The day Mangala issued a warning to P’karan

 SPECIAL REPORT : Part 383

Published

  2021/09/1

Mangala Samaraweera left an unforgettable mark in politics

By Shamindra Ferdinando

The late Minister Mangala Samaraweera, on Sept. 8, 2006, warned the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of dire consequences,unless the group returned to the negotiating table. The LTTE quit the negotiating table, in April 2003, during Ranil Wickremesinghe’s tenure as the Premier. The warning was issued in his capacity as the Foreign Minister, at a meeting with the Colombo-based diplomatic community.

Reiterating the then President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s readiness to consider proposals for a comprehensive and verifiable cession of hostilities, Samaraweera warned the LTTE that military aggression, on their part, would entail, what he called, military costs to them.

The Minister said so when he addressed a section of the diplomatic community in the wake of the successful Army assault on the LTTE first-line of defence across the Kilali-Muhamalai frontline a few days before the military recaptured Sampur in the East on August 4 (Forces seize Tigers’ Jaffna frontline with strapline …any military aggression on their part would entail military costs to them-Foreign Minister, The Island, Sept 11, 2006)

Matara district lawmaker, Mangala Pinsiri Samaraweera, who first entered parliament at the 1989 general election, received the vital foreign affairs portfolio in the wake of the then Premier Mahinda Rajapaksa’s triumph at the 2005 presidential election.

Samaraweera, 65, succumbed to Covid-19, at Lanka Hospital, last week.

Rajapaksa won narrowly against UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe, who lost by fewer than 200,000 votes. The polls boycott ordered by the LTTE caused Wickremesinghe’s defeat; he lost the Northern Province Tamil vote, which is traditionally cast in favour of the UNP. Interestingly, the announcement of the undemocratic act of telling the Tamil people not to vote was done by the Tamil National Alliance.

Following the presidential election, the LTTE resumed its offensive action in the Jaffna peninsula, in the first week of Dec. 2005. The LTTE launched a spate of claymore mine attacks in the North in spite of the Oslo-arranged Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) still in place with Peace Co-Chairs, namely the US, Japan, EU and Norway, engaged in the process, in a supervisory role. It looked as if the self-appointed co-chairs were there more to wink at the LTTE as it staged hundreds of CFA violations.

 Following the failed attempt to assassinate the then Army Chief Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, in late April 2006, Mavil-aru battle, in June-July 2006, the LTTE launched large scale offensives, in both the northern and eastern theatres, simultaneously, in the second week of August 2006. The LTTE made some rapid territorial gains, though the armed forces gradually stabilised the situation, on both fronts. Having survived a suicide attack, in late April 2006, and flown to Singapore, where he received specialised treatment, Fonseka was obviously back, wanting to atone for what the LTTE did to him. Back at his heavily fortified headquarters in Colombo where he vowed to finish off the LTTE once and for all.

The LTTE strategy suffered another serious setback when then Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, too, survived an LTTE suicide attack in the first week of Dec 2006.

Foreign Minister Samaraweera issued the warning to the LTTE, ahead of the LTTE assassination attempt on Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Samaraweera received his first ministerial portfolio in 1994, thanks to President Kumaratunga, who accommodated him in her Cabinet as Posts and Telecommunications Minister. Kumaratunga also rewarded Samaraweera with Urban Development, Construction and Public Utilities.

 A cocky LTTE leadership felt confident that its formations could overwhelm the Army in the Jaffna peninsula, having disrupted the Trincomalee- Kankesanthurai Main Supply Route (MSR). Their plans eventually went awry. However, at the time Samaraweera issued the warning, in early Sept 2006, the LTTE was in a commanding position, with the West openly and repeatedly singing hosannas on its behalf claiming that the security forces were incapable of defeating it. A section of the diplomatic community, as well as various experts, believed the LTTE had the wherewithal to bring offensive actions, in the northern theatre, to a successful conclusion. But, by May 2009, just two years and 10 months after the LTTE resumed hostilities, its fighting cadre was left annihilated.

Mangala receives Foreign portfolio

President Rajapaksa rewarded Samaraweera with the Foreign Affairs portfolio, though the latter hadn’t been his first choice. Rajapaksa-Samaraweera duo emerged as a team during the second JVP-inspired insurgency (1987-1990) when they functioned as key spokespersons for the Mothers’ Front. The group represented the interests of those who had been at the receiving end of the military campaign, backed by UNP death squads. The late Anura Bandaranaike, too, expected the President to reappoint him as the Foreign Minister after his failure to secure the premiership with the JVP’s backing. Bandaranaike was sworn in as the Foreign Minister immediately after the assassination of Lakshman Kadirgamar on the night of August 12, 2005, at his private Bullers Lane residence.

It would be pertinent to mention that the JVP contested the 2004 parliamentary election on the UPFA ticket, following the short-lived so-called parivasa administration.

The JVP achieved the unthinkable by securing 39 seats, including three National List slots. In the immediate aftermath of the 2004 polls victory, the JVP, in a letter dated April 5, 2004, addressed to the then President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, demanded that Lakshman Kadirgamar be made the Premier.

JVP General Secretary Tilvin Silva emphasised that their second choice was Anura Bandaranaike and the third Maithripala Sirisena, the then General Secretary of the SLFP.

However, Maithripala Sirisena strongly advised Kumaratunga against the move, widely believed to have had the backing of staunch Kumaratunga loyalist Samaraweera. Son of the late Minister Mahanama Samaraweera and Khema Samaraweera, outspoken Mangala, a fashion designer by profession, was known for his controversial statements. Samaraweera daringly backed LGBT rights when such things were never even openly discussed here and was at the forefront of such campaigns.

If the JVP strategy succeeded, Mahinda Rajapaksa would have been deprived of the premiership in 2004 and the opportunity to contest the presidential poll in the following year. President Kumaratunga quite wrongly asserted that she could continue till 2006 as the presidential poll scheduled for 2000 under her watch was held in 1999. However, the Supreme Court torpedoed her move. With the collapse of Kumaratunga’s strategy, Samaraweera backed Rajapaksa’s candidature due to failure on her part to secure the backing of party seniors. Samaraweera played a significant role in the overall presidential polls campaign, though both Kumaratunga and Anura Bandaranaike skipped the campaign and more or less worked against Mahinda Rajapaksa, covertly.

Samaraweera had been among several SLFP seniors invited by President Rajapaksa on the evening of Nov 19, 2005 to inform them of the allocation of Cabinet portfolios. The late Jeyaraj Fernandopulle, Maithripala Sirisena, Nimal Siripala de Silva, Mangala Samaraweera, Rohitha Bogollagama, Basil Rajapaksa (not a member of Parliament at the time) and Lalith Weeratunga had been present. Dullas Alahapperuma, too, had been present, though he didn’t sit at that meeting.

“President Rajapaksa didn’t consult anyone as regards allocation of portfolios. He simply informed those who were seated around an oval shaped table what they were going to get. UNPer Rohitha Bogollagama, who switched his allegiance to the SLFP during Kumaratunga’s tenure was offered the Foreign Affairs portfolio. Bogollagama, who held the Foreign Investment portfolio at that time, inquired whether he could retain the same in addition to the foreign affairs. However, the allocation of portfolios quite clearly irritated some party seniors. Shortly, thereafter, only Rohitha Bogollagama sat with President Rajapaksa for dinner whereas others left,” a source familiar with the Temple Trees discussion told the writer.

“Subsequently, the Rajapaksas reached a consensus with Samaraweera by offering him the Finance portfolio, originally offered to Bogollagama, who accepted the reality.

 Some believed Samaraweera expected the premiership and was quite disappointed when he was told he couldn’t retain the Urban Development portfolio. Samaraweera couldn’t maintain peace with the Rajapaksas and was unceremoniously stripped of the Foreign portfolio, in January 2007, in the wake of him pursuing an agenda opposed to that of the then Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa.

President brought in Bogollagama as the Foreign Minister. One-time UNPer handled the Ministry during the most challenging period with the West exerting tremendous pressure to undermine the war effort.

Ousted from SLFP, Mangala joins UNP

In spite of losing the foreign portfolio, Samaraweera antagonised the Rajapaksas by pursuing an agenda which the latter considered was severely inimical to the overall war effort. President Rajapaksa also felt that Samaraweera’s strategy undermined the ruling party, particular at a time the military was engaged in a desperate battle with the LTTE. Finally, President Rajapaksa sacked Samaraweera, along with Anura Bandaranaike and Sripathy Sooriyaarachchi, in the second week of Feb 2007.

However, within days after declaring war on the Rajapaksas, Bandaranaike backtracked and quietly reached an agreement with the ruling clan. President removed the trio after they skipped the vote on the state of emergency. Bandaranaike re-joined what he called ‘Carnival of Clowns’ much to the dismay of Samaraweera, who didn’t receive the support pledged by his colleagues.

A dejected Samaraweera formed the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (Mahajana) Wing. Samaraweera couldn’t secure the much expected backing required to sustain his campaign and finally disbanded his unregistered party, in August 2010, to accept the UNP membership. However, by then Samaraweewa had re-entered Parliament, from the Matara district, on the UNP ticket. Samaraweera had no option but to accept Ranil Wickremesinghe’s leadership and worked diligently for the UNP’s victory, five years later.

Samaraweera played quite a significant role as an Opposition UNP member (2010-2015) and member of the yahapalana administration (2015-2019) before he switched his allegiance to Samagi Jana Balavegaya (SJB) leader Sajith Premadasa.

However, Samaraweera deserted Premadasa in next to no time ahead of the last parliamentary election in August 2020. In an obvious bid meant to undermine the SJB, Samaraweera declared he wouldn’t be in the fray though he handed over nominations as the leader of the Matara District SJB.

Role in 2010 prez poll

In his capacity as the Foreign Minister, Samaraweera clashed with Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s strategy. One of the major issues of disagreement between the two was Samaraweera’s push for the re-opening of the Kandy-Jaffna road, at Muhamalai, to pave the way for the resumption of overland traffic to and from the Jaffna peninsula. Gotabaya Rajapaksa dismissed the suggestion. Rajapaksa asserted that Muhamalai wouldn’t be re-opened through negotiations with the LTTE. Instead, the re-opening would be done by clearing the LTTE fortifications across the Kilali-Muhamalai-Nagarkovil line.

 The then Defence Secretary Rajapaksa told the writer of his decision not to re-open the Muhamalai entry/exit point in agreement with the LTTE, under no circumstances. They also disagreed on the deployment of SLAF choppers to move LTTE leaders around (this was done in terms of the Oslo understanding) and the handling of international NGOs. The Foreign Ministry asserted the military would antagonise Western powers whereas the Defence Secretary emphasised that nothing could be allowed to undermine the war effort.

As promised, the government re-opened the Kandy-Jaffna A9 road, only after the eradication of the LTTE in 2009.

Having ridiculed Fonseka as a person not even capable of commanding the Salvation Army, Samaraweera had no qualms in accepting the challenging task of being the Opposition candidate’s campaign strategist. In fact, Samaraweera, on behalf of Fonseka, assured the US of his good intentions. One such meeting took place on January 6, 2010, a few days before the then US Ambassador in Colombo, Patricia Butenis, in a leaked diplomatic memo, named the Rajapaksa brothers, Mahinda, Gotabaya and Basil and Sarath Fonseka, as war criminals. The massive defeat suffered by Fonseka, at the January 2010 presidential election, revealed serious shortcomings in the overall strategy. The Fonseka campaign suffered due to foolish attempts to placate the Tamil electorate by blaming the Army for battlefield executions during the last phase of the Vanni east offensive. Samaraweera played a significant role in forming the US backed alliance which included the Tamil National Alliance, onetime cat’s paw of Velupillai Prabhakaran. Samaraweera also facilitated the JVP’s participation in the high profile project, spearheaded by the UNP.

Having defeated Ranil Wickremesinghe, by 180,000 votes, at the 2005 presidential election, the President secured a second term by polling over 1.8mn more votes than the war- winning Army Commander. Obviously, Samaraweera’s strategy didn’t work, though many, including some sections of the diplomatic community, strongly believed the former Foreign Minister could turn tables on Mahinda Rajapaksa. At the end, the UNP-led camp made a ridiculous bid to blame the humiliating defeat Fonseka suffered on what bankrupt JVP called a computer jilmaart (fraud)

Mangala as yahapalana FM

 Samaraweera who enjoyed excellent relations with the JVP at politically crucial periods, played strategic roles in both the SLFP and UNP-led camps. At the 2005 presidential poll, Samaraweera threw his weight behind Mahinda Rajapaksa and five years later the electorate saw him spearheading Fonseka’s presidential campaign. Samaraweera proved again in politics there were no permanent friends or enemies.

 Perhaps, one of Samaraweera’s major successes was his ability to secure the support of the powerful Tamil Diaspora. Samaraweera was quite satisfied with the way he handled the Diaspora in the run-up to the 2015 presidential election. The writer, who accompanied the government delegation to London, led by President Sirisena, had an opportunity to discuss the matter with the then Foreign Minister Samaraweera during the visit a couple of months after the presidential election.

Samaraweera facilitated the TNA’s backing for Sirisena that made his triumph over Mahinda Rajapaksa a reality.

The writer sought GTF’s spokesperson Suren Surendiran’s comment on Samaraweera’s demise Surendiran said that his first ever interaction with the late lawmaker had been in 2017 in his personal capacity. However, as the GTF spokesperson, Surendiran had interacted with Samaraweera, in 2011, and again when he visited the UK, in 2012, over dinner at his place with fellow colleagues of GTF. Surendiran said: “In September 2013 we formally met along with other politicians and civil society activists from Sri Lanka, and overseas, in Singapore. We, as GTF, have met him several times in the UK, Germany, Washington, Switzerland, Australia and Singapore.”

Responding to another query, Surendiran said that Samaraweera had been instrumental in arranging the GTF’s first meeting with the then President Maithripala Sirisena, in 2015, in London. Yes, I met you (the writer) downstairs after that meeting). “Mangala was not just a fellow Sri Lankan and politician, he was a great friend. Mangala spoke to several of us from GTF, from various countries, at a virtual meeting, on 17 July 2021. My last personal interaction was on 06 August, 2021, via texts. Under normal circumstances he would have wished me on my birthday but that wasn’t to be as he was moved to ICU a couple of days before.”

Unlike many of his colleagues in the government and the Opposition, Samaraweera never hesitated to take a public stand on the post-war national reconciliation process. Samaraweera openly contradicted President Sirisena’s frequent claims that he hadn’t been aware of the finalisation of the Geneva Resolution on Oct 1, 2015.

Responding to the strong criticism of his role in the Geneva process, Samaraweera included the following section in a bigger statement he issued during the yahapalana administration: The final text of the resolution was largely negotiated over the phone, with the President and I at the same hotel in New York, and the Prime Minister in Colombo, accompanied by the Secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the time, and the Ambassador of the US and High Commissioner of the UK. Once consensus was reached , the Secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the time, who was in Colombo, had coordinated with Sri Lanka’s Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva and conveyed the decision of the Government of Sri Lanka to the Human Rights Council.”

What Samaraweera didn’t say was that Sri Lanka’s Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva, Ravinatha Aryasinghe, had rejected the draft just over a week before, during informal discussion with the Sri Lanka Core Group, headed by the US. Whatever the likes of Samaraweera said the UNP earned the wrath of the people for what was called Geneva betrayal. The treachery in Geneva proved to be as bad as the Treasury bond scams, in Feb 2015 and March 2016, leading to the humiliating defeat at the Feb 2018 Local Government polls. Although President Sirisena switched portfolios, held by Samaraweera and Finance Minister Ravi Karunanayake, in May 2017 in consultation with UNP leader Wickremesinghe, the rot continued unabated. The Wickremesinghe-Samaraweera led strategy that pushed the country towards the US-led Quad alliance with Sri Lanka entering into a Comprehensive Partnership with Japan in the first week of Oct 2015, in addition to talks on SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement) and MCC (Millennium Challenge Corporation) agreements also with the US against the backdrop of President Sirisena entering into ACSA (Access and Cross Servicing Agreement) didn’t help the then government at all.

Finally, Samaraweera abandoned the UNP and joined the newly formed SJB soon after the 2019 presidential poll only to quit the parliamentary election at the eleventh hour. Following the SLPP’s sweeping victory at the general election, Samaraweera launched a political campaign with the involvement of some civil society activists. His office, situated at T.B. Jayah Mawatha a little distance away from SLFP main office, was called ‘Freedom Hub’, where he addressed his last media briefing on July 25.

Samaraweera warned the current leadership of the dire financial crisis experienced by the country not only due to the raging Covid-19 epidemic but waste, corruption, irregularities and negligence as well. At the time Samaraweera served as the Finance Minister (May 2017 to Nov 2019) the government revenue surpassed Rs 1,900 bn. The shortsighted policy of the SLPP that did away with a range of taxes and duties, immediately after the presidential election resulted in the loss of over Rs 500 bn in government revenue, which too contributed to the current messy financial situation. Perhaps one of Samaraweera’s major achievements was the transformation of the telecommunications sector though he too couldn’t absolve himself of being part of an utterly corrupt and ruinous political party system.

India’s Vietnam moment, US pullout and Afghan dilemma

  SPECIAL REPORT : Part 382

Published

  2021/08/25

UNP’s call to terminate diplomatic relations with Taliban questionable

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Can the recent US pullout, from Afghanistan, be compared with the Indian withdrawal, from Sri Lanka ,in late March 1990? Some sections of the Western media, at that time ,called the disastrous Indian military intervention here (July 1987-March 1990) India’s Vietnam. Reference was also made to what some called India’s Vietnam moment. The Washington Post report, that dealt with the situation in Sri Lanka, in the wake of ‘Operation Pawan,’ was aptly headlined, India’s Vietnam? The US media giant declared: “One reason that Sri Lanka had been unable to tame the ‘Tamil Tigers’ was the support that an indulgent New Delhi had let flow to them from India’s 50 million Tamils.”

What the Washington Post report, dated Oct 27, 1987, left unsaid, was that New Delhi armed over a half a dozen terrorist groups, in Sri Lanka, on the specific instructions of the then Indian Premier, Indira Gandhi, though Tamil Nadu was routinely blamed for the aggression. No less a person than the late Indian National Security Advisor and veteran diplomat J.N. Dixit, who had been Indian High Commissioner in Colombo (1985-1989) in his memoirs ‘Makers of India’s Foreign Policy’ acknowledged the executive prime ministerial decision to arm terrorists here.

Dixit’s declaration should be examined against the backdrop of Indira Gandhi‘s assassination by her Sikh bodyguards, on Oct 31, 1984. When did Indira Gandhi actually authorise arming of terrorist groups in Sri Lanka?

May be we shouldn’t be so unkind to Mrs. Gandhi, for obviously she was also a victim of circumstances, clearly sowed by the West. Mind you this was a time when the West was clearly lighting separatist fires right across India, be it in Punjab, Assam or Tripura. And the separatist fire that was lit here had, as its final aim, the breakup of India. The July ’83 riots, in the country, were clearly due to manipulation of the police here not to nip it in the bud by powerful interests. We even saw at firsthand how police, in different areas, went round egging the poor, among the Sinhalese and Muslims, to attack Tamils, who were considered the haves. So, in the resultant picture of mob violence, against hapless Tamils, that was created, can we blame Mrs. Gandhi for the counter steps that she took? She wanted to show the huge long restless Tamil population, in Tamil Nadu, that it was not the West that would give succor and protection to Tamils, in Sri Lanka, but mother India. The West even would have had plenty of infiltrators among her intelligence to feed her fears. From the word go, mind you, it was not in India that many of these separatists had their rear bases but in the capitals of the powerful West. For example, the LTTE International Secretariat was based in London, even after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi by it. Of course, their lame excuse was that the LTTE had not violated British laws!

She may have even assented to the ambush of a Sri Lankan military patrol, by Tamil terrorists, at Thinnavely, Jaffna, that was used by vested forces to trigger the anti-Tamil violence, in the south, with police not lifting a finger to stop it, let alone even firing a warning shot.

There had been an interesting incident, around 1977, at a cocktail party, in Manila, where a big talking American, who was obviously after one too many, had boasted to our Ambassador there, the late Oliver Perera, that soon there would be an armed rebellion, by Tamils, in Sri Lanka!

Obviously, Indira Gandhi’s assassination didn’t halt the despicable Indian project which culminated with the deployment of the Indian Army here. She was succeeded by son Rajiv, 40, the sixth and the youngest Indian Premier who intensified assistance to terrorist groups here. PM Gandhi also intervened, on behalf of the LTTE ,when the latter faced certain defeat in the hands of the Sri Lankan military.

If Rajiv Gandhi returned at the 1989 general election, the then Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa, elected in the previous year, wouldn’t have succeeded in getting rid of the Indian Army. Those who propagated, and justified, New Delhi’s direct intervention, here, following the July 1983 violence, directed at the Tamil community, conveniently ignored the truth that India triggered the riots by causing the deaths of 13 soldiers at Thinnaveli, in Jaffna. There had never been such a devastating attack on the Army, until Indian trained terrorists wiped out the lightly armed mobile patrol.

Can the US invasion of Afghanistan, in the wake of the 9/11 carnage, and the Indian military misadventure, in Sri Lanka, be compared? In the case of Afghanistan, the US invaded that country, on the pretext of going after those responsible for 9/11, receiving refuge there, whereas New Delhi forced Army deployment here to impose a ‘political’ solution. Over 30 years later, the Indian solution is on the Geneva agenda!

On both occasions, powerful foreign forces had pathetically failed to achieve their primary objectives, though the circumstances were totally different. For the US, both Afghanistan and the fall of Saigon, way back, in late April 1975, meant the humiliating failure of Washington’s strategic policy. In other words, the US abandoned South Vietnam and Afghanistan administrations, and here, in Sri Lanka, India gave up a Tamil administration, installed by its Army. India went to the extent of forming, what was dubbed, Tamil National Army (TNA) to protect the NE provincial administration.

The US-led NATO forces, invaded Afghanistan to destroy the Taliban administration, accused of providing safe haven to those responsible for the 9/11 attacks, though, at the end, the US negotiated with them whereas the Indian military mission was meant to disarm Tamil groups, once sponsored by New Delhi. It would be pertinent to mention that the US invaded Afghanistan, though the majority of those involved in the 9/11 attacks, were Saudis. Of the 19 attackers, 15 were Saudi citizens, two were from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), one was from Lebanon, and one from Egypt.

India destabilised Sri Lanka in a bid to create a situation, conducive for deployment of its Army, followed by Provincial Council elections, rigged in favour of the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF). With the Indian Army deployed in Sri Lanka, New Delhi forced the then JRJ administration to introduce the 13th Amendment to the Constitution. As the writer pointed out before, the 13th Amendment has ended up in the Geneva agenda.

Perhaps, those who had referred to New Delhi’s military misadventure here as India’s Vietnam may consider calling the US withdrawal, from Afghanistan, America’s Sri Lanka moment. The US pullout caused the immediate collapse of 72-year-old Mohammad Ashraf Ghani’s Afghan administration. Twice President Ghani, with the knowledge of the US, secured political asylum in the UAE. Ghani couldn’t have done so without the blessings of the Biden administration. International media coverage of the pathetic scenes at the Kabul airport must have deeply embarrassed the US. Those who believed the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces — including an 180,000 strong Afghan National Army, and a police force with 150,000 personnel, besides an Air Force, and other security wings — trained by the US military, NATO and India – could face up to the Taliban. They simply folded up like a house of cards, proving utterly unequal to the task of holding on to territory, and containing the Taliban. The Afghan imbroglio cannot be discussed without taking into consideration the US-Taliban agreement, finalised in Doha, in Qatar, in February, last year. In other words, Biden implemented the agreement between his predecessor Trump and the Taliban. Most probably, the US must have sealed the fate of its costly mission by its blind drone strikes there, which would have killed many hundreds, if not thousands, of innocents, thereby turning many more Afghans against the whole false façade of the West, fighting for human rights and fair play for their much-exploited women. Surely, how many times did they strike funeral processions, or weddings, while targeting the Taliban, using their smart missiles? Now, they and their allies have turned tail and run, leaving behind for the Taliban to use billions of dollars’ worth of state-of-the-art weapons!

India also stepped up engagement with Taliban, in the wake of US moves to bring the 20-year-old disastrous Afghan chapter to an end. One shouldn’t be surprised by the Indian strategy, as India cannot lose its relationship with Afghanistan, in the wake of the US pullout. That would be a major blunder on India’s part. Perhaps, the Afghan military received instructions, from those who sponsored them, to quickly give up the fight. That possibility cannot be ruled out. Perhaps, Ghani knew of that likelihood. In spite of being trained and equipped by US and its NATO allies, the Afghan Army didn’t have the guts to face the Taliban, who advanced to Kabul without facing any organised resistance. Quad member India, too, provided training to thousands of Afghan officers, and men, both in Afghanistan as well as at various training facilities, in India, over a period of time. India also provided a range of weapons, including helicopter gunships to Afghanistan. Of several Mi-24 helicopter gunships provided by India, the Taliban seized one as the Afghan Army quickly gave up the fight for Kabul. The swift collapse of the Afghan Army must have definitely embarrassed those who trained them.

India deployed Mi-24s against the LTTE here whereas the Sri Lanka Air Force acquired the same, in 1995, after the LTTE introduced surface-to-air heat seeking missiles.

In 1990, Sri Lanka faced a situation similar to that faced by the Afghan military. The Sri Lankan military struggled to cope up with an unprecedented crisis. The vacuum created by the Indian withdrawal had to be filled quickly but the Army lacked the strength. However, the country’s intrepid armed forces faced the challenge. The military saved the country from a catastrophe, in the wake of the Indian pullout.

The writer was among a group of journalists, invited to board INS Magar,on the morning of March 24, 1990, at the Trincomalee harbour, soon after the last contingent of Indian troops boarded the troop-carrier. The vessel left the port to the farewell strains of Auld lang syne, played by the Sri Lankan military. Before their departure, the Indian Commander, here, Lt. General A.S. Kalkat, declared, on board INS Magar: “We came as a proud force and are leaving as a proud force.” India lost 1,155 IPKF officers, and men, on top of 2,984 personnel wounded. India never bothered to build a monument for those who perished during the conflict here.

The Afghan Army didn’t have the stomach to fight the Taliban though there were some confrontations between them, as the US stepped up withdrawal. India re-trained Tamil terrorists, belonging to several groups, as well as new cadres, including underage children, as a last minute effort to establish, what was then known as the Tamil National Army. The TNA was meant to protect the then North-East administration of EPRLF strongman Varatharaja Perumal. However, the TNA collapsed, even before India completed its withdrawal, under controversial circumstances. India evacuated Perumal, along with those near and dear to him. The LTTE assassinated Rajiv Gandhi over a year later. Gandhi’s crime was sending the Indian Army here. Prabhakaran conveniently forgot how Gandhi saved him, in 1987, when the Sri Lanka Army was advancing on his hideout in the Vadamaratchchy region.

Resumption of hostilities

March 24, 1990, Trincomalee harbour: The last batch of Indian Army to leave Sri Lanka at the end of the disastrous mission

Less than three months, after India quit Sri Lanka, the LTTE resumed hostilities. Having gained valuable experience in fighting South Asia’s largest Army, the LTTE obviously believed the relatively smaller Sri Lanka Army could be overwhelmed in a meticulously planned offensive. By the end of June 1990, the LTTE had taken control of the Northern and Eastern Provinces, with the military confined to major bases. The police remained within their stations. When the writer, accompanied a group of journalists, assigned to cover the Indian departure ,from Trincomalee, the eastern port city was under threat. Both police and the military therein had no qualms in acknowledging the growing threat posed by LTTE units, operating just outside the town. Had the LTTE plan succeeded, Sri Lanka would have suffered an irrevocable setback in the Northern theatre of operations. As a result of miscalculations, on the part of the then political leadership, the LTTE had an opportunity to build up the required strength for a major offensive. The LTTE had the wherewithal to neutralise the Army, north of Vavuniya. Destruction, and the vacation of Army detachments, along the Kandy-Jaffna A9 road, isolated the Jaffna peninsula.

The LTTE couldn’t achieve its primary objective as the Army, in spite of being surrounded, managed to hold onto its strategic Elephant Pass base. The public would be surprised to know, at the time the LTTE resumed hostilities, the Army didn’t even have two battalions deployed in the entire Northern and Vanni regions. The then political and military leaderships never bothered to make contingency plans, as the Indians gradually withdrew from the Northern and Eastern regions. The last Indian contingent left by air, and sea, from Trincomalee, leaving the LTTE to isolate and destroy the police and the military. The LTTE realised the difficulties experienced by the military, primarily due to them not being at least engaged in proper patrolling. The armed forces, and the police, had been successful in neutralising the JVP threat (1987-1990) though the conventional LTTE challenge was not anticipated. The military hadn’t been prepared in the immediate aftermath of the Indian pullout.

Once the LTTE resumed hostilities, in the East, where the group massacred several hundred policemen, after they surrendered, on a government directive, the fighting quickly spread to the Northern theatre. The LTTE overran the Kokavil detachment, north of Vavuniya, in June 1990, and swiftly established control over the Vanni region. Successive governments had to move supplies, required by the military, and police, deployed in the Jaffna peninsula, by sea and air. The overland Main Supply Route (MSR) was restored in January 2009, during the final phase of the Vanni offensive.

The military and the police thwarted two JVP insurrections in 1971 and 1987-1990 and defeated conventional military challenges posed by the LTTE.

When the LTTE resumed hostilities, within months after the Indian withdrawal, in March 1990, the total strength of the Army had been 60,596 officers, and men, in both the Regular and Volunteer Forces. They had been deployed in isolated bases, with the majority outside the Northern and Eastern regions and, if not for the bravery of ordinary men and resolute leadership, given by some officers, they would have been overwhelmed in the Northern Province. Of the total strength at that time, the Regular Army comprised 2,221 officers and 36,304 other ranks. The Sri Lanka Army must have found the ground situation extremely difficult to handle as, at the height of the Indian Army deployment here, the IPKF comprised approximately 100,000 officers and men.

TNA’s view on Taliban

Jaffna District Illankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK) MP Sivagnanam Sridharan recently compared the spectacularly successful Taliban advance, on Kabul, and the Tamil community’s struggle. Sridharan declared that struggles, undertaken by minority communities, could erupt at any moment. Justifying their struggle, MP Sridharan warned of dire consequences if the community was suppressed. Obviously, the Jaffna District lawmaker believed the Taliban’s return to Kabul boosted the Tamil community. Sridharan should be reminded that his political party served the LTTE’s terror project, from 2001 until the crushing military defeat of the organisation, in May 2009. The TNA believed in the LTTE’s capability to bring its terror project to a successful conclusion. MP Sridharan, expecting Taliban to provide a boost, shouldn’t come as a surprise, as another TNA lawmaker. M.A. Sumanthiran, PC, attempted to exploit the 2019 Easter Sunday attacks. The TNA heavyweight had no doubts in issuing a warning, a week after the Easter Sunday carnage (at the BMICH), when he declared that such attacks should be expected if grievances of minorities weren’t addressed.

Norwegian Anders Behring Breivik, 32, shocked the world, in late July 2011, by massacring 90 and wounding over 300 in two separate incidents. Breivik made references to the LTTE as a role model in his ‘manifesto’ that was released to the web, hours before the devastating bomb attack, in central Oslo, and the subsequent shooting rampage in an island resort. So no one should be surprised over MP Sridharan talking in glowing terms about Taliban’s triumph, or MP Sumanthiran seeing the Easter Sunday massacre as a way to pressure the government over minority rights.

UNP Chairman Vajira Abeywardena’s recent call to terminate diplomatic ties with Afghanistan, in the wake of the Taliban triumph, reminded the writer of UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe assuring Japan (now a Quad member) that the LTTE hadn’t been involved with Al Qaeda. The assurance was given at a meeting organised by the Japan Center for Conflict Prevention (JCCP) at the Imperial Hotel. The writer accompanied the GoSL delegation, led by the then Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe whose task was to appreciate the Japanese role in the Oslo-led peace process (LTTE not linked to al-Qaeda, PM tells Japan-The Sunday Island, Dec 8, 2002). The Taliban provided a safe haven for those who had fought the Soviet Union, in the wake of its invasion of Afghanistan, in Dec 1979. Osama bin Laden had been among those who secured the protection of Taliban, having served US interests during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The Western media, and top US officials, have routinely referred to Afghanistan being the Soviet Union’s Vietnam. Decades later, the same fate has befallen the US military.

How Shangri-La made Akuregoda Defence Complex a reality

  SPECIAL REPORT : Part 381

Published

  2021/08/18

Front view of Akuregoda Defence Complex

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Wartime Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who made a new Defence Complex a reality, visited the sprawling building in his capacity as the President, Defence Minister and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on the morning of August 3. It was Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s maiden visit to the Army Headquarters, located within the partially completed Defence Complex.

In addition to the Army Headquarters, the Defence Ministry, too, has been moved to the Defence Complex whereas the work on the Navy and Air Force Headquarters are underway. The reportage of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s visit didn’t take into consideration how such a massive project came into fruition.

The war-winning Mahinda Rajapaksa government laid the foundation for the building project on May 11, 2011, two years after the eradication of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as a military threat that was tearing apart the nation for nearly 30 years. The high profile project, on a 77 acre land, at Akuregoda, Pelawatta, was meant to bring the Army, Navy, and the Air Force headquarters, and the Defence Ministry, to one location.

The project is the largest single building venture undertaken by the government after the successful conclusion of the war, in May 2009, and Mahinda Rajapaksa’s a landslide victory at 2010 presidential, beating war-winning Army Commander the then General Sarath Fonseka.

President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s defeat at the 2015 presidential election, and the still raging Covid-19 epidemic, caused considerable delay. It would be pertinent to mention that the 19th Amendment enacted by now estranged Maithripala Sirisena and Ranil Wickremesinghe in 2015 deprived the former’s successor from holding the defence portfolio. Having won the presidency in 2019, Gotabaya Rajapaksa brought in the 20thA in Oct, 2020 at the expense of the 19thA to eliminate legal impediments preventing him from taking over the Defence portfolio.

President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s visit to Akuregoda would have definitely taken place much earlier, under a very different environment, if not for the eruption of the Covid-19 pandemic, just a few months after his victory at the Nov 2019 election. The worst post-World War II crisis that had caused devastating losses to national economies, the world over, and delivered a staggering blow to Sri Lanka, heavily dependent on tourism, garment exports and remittances by its expatriate workers. President Gotabaya Rajapaksa hadn’t minced his words when he publicly acknowledged the catastrophe caused by the plunging of the national income and the daunting challenge in debt repayment amounting to as much as USD 4 bn annually.

The decision to shift the tri-forces headquarters and the Defence Ministry (The Defence Ministry situated within the Army Headquarters premises) caused a media furor with the Opposition alleging a massive rip-off. The then Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa reiterated his commitment to the project. If not for the change of government in 2015, the Akuregoda Defence Complex would have been completed during Mahinda Rajapaksa’s third term. Had that happened, Gotabaya Rajapaksa wouldn’t have emerged as the then Opposition presidential candidate at the 2019 poll. The disastrous yahapalana administration and the overall deterioration of those political parties, represented in Parliament, and the 19thA that barred Mahinda Rajapaksa from contesting the presidential election, beyond his two terms, created an environment conducive for Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s emergence as the newly registered SLPP’s candidate.

On his arrival at the new Army headquarters, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa was welcomed by General Shavendra Silva, who is also the Chief of Defence Staff. Thanks to the incumbent President’s predecessor, Maithripala Sirisena, the then Maj. Gen Shavendra Silva was promoted to the rank of Lt. Gen and appointed the Commander of the Army on Aug 18, 2019, just three months before the presidential poll. The appointment was made in spite of strong opposition of the UNP leadership and US criticism.

President Gotabaya Rajapaksa promoted the Army Commander to the rank of a Four-Star General on Dec 20, 2020.

The Army moved into new headquarters on Nov 8, 2019, about its a week ahead of the presidential election, in the wake of President Sirisena declaring it open before he went out of office, though work on the rest of the defence complex was far from over.

Shangri-La move

During the presidential election campaign, SLPP candidate Gotabaya Rajapaksa strongly defended his decision to vacate the Army headquarters during Mahinda Rajapaksa presidency to pave the way for the Shangri-La-Hotel in Colombo. Shangri-La was among the hotels targeted by the Easter Sunday bombers – the only location targeted by two of them, including mastermind Zahran.

President Gotabaya Rajapaksa is on record as having said that vacation of the site had been in accordance with first executive President J.R. Jayewardene’s decision to move key government buildings away from the city.

Gotabaya Rajapaksa said that a despicable attempt was being made to blame him for the Army Headquarters land transaction. “I have been accused of selling the Army Headquarters land to the Chinese.”

Rajapaksa explained that Taj Samdura, too, had been built on a section of the Army headquarters land, previously used to accommodate officers’ quarters and the Army rugger grounds. Although President Jayewardene had wanted the Army headquarters shifted, successive governments couldn’t do that due to the war and lack of funds, he said.

The Rajapaksa administration brought the war to a successful conclusion in May 2009. President Maithripala Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe declared open Shangri-La Colombo on Nov 16, 2017. Hong Kong-based Shangri-La Asia invited Gotabaya Rajapaksa for dinner the following day after the opening of its Colombo hotel. Shangri-La Chairperson, Kuok Hui Kwong, the daughter of Robert Kuok Khoon Ean, was there to welcome Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who had cleared the way for the post-war mega tourism investment project. Among those who had been invited were former President Mahinda Rajapaksa, former External Affairs Minister Prof. G.L. Peiris, former Presidential Secretary Lalith Weeratunga and President’s Counsel Gamini Marapana, PC.

The Cabinet granted approval for the high profile Shangri-La project in Oct 2010 and the ground-breaking ceremony was held in late Feb 2012.

Rajapaksa said that the Shangri-La proprietor, a Chinese, ran a big operation based in Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore. Another parcel of land was given to the mega ITC hotel project also during the previous Rajapaksa administration.

Following the change of government in January 2015, the remaining section of the Army headquarters land, too, was handed over to Shangri-La.

Gotabaya Rajapaksa emphasised that the relocation of the headquarters of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as the Defence Ministry, had been part of JRJ’s overall plan. The change of government, in January 2015, had caused a serious delay in completing the project and it was proceeding at a snail’s pace, Rajapaksa said. Even Parliament was shifted to Kotte in accordance with the JRJ plan, Gotabaya Rajapaksa said, explaining his move to relocate all security forces’ headquarters and Defence Ministry into one complex at Akuregoda.

Acknowledging that the Army headquarters had been there at Galle Face for six decades, Rajapaksa asserted that the Colombo headquarters wasn’t tactically positioned.

Rajapaksa blamed the inordinate delay in the completion of the Akuregoda complex on the Treasury taking hold of specific funds allocated for the project.

New Defence Complex

Army Chief Gen. Shavendra Silva welcomes President Gotabaya Rajapaksa

Major Gen. Udaya Nanayakkara had been the first Director, Project Management Unit, with overall command of approximately 5,000 tri-forces personnel assigned to carry it out. The Shangri-La transaction provided the wherewithal to implement the Akuregoda project though the change of government caused a setback. Nanayakkara, who had served as the Military Spokesman, during Eelam War IV, oversaw the military deployment, whereas private contractors handled specialised work such as piling, AC, fire protection and fire detection et al. The then MLO (Military Liaison Officer) at the Defence Ministry Maj. Gen Palitha Fernando had laid the foundation for the project and the work was going on smoothly when the yahapalana administration withheld funds. Political intervention delayed the project and by Sep 2015, Nanayakkara was replaced by Maj Gen Mahinda Ambanpola, of Engineer Service.

In spite of President Sirisena holding the Defence portfolio, he couldn’t prevent the top UNP leadership from interfering in the Akuregoda project. However, the Shangri-La project had the backing of A.J.M. Muzammil, the then UNP Mayor and one of the close confidants of UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe. Muzammil was among those present at the ground breaking ceremony held on Feb 24th, 2012 with the participation of Minister Basil Rajapaksa.

Having identified the invaluable land, where the Army Headquarters and Defence Ministry were situated, for its project, Shangri-La made its move. Those who had been aware of Shangri-La’s plans were hesitant and certainly not confident of their success. They felt fearful of Defence Secretary Rajapaksa’s reaction.

But, following swift negotiations, they finalised the agreement on Dec 28, 2010. Lt. Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya was the then Commander of the Army, with his predecessor General Fonseka in government custody after having been arrested within two weeks after the conclusion of the 2010 January 26 Presidential poll.

Addressing the annual Viyathmaga Convention at Golden Rose Hotel, Boralesgamuwa, on March 4, 2017, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, perhaps for the first time publicly discussed his role in the Shangri-La project. Declaring that Sri Lanka suffered for want of what he called a workable formula to achieve post-war development objectives, the war veteran stressed the pivotal importance of swift and bold decision-making.

Gotabaya Rajapaksa explained how the government had acted swiftly, and decisively, to attract foreign investment though some such efforts were not successful. There couldn’t be a better example than the government finalising an agreement with Shangri-La Hotels, he said.

Declaring that the bureaucratic red tape shouldn’t in any way be allowed to undermine investments, Rajapaksa recalled Chairman/CEO of Shangri-La Hotels and Resorts, Robert Kuok Khoon Ean, wanting the Army headquarters land for his Colombo project. In fact, the hotels chain, at the time, had proposed to build hotels in Colombo, Hambantota and Batticaloa, and was one of the key investors wanting to exploit Sri Lanka’s success in defeating terrorism.

“Khoon-Ean’s request for the Army headquarters land caused a serious problem for me. It was a serious challenge. How could I shift the headquarters of the war-winning Army? The Army had been there for six decades. It had been the nerve centre of the war effort for 30 years,” said Rajapaksa.

Rajapaksa went on to explain how he exploited a decision taken by the first executive president J.R. Jayewardene to shift the Army headquarters to Battaramulla, many years back. “Within two weeks, in consultation with the Secretary to the Finance Ministry, Dr. P.B. Jayasundera, and the Board of Investment, measures were taken to finalize the transaction. The project was launched to shift the Army, Navy and Air Force headquarters to Akuregoda, Pelawatte, in accordance with JRJ’s plan.”

The Hong Kong-based group announced the purchase of 10 acres of state land, in January 2011. Shangri-La Asia Limited announced plans to invest over USD 400 mn on the 30-storeyed star class hotel with 661 rooms.

The hotel is the second property in Sri Lanka for the leading Asian hospitality group, joining Shangri-La’s Hambantota Resort & Spa, which opened in June 2016.

Rajapaksa said that the top Shangri-La executive had referred to the finalisation of their Colombo agreement to highlight the friendly way the then administration handled the investment. Shangri-La had no qualms about recommending Sri Lanka as a place for investment, Rajapaksa said.

The writer explained the move to shift the Army headquarters and the Defence Ministry from Colombo in a lead story headlined ‘Shangri-La to push MoD, Army Hq. out of Colombo city: Army Hospital expected to be converted into a museum’ (The Island, January 4, 2011).

In the wake of the January 2015 change of government, the new leadership caused chaos with the suspension of the China-funded Port City Project, a little distance away from the Shangri-La project. Many an eyebrow was raised when the then Finance Minister Ravi Karunanayake declared, in March, 2015, that funds wouldn’t be made available to the Akuregoda Defence Complex project until the exact cost estimation of the project could be clarified.

Media quoted Karunanayake as having said “Presently, this project seems like a bottomless pit and we need to know the depth of what we are getting into. From the current state of finances, allocated for this project, it seems as if they are building a complex that’s even bigger than the Pentagon!”

The insinuating declaration was made despite them having committed the blatant first Treasury bond scam in Feb 2015 that shook the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe administration.

In June 2016, Cabinet spokesperson, Dr. Rajitha Senaratne announced the suspension of the Akuregoda project. Citing financial irregularities and mismanagement of funds, Dr. Senaratne alleged that all Cabinet papers on the project had been prepared according to the whims and fancies of Gotabaya Rajapaksa.

The suspension order was made public a few months after the second far bigger Treasury bond scam, in 2016 March. As sharp differences emerged between President Sirisena and the UNP, the former threw his weight behind the Akuregoda project. President Maithripala Sirisena on Sept 5, 2017, inspected the Akuregoda Defence Complex, as well as the Lotus Tower, under construction.

Within weeks after President Rajapaksa’s defeat, the new administration made its move against the Akuregoda project.

The following is The Island front page story, dated January 19, 2015: “Finance Minister Ravi Karunanayake, in the third week of January, said that Rs 13.2 billion, in an account maintained at the Taprobane branch of the Bank of Ceylon had been transferred to Consolidated Fund of the Treasury. The matter was being investigated as the account belonged to the Ministry of Defence, he added.

The Finance Minister stressed that the MoD had no right to maintain such an account in violation of regulations and therefore the opening of the account was being investigated. The Minister alleged that several illegal transactions, including one involving Samurdhi, had come to light. He estimated the Samurdhi transaction (now under investigation) at Rs. 4 billion.

Responding to the allegation, former Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa said that the funds received from the Shangri-La transaction had been deposited there and the funds utilised for the construction of Akuregoda Defence Complex.

The former Defence Secretary said that the chief accountant of the Defence Ministry could explain the matter. Insisting that the particular account hadn’t been in his name, Rajapaksa said that a detailed response would be issued shortly (Ravi K orders Rs 13.2 b in MoD account transferred to Treasury, with strapline, Funds were meant for Defence Complex – Gotabaya).

The writer obtained the above statements from Karunanayake and Rajapaksa in the wake of the former’s statement that the Akuregoda Defence Complex was even bigger than the US Defence Headquarters Pentagon.

Yahapalana

role in Shangri-La expansion

In spite of strongly objecting to almost all projects launched by the previous government, the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe administration pledged their commitment to them. Yahapalana support extended to Shangri-La is a case in point. Having secured 10 acres from the previous Rajapaksa administration, Shangri-La purchased an additional three and a half acres, also on a 99-year lease, recently.

However, The Sunday Times reportage of the second Shangri-La land deal prompted President Maithripala Sirisena to direct Cabinet spokesman, Dayasiri Jayasekera, to clarify the transaction. In other words, President Sirisena contradicted Development Strategies and International Trade Minister Malik Samarawickrema for alleging that the President gave three and a half acres, situated between the newly opened Shangri-La Hotel and Beira Lake.

Jayasekera explained the circumstances under which Shangri-La, through its Singapore based subsidiary Perennial Real Estate Holdings acquired three and a half acres adjoining its latest hotel, situated on 10 acres, abutting the Galle Face promenade, in Colombo.

On the day before the opening of Shangri-La by President Sirisena and PM Wickremesinghe, Jayasekera explained how the government had re-negotiated with the Shangri-La Group what he called a much better deal than the one struck by the previous administration.

Jayasekera confirmed that the lease was for a period of 99 years. The government leased three and a half acres of land at a rate of Rs. 13.1 mn per perch whereas the previous administration agreed to Rs 6.5 mn per perch. According to Jayasekera the previous government had leased 10 acres at a rate of Rs 9.5 mn (with taxes) per perch.

The bottom line is in spite of opposition, the UNP backed controversial projects. The UNP’s opposition to the Shangri-La project, in a way similar to the campaign carried out against the Chinese investment in the Hambantota port. The UNP in 2017 handed over the Hambantota port on a 99-year-lease to China.