured a historic near two-third majority last month, the SLPP self-inflicted a major injury by way of the draft 20th Amendment. Premier Mahinda Rajapaksa’s decision to name a nine-member group, consisting of SLPP lawmakers,to examine the draft 20th Amendment, is also evidence that in its current form the draft is a flawed document. The Premier’s Office made the announcement on Sept. 12.

The Premier’s team comprises SLPP Chairman and Education Minister Prof. G.L. Peiris, Justice Minister Ali Sabry PC, PHU leader and Energy Minister and Attorney-at-law Udaya Gammanpila, Labour Minister and Attorney-at-law Nimal Siripala de Silva, Jathika Nidahas Peramuna leader and Industry and Commerce Minister Wimal Weerawansa, Education Reforms, Promotion of Open Universities and Distance Learning State Minister and Attorney-at-law Susil Premajayantha, State Media Minister Sathasivam Viyalendran, MP Dilan Perera and MP and Attorney-at-law Premanath C. Dolawatte.

Nimal Siripala de Silva represents the SLFP whereas the appointment of Viyalendran, a former Tamil National Alliance lawmaker, is significant.

Premier Rajapaksa called for the report by Sept 15, according to his office. However, Minister Weerawansa, on Saturday (12), said that examination led to the SLPP paying a huge price for not being tactful in handling the 20th Amendment. However, the SLPP’s readiness to address the concerns, raised by various parties, should be appreciated and recognized as a positive development to openly accept shortcomings, when pointed out.

 

Prez Gotabaya’s response

President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, on Friday (11), assured Manohara de Silva, PC, and SLPP National List member Gevindu Cumaratunga, of his readiness to submit a fresh draft by rescinding the controversial current draft of the 20th Amendment. The President’s Counsel, and the MP, met the President, on behalf of the National Joint Committee (NJC) and civil society group Yuthukama. The assurance was given in the wake of Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa, too, assuring SLPP coalition partners a new draft would be presented in Parliament. The Premier’s move was revealed by Minister Wimal Weerawansa, at a public rally he addressed, at Avissawella, a on Saturday (12).

The government responded quite wisely by deciding to withdraw the draft 20th Amendment, amidst the Opposition, and those opposed to the SLPP, exploiting the situation to their advantage. The SLPP struggled to cope up with the Opposition attacks as well as criticism directed by several civil society groups.

Polls monitoring group PAFFREL (People’s Action for Free and Fair Elections) warned the SLPP that though the coalition secured a nearly two-thirds majority, at the recently concluded general election, it was not empowered to introduce whatever it desired. In a strongly worded statement, issued on Sept. 13, PAFFREL’s Executive Director Rohana Hettiarachchi pointed out that the electorate twice endorsed the SLPP’s move to abolish the 19th Amendment. However, the SLPP shouldn’t abuse the people’s mandate to introduce an Amendment merely to suit its agenda, regardless of hostile public sentiment. While recollecting how only UPFA lawmaker Rear Admiral (retd.) Sarath Weerasekera voted against the 19th Amendment in 2015, Hettiarachchi urged members of the 9th Parliament not to do anything they would regret later.

Transparency International Sri Lanka (TISL), too, expressed serious concern over the proposed 20th Amendment when its Executive Director Asoka Obeyesekere recently explained how the proposed law could undermine the monitoring of public spending, Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC), curtailment of the Election Commission’s powers and operation of RTI (Right to Information) Law.

Obeysekere didn’t mince his words, at a recent media conference at the TISL office, where he declared: “The proposed 20th Amendment also removes the Audit Service Commission and National Procurement Commission, key institutions intended to act as a check on public spending. By removing any mention of the Audit Service Commission, the proposed 20th Amendment effectively renders the National Audit Act obsolete. The National Audit Act provides the Audit Service Commission with considerable powers, including the ability to impose surcharges on public officials, who cause losses to the state. The removal of the Audit Service Commission will invalidate this essential power.

Despite the mandate of the National Procurement Commission not being fully operationalized, the existence of the institution is nonetheless important to ensuring a transparent and accountable procurement structure. Public procurement is a high-risk area for corruption. Whilst recognizing the importance of the President’s own commitment as clearly enunciated in his manifesto to eradicate corruption and promote efficiency, we call on the government to recognize the importance of the institution of an independent procurement commission to realize this commitment.”

The TISL refrained from commenting on other contentious matters, such as the proposed setting up of a five-member Parliamentary Council in place of the highly flawed 10-member Constitutional Council, abolishing limit on the number of cabinet and non-cabinet ministers, doing away with the prohibition on dual citizens to contest parliamentary election, denying the citizens right to file fundamental rights cases against the President, naming the Attorney General as the respondent. Many an eyebrow was raised when the age limit of those seeking the Office of the President were lowered to 30. Some of the provisions in the 20th Amendment disappointed the public. In fact, the proposed 20th Amendment diminished the importance of restoring the President’s right to hold a defence portfolio by resorting to a despicable political agenda. The SLPP could have easily avoided the embarrassing situation if the proposed amendment was at least discussed among members of the cabinet, as well as the parliamentary group. There hadn’t been a genuine effort, within the SLPP, to reach a consensus on the vital amendment. In fact, the SLPP could have easily discussed the matter informally with the parliamentary opposition. The consensus with the Opposition could have been reached, especially against the backdrop of the SLPP retaining three key provisions in the 19th Amendment, namely restriction of the number of presidential terms to two and five-year tenure for the term of the President and the Parliament.

The crisis over the 20th Amendment should be examined also taking into consideration the SLPP MP-elect for the Ratnapura District, Premalal Jayasekera, taking oaths as a Parliamentarian, on Sept, 8, 2020, subsequent to the Court of Appeal taking a stand, contrary to that of the Attorney General. State Minister Sanath Nishantha’s brother Jagath Samantha caused media furore by destroying a part of Ramsar wetlands at Anavilundawa. Former Chairman of Arachchikattuwa Pradeshiya Sabha Jagath Samantha is alleged to have got part of the sanctuary bulldozed to establish a shrimp cultivation centre. This was revealed by a ministerial committee that inquired into destruction of the wetlands. Wildlife and Forest Conservation Minister C.B. Ratnayake, and some of his officials, recently struggled before the media. State Minister Nishantha, having admitted to President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, when inquired from him about the Anavilundawa incident, however denied responsibility. The State Minister refrained from mentioning his brother being wanted by the police in that regard. The destruction of a part of a historical building, allegedly at the behest of the Kurunegala Mayor Thushara Sampath, also did immense damage to the SLPP, regardless of action taken by the government to save face.

The SLPP needs to review its strategies or prepare to face the consequences. What is really praiseworthy about the line up behind this government are the brave faces among its frontline partners who are willing to call a spade a spade to correct things in the bud as is proved by their willingness to speak out to correct those at the helm for the good of the nation, where necessary, as in the case of 20A, or rape of the environment.

 

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‘Elina wanted Premadasa to succeed JRJ’: correction

 

 

In last week’s Midweek article, titled ‘Elina wanted Premadasa to succeed JRJ’, on the Sept. 09 edition of The Island, the writer inadvertently identified Lilani de Silva as an aide to Elina Jayewardene. Lilani is a neighbour of the Jayewardenes. The relevant section should read as: ‘Elina Jayewardene’ is based on interviews with several persons, including Pradeep Jayewardene, Rukshan Amal Jayewardene (the second grandchild JRJ and Elina), Charmaine Mendis, first wife of late Ravi Jayewardene (their only son), close relatives, Professor Asvini Fernando and Lakshmi Suneetha Subasinghe. The author also interviewed Dr. Sathis Jayasinghe and Nalini Mapitigama. In addition to them, the author talked to several female aides, who had been with EJ until the very end. Among them were Galahitiyage Lilawathie and Hettiarachchige Magilin and the Jayewardene’s immediate neighbour, Lilani de Silva. The Jayewardenes’ third grandson Amrik, hadn’t been so excited about the brief biography about their late grandmother, and the author did not get an opportunity to speak with him. The author also quoted from the work of the late senior government servant, Amara Hewamadduma. The error is regretted.