An attempt on Balasingham’s life at Hilton Colombo

War on terror revisited : Part 103

February 7, 2013, 8:25 pm



by Shamindra Ferdinando

The then Commandant of the elite Special Task Force (STF) Superintendent of Police Lionel Karunasena in May 1989 was informed of the impending talks with the LTTE. Karunasena was directed to provide security to LTTE representatives arriving in Colombo for the first ever direct negotiations between the government and the LTTE. President Ranasinghe Premadasa wanted the STF, which was also responsible for his own security to be in charge of the LTTE representatives’ ‘close protection’ during their stay in Colombo. President Premadasa obviously feared for the safety of his visitors in Colombo.

In spite of the Presidential Security Division (PSD) handling President Premadasa’s security, the STF played a critical role in the overall protection plan. In fact, the STF assigned several hundred personnel for the President’s protection.

Having obtained President Premadasa’s approval, SP Karunasena summoned ASP Nimal Lewke to his well guarded office in Colombo. At that time Lewke was based in Batticaloa, though in accordance of the Indo-Lanka Accord (ILA) the STF couldn’t conduct operations in any part of the country against the LTTE. The Sri Lankan armed forces were confined to barracks. However, the para-military wing of the police department was heavily involved in anti-insurgency operations directed against the JVP/Deshapremi Janatha Viyaparaya (DJV) in the South.

The meeting between President Premadasa and SP Karunasena took place after the LTTE’s International Secretariat in London had accepted the President’s invitation for talks on April 15, 1989.

Lewke recently recalled the circumstances under which he had been given the unenviable task of protecting LTTE representatives during their visits to Colombo and transit through the Katunayake International Airport (KIA). In a brief interview with the writer, Lewke, one-time commandant of the STF said that Commandant Karunasena had apparently been in a quandary and deeply concerned when he walked in to the commando chief’s office.

Lewke said: "We in the STF had a very high regard for Karunasena, as he was a very keen, dedicated, disciplined officer. When I sat in front of him, he smilingly told me ‘Nimal, I have a special task for you’. I was surprised as it was not the normal way he entrusted responsibilities to his officers. The normal firmness in his voice was not there and I knew that something out of ordinary was going to happen.

"After a lapse of a few seconds, I was informed of the impending negotiations with the LTTE and the STF being chosen to provide security to LTTE representatives visiting Colombo. I was told to pick my own team and be ready to provide security to the visitors. I was stunned. I was being asked to look after a group of terrorists we had been fighting. It was definitely not a task any armed forces officer wanted to be entrusted with. I resented the idea."

Asked whether he could have opted out of the assignment, Lewke said that the Commandant was firm in his conviction that the STF should carry out the task. Karunasena was of the opinion that they couldn’t ignore directives received from President Premadasa.

Lewke said: "Still I could not respond to the Commandant. In a firm voice, the Commandant told me that it was the President’s wish and the STF had no option but to carry it out. Then I excused myself, and asked him why the President had to choose the STF. The Commandant said that it was a request from the LTTE hierarchy that STF should be deployed for their protection. Regardless of my anxiety, I felt proud that the LTTE, too, respected our capabilities."

The Commandant wanted Lewke to select his own team. Rohan de Silva, Jagodaarachchi (currently at the PSD), Rohan Fernando (Puttalam) and Keerthipala (CID) were among those picked by Lewke as they, too, had received ‘close protection training’ and worked closely with Lewke on the battle front. Lewke acknowledged that none of those selected by him would have liked the assignment and they, too, had felt they same way as he.

STF receives Balasingham at KIA

President Premadasa demanded the best possible protection for the visitors arriving at KIA in late April 1989 for the first round of talks in Colombo. Lewke had been present at the KIA when one-time British High Commission employee and LTTE theoretician Anton Balasingham and his Australian born wife Adele arrived from London at night. They were accompanied by Prabhakaran’s wife, Mathivathani, his daughter, Duwarka and son Charles Anthony as well as Lawrence Thilagar. Prabhakaran’s second son, Balachandran was born years later in the Puthukudirippu area.

Senior representatives from the Presidential Secretariat were there to receive the LTTE delegation. Having welcomed the visitors, the Presidential Secretariat officials left the airport instructing the STF to move them to a safe location.

Lewke said: "Balasingham was extremely nervous. While speaking with representatives from the Presidential Secretariat, Balasingham smoked several cigarettes. Throughout his conversation with the officials, he kept looking at us. Balasingham obviously seemed agitated. We were in civvies. Members of my team were authorized to carry side arms. When I told Balasingham I represented the STF, Prabhakaran’s chief negotiator promptly said he was aware of it."

The STF had escorted the LTTE team to a spacious bungalow belonging to the airport authority situated within the premises. The visitors stayed until they were airlifted at first light to Nedunkerni the following day. The SLAF was responsible for their security on the way as the STF had been specifically instructed not to accompany them. The SLAF was engaged in a highly dangerous mission. The SLAF realized the possibility of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) taking hostile action as it was still engaged in operations against the LTTE in spite of being asked by President Premadasa to suspend operations pending its withdrawal. The IPKF ignored President Premadasa’s directive contemptuously.

Minister wanted Balasingham killed

Although some felt Balasingham would visit Colombo immediately after arriving at the KIA, the British passport holder wanted to consult Prabhakaran first of all. The people strongly resented the government giving concessions to the LTTE. President Premadasa incurred the wrath of the people for appeasing the LTTE. An influential section of the government strongly objected to proposed talks between the government and the LTTE. That grouping was of the opinion that President Premadasa was causing irreparable damage to Sri Lanka’s relations with India.

President Premadasa realized the growing opposition to his initiative within his own camp, though he remained confident of the outcome of negotiations with the LTTE. The President was perhaps overconfident. Lewke recollected a chance encounter with a powerful minister who didn’t hide his feelings when he commented on the proposed talks with the LTTE.

Lewke said: "Having had consultations in Mullaitivu jungles, the LTTE delegation was scheduled to be airlifted from the Mullaitivu jungles to the SLAF grounds at Parsons Road. I was waiting with a section of my security team to receive the delegation when an SLAF chopper landed. We thought the LTTE delegation was coming, though the passenger turned out to be a powerful minister. He wanted to know what I was doing there. When I told him that I was waiting for the arrival of LTTE representatives, he reacted angrily. The minister wanted to know the names of the delegates. When I revealed their names, he looked hard at me, held my hand and told me, ‘you call yourself a Kandyan Buddhist like me and you should remember what these b…s did at Sri Maha Bodhiya; if I were you, I would shoot and kill all of them. If you do that, you’ll be a hero’. So saying the minister went away. I was flabbergasted; I did not know what to say. I felt sorry for myself. I never found fault with the minister for his reaction."

Stay at Hilton Colombo

The STF contingent detailed to protect the LTTE negotiators always operated in civvies. They were accommodated on the top floor, where commandos in civvies guarded them. The Hilton staff, too, came under close scrutiny for obvious reasons. The possibility of infiltration by the JVP or some other Indian sponsored Tamil group compelled the government to adopt extraordinary security measures. President Premadasa left nothing to chance. The LTTE delegation visited the Presidential Secretariat and Sucharitha on several occasions.

Lewke said that the minister’s angry reaction to the presence of LTTE representatives in Colombo helped him realize how daunting their task was. A section of the government felt that President Premadasa was making far too many concessions to the LTTE at the expense of national security. In spite of many expressing doubts about the LTTE’s sincerity, the President remained confident of reaching an understanding with the LTTE. Unlike his predecessor, President J. R. Jayewardene as well as successors, President Premadasa personally handled negotiations and went to the extent of inviting LTTE representatives to his private residence Sucharitha, where confidential talks took place. Discussions regarding transfer of arms from the Sri Lanka Army to the LTTE also took place at Sucharitha with the participation of A. C. S. Hameed, Chairman of the UNP as well as the chief negotiator for talks with the LTTE, State Minister for Defence Ranjan Wijeratne and Defence Secretary Gen. Sepala Attagalle. The transfer of arms was investigated by a presidential commission which inquired into the assassination of one-time National Security Minister Lalith Athulathmudali during Premadasa’s presidency.

Playing ball with Tigers

War on terror revisited : Part 102

February 5, 2013, 8:16 pm




An unsuspecting President Ranasinghe Premadasa unwittingly threw a fresh lifeline to the sinking Tigers in May 1989. The President’s controversial action was prompted by his thinking that the IPKF would not go back unless he inflicted heavy losses on it. Having decided on a partnership with the LTTE, a naïve President moved swiftly and rapidly to appease Prabhakaran, who exploited the situation to get cement, steel for construction purposes, T-56 assault rifles, ammunition and money from the SriLankan government. At the behest of President Premadasa, the national carrier, Air Lanka flew top Tigers, including one-time Jaffna commander, Sathasivam Krishhnakumar alias Kittu to Heathrow airport, whereas Prabhakaran’s wife and two children were flown back to the Katunayake International Airport. President Premadasa felt the peace initiative would primarily depend on concessions given to the LTTE. When Prabhakaran pushed for significant reduction in military presence in the Jaffna peninsula, President Premadasa readily agreed to vacate strategic Point Pedro and Valvettiturai bases, which remained in the hands of the LTTE until the troops of Operation Riviresa liberated them during President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s time.

 By Shamindra Ferdinando

President Ranasinghe Premadasa quietly ordered the release of top LTTE operative, Ms Manori Daniels serving a six-year term of Rigorous Imprisonment in late Oct 1989. She was one of those involved in a car bomb explosion opposite Zahira College, Maradana on Nov. 9, 1987. On the instructions of President Premadasa, the then Attorney General directed the release of Daniels from the high security Welikada Prison.

President Premadasa was responding to LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran’s request for the convict’s release (Maradana bomb blast woman released – The Island, Oct 30, 1989). The President set an extremely bad precedent by releasing a terrorist found guilty of a specific operation targeting civilians. The Maradana blast claimed the lives of about 40 persons, while over 100 were injured. Ms Daniels was among a group of terrorists given a presidential pardon during the 14-month long ceasefire (May 1989 to June 1990).

Ms Daniels was aka Manoranjini Moorthathi and Manorani Watson. The released bomber was a mother of two serving at a government school in the Batticaloa District at the time she carried out the attack. The police took her into custody on Dec. 12, 1987 under emergency regulations. She was sent to prison on Feb 6, 1989 only to be released due to presidential intervention. During her short stay at Welikada, she won a beauty contest organised by the prisons authorities.

Ms. Daniels was sentenced to six years RI by the then High Court Judge of Colombo, H. W. Senanayake. She had been indicted under Section 5 of the Prevention of Terrorist Act (PTA) for failure on her part to divulge information as regards terrorist related activity to law enforcement authorities. Ms Daniels was directly involved with Gagendran, who took cyanide and died when police apprehended him. The police zeroed in on them at Aranthalawa, as they were on their way back to Batticaloa.

Investigations revealed that Ms. Daniels and Gagendran had arrived in Colombo from Batticaloa on Nov. 15, 1989, in a car carrying the bomb. Interestingly, the duo had offered a lift to four army personnel in a bid to avoid possible checks on the way from Batticaloa to Colombo.

Later it transpired that Gagendran had been directly involved in the Gas Works Street bomb blast on April 21, 1987, which claimed the lives of over 100 civilians and wounded over 200.

According to statistics available with the Justice Ministry, Presidents, JRJ, Ranasinghe Premadasa and D. B. Wijetunga released 72 convicts during the period from 1978 to 1994. But it was only President Premadasa, who set free LTTE cadres.

At the behest of President Premadasa, the Defence and Foreign ministries facilitated the departure of LTTE Deputy Leader, Sathasivam Krishhnakumar alias Kittu departure to the UK for medical treatment. President Premadasa and Minister A. C. S. Hameed, who functioned as the government’s chief negotiator gave in to LTTE’s demands regardless of the consequences. They obviously felt that ongoing peace talks had to be sustained at any cost (Kittu off for treatment – The Island, Oct 30, 1989).

The Island incurred the wrath of a section of the then government for reporting the release of Ms Daniels and Kittu’s departure for the UK. The government alleged that such revelations could cause irreparable damage to the peace process.

In spite of Kittu being one of those personally involved in killing of members of rival groups in the Jaffna peninsula as well as a spate of attacks on the army, the Foreign Ministry worked closely with the British High Commission to facilitate Kittu’s transfer. The President directed the Sri Lankan High Commission in the UK to provide anything required by Kittu, one-time LTTE’s Jaffna commander. President Premadasa never realised the LTTE’s influence in Western capitals, particularly in London, due to the presence of LTTE theoretician Anton Balasingham and Adele, his Australian born wife. Balasingham carried a British passport. The duo had excellent contacts with British officials due to Balasingham being a former employee of the British High Commission in Colombo. They played a high profile role in promoting the LTTE in Europe and India in the run-up to the signing of the Indo Lanka Accord (ILA), on the morning of July 29, 1987.

Balasingham speaks out in Colombo

Balasingham explained the LTTE’s position on a range of issues in an exclusive interview with the writer at his heavily guarded suite at the Galadari Meridien during the second week of Oct 1989 (LTTE doubts Indian intentions in Sri Lanka – The Island, Oct. 15, 1989). On the instructions of President Premadasa, a squad of elite Special Task Force (STF) personnel were in charge of Balasingham’s security. It would be pertinent to mention that at that time the STF was in charge of President Premadasa’s security as well. The STF’s loyalty to the government in power had never been questioned. In fact, some wrongly tended to associate the STF with the UNP, particularly due to its formation during the JRJ administration.

Balasingham spoke candidly about the ongoing peace process and what the group expected President Premadasa to do.

Responding to ‘The Island’ ahead of the impending third round of talks at Sucharitha in Nov, 1989, Balasingham called for the dissolution of the EPRLF-run North-East Provincial Council (NEPC) in the run-up to the IPKF’s withdrawal. The LTTE wanted fresh elections for the temporarily merged North-East Province immediately after the IPKF pullout. Unlike President Premadasa, Balasingham had a realistic view of the IPKF withdrawal. The former ‘Virakesari’ staffer expressed confidence that the IPKF could complete its pullout by end of 1989. The LTTE most probably felt that the then Premier Rajiv Gandhi would lose the parliamentary polls in Nov. 1989. V. P. Singh won the parliamentary poll paving the way for the IPKF’s pullout.

Balasingham lambasted India for forming a new militia called Tamil National Army (TNA) to strengthen the EPRLF administration in the North-East Province. The LTTE representative expressed serious doubts over India’s intention and claimed that India wanted to unite all armed groups under one flag and place it under the EPRLF command. Such a force would be a major threat to security and political stability of the country, he asserted.

Balasingham said that President Premadasa would have to take punitive action against Chief Minister of the NEPC Varatharaja Perumal, whose militia as well as the so-called Citizens’ Volunteer Force (CVF), continued to operate under IPKF command, regardless of President Premadasa’s wishes. The LTTEer warned that there could be a bloodbath unless the government took tangible measures to neutralise the threat posed by the combined strength of the TNA and the CVF.

Balasingham declared that the PC system established under the 13th Amendment to the Constitution was wholly inadequate to meet the aspirations of the Tamil speaking people. The LTTE was ready to drop its original demand for a separate state if President Premadasa could offer an alternative, acceptable to the LTTE, Balasingham revealed, declaring that the group was satisfied with President Premadasa’s efforts to bring about national reconciliation. The LTTE wouldn’t hesitate to resume hostilities if it couldn’t secure the legitimate rights through negotiations, Balasingham warned.

When the writer raised the possibility of the JVP receiving weapons training as well as armaments, particularly landmines from the LTTE, Balasingham emphasised that the group wasn’t in any way linked with the southern insurgency. Although he didn’t name any particular group involved with the JVP, he claimed that the JVP could be receiving some support from some other Tamil group.

JVP mounts landmine attacks

The JVP is believed to have received training in the use of landmines by the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE). A select group of JVPers had an opportunity to receive training under PLOTE instructors somewhere in the Vavuniya-Mannar region. The sudden appearance of landmines in the South sent shock waves through the security establishment. Although the army and the police managed to detect some landmines, several explosions caused consternation among troops as the top brass faced the daunting task of maintaining regular patrols. The JVP’s strategy was basically the same as that of northern terrorist groups. The group felt that successful landmine warfare could severely restrict the movement of the army in the province, hence giving it an opportunity to consolidate its power. A successful campaign could have plunged the armed forces into a major crisis. The JVP could have achieved its military objectives with a spate of well planned mine attacks.

Who facilitated the JVPers to receive training under PLOTE instructors? Could the PLOTE provide training as well as explosives to the JVP without the IPKF’s knowledge? Did the PLOTE personnel conduct joint operations with the JVP? The PLOTE could have had a hand in JVP landmine attacks.

The writer and staff photographer Jude Denzil Pahiraja were the first journalists from Colombo to visit Kapparatora, Weligama, where the JVP carried out its landmine attack on the morning of July 21, 1988. The JVP had targeted a convoy of vehicles carrying a group of UNP Southern Provincial Council members to Galle. Those standing near the scene of the blast alleged that it could have caused deaths among students of the nearby Sangananda Kapparatota Vidyalaya. Fortunately, there hadn’t been any children on the narrow road when the targeted convoy passed the spot.

The Kapparatota blast was the first mine blast carried out by the JVP. The blast took place in the wake of the then President JRJ placing the security in the entire Southern Province comprising the districts of Galle, Matara and Hambantota under the army. Lt. Colonel Vipula Boteju of the Gemunu Watch took over Hambantota, whereas Lt. Colonels, L. Wijeratne and Patrick Fernando moved to Matara and Galle, respectively. The late Brig. Lakshman Algama, Security Forces Commander, South and Maj. Gen. Asoka Jayawardene, the General Officer Commanding troops deployed in the Southern region (JVP attempts forced teetotalism – The Island’July 24, 1988).

We were on our way to Hambantota to report on a highly publicised JVP attempt to ban liquor when the JVP triggered a landmine explosion. The then Southern Province Chief Minister M. S. Amarasiri was of the opinion that landmine warfare could cause a major setback to their efforts against the JVP. Amarasiri was speaking to the writer, having met the army top brass in charge of security in the South on July 26, 1988. The meeting took place at the Chief Minister’s office. Foremost on the veteran politician’s mind was the introduction of landmines (22 persons killed since July 10 – The Island, July 27, 1988). The dead included four relatives of the then Southern Province DIG Premadasa Udugampola.

The Kapparatota blast took place immediately after the then Army Commander Lt. Gen. Nalin Seneviratne had taken over the security in the Southern Province. In accordance with the security strategy, the Defence Ministry moved the Air Force as well as the elite Special Task Force (STF) out of the Southern Province (Army Chief flies South to assess situation – The Island’July 21, 1988).

Premadasa’s plan goes awry as JVP opens up new front

War on terror revisited : Part 101

February 3, 2013, 8:11 pm

LTTE personnel taking salute at the ‘Col’ Kittu memorial ceremony in Jan 2004. Kittu was killed by the Indian Navy on the high seas.


By Shamindra Ferdinando

The then Indian government reacted angrily to the growing relationship between President Ranasinghe Premadasa and the LTTE. Although many party seniors as well as officials realized President Premadasa’s folly, none dared to dispute his controversial strategy, which antagonized India.

The Foreign Ministry remained silent as Premadasa stepped up his anti-India campaign. The President was naïve enough as far as military matters were concerned to believe that he could inflict heavy losses on one of the largest armies in the world by arming the LTTE, which was on the verge of collapse, in the face of relentless Indian military action at the time President Premadasa threw a lifeline to Prabhakaran’s LTTE. The President’s move paved the way for a historic meeting between LTTE theoretician Anton Balasingham and President Premadasa at the latter’s private residence, ‘Sucharitha’, on May 4, 1989.

In late June 1989, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) launched a major offensive in the northern region targeting LTTE bases. The operation got underway in the wake of President Premadasa requesting the IPKF to stop operations pending its withdrawal by July 29, 1989. Almost 100 persons, including LTTE cadres, IPKF personnel and a top government official died in the last week of June, 1989 in the northern region.

At that time, the LTTE had media contacts based in Colombo, who countered statements issued by the Indian High Commission in Colombo as regards violence sweeping the northern region. Primrose Sharma was the Indian High Commission spokesperson at that time. The Sri Lankan government and the LTTE accused the IPKF and the EPRLF-led administration in the temporarily merged North-East Province of forcibly conscripting youth for the Citizens’ Volunteer Force (CVF)/Tamil National Army (TNA). The EPRLF publicly defended its right to form an armed force of its own to protect the provincial administration. Hundreds of youth fled their homes and some of them sought refuge in Colombo to escape the EPRLF conscription drive. Some of them were accommodated at Hindu College, Wellawatte.

A desperate President Premadasa sent a telex message to Premier Gandhi requesting him to suspend IPKF action as it could jeopardize ongoing negotiations between him and the LTTE. India ignored President Premadasa’s plea (IPKF in new offensive-The Island July 2, 1989.

The TELO, ENDLF and the EPRLF formed the Tamil National Council (TNC) to pursue what the then Chief Minister called Tamil speaking people’s right for self determination. Close on the heels of the first round of talks between President Premadasa and the LTTE (May 3-May 30, 1989), the EPRLF called for the abolition of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution. The TNC asserted that far reaching constitutional amendments were required to facilitate genuine devolution of powers to the temporarily merged province.

Killing outside Maldivian High Commission

On the night of July 16, 1989, an unidentified gunman shot dead PLOTE leader Uma Maheswaran at Frankfurt Place, Bambalapitiya. Some alleged that a section of the PLOTE had carried out the assassination at the behest of India’s premier intelligence outfit, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). Interestingly, Maheswaran was gunned down opposite the Maldivian High Commission against the backdrop of the PLOTE launching a sea borne attack on the Maldives. (The war on terror revisited series discussed the PLOTE operation as well as the Indian military operation to save the then Maldivian leader Mohammed Abdul Gayoom). The then Senior Under-Secretary of the Foreign Ministry, Ibrahim Hussain Zaki, is on record as having said that he had seen Maheswaran lying dead near the Maldivian High commission in Sri Lanka. "When I saw him lying dead, I quickly recalled that it was he whom I had seen in my room in mid 1988 about three months before the coup attempt," the Maldivian media quoted Zaki of the Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) as having said.

Zaki linked Maheswaran with an attempt made on Nov 3, 1988 to overthrow the Maldivian government.

The police failed in their responsibility to conduct a proper investigation. The Premadasa regime went out of its way to suppress information regarding security matters. The then Competent Authority deprived The Island of an opportunity to reveal the identity of the person killed outside the Maldivian High Commission in our July 18 issue. The police or the intelligence services never examined the possibility of Maheswaran being killed for his role in the Maldivian coup attempt (PLOTE leader Uma Maheswaran gunned down at Bambalapitiya-The Island July 19, 1989).

In an exclusive interview with this writer over a year ago, the Male coup leader, businessman Abdulla Luthufee (his first since the Nov. 3, 1988 coup attempt), said that the raid on Male would never have been possible without his relationship with Maheswaran whom he described as a friend. The raiding party comprised 80 PLOTE cadres, including those trained by Indian military instructors. Maheswaran’s assassination should have prompted investigators to examine the Maldivian connection.

Gen. Ranatunga speaks out

The Premadasa government was struggling in the South with the JVP going on the rampage. The situation in the North was worse. The government couldn’t handle the challenge posed by the IPKF in the wake of Prime Minister Gandhi’s refusal to withdraw troops. Indian leaders didn’t mince their words when they declared that India wouldn’t meet President Premadasa’s July 29, 1989 deadline to quit Sri Lanka. India’s position fuelled speculation that Sri Lankan troops would throw their weight behind the LTTE battling the IPKF. A gun battle between the Sri Lankan Army and the IPKF at Atambagaskade in the Vavuniya district in early July 1989 sent shock waves through the security establishment. The confrontation claimed the lives of two IPKF personnel, while three received injuries. Senior representatives of the Sri Lankan Army and the IPKF moved swiftly to defuse tension and prevent clashes from spilling over into the neighbouring areas. President Premadasa’s security advisor, Gen. Cyril Ranatunga emphasized that the failure on the part of India to withdraw the IPKF before the deadline wouldn’t lead to hostilities between Sri Lankan forces and the IPKF. Gen. Ranatunga also scotched rumours that President Premadasa, in his capacity as the Commander-in-Chief, had ordered the re-deployment of troops in the Northern and Eastern districts immediately after the lapse of the deadline given to the IPKF. In accordance with the Indo Lanka Accord (ILA), Sri Lankan armed forces were confined to barracks (Ranatunga rules out confrontations—The Island July 25, 1989).

Gen. Ranatunga gave his assurance in the wake of the IPKF protesting against the SLAF engaging in hostile acts. The IPKF and the Indian High Commission accused the SLAF of causing unnecessary friction amidst rising tension in the war zone. The IPKF reacted furiously to an SLAF aircraft carrying out midnight manoeuvres over an IPKF base in the Vavuniya district. The then Chief of Staff of the SLAF, Terrance de S. Gunawardane, confirmed the night flight. Gunawardena said that ILA couldn’t bar the SLAF from carrying out training exercises. The IPKF caused another controversy when it asserted that Gen. Ranatunga, too, should notify the Indian military authorities if he wanted to visit the North (SLAF dismisses Indian army protests of ‘hostile’ acts-The Island July 27, 1989).

Battle outside Mannar hospital

The IPKF went on the rampage in Mannar town after the LTTE killed over 25 IPKF personnel outside the Mannar base hospital in the third week of Aug. 1989. It was the worst attack on the IPKF during 1989. The LTTE launched a multi-pronged attack on the IPKF taking cover in the hospital. Heavily armed terrorists swooped down on the IPKF point after a surprise mortar attack on unsuspecting jawans. The IPKF probably thought that the LTTE wouldn’t engage troops outside the hospital (Over 25 IPKF men killed near Mannar hospital-The Island Aug 18, 1989).

A bloody crackdown

About a week before the lapse of President Premadasa’s unrealistic deadline for the IPKF’s withdrawal, the JVP declared its intention to launch a massive protest campaign on July 28 against India and the presence of Indian forces in the country. The JVP ordered both public and private sector employees not to report for work on July 26, 1989. Posters and leaflets warned workers of dire consequences unless they heeded the directive issued by the Deshapremi Janatha Viyaparaya (DJV). JVP directed bomb attacks at the State Bank of India building at Sir Baron Jayatilleke Mawatha, Fort and the Indian Bank at the Main Street. In the South, a landmine ripped through an army vehicle killing two and wounding four. It was the first major attack on the army after a quiet period. An irate President ordered the police and the military to crush demonstrations organized by the JVP on the morning of July 28.

As the JVP threatened to march on the Indian High Commission and India House, India bolstered its firepower in Colombo. Having informed the government, India airlifted a heavily armed contingent of para-commandos attached to the IPKF to Ratmalana. The Para commandos landed at the Ratmalana air base on July 27, during JVP led protests in Colombo. The government couldn’t resist the Indian deployment in Colombo. Indian commandos took up position at the High Commission and India House. The Indian High Commission asserted that its troops would protect Indian lives and property regardless of the consequences. Indian troops also took up positions at the Taj Samuda, where many Indian diplomatic staff took refuge for the second time during 1989. They were forced to move into the Taj in the second week of June 1989, due JVP threats.

In spite of State Minister for Defence Ranjan Wijeratne assuring security for the Indian diplomatic staff and Indian property in Colombo, India declared its intention to maintain additional strength as long as the JVP posed a threat. India emphasized its right to sustain required military presence to meet any eventuality. Instead of withdrawing its forces as demanded by President Premadasa, India increased its military presence in Colombo, much to the consternation of the government.

The government warned the JVP to call off the planned demonstrations. But, the outfit however, forced hundreds of people to launch protests in the provinces. The police and armed forces opened fire on protesters killing about 200 persons on the morning of July 28, 1989. The armed forces and the police prevented the wounded being moved to nearby government hospitals. Troops also thwarted attempts to remove bodies of those killed during the bloody crackdown. In Moneragala alone, over 25 persons were killed. Interestingly, the JVP failed to mobilize people in the Matara and Hambantota districts during the July 28 demonstrations. It was the worst day in terms of the number of people killed during the second JVP-led insurgency. During clashes between the police backed by security forces and JVP-led protesters on July 29, 1987, about 150 persons died. The dead included several Buddhist monks.

The situation continued to deteriorate as troops executed family members of suspected JVP cadres in the wake of attacks on the army and the police. Once, the then army chief Lt. Gen. Hamilton Wanasinghe had to take up the issue with those in charge of security in the North Central region. In the wake of the July 28, 1989 incidents, both the government and the JVP stepped up violence. Those suspected of being involved with the JVP were summarily executed.

Landmine blast rocks Middeniya

In late Aug. 1989, six soldiers died in a landmine explosion at Gomadiya, a village several miles away from Middeniya in the Hambantota district. Two personnel, who survived the blast, were airlifted to Colombo for medical treatment as troops launched a clearing operation in the area. It was the second major landmine blast directed at the army by the JVP. Six army personnel, including two officers died in a landmine blast at Galewela in the Matale district (Six soldiers killed in landmine blast-The Island Aug 24).

The JVP obtained landmines from Indian sponsored Tamil groups operating alongside the IPKF. Did the IPKF authorize the arming of the JVP, too, in response to President Premadasa giving arms, ammunition and money to the LTTE? The IPKF couldn’t have been unaware of the LTTE receiving arms from President Premadasa. Had the government bothered to investigate, it could have ascertained the circumstances under which the JVP had acquired landmines.

Tamil groups received landmines courtesy India at the onset of their campaign with the July 23, 1983 landmine attack being the first major reported incident, which plunged Sri Lanka into crisis.

The JVP blasted a police vehicle proceeding towards Gannoruwa also in the Hambantota district on the afternoon of Oct 27, 1989 killing four policemen. Seven policemen received injuries. It was the biggest blast since the killing of 12 soldiers, including two officers in the Middeniya and Galewela areas. The use of landmines by the JVP had a devastating impact on the armed forces. On the other hand, the sudden appearance of mines compelled the government to go all out against the JVP.

An unparalleled folly

War on terror revisited : Part 100

January 31, 2013, 12:00 pm

The army never examined the circumstances under which the senior officers cooperated with the UNP leadership to hand over weapons, though they knew the danger in the President’s move. The LTTE, too, remained silent on the issue. At the behest of President Premadasa, the Treasury released funds to the LTTE and also facilitated senior LTTE personnel leaving the country for medical treatment and to be with their loved ones. One-time Jaffna Commander Kitu was among those who received the government support to go overseas. When he arrived at Heathrow airport, Sri Lankan High Commission officials were present to welcome him.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

In the wake of President Ranasinghe Premadasa throwing his weight behind LTTE attempts to destabilise the IPKF-backed EPRLF administration in the temporarily merged North-East province, Tamil groups loyal to India hit back.

The IPKF turned a blind eye as armed gangs went on the rampage in Samanthurai in the Digamadulla electorate, causing heavy damage to property belonging to Muslims. Trouble started on May 17, 1989 after a group of armed Tamil persons who had arrived in a Pajero to the Samanthurai village council threatened several Muslims. The Sri Lankan military and the police couldn’t intervene as the IPKF was in charge of security in the province in accordance with the Indo-Lanka Accord (ILA). Muslim civilians,too, retaliated against Tamil speaking civilians in the area causing substantial damage. Over 100 houses were destroyed in clashes, with Muslims suffering heavy damages.

The EPRLF-led gangs led attacks in Samanthurai. The incident wasn’t the first since the EPRLF won the first election for the N-E Provincial Council conducted on Nov 19, 1988, with the help of the IPKF.

Although the LTTE wasn’t involved in the Samanthurai chaos, the group quickly realised clashes between the provincial administration and Muslims could help its own strategy to undermine President Premadasa’s administration. President Premadasa was in a dilemma. Having won the presidential election just 5 months before, President Premadasa found himself in an unenviable situation. Although he was the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces he couldn’t move troops or police to neutralise marauding armed gangs, which operated with impunity. Although both the SLMC as well as the powerful Muslim group of Muslim politicians in the UNP had demanded urgent action on the part of the President, he couldn’t deploy troops (Ashraff wants Lankan troops for Samanthurai with strap line Sequel to burning Muslim, Tamil houses-The Island May 19, 1989)

The then Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) leader A.H.M. Azwer, MP, called on President Ranasinghe Premadasa for the immediate deployment of Sri Lankan troops, whereas the Muslims called for the elite Special Task Force (STF).

The then Premadasa loyalist UNP MP Azwer was at the forefront of the pressure group, which pushed for the deployment of Sri Lankan forces in Samanthurai and other areas vulnerable to attacks. The then trade minister, A. R. M. Mansoor and SLMC leader Ashraff were among those who visited Samanthurai amidst the violence. The Samanathurai incidents took place in the wake of violence directed at Muslims at Kinniya and Kalmunai.

In spite of the SLMC being in the main opposition at the North-East Provincial Council, it couldn’t intervene. Having realised that President Premadasa, too, was helpless, MP Ashraff urged the IPKF to provide security to Muslims. The IPKF ignored his plea (Ashraff wants security for Muslims-The Island May 18, 1989).

The IPKF deployed strong forces to ensure that local troops wouldn’t move out even if they received orders from Colombo.

In fact, the EPRLF-led gangs wouldn’t have dared to go on the rampage without the IPKF’s blessings. In the guise of training a so-called Citizen’s Volunteer Force (CVF) for deployment in the Northern and Eastern districts, the IPKF worked overtime to train Tamil youth at their camps. President Premadasa’s unilateral declaration on April 13, 1989 that the IPKF should leave Sri Lanka before July 29, 1989 prompted the IPKF to intensify its destabilisation programme.

The CVF operated alongside the IPKF regardless of President Premadasa’s call for the IPKF’s departure. In the last week of May 1989, Indian troops operating in Kodikamam in the Jaffna peninsula shot dead a senior LTTE cadre, whom the LTTE described as a political wing cadre. The Kodikamam killing was preceded by the IPKF gunning down an LTTE tax collector in the Vavuniya district. The IPKF simply refused to suspend military operations pending its withdrawal as demanded by President Premadasa. The beleaguered president was of the opinion that the IPKF should be confined to barracks, until India worked out a plan for de-induction of troops.

None of his ministers or senior officials dared to discourage the president from teaming up with the LTTE to challenge the IPKF. If not for the then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi calling for parliamentary elections in Nov. 1989, President Premadasa would have had to face an unprecedented crisis. The IPKF intensified operations against the LTTE, regardless of mounting civilian casualties. In the first week of June, 1989, Indian troops battled the LTTE in the Jaffna peninsula with the support of helicopter gunships. The LTTE appealed for President Premadasa’s intervention, though it knew the UNP leader was powerless. The LTTE move highlighted President Premadasa’s dilemma. The IPKF indicated that it wouldn’t abide by the presidential directive as long as the LTTE wasn’t ready to surrender its arms (20 Tamil terrorists, two IPKF men, many civilians killed-The Island June 8, 1989). The IPKF stepped up offensive action ahead of the second round of talks (June 16 to July 2, 1989) between President Premadasa and the LTTE, which took place at the Army Sports Club pavilion. The first round of talks took place from May 4 to 30, 1989 at the Colombo Hilton and Galadari Hotel.

EPRLF challenges SLA

The EPRLF called for a protest against the Sri Lankan Army on June 6, 1989. The EPRLF declared that Sri Lankan forces weren’t required in the northern and eastern districts as it was capable of providing security with the support of the IPKF. The EPRLF ordered all shops closed in Trincomalee town as the IPKF blocked Sri Lankan bases in the area. The government remained silent. It was the first protest organised by the EPRLF administration against the army. (PC hartal disrupts civilian life in Trinco-The Island June 8, 1989) and (Anti-Sri Lanka army demo in Trinco-The Island June 6, 1989).

The IPKF declared that talks between President Premadasa and the LTTE wouldn’t change its strategy.

In neighbouring Batticaloa, the EPRLF ordered a major public campaign demanding the IPKF’s continued stay. Protesters urged Sri Lankan forces to leave, northern and eastern provinces leaving the EPRLF administration to look after their interests. Their protests coincided with the second round of Premadasa-LTTE talks in Colombo. On the afternoon of June 13, 1989, the SLAF airlifted nine LTTE personnel, including Yogiratnam Yogi to Colombo. They joined LTTE theoretician Anton Balasingham and his wife, Adele, who arrived from Australia two days before. As in the previous occasion, some members of the LTTE delegation, which included a Muslim representative, carried weapons.

Subsequently, Prabhakaran sent his deputy Gopalsamy Mahendrarajah a.k.a Mahattaya for the third round (Nov 1989), who had spearheaded many battles against the IPKF to Colombo. Interestingly, Mahataya led the LTTE delegation, which included Anton Balasingham and Yogiratnam Yogi. The third round was held at the President’s private residence, Sucharitha.

Gen. Cyril R blames Premadasa

The writer couldn’t recollect at least one instance members of President Premadasa’s cabinet or senior members of the armed forces and public officials being critical of the president’s strategy. None dared to challenge the President who publicly declared his faith in the LTTE. JRJ loyalist Gen. Cyril Ranatunga, in his capacity as the Security Advisor to President Premadasa as well as the Ministry of State for Defence during 1989-1990 period was one of the few officials intimately aware of the President’s dealings with the LTTE. President Premadasa had faith in his chief negotiator, A.C.S. Hameed, the then Higher Education Minister and Chairman of the UNP. Premadasa’s trust in political veteran Hameed contributed to the disastrous decision to direct the police deployed in the Ampara and Batticaloa districts to surrender to the LTTE at the onset of ealam war IV in June 1990, an issue, which would be dealt separately.

Having served President Premadasa faithfully during that turbulent time, Gen. Ranatunga in a piece titled Negotiating peace in Sri Lanka: The role of the military (published by International Alert of London, UK in Feb 1998 under the auspices of Dr. Kumar Rupesinghe) faulted President Premadasa for his ill-fated strategy.

Gen. Ranatunga alleged that in spite of him being the presidential security advisor, he wasn’t consulted when the army was directed to vacate what he described as a vital military base at Valvettiturai. Gen. Ranatunga blamed the President for overtly being generous to the LTTE in a bid to win Prabhakaran’s confidence. According to former Gen. Officer Commanding (JOC) of the Joint Operations Command (JOC), the decision to vacate the strategic base at Valvettiturai was taken by the President in consultation with the then Foreign Minister and the IGP. Ranatunga asserted that the Commander-in-Chief was clueless about the importance of military establishments and made decisions severely detrimental to security interests. He was of the opinion that the LTTE cleverly exploited the President’s weakness to its advantage. The LTTE always articulated that the presence of the military wasn’t conducive for national reconciliation. The LTTE pushed the President for a gradual decrease in military presence.

Gen. Ranatunga didn’t refer to the vacation of the army base at Point Pedro situated close to Valvettiturai. Interestingly, Ranatunga didn’t make any reference to the role played by the then Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Hamilton Wanasinghe.

As soon as the army vacated Point Pedro and Valvettiturai, the LTTE moved in. The IPKF turned a blind eye to what was going on. Perhaps the IPKF/EPRLF administration, too, liked the gradual decrease of the Sri Lankan military presence in the Northern Province as it was compatible with their strategy. The President played into the hands of those seeking to diminish government power in the northern region. The then Brigadier Y. Balaratnarajah functioned as Security Forces Commander, Jaffna from Feb 1989 to Dec 1989. He was succeeded by Brig. Jaliya Nanmuni.

Unfortunately, the SLFP led Opposition failed to highlight the President’s folly both in and outside parliament. Opposition lawmakers largely remained silent, though they knew what was going on, on the ground.

Ranatunga confirmed the transfer of arms, ammunition and equipment to the LTTE during the 14-month ceasefire (May 1989 to June 1990) and lifting of restrictions on a range of items, including cement to enable Prabhakaran to fortify their bases. The Gen. didn’t elaborate.

However, most of the weapons transfers took place in the sensitive Weli Oya region located close to Mullaitivu jungles. On the instructions received from Army headquarters, senior officers stationed at Weli Oya had handed over weapons, though many soldiers resented the government-LTTE collaboration. Years later, the issue came up when Deputy Defence Minister Anuruddha Ratwatte toured Weli Oya during peace initiative launched by the then President Chandrika Kumaratunga (Jan 1995-April 1995). Minister Ratwatte was accompanied by service chiefs and a group of journalists, including Prabath Sahabandu, the present editor of The Island. Minister Ratwatte and service chiefs were visiting troops to brief them of the ongoing peace process. Having flown to Palaly in one aircraft, the defence top brass were moved to a single chopper for a meeting with troops based at Weli Oya, where a battle hardened soldier queried the Minister whether the army would have to hand over weapons to the LTTE like in 1989-1990 period.

The Gujral factor

War on terror revisited : Part 99

January 29, 2013, 7:56 pm

By Shamindra Ferdinando

 JVP leader Somawansa Amarasinghe signing the Condolence Book opened in the Indian High Commission in Colombo on the sad demise of Inder Kumar Gujral, Former Prime Minister of India, who passed away on Nov. 30, 2012.
The JVP in June 1989 ordered all Indians to leave the country or face the consequences. It was nothing but a foolish propaganda effort in the wake of President Premadasa’s demand for the IPKF’s withdrawal by July 29, 1989. The then Indian High Commission spokesperson Ms Primrose Sharma explained the measures taken by India to ensure the safety and security of the diplomatic staff. The majority of the diplomatic and non-diplomatic staff moved to Colombo hotels, with the police and security forces providing security (Security forces on full alert-The Island June 15, 1989).

 One-time Indian Prime Minister Inder Kumar Gujral died on Nov. 12, 2012 in a hospital at Gurgaon near New Delhi, aged 92. Gujral was India’s 12th premier, heading a United Front coalition government (April 1997 to March 1998). He held the external affairs portfolio twice, first from 1989-1990 and again in 1996-1997.

The much discussed Gujral Doctrine took shape during his second stint as India’s External Affairs Minister, though his influence in changing Indian foreign policy towards Sri Lanka in 1989 could never be disputed. If not for Gujral, the then President Ranasinghe Premadasa would have found himself in a catastrophic situation. Gujral advocated the withdrawal of the IPKF.

The defeat of the then Premier Rajiv Gandhi’s Congress at the Nov. 1989 general election and the formation of the National Front government, with Gujral as its external affairs couldn’t have come at a better time for President Ranasinghe Premadasa. Had the Congress regained power, India wouldn’t have complied with President Premadasa’s demand and he would have had to face a powerful hostile power. This, against the backdrop of Premadasa’s hostility towards India in general and the Gandhis in particular, would have placed Sri Lanka in an extremely difficult position.

Former Indian Foreign Secretary J. N. Dixit in his memoirs, titled Makers of Indian Foreign Policy, faulted Gujral’s strategies. In a chapter captioned ‘A Pacifist and an Optimist’, Dixit, New Delhi’s top diplomat in Colombo during the deployment of the IPKF declared, "I.K. Gujral was appreciated for his idealism and commitment to peace. But he was overoptimistic and was willing to make compromises with other countries in a one-sided manner." Commenting on Gujral’s response to President Premadasa’s demand to withdraw the IPKF, Dixit said that the then External Affairs Minister was of the opinion that India should not have got involved in a mediatory role in Sri Lanka. According to Dixit, Gujral was also strongly opposed to training and arming of what Dixit described as Tamil separatist groups and the deployment of Indian armed forces in Sri Lanka. "Gujral did not accept the argument that if India had not got actively interested in trying to resolve the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, it might have had to face a separatist movement in Tamil Nadu. He was also of the view that India’s military involvement and political mediation in Sri Lanka was against the basic principles of nonalignment and the stipulations of international law. He orchestrated a 180 degree turn in India’s Sri Lanka policy. There were segments of Indian public opinion which welcomed his decision as a statesman-like action, restoring India’s foreign policy on the right track and regaining the moral high ground which it had apparently lost in Sri Lanka."

Dixit said that others felt that the decision taken by Premier V. P. Singh and Gujral caused the dismantling of the ILA, leading to the failure of what he described as the disintegration of the experiment of Tamil self-government in Northern and Eastern Sri Lanka.

President’s shocking move

Having won the Nov. 19, 1988 presidential election, President Premadasa set the stage for a fresh confrontation with India, at the Jan. 2, 1989 inauguration of his presidency. In spite of his hostility towards, India, no one expected him to demand the withdrawal of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), in a bid to facilitate resumption of direct talks with the LTTE.

The demand was made on the morning of April 13, 1989. Addressing a small gathering at Chittawiwekaasramaya, a temple situated near the Independent Television Network (ITN) head office, President Premadasa called for the withdrawal of the IPKF within three months (on or before July 29, 1989, the second anniversary of the signing of the Indo-Lanka Agreement). The announcement was made after President Premadasa had declared a unilateral ceasefire throughout the country to coincide with the Sinhala and Tamil New Year. The IPKF, too, reluctantly agreed to suspend operations in the temporarily merged North-East Province, in accordance with President Premadasa’s move. During the weeklong ceasefire, violence claimed the lives of 110 persons.

India/IPKF would never have suspected President Premadasa’s plan to call for the IPKF’s withdrawal in the wake of the temporary ceasefire. The President was hastily responding to the LTTE declaration that it wouldn’t suspend operations until the IPKF quit Sri Lanka. On the instructions of President Premadasa, the then State Minister of Defence Ranjan Wijeratne invited the LTTE to direct talks. The LTTE’s International Secretariat in London accepted the invitation on April 15, 1989. The stage was set for what came to be known as the Premadasa-Prabhakaran honeymoon.

Premadasa’s ill-fated strategy paved the way for the transformation of the LTTE from essentially a terrorist organisation to a force with a distinctive conventional military capability.

Although President Premadasa always talked of restoration of normalcy in the North as well as South through consultation, consensus and compromise, the UNP leader never practised what he preached. He did not trust anyone and none dared to discourage him from challenging India. Fear of losing access to the President’s private residence, Sucharitha made politicians and officials alike go with his thinking. The President felt that that he would be free to deal with the LTTE and the JVP once he got rid of the IPKF. He obviously considered the IPKF the biggest obstacle to his presidency. An angry India was blunt in its response. President Premadasa was told the IPKF wouldn’t be pulled out. In spite of President Premadasa pushing the Indian High Commission in Colombo as well as Premier Gandhi for de-induction of the IPKF, India remained noncommittal.

Balasinghams in Colombo

Former Veerakesari staffer turned former British High Commission employee Anton Stanislaus Balasingham arrived at the Katunayake International Airport (KIA) on April 26, 1989. He was accompanied by his second wife, Australian born Adele. On the instructions of President Premadasa, Air Lanka flew them from Heathrow to KIA at the government’s expense. Balasingham was representing the LTTE as its theoretician. The SLAF flew them to Colombo for a meeting with Presidential Secretary K.H. J. Wijedasa (Balasingham arrives here for talks-The Island April 27, 1989).

At the behest of President Premadasa, the SLAF airlifted the LTTE delegation from the Vanni to join the Balasinghams for their first formal meeting with the government at the Colombo Hilton on May 5, 1989. However, President Rajapaksa met the LTTE delegation at Sucharitha on the evening of the previous day. They discussed the crisis caused by the Indian intervention, deployment of the IPKF, formation of a militia loyal to the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF)-run PC administration in the North-East and the ‘colonisation of predominately Tamil areas’ under the auspices of the Mahaweli Authority.

The LTTE conveniently forgot the circumstances that had led to the Indian intervention in June 1987. India intervened when the Sri Lankan Army was advancing on two flanks after having liberated Vadamaratchchy in the last week of May 1987.

President Premadasa went out of his way to appease the LTTE. On his instructions, the government facilitated the return of Prabhakaran’s wife Mathivathani, daughter Duwarka and son Charles Anthony from Europe. Their fourth child Balachandran was born in the Vanni East.

Premadasa leads talks

Premadasa declared that the IPKF should be confined to their barracks in case its withdrawal couldn’t be completed. India ignored Premadasa’s call. As part of measures to undermine Premadasa’s administration, India formed a militia under the political leadership of the EPRLF to face the Premadasa-Prabhakaran axis. The so-called Citizen’s Volunteer Force (CVF) was transformed into the Tamil National Army (TNA). The IPKF didn’t realise that the TNA couldn’t match the LTTE.

In the immediate aftermath of V. P Singh’s triumph, Premadasa’s sent State Minister for Defence, Ranjan Wijeratne, to explore the possibility of expediting the IPKF pull out. External Affairs Minister Inder Kumar Gujral as expected gave an assurance that India would pull out her forces.

Premadasa handpicked his team for negotiations with the LTTE. He kept Messers Lalith Athulathmudali and Gamini Dissanayake out of the secret process. A. C. S. Hameed (Minister of Higher Education and UNP Chairman), Ranil Wickremesinghe (Minister of Industries). Ranjan Wijeratne (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Sirisena Cooray (Minister of Housing and Construction), U. B. Wijekoon (Minister of Public Administration, Home Affairs and Provincial Councils), P. Dayaratne (Minister of Lands, Irrigation and Mahaveli Development) took part in the first round of talks held at the Colombo Hilton and Galadari Hotel (May 4-May 30, 1989).

The second round (June 16-July 2, 1989) was also held in Colombo. Premadasa included Festus Perera (Minister of Power and Energy) and A. R Mansoor (Minister of Trade and Shipping) in the delegation.

The third round was held in November 1989 at Sucharitha with the participation of Premadasa, Hameed and Ranjan Wijeratne. Among the officials present were Defence Secretary Sepala Attygalle, presidential secretary K. H. J Wijedasa, Foreign Secretary Bernard Tillekaratne and International Affairs Advisor Bradman Weerakoon. Prabhakaran’s deputy, Gopalsamy Mahendraraja aka Mahattaya joined the third round. The LTTE delegation included Balasingham and Yogiratnam Yogi.

Felix Dias Abeysinghe, a former Elections Department chief who drafted routine press releases issued after the meetings was also present. But there was no press release after the third round.

Did Army Commander Lt. Gen. Hamilton Wanasinghe, Defence Secretary General (rtd.) Sepala Attygalle and presidential security advisor General (rtd.) Cyril Ranatunga resist Premadasa’s strategy?

At the behest of the President, the army provided arms, ammunition and equipment to the LTTE to carry out attacks on the IPKF and the Tamil groups loyal to India. The LTTE also received funds from the Treasury.

The President directed the army to provide tactical support to the LTTE to carry out operations against the TNA.

EPRLF fights back

In the run-up to President Premadasa’s call for the IPKF’s withdrawal, the embattled Chief Minister of the North-East Provincial, Council Varatharaja Perumal called for far reaching constitutional reforms to devolve powers to the provinces. Having met Indian Premier Gandhi and President Premadasa, Perumal called a media briefing on the morning of April 7, 1989 in Colombo to explain the urgent need for tangible action on the part of India and Sri Lanka. Perumal declared that the EPRLF expected Premier Gandhi to take up the issue with President Premadasa. Responding to a query, Perumal strongly defended his decision to call the provincial administration the government of the Northern and Eastern Provinces (Perumal says he asked for India’s help––The Island April 8, 1989).

On April 17, 1989, the EPRLF warned the Sinhalese living in Welikanda area to leave or face the consequences. Despite threats, some villagers lodged complaints with the Welikanda police, though law enforcement officers couldn’t interfere with the EPRLF (‘Quit or die’ threat to Welikada settlers––The Island April 21, 1989).

IPKF engineers protests

in B’caloa

Having decided to ignore President’s Premadasa’s vacation order, the IPKF mobilised thousands of people in Batticaloa against Premadasa’s call. Protesters handed over petitions to the IPKF demanding the continued presence of the Indian forces and the speedy devolution of powers to Perumal’s provincial council (Demos in Batticaloa calling for IPKF to stay-The Island June 13, 1989). The ENDLF (breakaway PLOTE faction), TELO and EPRLF led the protests. The Sri Lankan military remained in barracks.

The IPKF and the EPRLF administration went to the extent of escorting senior government officials from their residences to the Batticaloa Kachcheri to prevent the LTTE from disrupting civil administration.

India indicated in no uncertain terms that President Premadasa’s deadline wasn’t acceptable. Until the change of government in Nov. 1989, India remained committed to an Indian military presence, regardless of the President’s call.

Premadasa misreads JVP’s intentions

War on terror revisited : Part 98

January 27, 2013, 8:30 pm

Jan 2, 1989 Dalada Maligawa: President elect Ranasinghe Premadasa signs the visitors’ book before he addressed the nation




By Shamindra Ferdinando

In Dec 1988, the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) and the police clashed with armed persons backed by the IPKF at Sumedagama in the Trincomalee district. The Joint Operations Command (JOC) and the Indian High Commission acted quickly to defuse the situation in the wake of the SLA killing five armed members during a confrontation. The police, too, killed another armed person in a separate confrontation. The situation deteriorated further when a gun battle between the SLA and the IPKF resulted in the death of an Indian soldier, also in Trincomalee. Both the JOC and the Indian High Commission felt that sporadic incidents could develop into a major confrontation in Trincomalee. They warned of the possibility of SLA-IPKF battles spreading to other districts.

Police headquarters sent DIG Mahesh Selvaratnam especially to investigate the situation and take remedial action.

Responding to the Indian High Commission allegations, the SLA and the police insisted that the IPKF and some cadres of the EPRLF were responsible for causing mayhem in Trincomalee. They cleared the LTTE of involvement.

In the wake of the EPRLF securing the administration of the temporarily merged North-East Province at the Nov 19, 1988 PC polls, the group began flexing its muscles. The EPRLF had the IPKF’s backing to meet any eventuality. The IPKF provided weapons to hundreds of EPRLF cadres as well as other groups loyal to India in accordance with an overall security plan. India wanted to establish an armed force comprising members of all groups other than the LTTE to protect the EPRLF administration.

President JRJ faced the prospect of having an extremely hostile political entity in the temporarily merged province with an armed force of its own. Although the UNP realized the danger in the Indian move, it couldn’t intervene.

 The government was helpless. But the EPRLF-IPKF alliance was going to be Ranasinghe Premadasa’s problem in the wake of Dec 19, 1988 presidential election. The country was in turmoil. The presidential election was held amidst violence with the JVP on the offensive in the South. JVP gunmen targeted election staff. In separate incidents, two senior presiding officers died. The IPKF was in charge of security in the Northern and Eastern districts, though the government deployed Sri Lankan troops and police in predominately Sinhala areas in the Eastern Province with the consent of the IPKF. The bottom line was that President JRJ had no option but to obtain IPKF approval for deploying local forces. Having overcome an attempt by an influential section of the party to undermine his campaign, Ranasinghe Premadasa won the Dec 19, 1988 presidential election by polling 2,569,199 votes to beat his main contender, Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike. The SLFP leader polled 2,289,960, whereas Sri Lanka Mahajana Pakshaya (SLMP) leader, Oswin Abeygunasekara obtained 235,719 votes. Abeygunasekara’s campaign had the backing of the UNP.

Premadasa was sworn in as the second executive President on the morning of Jan 2, 1989 at the Dalada Maligawa.

Delivering his inaugural address to the nation, a confident Premadasa revealed his readiness to meet both the LTTE and the JVP in a bid to bring both groups into the political mainstream. The President’s move was anticipated. The President was making an attempt to form a common front against the Indian intervention. The UNP leader was of the opinion that the government could work closely with the JVP as well as the LTTE due to him, JVP leader Rohana Wijeweera and LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran wanting the IPKF out. President Rajapaksa felt he could exploit their hostility towards India/IPKF to his advantage. The JVP most probably realized President Premadasa’s strategy, hence its decision to spurn the peace offers.  However, the President didn’t make any direct overtures to the LTTE.

EPRLF-led Tamil Front takes shape

President Premadasa resented the IPKF’s presence. During his tenure as the Prime Minister Premadasa strongly opposed the Indian intervention. The President was wary of the IPKF-EPRLF nexus. The President and his advisors felt tangible actions were needed to neutralize the threat posed by the IPKF-EPRLF grouping. They considered the formation of a Tamil front under the EPRLF leadership ahead of the parliamentary elections in April 1989, a major threat. The Indian sponsored group included members of the TULF, TELO, EROS and ENDLF. The IPKF believed the LTTE could be isolated by bringing the TULF and all armed Tamil groups under one umbrella. In support of the political coalition, India intended to set up a strong force capable of taking on the LTTE. The Indian plan was obvious. The Indian government and the IPKF asserted that their operation could be legitimized by involving the TULF. The Indian operation was launched at the expense of the TULF.

The Tamil front contested the general election in April 1989 on the TULF ticket, though the EROS fielded candidates in Jaffna, Batticaloa, Trincomalee and Vanni on its own. The EROS contested the four electoral districts as Independent Group I. It ended up winning 13 seats, whereas those who contested on the TULF ticket won 10 seats. Both won one National List seat each. The Democratic People’s Liberation Front, the political wing of the PLOTE failed to secure a single seat. Under President Premadasa’s leadership, the UNP secured 125 seats including 15 National List slots. The Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC) contested on the UNP ticket. The SLFP managed to win 67 seats, including nine National List slots.



Political pact amidst war

Interestingly, the TULF was brought back from India in May 1988 following tripartite consultations involving India, TULF and the LTTE. The original plan was for the TULF to participate at the first ever provincial council election scheduled for August, though it couldn’t be held as scheduled. One-time TULF MP Vettivelu Yogeswaran revealed the understanding between the TULF and the LTTE a few days before TULF leaders, Appapillai Amirthalingham, Murugesu Sivasithamparam and R. Sampanthan were scheduled to return. Yogeswaran said that they had been able to reach an understanding with the LTTE during consultations in India (TULF leaders return on Monday-The Island May 12, 1988). Yogeswaran inadvertently revealed what was going on in New Delhi, while the IPKF was waging war against the LTTE. The Indian media quoted the then Mahaweli Development Minister Gamini Dissanayake as having said in New Delhi that, provincial elections in August would entirely depend on the IPKF’s ability to suppress the LTTE.

The LTTE would never have expected the TULF to join hands with Indian sponsored armed groups. On the other hand, the TULF had no option but to join the EPRLF-led grouping due to Indian pressure. Except for the LTTE, all other Tamil political parties and groups worked under the auspices of the Indian High Commission and the IPKF. The Indian government didn’t tolerate dissent as it worked hard to isolate the LTTE. The LTTE was given only one opportunity during September 1989 to join the political mainstream. The previous article dealt with India declaring a 10-day unilateral ceasefire to facilitate the LTTE’s return to the negotiating table. The LTTE ignored the offer.



Moves to pacify JVP backfire

The security situation continued to deteriorate in spite of President Premadasa’s efforts to restore government authority in the South as well as in the IPKF-dominated Northern and Eastern districts. President Premadasa’s attempts failed. On the night of Dec 13, 1988, the JVP attacked the Welikada Prison, resulting in a major battle with the armed forces. The JVP operation highlighted the rapid deterioration of the security situation in the wake of the Nov 19, 1988 presidential election.

In January 1988, the JVP mounted an unprecedented attack on army commandos at Hungama killing three personnel. It was the second major incident since the lifting of the five-year-old state of emergency. President Premadasa lifted the emergency regulations, though security chiefs felt that the time wasn’t opportune for the removal of the state of emergency. In the first incident, subversives shot dead three soldiers and wounded five other personnel, including one officer also in the deep South.    

Bradman Weerakoon (presidential advisor 1989-1993), in an article captioned President Premadasa-LTTE peace negotiations discussed the then UNP leader doing away with the countrywide state of emergency on Jan. 12, 1989 regardless of opposition by his Cabinet and his security advisors. According to Weerakoon, the President ordered the release of 1,800 JVP detainees. After a brief quiet period, the JVP intensified attacks on the police and armed forces.

Successive attacks on the army in the south within a week after the lifting of the state of emergency humiliated President Premadasa in the eyes of those who opposed his controversial strategy of appeasement. The release of 1,800 JVP suspects, too, contributed to the rapid deterioration of the situation in the Southern, Central and North Western Provinces. The police and the army struggled in the face of JVP attacks. JVP gangs executed suspected informants and supporters of the UNP, SLFP as well as left parties. The police and the military, too, hit back with a vengeance. The government unleashed death squads. President Premadasa allowed his security chiefs to adopt whatever anti-insurgency measures to eradicate the JVP. An irate President wanted the JVP dealt with as early as possible. The police, armed forces as well as death squads, some of which operated under politicians, stepped up operations targeting JVP cadres. In hindsight, President Premadasa wanted a trouble free south before he entered into negotiations with the LTTE. The government turned a blind eye to security forces and police carrying out reprisals in the south. In fact, it was part of the overall strategy. Although a section of the security establishment resented the strategy, the political leadership at the highest level decided the JVP should be destroyed at any cost. The armed forces had the blessings of the political leadership to do whatever required of neutralising the JVP.



Premadasa suffers

another setback

 President Premadasa struggled to contain the situation. Although the UNP leader repeatedly declared he would pursue the three ‘Cs’ strategy namely consultation, consensus and compromise to restore peace in the country, President Premadasa always believed that he was right. Having failed to persuade the JVP to come to the negotiating table, President Premadasa explored ways and means of reaching out to Tamil speaking people. The president desperately wanted to win the hearts and minds of the Tamil speaking people. He suffered a severe setback when the SLA went on the rampage in the districts of Mannar and Vavuniya in the third week of Jan. 1989. Troops were accused of killing 14 civilians in separate incidents on Jan 17 and Jan 20, 1989. Seven of them were killed close to Atambagaskadawewa close on the heels of gunning down of a member of the National Auxiliary Force (NAF) and one civilian on Jan 17. Troops shot dead seven more civilians after the LTTE ambushed a routine SLA patrol at Silavaturai off Kondachchi. The Silavaturai incident claimed the lives of seven. Violence claimed the lives of 16 SLA personnel, 13 IPKF and 25 civilians from Jan 8 to Jan 22, 1988. Both the LTTE and JVP inflicted losses on the SLA (Killings in NP; Inquiry ordered-The Island Jan 22, 1988).

Pending an investigation, army headquarters shifted about 100 officers and men of the 5 CLI (Ceylon Light Infantry) out of Mannar and Vavuniya. On instructions from Colombo, Vanni Brigade Commander, the then Brig. Ranjan de Silva, called a meeting with senior EPRLF, TELO, ENDLF and TULF representatives to discuss the situation (CLI men moved out pending probe into killings-The Island Jan 26, 1989).

Indiscipline among troops remained a major issue, though the SLA had been fighting Indian sponsored terrorist groups since 1983. Troops tended to go on the rampage at the slightest provocation in the absence of a cohesive strategy to deal with the situation.

Missed opportunities

War on terror revisited : Part 97

January 22, 2013, 8:53 pm




 The Indian Army during its deployment here (July 1987-March 1990) caused irreparable damage to the Tamil community.Instead of disarming all Tamil groups sponsored by the Indian government, the IPKF ended up arming thousands of men, further militarizing war-torn areas. Unfortunately, Sri Lanka never examined the Indian deployment here, which aggravated the situation.

 by Shamindra Ferdinando

Having scheduled the first election for the temporarily merged North-Eastern Province for Nov. 19, 1988 in accordance of the Indo Lanka Accord (ILA), India declared a five-day unilateral ceasefire in the third week of Sept. 1988 in a bid to facilitate a fresh round of talks with the LTTE. Although the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was sceptical about the LTTE’s intentions, India felt Velupillai Prabhakaran should be given another chance to enter the political mainstream.

India extended the ceasefire by five more days when the LTTE ignored the first offer. In an exclusive interview with this writer, the then Indian High Commissioner, J. N. Dixit ruled out direct talks with Prabhakaran unless the LTTE chief responded positively to the ongoing ceasefire. Dixit did not mince his words when he declared that Prabhakaran should respond before 7 a.m. Sept. 26, 1988 or face the consequences. Dixit emphasised that the surrender of arms, ammunition and equipment belonging to the LTTE was a prerequisite for negotiations. Dixit was responding to a statement attributed to the LTTE, calling for unconditional talks.

The Indian High Commissioner was responding to The Island queries, after having high level consultations in New Delhi followed by a meeting with the then President JRJ. Dixit’s deputy, Nerupan Sen told the writer that there was no indication from New Delhi of any further extension of the ceasefire (Lay down arms for talks-India tells LTTE–The Island Sept. 25, 1988).

Presidential Secretary Lalith Weeratunga lambasted India at the launch of C. A. Chandraprema’s ‘Gota’s War’ at the Waters Edge last May. Weeratunga asserted that President Mahinda Rajapaksa would have reacted differently if he had come under the same pressure as the late President JRJ. J.N. Dixit had been lucky that he had had to deal with JRJ and not President Rajapaksa, Weeratunga declared. Among the distinguished invitees were many diplomats, including Indian High Commissioner Ashok K. Kantha. Weeratunga didn’t refer to the late President Ranasinghe Premadasa’s reaction to India’s role.

The Indian move received the backing of all Citizens’ Committees active in the Northern and Eastern districts, though none of them wanted to pressure the LTTE to accept the ceasefire. Instead, they appealed to Dixit to extend the ceasefire in the wake of an LTTE cadre lobbing a hand grenade at an IPKF vehicle at Punguduthivu on Sept. 23, 1988. IPKF personnel captured the attacker.

India strongly felt that all Tamil groups, including the LTTE should join the provincial administration. Dixit asserted that the LTTE wouldn’t get another opportunity if it spurned the latest offer. Although the LTTE ignored the Indian offer, many pointed out that Prabhakaran, too, had suspended attacks. They described the grenade attack on the IPKF at Punguduthivu as an isolated case. Speculation was rife of an understanding between India and the LTTE before the lapse of the ceasefire on the morning of Sept. 26, 1988.

It was the first formal attempt made by India in consultation with President JRJ to bring the LTTE back to the negotiating table, after the launch of Operation Pawan in the second week of Oct. 1987.

Interestingly, the IPKF made an attempt to establish contact with the LTTE through the Batticaloa Citizens’ Committee. The IPKF high command summoned the BCC for a meeting at the Batticaloa Rest House on Sept. 16, 1988 to explore ways and means of contacting the LTTE. The IPKF conveniently forgot its earlier threat to members of the BCC not to contact the LTTE. Addressing the BCC, Maj. Gen. Ashok K. Metha said that the IPKF was ready to extend its unilateral ceasefire if the LTTE responded positively to the Indian offer. Metha urged the BCC to facilitate a meeting between the IPKF and the LTTE (India to extend ceasefire to get LTTE to accept peace offer––The Island Sept 17, 1988).

Had the LTTE accepted the Indian offer, it could have had an opportunity to join the provincial administration.

LTTE resumes attacks

One day after the lapse of the 10-day ceasefire, the LTTE resumed operations with an attack in the Trincomalee District. The LTTE triggered a claymore mine explosion targeting an IPKF patrol before firing small arms. The attackers fled leaving three IPKF bodies. Four IPKF personnel suffered injuries. The people of Trincomalee launched a protest on the morning of Aug. 25, 1988 calling for an immediate ceasefire between the IPKF and the LTTE. The decision to launch the first major attack on the IPKF in Trincomalee was a signal to Tamil speaking people not to interfere with its strategy (Call for IPKF-LTTE ceasefire––The Island Aug. 26, 1988).

On Oct. 1, 1988, the LTTE killed an IPKF doctor and seriously wounded five other personnel close to the Monkey Bridge, Trincomalee.

The IPKF remained confident that it could ensure security, though the LTTE would make every effort to disrupt the election scheduled for Nov. 19, 1988. Overall Commander of the IPKF Lt. Gen. A.S. Kalkat assured the then Defence Secretary Gen. Sepala Attygalle that the IPKF was fully geared to provide security for the election in spite of LTTE threats (IPKF assures security for N-E poll––The Island Oct 2, 1988).

Although the then Elections chief Chandrananda de Silva announced that nominations would be accepted at kachcheris from Oct. 3 to Oct. 10, 1988, the LTTE ordered staff not to report for duty. Except for the Ampara and Trincomalee kachcheris other offices remained closed. Ahead of nominations, the IPKF moved the top leadership of the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) from Chennai to Sri Lanka in a special Indian Air Force flight. Subsequently, the IPKF made arrangements for those contesting the election to hand over their nominations (EPRLF fails to file nomination papers––The Island Oct. 4, 1988).

First recovery of missile

In the run-up to Nov. 19, 1988 polls, the IPKF recovered a shoulder-fired missile and a launcher during an operation conducted at Nallur in the Jaffna peninsula. The then Deputy Indian High Commissioner Nerupan Sen expressed concern over the possibility of the LTTE receiving the missile of Soviet origin through an agency or an organisation hostile to India. The recovery was made by Indian commandos (LTTE SAM was of Soviet make––The Island Aug. 5. 1988).

JRJ meets media

President JRJ rarely called a press conference to explain his position. On the afternoon of Oct. 5, 1988, the writer had the opportunity to cover a hastily arranged presidential media conference due to the absence of any of senior journalists at that time. President JRJ was flanked by the then Education Minister Ranil Wickremsinghe, Chief Minister of the Southern Provincial Council M.S. Amarasiri, Defence Secretary Sepala Attygalle and IGP Ernest Perera.

President JRJ lambasted the SLFP for not backing his efforts to quell the JVP insurgency, though the UNP had thrown its weight behind Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike’s regime during the 1971 insurgency. Whatever the criticism of those aligned with the JVP campaign of death and destruction, the government and the governing party, President JRJ vowed, would not in any way compromise national security and democracy. The President declared that the JVP had absolutely no popular support; it only had the SLFP’s backing. The UNP leader said that both the North and the South were in turmoil with a sharp upsurge in violence and the JVP seemed hell-bent on achieving its objectives and obviously did not believe in half measures, while reiterating his commitment to preserve democracy (JVP does not believe in half measures––The Island Oct 6, 1988).

During the briefing, JRJ never indicated the possibility of a fresh attempt to bring the JVP back to the political mainstream. In fact, he strongly backed the police for their efforts to quell the insurgency under extremely difficult circumstances. JRJ suspended police and military operations on Oct. 20, 1988 to facilitate a dialogue with the JVP. The government resumed operations on Nov. 1, 1988 in the wake a series of attacks. The resumption of government operations coincided with a major JVP attack on the Auxiliary Force Training Camp at Pannala. The attackers killed four personnel, including Lieut. Lanka Thalgahagoda. Although the attackers lost four men during the raid, they seized 447 weapons (Pannala training camp attacked––The Island Nov. 2, 1988).

Instead of responding positively to JRJ’s overtures, the JVP intensified attacks. The UNP, too, hit back hard. The JVP felt that JRJ could be brought to his knees through violence. The JVP exploited the IPKF’s presence as well as the merger of the Eastern Province with the Northern Province as a rallying point against the UNP. The JVP strongly believed the armed forces would ultimately turn their guns on the government. Although the UNP managed to recruit some members of the armed forces, it couldn’t attract a sizeable number to its ranks.

The JVP’s attempts to infiltrate at least the middle level officers, too, failed, though at one point it felt that the Indian intervention in the wake of Operation Liberation to regain the Jaffna peninsula, would cause an armed forces revolt. The JVP wrongly asserted that the attack on Indian Premier Rajiv Gandhi by a naval rating at a guard of honour at President’s House immediately after the Indian leader’s arrival in Colombo was an anti-JRJ action.

IPKF causes fresh controversy

In the run-up to the provincial council election, the IPKF announced a controversial plan to form another para-military force on the pretext of providing additional muscle to the local police. President JRJ had no option but to accept the Indian proposal. The IPKF was to recruit, train and deploy several thousands of men throughout the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The IPKF asserted that the new force would perform a task similar to that of the home guards (New para-military force for N-E––The Island Nov 6, 1988). Although the military and the police realised the danger of forming another armed group, no one dared voice his concern. The IPKF openly promoted the EPRLF as its choice at the PC election. The IPKF threw its full weight behind the EPRLF to ensure its victory against the UNP. The proposed armed force was to provide security to the EPRLF administration. The Colombo based diplomatic community turned a blind eye to what was going on in areas under IPKF control. The UNP was struggling on the Southern front. President JRJ’s administration lacked the strength to oppose the Indian move to further militarise the northern and eastern districts.

The first indication of the IPKF’s new move came to light in the last week of Oct. 1988, though it was being discussed at the highest level in New Delhi. The IPKF told some members of the BCC of its decision to recruit about 300 youth from the Batticaloa District to augment the new para-military force.

On the eve of the Nov. 19, 1988 election, violence claimed the lives of two jawans, three civilians and ten LTTE cadres. The LTTE also fired at the Valaichenai police station.

The IPKF mobilised its entire strength to thwart LTTE plans to disrupt the election. At the behest of its political masters in New Delhi, the IPKF rigged the election for the benefit of the EPRLF. The UNP and the SLMC couldn’t challenge the EPRLF’s superiority. The IPKF’s military might made the EPRLF ‘invincible’. In spite of being the President and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, JRJ was helpless.

The EPRLF won the first NE provincial council polls comfortably.