Culpability of states which have subscribed to terrorism

SPECIAL REPORT : The road from Nanthikadal to Geneva : Part 2

December 10, 2013, 6:12 pm 

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry swears in Nisha Desai Biswal as Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs at the U.S. Department of State in Washington, D.C., on November 21, 2013. [State Department photo]

 By Shamindra Ferdinando

Having succeeded Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Robert O’ Blake recently, an American of Indian origin Nisha Desai Biswal declared that the US and its friends across the international community had underscored the need for Sri Lanka to make progress on issues of reconciliation, on issues of accountability and issues of human rights or face the consequences.

Blake was America’s wartime ambassador in Colombo (Sept 2006 –May 2009). He moved to Colombo from New Delhi where he was No. 2 at the diplomatic mission.

Ms Biswal was addressing the media in Washington on Dec. 4.

The first ever Indian-American to hold the post, Ms Biswal didn’t mince her words when she warned the Sri Lankan government that unless real progress was made, particularly on the issues of accountability, the patience of the international community would start to wear thin.

Addressing a distinguished gathering at the Foggy Bottom headquarters of the State Department on Nov. 21, 2013 after the swearing in of Ms Desai as Robert O’Blake’s successor, US Secretary of State John Kerry said, "Think about the message that we’re sending today, which I’m excited about: The story of a woman who left a small town in India at the age six, to come to America and now as become one of the most important leaders in the Department of State."

Instead of vowing in both in and outside parliament that the government wouldn’t bow down to international pressure, those responsible for formulating Sri Lanka’s response to war crimes allegations should closely examine the issue of ACCOUNTABILITY. The government needs to remind those pushing for an international war crimes tribunal that ACCOUNTABILUTY issues couldn’t be examined in isolation. It would a grave mistake on the part of the government to scrutinize the entire range of issues in the run-up to the next session of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in Geneva. For want of cohesive strategy and negligence, the country had been overwhelmed by a relentless international propaganda campaign. Had Sri Lanka failed on the war front, none of those demanding that President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s government addressed ACCOUNTABILITY issues would have bothered to take up the separatist eelam war at international forums. That is the bottom line.

Before discussing the war crimes issue further, it would be pertinent to mention that Sri Lanka wouldn’t have been able to bring the war to a successful conclusion in two years and nine months (Sept 2006-May 2009) without the US helping the SLN to locate four LTTE floating arsenals on the high seas. The US offered tangible help following the then Navy Chief Vice Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda briefing Blake regarding the need for urgent action against the LTTE. The LTTE never recovered from the loss of four ships loaded with arms, ammunition and equipment in September and Oct 2007.

Shocking failure to exploit Dhanapala’s advice

One of the most prominent international diplomats produced by Sri Lanka, Dr. Jayantha Dhanapala discussed the issue of ACCOUNTABILITY when he appeared before the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission on Aug. 25, 2010. The correspondent was fortunate to be present at the Lakshman Kadirgamar Institute of International Relations and Strategic Studies where Dhanapala made his presentation (Intl. laws shouldn’t apply to conflicts between States and terrorist groups with strap line …calls for a review of Rules of War-The Island August 26, 2010). Although it was perhaps the most important submission made before the LLRC, the government didn’t make use of Dhanapala’s effort. Western and the civil society organizations couldn’t have ignored the statement attributed to Dhanapala on the issue of the controversial Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept. Let me reproduce verbatim what one-time head of the SCOPP (Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process) Dhanapala told the LLRC headed by former Attorney General C.R. de Silva. Having recollected the circumstances under which the United Nations General Assembly adopted the R2P concept at its 60th summit in September 2005, Dhanapala emphasized the pivotal importance to expand that concept with regard to the issue of ACCOUNTABILITY. The former UN under Secretary General said: "Now I think it is important for us to expand that concept to bring in the culpability of those members of the international community who have subscribed to the situation that has caused injury to the civilians of a nation. I talk about the way terrorist groups are given sanctuary; are harbored, ; are supplied with arms and training by some countries with regard to neighbors or with regard to other countries. We know that in our case, this has happened, and I don’t want to name countries, but even countries who have allowed their financial procedures and systems to be abused in such a way that money can flow from their countries in order to buy arms and ammunition that caused the deaths, maiming and the destruction of property in Sri Lanka are to blame and there is therefore a responsibility to our civilians and the civilians of other nation states from that kind of behavior on the part of members of the international community …" Dhanapala went to the extent of calling for a new set of rules as the IHL didn’t address a situation a conventional army had to battle terrorists (Dhanapala calls for a new set of rules with strap line The rules of war as they exist do not meet today’s requirements-The Island September 6, 2010).

Unprecedented case of Charles Taylor

The government needs to revisit Dhanapala’s submissions especially in the backdrop of former Liberian President Charles Taylor being sentenced to serve a 50-year jail term for sponsoring terrorism in neighboring Sierra Leone, a long standing member of the Commonwealth. The 65-year-old Taylor was sentenced by the UN backed Special Court for Sierra Leone. The verdict was upheld in The Hague. He was sentenced on 11 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The court declared that Taylor in his capacity as President of Liberia from 1997 to 2003, provided arms and ammunition to terrorists in neighboring Sierra Leone. During proceedings, much to the embarrassment of the US, Taylor revealed his close relationship with US security authorities and his extraordinary escape from the maximum security Plymouth Country Correctional Facility in Massachusetts in November 1985 with the help of US agents. The revelation was made in July 2009. The escape took place several days before an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the then Liberian government was made with the support of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Taylor told the tribunal.

Dixit on Indian intervention in Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka could never have finished off the LTTE during eelam war IV (Sept 2006 to May 2009) without India’s blessings. Although India made a desperate attempt to arrange a ceasefire as the Sri Lankan Army (SLA was closing in on the LTTE formation’ on the Vanni east front, the government couldn’t have brought the ground offensive to that stage if India intervened much earlier. But Sri Lanka would never have been plagued by terrorism if not for Indian intervention. Shoojit Sircar’s ‘Madras Café’ discussed the Indian intervention here leading to the assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi at Sriperumbudur near Chennai by an LTTE suicide woman cadre on May 21, 1991.

Former Indian High Commissioner in Colombo J.N. Dixit who retired with the rank of Foreign Secretary, faulted former Premier Indira Gandhi for intervening in Sri Lanka. Dixit in his memoirs titled ‘Makers of India’s Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha’, asserted that Indian intervention here was one of two foreign policy blunders made by Premier Indira Gandhi.

Dixit said, "The two foreign policy decisions on which she could be faulted are: "her ambiguous response to the Russian intrusion into Afghanistan and her giving active support to Sri Lankan Tamil militants. Whatever the criticisms of these decisions, it cannot be denied that she took them on the basis of her assessments about India’s national interests. Her logic was that she couldn’t openly alienate the former Soviet Union when India was so dependent on that country for defence supplies and technologies. Similarly, she could not afford the emergence of Tamil separatism in India by refusing to support the aspirations of Sri Lankan Tamils. These aspirations were legitimate in the context of nearly fifty years of Sinhalese discrimination against Sri Lankan Tamils. In both cases, her decisions were relevant at the point of time they were taken. History will judge her as a political leader who safeguarded Indian national interests with determination and farsightedness."

With the next Geneva session scheduled for March 2014, it would be necessary for decisions makers here to peruse Dixit’s memoirs. Perhaps make one available to the new Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia, Ms Biswal to help her understand the crisis caused by the then Indian political leadership. She should be able to comprehend the catastrophe caused by India, the country of her birth.

Perhaps Sri Lanka’s policy makers never really understood India’s decision to intervene here. Sri Lanka will have to pay an extremely heavy price for the failure of those in authority to have a cohesive defence in the face of mounting international pressure. India sponsored over a half a dozen terrorist groups targeting the then President JRJ’s government in accordance with its security policy. The Indian operation was meant to thwart the US project involving Pakistan and Israel. Unfortunately, successive governments had failed to examine the logic in India fomenting terrorism here, and hence failed to counter anti-Sri Lanka propaganda. Those wanting to haul Sri Lanka up before an international war crimes tribunal unless President Rajapaksa addressed human rights, ACCOUNTABILITY and reconciliation issues had conveniently forgotten the Indian role. India, due to domestic political compulsions, threw its weight behind a US sponsored resolution against Sri Lanka in Geneva. Recent electoral losses suffered by the incumbent Congress administration at the hands of the BJP will compel it to appease Tamil Nadu further.

Dixit explained lucidly New Delhi’s decision to destabilize Sri Lanka. The outspoken diplomat said that India had no option but to take measures due to Sri Lanka’s evolving security connections with the US, Pakistan and Israel. Dixit stressed that India’s motivations as well as actions Vis-a-Vis Sri Lanka should be analysed in the context of the regional as well as global political, security and economic environment during the 1980-1984 period. Dixit went on to allege that the US and Pakistan exploited the rise of Tamil militancy to create what he called a politico-strategic pressure point against India in the island nation.

Need for a Truth Commission

Sri Lanka is now under pressure to accept a South African proposal to establish a Truth Commission to inquire into the conflict. Those backing the SA move are of the opinion that an agreement on the establishment of a truth Commission can subdue the push for an international war crimes tribunal. Perhaps a Truth Commission or whatever one calls such a mechanism, can help Sri Lanka to prove the culpability of those who had sponsored terrorism here. In case Sri Lanka and South Africa can reach agreement on the proposed Truth Commission, it should be given a mandate to fully investigate the national issue leading to eelam war IV. Such a commission can help prove that Sri Lanka would never have had to transform its ceremonial army to a lethal fighting force if not for the LTTE wiping out a routine army patrol made of troops of the first battalion of the Sri Lanka Light Infantry (1 SLLI) in Jaffna in July 1983.With Dixit publicly admitting Premier Gandhi had authorized ‘active support to Sri Lankan Tamil militants’those interested in establishing ACCOUNTABILITY should seek to establish the circumstances leading to the unprecedented coordinated attack on the 1 SLLI. The LTTE operation was meant to provoke the poorly trained army as well as the Sinhalese. India and LTTE succeeded in their attempt. The rest is history.

Act now or face the consequences

SPECIAL REPORT : The road from Nanthikadal to Geneva : Part 1

December 3, 2013, 5:07 pm 

With the next session of the Geneva-based United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) session three months away, The Island intends to discuss what Sri Lanka’s response to unsubstantiated war crimes allegations should be as well as the government’s failure to exploit the ‘ground situation’ for want of a cohesive strategy.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

The Sri Lankan government reacted angrily to British Prime Minister David Cameron’s ultimatum that the failure on its part to initiate what he called a credible investigation into alleged war crimes committed by the Army during the final phase of the offensive on the Vanni east front would prompt him to move the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), against Sri Lanka in March next year.

The British Conservative leader issued the challenge on Nov. 16 after having met President Mahinda Rajapaksa on the sidelines of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Colombo. Cameron was keeping his much publicised promise given to the UK based Tamil Diaspora groups; namely the Global Tamil Forum (GTF), British Tamil Forum (BTF) and Tamils against Genocide, at a meeting on Nov. 7.

Cameron didn’t mince his words when he told a packed media conference at the BMICH (Bandaranaike Memorial International Conference Hall) that Sri Lanka, in spite of being at the helm of the Commonwealth for the next two years would have to face the consequences if the government ignored the British ultimatum.

Cameron deprived local journalists of an opportunity to pose questions to him. Instead, he invited British, Australian and one Indian journalist to direct questions at him. A representative of a local private television station too, was allowed to direct a ‘full toss’ at him.

UK bashing won’t help GoSL

As anticipated, the state-run media lambasted Cameron, recalling atrocities committed by British forces over a period of time in various parts of the world, including Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland. The local media also harped on the UK’s failure to release the long awaited Sir John Chilcot report on the March 2003 invasion of Iraq. But such a campaign will not prompt the British to change its strategy. Such a project will be nothing but an excise in futility. The government needs a reappraisal of its strategy.

In the backdrop of the British ultimatum, it would be pertinent to reexamine the entire gamut of issues relating to the war crimes charge with the focus on ACCOUNTABILITY and the RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (R2P) concept.

The government would have to rethink its strategy within the next few months. Those responsible for formulating the government’s response should keep in mind that repeating the success of the post- war recovery process and the status of national reconciliation in accordance with the recommendations made by the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) wouldn’t blunt a high profile Geneva offensive. Although it would be of pivotal importance to repeat Sri Lanka’s unprecedented post-war achievements, the government couldn’t afford not to develop a fresh strategy. The decision makers would have to take a new look at the contentious issues of ACCOUNTABILITY as well R2P. Nothing could be as important as reexamining all information available to the government before formulating Sri Lanka’s response. The failure on the part of the government to counter those wanting to haul Sri Lanka up before an international war crimes tribunal could cause a debilitating setback on the diplomatic front.

‘Support change’ in Sri Lanka

Before discussing the options available to the government, it would be important to realise that the British had been far more hostile towards Sri Lanka than the US though the latter moved a resolution targeting Sri Lanka at the last Geneva sessions. Although a reluctant India too, had to throw its weight behind the US-led resolution, the British fired the first salvo targeting Sri Lanka at the Geneva session. The British statement went to the extent of calling for a regime change in Sri Lanka. On behalf of the Conservatives-led UK coalition, the Foreign Office Minister responsible for the human rights portfolio, Jeremy Browne, called for UN intervention in Sri Lanka to ‘SUPPORT CHANGE’ in Sri Lanka. Browne said: "We, as UN member states, must take our human rights obligations seriously, and where states fail, the institutions of the UN should act and support change. Such actions are what makes the council an effective human rights body, able to scrutinise states’ compliance with their obligations and offer technical assistance," ( UK for IN intervention to ‘support change" in SL with strap line UNHRC chief pushes for new mechanism to tackle uncooperative governments-The Island of Feb 28, 2012).

With parliamentary elections scheduled for the early part of next year, India will have no option but to support the joint UK-US-EU initiative in Geneva next March. That is the bottom line. They will go on the offensive whatever the measures taken by the government to appease the five- party Tamil National Alliance (TNA), now in control of the Northern Provincial Council (NPC). The government mustn’t forget that for those pushing for war crimes inquiry there are certain ‘push factors’ though they pretended their exercise is meant to address the grievances of the Tamil speaking people living in Sri Lanka.

The accountability issue here is nothing but an excuse for them to pursue their own agendas. The Conservative Premier Cameron’s motive for playing politics with the issue cannot be different from that of former UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband, who is on record as having told a London based US embassy official how he spent a two thirds of his time on Sri Lanka to appease the Tamil electorate. Similarly, India too is influenced by the Tamil Nadu factor, hence Sri Lanka can expect major political parties to take an extremely hostile approach in the run-up to Geneva.

US plan goes awry

The US seems bent on teaching Sri Lanka a lesson for ignoring US pressure to stop the Vanni offensive. The US, India as well as the UK and France demanded a ceasefire on the Vanni east front during a crucial stage of the offensive. President Rajapaksa insisted he wouldn’t accept anything but an unconditional surrender. The US probably felt humiliated and thus wanted to bring the Sri Lankan leadership to its knees.

The US strategy suffered a major setback due to the man who led the victorious army General Sarath Fonseka breaking ranks with the Rajapaksas to challenge President Mahinda Rajapaksa at the January , 2010 presidential election. The Sinha Regiment veteran had inadvertently jeopardised the US game plan.

Fonseka’s move should be examined in the backdrop of former US ambassador in Colombo Patricia Butenis categorising President Rajapaksa, Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, Gen. Fonseka as well as Economic Affairs Minister Basil Rajapaksa as war criminals (US diplomatic cable originating from Colombo on January 15, 2010). Butenis alleged that President Rajapaksa and General Fonseka were largely responsible for war crimes. Subsequently, the US sided with General Fonseka and went to the extent of calling him a political prisoner. The US invited General Fonseka for diplomatic functions, where he was seen with former President Chandrika Kumaratunga, who criticised the conduct of the army during the final assault on the LTTE.

Can the US drop General Fonseka from the original list of alleged war criminals? Did the TNA’s shocking decision to back General Fonseka, when they accused of causing irreparable harm to the Tamil community, at the presidential election too, influenced the US decision? (TNA backs Fonseka, The Island January 7, 2010). Ambassador Butenis called General Fonseka a war criminal just a week after the TNA declared its support to the tough talking soldier. The TNA joined the UNP led campaign to propel General Fonseka to the presidency. Interestingly, the TNA made its announcement in parliament. The UNP had absolutely no qualms about backing the war veteran whom it accused of ordering the killing of The Sunday Leader editor Lasantha Wickrematunga in January 2008. Senior UNPer Joseph Michael Perera alleged in Parliament that a special unit controlled by General Fonseka was responsible for attacks on journalists.

The US, TNA as well as UNP owed an explanation to Sri Lankans and the UNHRC as regards their mind-boggling change of position. Various Tamil Diaspora groups too, should explain their position as regards the war crimes probe.

Shocking US statement

For want of an effective approach and the lethargic attitude of a section of officialdom, the government pathetically failed to take advantage of some critically important developments. Nothing can be as shocking as Sri Lanka’s failure to exploit an astounding statement made by war-time US Defence Advisor in Colombo Lt. Col. Lawrence Smith a little over two years after the killing of LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran on the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon (Now, US suspects credibility of LTTE surrender offer-The Island, June 3, 2011).

Those responsible for countering unsubstantiated war crimes allegations totally ignored the controversial statement attributed to the US official.

Addressing a Defence Symposium in Colombo on June 1, 2011, Lt. Col. Smith questioned the very basis of the allegation that the Army had executed a group of surrendering LTTE personnel and their families on the Vanni east front. Much to the surprise of those present at the symposium, the US official stressed the need to examine the credibility of the alleged attempts made by Kumaran Pathmanathan aka ‘KP’ as well as Nadesen (in charge of LTTE ‘Police’) to facilitate a surrender of LTTE leaders. He declared that the surrender offers he was aware of seemed to have come from those who had nothing to do with the command of the LTTE fighting cadre on the ground.

Interestingly, Lt. Col. Smith was responding to a query posed by retired Indian Major General Ashok Kumar Metha to the then General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the celebrated 58 Division, Maj. Gen. Shavendra Silva. Metha’s query was meant to harass the army top brass and he probably wouldn’t have raised the query if he had known that Lt. Col. Smith was going to make a statement detrimental to a high profile anti-Sri Lanka project.

Lt. Col. Smith, who had been in Colombo since June 2008, declared that the likes of ‘KP’ and Nadesen had no real authority over the LTTE, in spite of being the group’s mouthpieces.

US State Department spokesperson Mark Toner swiftly dismissed the statement attributed to Lt. Col. Smith on the basis that it was his personal opinion. Toner couldn’t have said anything contrary, especially in the wake of his predecessor P.J. Crowley being forced to quit for being critical of the treatment of Wiki Leaks suspect, Badley E. Manning.

Could the UN ignore the statement made by Lt. Col. Smith? It wouldn’t be fair to dismiss his statement on the basis that he was at the symposium as an observer. What matters is the US official questioned the very basis of the allegations directed at Sri Lanka, therefore the government should take up the issue with those pushing for a war crimes probe.

The haste and the circumstances under which the US State Department rejected a US embassy official assessment was nothing but shocking in the backdrop of its readiness to take unsubstantiated allegations made by nameless persons.

Why would the US dismiss such valuable opinion if the Obama administration is keen to establish the truth?

To be continued on Dec 11

Madras Café, Tamil Diaspora and TN factor

War on terror revisited : Part 168

October 1, 2013, 6:38 pm 

by Shamindra Ferdinando

Shoojit Sircar’s controversial movie, Madras Café dealt with real-life events in the ‘80s and early 90s that changed the history of Sri Lanka and India.

The movie, focused on the period after the North-East Provincial Council (NEPC) polls held on Nov. 19, 1988, in accordance with the Indo-Lanka Accord of July 29, 1987. The Indian army helped the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) secure the NEPC with an overwhelming majority in the wake of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) declining to contest the polls. Although the TULF felt it could secure the NEPC, it feared to earn the wrath of the LTTE. The then TULF leader A Amirthalingam refused to join the fray at the behest of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

The assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by the LTTE, one of the groups sponsored by India’s premier intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), is its central theme. Madras Café speculated on the possibility of the LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran ordering the assassination at the behest of a foreign power and the alleged involvement of Indian officialdom in the atrocity to thwart him from returning to power at the parliamentary polls. Madras Café also discussed an Indian plot to influence a senior LTTE cadre to assassinate Prabhakaran.

Major Vikram Singh, played by Bollywood heart throb John Abraham, sent on a special mission to Jaffna peninsula occupied by the Indian army (July 29, 1987-March 1990) uncovered a plot to assassinate Gandhi. In spite of having advanced intelligence, Indian security services failed to protect Gandhi, much to the dismay of those who uncovered the plot.

The LTTE feared the consequence of the possible return of Gandhi as India’s Prime Minister at a time it was fighting the then President Ranasinghe Premadasa’s government. The LTTE resumed hostilities on June 10, 1990 after having 14 months of talks (May 1989-June 1990) with the government. Did a foreign power exploit the LTTE fear of Gandhi’s return to office to its advantage?

An LTTE operative, Thenmozhi Rajaratnam alias Dhanu blew up Gandhi at Sriperumbudur near Chennai on the night of May 21, 1991, the day after the first round of polling took place. The assassination compelled the Election Commission to put off the second and third rounds of polling to June 12 and June 15, respectively. The assassinated Gandhi’s Congress did well in the second and third rounds to secure the election. The victory paved the way for a minority government under veteran politician P.V. Narasimha Rao in the wake of the dissolution of Lok Sabha 16 months after the previous parliamentary polls in Nov 1989.

In spite of Sircar declaring that the movie dubbed an espionage thriller was a work of fiction, it has a resemblance to actual events in Sri Lanka and India. UK-based Tamil groups, spearheaded by the Tamil Youth Organization (TYO) opposed its screening in the UK. Violent protests and threats prompted three major cinema companies owned by Cineworld, Odeon and Vue to cancel screening of the movie scheduled to begin on Aug. 28.

Madras Café dealt a severe blow to those who had been still trying to promote LTTE ideals, in spite of the group losing its conventional military capability in May 2009. Interestingly, Madras Café was never filmed in Sri Lanka, though the production team could have taken the opportunity. Filmed in Kerala and Tamil Nadu as well as some scenes in the UK, Malaysia and Thailand, Madras Café was released in Sri Lanka too. In the Jaffna peninsula, the movie was shown on giant screens at public places in the run-up to the first Northern Provincial Council polls on Sept. 21, 2013.

The worldwide release of Madras Café couldn’t have come at a better time for Sri Lanka facing criticism by a section of the international community for alleged battlefield atrocities during the last phase of the conflict. Madras Café forced the Tamil Diaspora, which thrived on unsubstantiated Channel 4 documentary series, Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields, on to the back foot, amidst ongoing efforts to sanitize the LTTE.

Tamil Nadu factor

Prabhakaran reacted furiously to the EPRLF’s installation as the NEPC administration. Prabhakaran adopted a two-tracked policy to undermine the EPRLF administration. The LTTE chief worked closely with the then Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi as he was having direct talks with President Premadasa. Prabhakaran’s strategy was meant to isolate the EPRLF, through political and military means. President Premadasa turned a blind eye to LTTE operations directed at the EPRLF. The UNP leader went to the extent of providing both financial and material support to the LTTE. Both President Premadasa and Prabhakaran agreed that the EPRLF should be neutralized through military means. However, at that time, unknown to President Premadasa, Prabhakaran, through his trusted spokesman, Anton Balasingham conducted a dialogue with Karunanidhi. The UK-based Balasingham and his Australian-born, Adele visited Tamil Nadu on several occasions to meet Karunanidhi on behalf of Prabhakaran during the time the LTTE had direct negotiations with President Premadasa.

Justice M.C. Jain, who investigated the circumstances as well as the conspiracy leading to the assassination of Gandhi, revealed the complicity of Karunanidhi’s DMK. Jain also blamed former prime ministers, V.P. Singh and Chandra Shekhar for their failure to take tangible action to thwart the attempt on Gandhi’s life. Jain also targeted the then Finance Minister P. Chidambaram for ‘supping with the devil in the cause of political expediency.’ S. Guhan, one-time advisor to Karunanidhi told the Jain Commission of three clandestine meetings the then Chief Minister had with the Balasinghams between December 1989 to February 1990, at the Port Trust Guest House, Madras. Guhan, who had been present on all three occasions, revealed Karunanidhi explored the possibility of having the LTTE in a reconstituted NEPC. The LTTE rejected the move. Balasingham insisted that the LTTE wanted the NEPC dissolved and fresh elections held, under the auspices of the Sri Lankan government.

The Jain Commission revealed that in spite of the Indian army being engaged in counter terrorist operations in Sri Lanka, Tamil Nadu remained the main supply base for the LTTE throughout this period. The LTTE-TN alliance continued after the LTTE declared war on President Premadasa on June 10, 1990, after 14 months of direct negotiations. When President Premadasa ordered large scale military operations, the LTTE swiftly made overtures to Gandhi in a bid to bring Indian pressure on Sri Lanka. Gandhi too made the mistake of meeting senior LTTE representatives several weeks before his assassination to discuss the LTTE’s appeal (Indian Involvement in Sri Lanka and the Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987: A retrospective evaluation by one-time Indian Foreign Secretary J.N. Dixit-an International Alert publication released in February 1998).

Unfortunately, Madras Café hadn’t delved into the domestic political conspiracy, hence missing an important aspect. In fact, successive Sri Lankan governments failed to examine the assassination of Gandhi. Had Sri Lanka opted for a comprehensive investigation, it could have exposed the LTTE and those in Tamil Nadu still propagating separatist sentiments in Sri Lanka.

It would be pertinent to mention that the then Elections Commissioner, Chandrananda de Silva, at the behest of President Premadasa recognized the LTTE’s political wing PFLT (People’s Front of Liberation Tigers ) as a political party in early December 1989-six months before the outbreak of eelam war II. Having secured political recognition, the LTTE pushed Premadasa to dissolve the NEPC to pave the way for fresh elections. The LTTE also demanded that the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution be repealed to facilitate the negotiating process. The introduction of the Sixth Amendment to the 1978 Constitution in the wake of the killing of 13 soldiers in Jaffna was meant to protect the unitary character of the country. In spite of the LTTE relentlessly pushing President Premadasa, the UNP leader declined to go ahead with constitutional change or dissolve the NEPC, much to the dissatisfaction of the LTTE.

EPRLF’s 19-point plan

Had Gandhi prevailed at the November 1989 parliamentary polls, he may have ignored President Premadasa’s unilateral declaration that the Indian army quit Sri Lanka. President Premadasa made his unexpected announcement on the morning of April 13, 1989 at a temple in the suburbs of Colombo. Gandhi simply ignored Premadasa’s demand that the Indian army withdraw by July 29, 1989. However, the newly elected National Front Government brought about a major change in India’s policy towards not only Sri Lanka, but other neighbours as well.

As relations between President Premadasa and the EPRLF rapidly deteriorated with the security forces increasingly cooperating with the LTTE, NEPC Chief Minister Varatharaja sought India’s intervention. But India remained aloof with the then V.P. Singh administration declining to intervene in President Premadasa’s strategy. Much to the dismay of Perumal, Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Karunanidhi bluntly told him to dissolve the NEPC to make way for the LTTE. Under pressure from all quarters, Perumal offered to share power with the LTTE and to hand over the chief ministership to the LTTE.

The EPRLF as well as its patrons in New Delhi failed to realize that the LTTE never wanted to share power with the EPRLF or any other political party or group. The TULF was not an exception. Having failed to secure Karunanidhi’s support to work out an agreement with the LTTE, the EPRLF unveiled a 19-point Charter signed by K. Pathmanabha, Secretary General of the party to settle all outstanding issues, including devolution of power, colonization and law and order. Having formulated the plan, the EPRLF presented it to Karunanidhi seeking his intervention to pave the way for talks with the LTTE. But Karunanidhi rejected the EPRLF plan on the basis it didn’t recognize the LTTE as the sole representative of Tamil speaking people.

In the wake of its failure to win support for the plan, the EPRLF on March 1, 1990 converted the NEPC into a Constituent State Assembly for the purpose of drafting a Constitution for what Perumal called the Eelam Democratic Republic. Perumal declared that independence would be declared on March 1, 1991 in case President Premadasa failed to implement the 19-point Charter.

On June 19, 1990-nine days after the eruption of eelam war II, an LTTE hit squad massacred 13 EPRLF personnel, including Secretary General Pathmanabha, Jaffna District parliamentarian G. Yogasangary and provincial Finance Minister P. Kirupakaran at a flat in Kodambakkam, Madras. Perumal escaped as he was away from Madras at the time of the LTTE raid. Some alleged that a senior member of the EPRLF alerted the LTTE as to the presence of Pathmanabha at Kodambakkam. The LTTE went ahead with the operation in spite of EPRLF seniors living there under the protection of the government of India. Still India failed to take punitive measures against those politicians and law enforcement officers in Tamil Nadu collaborating with the LTTE. India obviously felt that any move on its part to dismantle the LTTE in Tamil Nadu could cause a major rift with the Tamil Nadu administration. India paid a heavy price for its failure to neutralize the LTTE on its soil.

The LTTE operated with impunity in Tamil Nadu, with the state administration turning a blind eye to what was going on. The LTTE had the resources in Tamil Nadu to take on major operations.

On March 21, the following year, the LTTE blew up Gandhi immediately after the conclusion of the first phase of parliamentary polls.

Madras Café examined the circumstances under which Prabhakaran dispatched a hit squad to assassinate Gandhi whose re-election the LTTE chief feared could cause serious impediments to his plans. The LTTE justified the Gandhi assassination on the basis of various atrocities committed by the Indian army during its deployment in Sri Lanka. The LTTE alleged that Gandhi was assassinated to avenge the rape of Tamil women by the Indian army.

First NE polls:Indian army engineers EPRLF victory

WAR ON TERROR REVISITED : Part 167

September 22, 2013, 8:31 pm 

Good times in Jaffna before the LTTE declared war on the IPKP in early Oct 1987: (From L-R): Vaithilingam Sornalingam alias Shankar spearheaded the project to establish the ‘Air Tigers’ (subsequently promoted to the rank of ‘Colonel’ by Prabhakaran, he was killed by the SLA at an early stage of eelam war IV), Thillaiyampalam Sivanesan alias ‘Colonel’ Soosai commanded the ‘Sea Tigers’. He was killed during the final phase of eelam war IV), Velupillai Prabhakaran and ‘Colonel’ Swarnam, veteran fighter (killed during the final phase of the conflict) and an unidentified senior IPKF officer. The SLA identified the person standing behind the IPKF officer as Gadafi, one-time bodyguard of Prabhakaran (this picture was among hundreds of pictures found by the army during the Vanni battles).

By Shamindra Ferdinando

In the wake of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) securing the Northern Provincial Council (NPC) at Saturday’s first ever Northern PC polls, it would be pertinent to examine the circumstances under which the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) took control of the North-East Provincial Council (NEPC) at an election conducted by the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF).

Since the liberation of the Eastern Province in mid 2007, the Eastern Provincial Council (EPC) was elected twice (2008 and 2012), though the NPC poll was delayed until the government achieved substantial progress in the post-war recovery project.

The military brought the war to an end on the morning of May 19, 2009, when troops shot dead LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran on the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon.

In June 1987, the then Indian government forced Sri Lanka to call off the largest ever combined security forces offensive codenamed ‘Operation Liberation’ aimed at regaining Jaffna to pave the way for the Indo-Lanka Accord (ILA) on July 29, 1987. The offensive was launched after the collapse of the Thimpu initiative in August 1985. The Indian bid failed primarily due to the LTTE’s inflexible attitude, leaving President JRJ with no other option than an all out offensive directed against the LTTE.

The ILA was meant to confine the Sri Lankan military to barracks and devolve powers to the provinces after having merged the Eastern Province with the Northern Province as one administrative unit. There was also provision for a referendum to be held by December 31, 1988 in the Eastern Province comprising Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara districts to decide whether the merger should be permanent. But the then Sri Lankan President JRJ had the power in accordance with the ILA to postpone the referendum at his discretion.

In spite of strong objections by the then main Opposition, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) led by former Prime Minister, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, President JRJ on November 14, 1987 ensured the passage of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution as well as the Provincial Councils Act No 42 to create the PCs. The President’s move caused instability, with the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) stepping up second uprising. A section of the UNP too, opposed President JRJ though he issued proclamations on September 2 and 8, 1988 enabling the Northern and Eastern provinces to be one administrative unit administered by one elected council.

President JRJ insisted that the merger was meant to be a temporary measure and those living in the Eastern Province had the power to exercise their franchise at a referendum on or before Dec 31, 1988 to decide whether it should be a permanent merger.

India felt that the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) would be comfortably able to secure the NEPC at the forthcoming elections. The Indian move went awry due to unforeseen circumstances which changed the political history of Sri Lanka and India. Successive governments refrained from calling for a referendum in the Eastern Province until the JVP, the then political ally of President Mahinda Rajapaksa moved the Supreme Court against the merger. Having examined three separate petitions filed by the JVP seeking a separate Provincial Council for the Eastern Province, the Supreme Court on October 16, 2006 ruled that the proclamations issued by President Jayewardene were null and void and had no legal effect. The NE Province was formally de-merged into the Northern and Eastern provinces on January 1, 2007.

Interestingly, even before President JRJ issued proclamations merging the Eastern Province with the Northern Province, the government conducted PC polls in other regions during the period of April 28, 1988 and June 9, 1988. Having established PCs in the Southern, Western, North Central, Sabaragamuwa, Uva, North Western and Central Provinces, President JRJ set the stage for the first election for the temporarily merged NEPC.

Unexpected development

India wanted the TULF to contest the NEPC polls. In fact, India guaranteed the TULF of a polls victory. Contrary to President JRJ’s opinion, India insisted that Sri Lankan security forces and the police couldn’t get involved in security in the province in accordance with the ILA. Automatically, the IPKF took charge of the operation. The Colombo based diplomatic community and civil society turned a blind eye to what was going on the NE Province. The TULF decided against contesting the polls as it didn’t want to earn the wrath of the LTTE. In spite of being expelled from the Jaffna peninsula by the IPKF, the LTTE remained strong in the Vanni. The LTTE also conducted hit and run attacks on the IPKF and its allies in the Jaffna peninsula as well as in the Eastern Province. The TULF opposed elections at any level before the IPKF and the LTTE suspended hostilities. The TULF also strongly opposed India’s decision to arm groups opposed to the LTTE on the pretext of forming a Citizens Volunteer Force (CVF). In fact, the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), too, strongly opposed the formation of another armed group, as it threatened the interests of the community, particularly in the Eastern Province. But India was adamant.

Another contentious issue was having separate elections in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, though the elected members would form a single administrative unit. The TULF urged India to take tangible measures to restore normalcy before going ahead with the polls, though members expressed their reluctance to contest due to LTTE threats. The LTTE warned the TULF to boycott the polls or face the consequences. The TULF refused to contest, though India assured the leadership of protection. The TULF quite rightly realized that LTTE leader Velupllai Prabhakaran would never allow the NEPC to function as long as India didn’t come to an understanding with him. Irate Indian officials threatened the TULF with punitive action unless it went along with their strategy. Still the TULF refused.

A bloody war erupted in the wake of the IPKF launching a massive operation on the night of October 10/11, 1987 in response to a spate of LTTE attacks on its troops. Although India subsequently made attempts to reconcile with the LTTE, Prabhakaran refused to collaborate, hence upsetting the entire Indian strategy.

India turns to EPRLF

India had no option but to turn towards EPRLF leader, K. Pathmanaba, who swiftly accepted the opportunity to contest the NEPC with the backing of the IPKF. The EPRLF leadership realized that the political project couldn’t go wrong due to the direct involvement of the IPKF, which worked closely with the group. The Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), the Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS) and the People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) declined to contest. The IPKF threw its weight behind the EPRLF, which promised the electorate peace, democracy and unity. In spite of the EPRLF being an armed group, the then Elections Commissioner Chandrananda de Silva recognized it as a political party at the behest of the government. The LTTE vowed to annihilate the EPRLF, regardless of IPKF security at its disposal.

At the behest of India, Madras based TULF leader A. Amirthalingam issued a statement urging the Tamil speaking people to exercise their franchise to consolidate gains made by the community through the ILA. The failure on the part of India to convince the TULF to participate in the electoral process made the first NEPC polls a futile exercise. The election was eventually held on November 19, 1988 under the supervision of the IPKF. Although the LTTE launched a series of attacks in the Eastern Province, it couldn’t sabotage the election process.

The JVP too, warned those exercising their franchise with death. The JVP directed its threats particularly at the Sinhalese living in Trincomalee and Ampara districts. However, unlike the LTTE, the JVP didn’t have the wherewithal to carry out its threats.

India exploited the ground situation as well as the provision that separate elections would be held in the Northern and the Eastern Provinces to facilitate a comfortable victory for the EPRLF. President JRJ watched helplessly while the then Indian High Commissioner in Colombo, J. N. Dixit arranged a no contest pact in the Northern Province to the benefit of Padmanaba’s group. In the Eastern Province, too, the IPKF worked overtime to ensure the EPRLF’s victory. The EPRLF secured 41 out of 71 seats in the NEPC. On October 10, 1988, India installed Varatharaja Perumal as the Chief Minister of the NEPC.

Lt. Gen. Kalkat speaks out

Addressing the media in Trincomalee on November 19, the IPKF chief, Lt. General A.S. Kalkat alleged that the LTTE planned to cause a bloodbath in the temporarily merged province. The Reuters quoted Lt. Gen. Kalkat as having said: "But many voters defied a boycott call by Tamil terrorists and Sinhala extremists and went to the polls. The LTTE had vowed not to let the democratic process go through. They had promised a bloodbath."

Due to LTTE threats directed at the polling staff, India had to request President JRJ to send public servants from Colombo to man polling booths in the Eastern Province. The Sri Lankan Air Force (SLAF) and the Indian Air Force (IAF) airlifted hundreds of polling staff from the Ratmalana air base to China Bay. Polls chief, Chandrananda de Silva said that he had to depend on polls staff from the South due to the reluctance on the part of public servants in the Eastern Province to man polling booths. De Silva estimated that approximately 4,000 polling staff was needed to be deployed in the Eastern Province to man nearly 600 polling booths (Polls staff airlifted –The Island November 18, 1988).

Lt. Gen. Kalkat alleged that the LTTE had ordered the killing of five civilians every night from every village between November 12 and 19 (Poor turnout of Sinhala voters in East with strap line heavy polling reported in certain areas-The Island Nov 20, 1988). Although the LTTE mounted a series of attacks in the Eastern Province, a substantial number of Tamils and Muslims exercised their franchise. However, the vast majority of Sinhalese living in the Eastern Province kept away from voting. The IPKF and the EPRLF brought voters to polling booths under the very noses of the election staff. The EPRLF ordered the electorate to vote for its candidates or face the consequences.

With the setting up of Perumal’s administration, the IPKF intensified its operations targeting the LTTE. Unfortunately, the EPRLF failed to consolidate its base and further expand on it much to the anxiety of the Indian government. In spite of winning the NEPC with the IPKF’s patronage, the EPRLF couldn’t win over the hearts and minds of Tamil speaking people. In hindsight, both India and the EPRLF failed to comprehend the then Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa’s strategy. Perhaps, they felt President JRJ would pave the way for either Gamini Dissanayake or Lalith Athulathmudali to contest the presidential election in December 1988. Had that happened, the EPRLF could have had an opportunity to consolidate its position in the NE province without difficulty. India firmly believed that it could come to an understanding with Dissanayake or Athulathmudali to ensure the implementation of the ILA. The Indian strategy collapsed when Premadasa secured the UNP presidential nomination in early November 1988. Much to the disappointment of India, both the UNP presidential candidate, Ranasinghe Premadasa and his main challenger, Sirimavo Bandaranaike vowed to abrogate the ILA. They declared that the IPKF would be asked to leave immediately after their victory. Amidst bloody violence perpetrated by the LTTE in the NE province and the JVP in the South, Premadasa won the country’s second presidential election held on December 19, 1988. Premadasa secured 50.43 per cent of all votes cast at the election to defeat Sirimavo Bandaranaike, who obtained 44.95 per cent of votes. Those living in areas under LTTE control couldn’t vote for want of polling booths.

In fact, both India and EPRLF knew the trouble they were heading for even before the November 19, 1988 NEPC polls as Premadasa handed in his nomination for the presidential election on November 10, 1988. Soon after securing the nomination, Premadasa told his close associates of his intention to reach an understanding with the JVP as well as the LTTE, much to the discontent among party men. The President felt that he could win over Tamil speaking people and the majority community by getting rid of the IPKF as both the LTTE and the JVP opposed the ILA. The war on terror series had dealt extensively with the consequences of President Premadasa’s ill-fated strategies.

JVP’s bid to cripple Torrington Square media complex thwarted

War on terror revisited : Part 166

August 25, 2013, 8:55 pm



In the background of the SLAF chopper used for VIP flights, President Ranasinghe Premadasa stands with his son, Sajith and daughter, Dulanjali at his Ambanpola estate, during the ceasefire with the LTTE. Babu, tasked with assassinating the President sometimes accompanied him to Ambanpola, also in SLAF choppers. A young SLAF pilot, Roshan Goonetileke stands next to the President (Recently retired from the post of Chief of Defence, with the rank of Air Chief Marshal)





By Shamindra Ferdinando


At the height of the JVP-led second insurrection (July 1987-early 1990) the government placed the elite Special Task Force (STF) in charge of security at the SLBC/Rupavanini /ITN complex at Torrington square. Amidst JVP efforts to sabotage the complex, the STF was given the unenviable task of ensuring uninterrupted services. The then ASP (Operations Colombo) Nimal Lewke recalled STF Commandant Lionel Karunasena instructing him to establish a base at the complex to enhance security (Having served the STF as its Commandant during a crucial period in the war against the LTTE, Lewke retired at the conclusion of the conflict, with the rank of Senior DIG).


According to Lewke, the then Defence Secretary, Gen. Sepala Attygalle had wanted the STF to be in charge of security at the complex. Lewke said: "The then Chief Inspector Upul Seneviratne functioned as the officer-in-charge of the complex. A group of commandos took up position at the complex. We worked closely with other services to thwart JVP plans." (Seneviratne was killed in a claymore mine blast on the morning of July 7, 2006 at Digana as he was on his way to the Katukurunda STF training base. Seneviratne held the rank of SSP at the time of his death).


Due to growing JVP threats directed at employees of the three institutions, the STF went to the extent of accommodating them at the Sri Lanka Foundation Institute (SLFI). However, some employees, including those who had been engaged in news reading quit, compelling the military and the STF to assign news readers and in some instances camera crews for media coverage. Lewke said that an SLAF crew accompanied the government’s chief negotiator, Minister A.C.S. Hameed on a special mission across army frontlines in Palaly for a clandestine confab with the LTTE (previous piece dealt with Minister Hameed’s mission which almost ended up in disaster on June 16, 1990). It was the only such mission undertaken by the government after the outbreak of hostilities on the night of June 10, 1990.


Thevis Guruge warned


As the JVP was known to have infiltrated the armed forces and the police, those in charge of counter-insurgency operations had to take precautions to prevent infiltration of the Torrington complex. Lewke recalled warning the then SLBC Chairman Thevis Guruge of a possible attempt on his life and the presence of a JVP mole within the complex a few days before his assassination on July 23, 1989. The JVP killed the versatile Rupavahini personality Premakeerthi de Alwis (42) on the night of July 31, 1989. Lewke said: "We were seriously concerned about the threat to Guruge as well as several other employees. Subsequent to the killing of Guruge and Alwis, the JVP also killed SLBC News Editor Kulasiri Amaratunga (62), as it stepped up violence in the wake of the government entering into a fresh dialogue with the LTTE in May 1989." Amaratunga was shot in the neck by a gunman at his Mount Lavinia residence in August 1989.


Lewke recollected the severe difficulties caused by the assassination of media personalities. Obviously, the JVP felt that the government could be seriously undermined by crippling the SLBC and the two state-run television stations.


The attempt to sabotage the Torrington complex should be examined in the backdrop of the JVP targeting the Lake House distribution network in the provinces. The JVP ordered people not to buy Lake House publications or face the consequences. The government ordered the military and the police to distribute the Dinamina, Daily News and the Observer, free of charge.


Insurgents released,
terror intensified


Having won the parliamentary polls in early April 1989, President Premadasa caused a devastating setback to counter-insurgency operations by releasing hundreds of insurgents. Although the President’s political colleagues and the military top brass realized the stupidity of the President’s move, none dared dispute him. With the release of suspects, the JVP stepped up its campaign with an all out assault on the government media. Lewke stressed the importance of the work undertaken by the military and the police to ensure that the Torrington complex remained operational. Lewke said: The "collapse of operations there could have had a devastating impact on the overall government counter insurgency strategy. There could have been chaos if the state media failed at that time."


However, government forces could concentrate fully on the JVP threat due to the LTTE returning to the negotiating table (May 1989-June 1990). Although the military brought the JVP to its knees in November/December 1989, it remained involved in the Torrington square media operation.


It would be pertinent to mention that the STF was also responsible for the safety and security of the LTTE delegation during its stay in Colombo. The STF remained in charge of visiting LTTE delegates’ security from May 1989 until June 1990 a small contingent was escorted to the Ratmalana air base, for transfer to Palaly.


The then Leading Aircraftsman (LAC) P.W. Dissanayake, a member of the four-man SLAF crew led by the then Flying Officer Andrew Wijesuriya which accompanied Minister Hameed into enemy-held territory recalled joining the then State Minister for Defence, Ranjan Wijeratne on a special mission in late March 1990. Dissanayake (retired in Dec 2008 with the rank of Warrant Officer) said: "Close on the heels of the last Indian army contingent leaving Sri Lanka on March 24, 1990, State Minister for Defence Ranjan Wijeratne visited major security forces bases in the northern and eastern districts. The minister explained the situation to the officers and men and their new responsibilities in the wake of the Indian pullout. Having visited the camps, the minister returned to Colombo, to brief President Premadasa at Sucharitha."


Dissanayake stressed that Minister Wijeratne never indicated the possibility of resumption of hostilities or any problem with the LTTE. Instead, he underscored the importance of the ongoing ceasefire agreement with the LTTE, though some feared Prabhakaran quitting the negotiating table. The STF was also deeply involved in President Premadasa’s security. Both President Premadasa and his predecessor, JRJ largely depended on the elite force for important projects.


Gamini, Lalith earn
Premadasa’s wrath


President Premadasa felt he could exploit the Indian pullout to his political advantage. The president’s assertion was based on the premise that his understanding with Prabhakaran could be transformed into a permanent peace agreement. Although a section of the UNP as well as the military top brass feared the President’s project could go wrong, none of them wanted to voice their concerns. The LTTE cleverly propagated that India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) was still continuing its destabilization project though the Indian army quit the country. The LTTE identified one-time Mahaweli Minister and JRJ confidant Gamini Dissanayake as the person spearheading the Indian agenda here. On the other hand, one-time National Security Minister Lalith Athulathmudali was branded as a person promoting Israeli interests here. The allegation was made subsequent to the closure of the Israeli Interests Section on April 20, 1990. President Premadasa lambasted Athulathmudali in parliament though he was not identified by name. The state-run media gave wide coverage to President Premadasa’s criticism directed at Athulathmudali who expressed doubts about the UNP leader’s strategy. President Premadasa resented Dissanayake and Athulathmudali for being critical of his handling of the peace process. When Dissanayake and Athulathmudali teamed up later to move an impeachment motion against President Premadasa, an angry President declared in parliament: "…I had the Israeli Interests Section removed. In such a context, there is nothing to be surprised about Mossad rising against me. Please remember that there are among us those who have gone to Israeli universities and lectured there and earned dirty money."


Athulathmudali voiced his concern that the military could find itself in an extremely difficult position in case the LTTE resumed hostilities. Athulathmudali asserted that the vacation of Point Pedro and Valvettitutai during the ceasefire and the failure on the part of the government to redeploy troops in the immediate aftermath of the Indian pullout could cause an unprecedented crisis. Obviously, Athulathmudali’s successor, State Minister for Defence Ranjan Wijeratne too, went along with President Premadasa’s strategy. Minister Wijeratne remained silent about major concession made by President Premadasa, though he realized the LTTE was exploiting the situation.


Baseless theory


Some have speculated that President Premadasa, with the help of a faction led by Gopalswamy Mahendraraja alias Mahattaya plotted to eliminate Prabhakaran in a lightning operation. That couldn’t have been the case in the backdrop of assertions that Mahattaya had been under the influence of the Indian intelligence and Minister Dissanayake too, was plotting against President Premadasa, with the connivance of India. Instead, President Premadasa allowed Prabhakaran to flex his muscles by restricting the military presence in Jaffna as well as the Vanni theatres to very much less than two battalions. A simple examination of the military deployment would reveal that the President and his advisors never planned for any eventuality. Although President Premadasa could have beefed up the military presence in the Northern region, consequent to the eradication of the JVP threat in November/December 1989 and the Indian army pullout in March 1990, he did absolutely nothing. Had there been some sort of understanding with Mahattaya, it would have been shown on the ground. At the time, the LTTE resumed hostilities during the second week of June 1990, the army deployment in the Eastern Province comprised just three infantry battalions and less than two in the entire Northern region.


When fighting erupted, the army didn’t even have adequate transport to move troops from the South to the northern and eastern districts. The then President Premadasa’s security advisor General Cyril Ranatunga revealed in his memoirs, the army using private transport to move troops. Arms and ammunition too, had been in short supply due to the UNP administration neglecting the armed forces’ needs due to the Indo-Lanka Accord and the subsequent honeymoon with the LTTE. Unfortunately, the likes of Ranatunga and the then army commander Lt. General Hamilton Wanasinghe remained passive onlookers as the situation rapidly deteriorated in the northern and eastern provinces.


The Indian pullout was meant to speed up the national reconciliation process with the LTTE promoting PFLT (People’s Front of Liberation Tigers) in the northern and eastern districts. Instead, the LTTE overnight changed its attitude when the last Indian contingent left Trincomalee. Although the state-run media as well as those in the privately owned media worked overtime to portray a rosy picture, the situation continued to deteriorate rapidly with the LTTE imposing restrictions on the military. The LTTE went to the extent of detaining officers who defied its diktat. The LTTE took up the position that all movements between security forces camps in the Jaffna peninsula should be strictly subject to its prior approval. The situation in the Eastern Province was better, though the LTTE repeatedly interfered with the security forces and police, much to the resentment of those deployed there. Until war erupted in June 1990, the President did absolutely nothing to review the situation. Instead, he bent backwards to appease the LTTE. The President remained committed to peace at any cost until the war erupted during the second week of June 1990, with the execution of over 600 policemen.

ICRC push for Jaffna demilitarized zone angers Ranjan W

* War on terror revisited : Part 165

August 22, 2013, 12:00 pm 

By Shamindra Ferdinando

LTTE theoretician Anton Balasingham and Yogiratnam on ground at Nedunkerni in Vanni east in early May 1989 shortly before they boarded Bell 212 captained by Flight Lieutenant Romesh Mendis for journey to Colombo. IN the center is senior police official Eric Perera (person wearing a cap). Adele Balasingham (extreme right)

The then President Ranasinghe Premadasa paved the way for the ICRC presence in Sri Lanka during the second JVP insurgency (July 1987-Nov/Dec 1989). The invitation was extended during his honeymoon with the LTTE (May 1989-June 1990). Soon after the LTTE resumed hostilities on the night of June 10, 1990, the ICRC expanded its operations to cover the entire country with the focus on the northern and eastern districts. The ICRC established offices there and quickly brought in additional foreign personnel to run newly established offices in areas dominated by the LTTE. With the armed forces under siege in most districts, the LTTE had direct access to ICRC offices in the wake of various international agencies expanding their operations here. Having resumed hostilities, the LTTE deprived water to the people of Kallar, Seruwila and Serunuwara by closing the sluice gates of the Werugal tank. The ICRC mission in Trincomalee engaged in negotiations with the LTTE to pave the way for the resumption of water supplies. The government too supported the ICRC bid, as it felt it didn’t have any other option. The LTTE rejected the plea forcing the army to launch an operation to open the sluice gates. An operation involving the Sri Lanka Light Infantry (SLLI), Gemunu Watch and Gajaba Regiment troops dislodged terrorists to pave the way for the resumption of the water supply. The army killed seven terrorists during the operation, while five personnel lost their limbs due to explosions caused by anti-personnel mines.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), called for the immediate declaration of a demilitarized zone in the area covering the Jaffna Fort and the Jaffna hospital during the last week of July 1990. The ICRC made its move amidst the ongoing LTTE efforts to overrun the Jaffna fort manned by the Sixth battalion of the Sinha Regiment (6SR). The ICRC felt that a tripartite agreement involving the government, the LTTE and the ICRC could prevent the battle for the Dutch-built Jaffna fort from jeopardizing the lives of those seeking treatment at the premier medical institution in the peninsula, as well as the staff.

Much to the dismay of those battling the LTTE, the government promptly accepted the ICRC proposal. The then minister John Amaratunga declared the government’s readiness to accept the ICRC proposal provided the LTTE too, agreed to reciprocate. Minister Amaratunga wouldn’t have voiced support for the controversial move without having obtained President Ranasinghe Premadasa’s blessings. The UNP leader still believed he could reach an understanding with the LTTE to pave the way for Prabhakaran’s return to the negotiating table.

The LTTE resumed hostilities on the night of June 10, 1990 after having direct negotiations with the UNP administration for 14 months. The ICRC bid was the first such attempt after President Premadasa’s chief negotiator, Minister A.C.S. Hameed made a desperate attempt to work out a deal with the LTTE about a week after the resumption of hostilities.

Before discussing the ICRC move further, it would be pertinent to examine the circumstances under which Minister Hameed met the then LTTE deputy leader Gopalswamy Mahendraraja alias Mahattaya at a place close to the Nallur temple, on June 16, 1990. Subsequent to the meeting which lasted for almost seven hours, the presidential secretariat announced a fresh ceasefire with effect from 6 p.m. on June 16, 1990. The ceasefire never materialized (Government and LTTE agree on ceasefire-The Island Jun 17, 1990). Instead, major battles erupted in the wake of the failed peace bid with the LTTE stepping up attacks on security forces detachments in the Jaffna and Vanni theatres. The LTTE overran Kokavil during the second week of July 1990. Two weeks later, the army abandoned its base at Kilinochchi. The debacles at Kokavil and Kilinochchi paved the way for an all out assault on the detachment at Mankulam, compelling the army to vacate it during the fourth week of November 1990.

SLAF team accompanies Hameed

The then Leading Aircraftman (LAC) P.W. Dissanayake recollected accompanying Minister Hameed in the guise of an employee of the state-owned Rupavahini Corporation (Dissanayake retired in Dec 2008 with the rank of Warrant Officer). Dissanayake said: "There were altogether four of us, including the then Flying Officer Andrew Wijesuriya, who was in charge of the group (Wijesuriya holds the rank of Air Commodore now). The team included LACs, D.M.K. Dassanayake and S.M.A. Jayatissa. We accompanied the minister on the pretext of being a Rupavahini crew assigned to cover the meeting in the LTTE held area. Having reached the end of the area under military control, four of us got into the back of an LTTE vehicle, while Minister Hameed got into another vehicle also driven by an LTTE cadre. We reached the venue for the meeting, though the LTTE denied us access to the meeting though we were allowed to take some footage before the commencement of the discussion. We had lunch there before returning to Palaly in the evening."

Dissanayake recalled the then LTTE commander in charge of Jaffna, Dominic coming in a Pajero to no man’s land to escort them to the meeting. According to him, they had arrived in Palaly along with Minister Hameed earlier in the day in a beechsuper King. The minister’s mission could have gone awry even before he entered the LTTE held area when troops fired at an LTTE vehicle, possibly the one carrying Dominic. The then Major Crishanthe de Silva of the Engineers Regiment had the unenviable task of driving Minister Hameed to the LTTE line (Major General de Silva was recently appointed Chief of Staff, with the elevation of Major General Daya Ratnayake as the Commander of the army). According to Major General de Silva, troops had opened fire as two LTTE vehicles entered the no fire zone, instead of one as agreed earlier. "In hindsight, the then government had been prepared to take unprecedented risks in a bid to bring the LTTE back to the negotiating table. In spite of the LTTE causing heavy losses to the government at the onset of eelam war II during the second week of June 1990, the government pushed hard for a settlement. Minister Hameed’s mission was such an endeavor. In fact, the LTTE went to the extent of firing indiscriminately at the Palaly airfield as Minister Hameed was walking towards the beechsuper King which was parked on the runway. The Minister was rushing back to Ratmalana to brief President Ranasinghe Premadasa of the outcome of his meeting."

Rupavahini under military control

In response to the threat posed by the JVP, the government brought the Rupavahini Corporation under military control. It was part of the overall counter subversive strategy to thwart the JVP from destabilizing a vital state propaganda organ. The then Air Commodore Ananda Samarakoon functioned as the Competent Authority, with the army responsible for the main control room, the navy responsible for the studios and the air force for handling the news room. Those who had been assigned to accompany Minister Hameed were members of the air force contingent attached to Rupavahini. Wijesuriya and the then Flight Lieutenant Ushan Wickremesinghe had functioned as English news readers, whereas there was a separate team of Sinhala news readers. Air Commodore Wijesuriya recollected LACs, Dissanayake, Dasanayake and Jayatissa joining him voluntarily when he wanted only one for the mission. During the visit to the LTTE held area, Wijesuriya had functioned as a producer with Rupavahini. The government had no option but to depend on the military to run Rupavahini as well as the ITN and also to distribute newspapers published by Lake House in the face of the JVP threat. Although the JVP collapsed in November/December 1989 with the execution of its leader Rohana Wijeweera, the military remained in charge of Rupavahini and the ITN, hence Wijesuriya’s team joining Minister Hameed in a dangerous mission.

Wijeratne dismisses ICRC move

The ICRC sought a fresh dialogue between the government and the LTTE to establish a demilitarized zone in Jaffna in the wake of the military planning to launch a major lagoon borne assault to break the siege on the Jaffna Fort. The combined security forces offensive codenamed ‘Thrivida Balaya’ was spearheaded by the then Major General Denzil Kobbekaduwa, the General Officer Commanding (GoC) of the Second Division headquartered in Anuradhapura. Thrivida Balaya was meant to regain Jaffna town. None other than Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, who had been in command of the first battalion of the Gajaba Regiment (IGR) assigned for the assault told the writer that the army couldn’t achieve its objective. The then State Minister for Defence, Ranjan Wijeratne reacted angrily when he heard of the ICRC’s bid to declare a demilitarized zone covering the Jaffna fort and the hospital area. Minister Wijeratne had been overseas at the time the ICRC initiative got underway. Having returned to the country on August 4, 1990, Minister Wijeratne declared that a ceasefire in the northern region was useless and detrimental to national security interests. The media quoted Minister Wijeratne as having said: "Why should we have demilitarized zones and ceasefires when they are brutally massacring innocent people? I am not in a mood for any demilitarized zone or ceasefire". Minister Wijeratne was speaking seven days after Minister Amaratunga welcomed the ICRC initiative. Minister Wijeratne and the military top brass voiced concern over the ICRC proposal. They asserted that the proposed demilitarized zone would effectively thwart the launch of offensive action to regain the Jaffna town, hence it couldn’t be accepted under any circumstances.

War preparations underway

Amidst the debate on the ICRC proposal, the navy carried out a major operation involving landing craft, SLNS Pabbatha and SLNS Kandula to ferry arms, ammunition and equipment needed by troops tasked for ‘Thrivida Balaya’ from Trincomalee to the newly built landing point at Milady. The army worked without a break to construct the new landing point which extended about 150 metres from the land to facilitate the offloading of military equipment, vehicles and other supplies. The launch of the operation had been tentatively planned for the third week of August 1990 with sea and air borne troops securing Kayts before proceeding to cross the Jaffna lagoon, after having overcome LTTE resistance on Mandathivu Island.

Minister Wijeratne opposed the ICRC bid as he felt it could jeopardize the plan to regain Jaffna town. Although the army succeeded in breaking the siege on the fort on the morning of September 13, 1990, it couldn’t achieve its primary objective to liberate Jaffna town. The operation to liberate Jaffna had to be called off in late September 1990 and the fort abandoned much to the dismay of those who pushed hard for a pragmatic strategy to defeat the LTTE.

The LTTE released 15 Tamil speaking policemen who had been in their captivity through the ICRC in support of the latter’s initiative. The ICRC moved the released policemen from Jaffna to Trincomalee to pave the way for favourable media coverage for the LTTE. An angry Wijeratne pointed out that the LTTE had massacred over 600 policemen during the second week of June 1990 therefore the much publicized release of Tamil speaking personnel was nothing but a publicity gimmick.

At the onset of the ICRC initiative, the LTTE stormed two mosques at Kattankudy on August 3, 1990 killing about 150 Muslims. Immediately thereafter, the LTTE massacred about 50 Muslims in and around Akkaraipattu, also in the Eastern Province. The SLMC lambasted the government for failing to provide sufficient security to the community, in spite of repeated appeals since the commencement of hostilities during the second week of June, 1990.

The ICRC, while pushing for a demilitarized zone in Jaffna, remained strangely silent as regards LTTE atrocities in the Eastern Province. Muslims went on the rampage targeting Tamil civilians. Al Oluvil in the Eastern Province, an armed gang massacred 48 Tamil civilians. Another gang chased Tamils from Kudapokuna in the Mahaweli area as the police and the military looked the other way. The government struggled to cope with the rapidly deteriorating situation in predominately Tamil and Muslim areas in the Eastern Province. Addressing parliament on the morning of August 7, 1990, Minister Wijeratne reiterated his commitment to finish off the LTTE. Without making any reference to planned ‘Thrivida Balaya’ aimed at liberating Jaffna, the outspoken minister declared: "We will show no mercy. We will annihilate terrorists." Within hours after Minister Wijeratne’s vow, the LTTE retaliated. In a deliberate attempt to provoke the government, terrorists massacred 32 Sinhala men, women and children at Bandarduwa in the Ampara district. On the following day, they attacked a private bus on the Morawewa-Horowpothana road killing 27 Sinhalese, including 15 women. The LTTE stormed a Sinhala village in the Vavuniya district killing eight persons. Within a week, about 300 civilians, the majority of them Muslims, were dead. The country was in chaos. In spite of threatening to eradicate the LTTE, Minister Wijeratne didn’t have the wherewithal to take the battle into enemy territory. Instead, the military was fighting to save the remaining bases in the Jaffna and Vanni theatres. The government lacked troops to thwart attacks on civilians. The military also found it extremely difficult to prevent hit and run attacks aimed at crippling overland movements. Unfortunately, the government failed to realize the urgent need to enhance the fighting strength to meet the LTTE challenge. The government ignored the urgent need to develop a cohesive strategy with the focus on a rapid increase in the fighting strength. The country paid dearly for President Premadasa’s lapse.