CBK waged ‘Mother of all wars’ -Rev. Dr. Emmanuel

SPECIAL REPORT : Part 49

November 11, 2014, 5:24 pm 

by Shamindra Ferdinando

Last week, The Island partly dealt with Rev. Dr. S. J Emmanuel’s thoughts on the collapse of talks between the government of the then President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga and LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, in April 1995.

The priest blamed Mrs. Kumaratunga for the breakdown of talks. Rev. Dr. Emmanuel’s views, on the conflict, are relevant, even in the post-war period, due to his high profile role in the UK headquartered Global Tamil Forum (GTF). The influential Diaspora grouping spearheads a costly campaign meant to haul Sri Lanka up before an international war crimes tribunal.

The GTF wields immense influence, particularly in the UK, where the grouping receives access to the ruling Conservatives-Liberal Democrats coalition, at the highest level.

The GTF was among many organizations and individuals recently proscribed by Sri Lanka, in accordance with an overall strategy to counter post-war separatist movement gaining ground. It would be pertinent to mention that Prabhakaran would never have allowed the formation of such a grouping if he survived the military onslaught, in early 2009.

Rev. Dr. Emmanuel discussed the events, leading to the outbreak of war, in April, 1995, at a conference held in Lausenna, Switzerland, in July, 1997. Let me examine some critical points raised by Rev. Dr. Emmanuel, which couldn’t be discussed last week. (The writer is grateful to the GTF leader for making his submissions, Lausenna conference available to The Island).

Rev. Dr. Emmanuel condemned Mrs. Kumaratunga for conducting a brutal war, consequent to the breakdown of talks. The priest declared: "The war, as conducted by the Kumaratunga regime, added a new horror element to the ethnic war - internationalizing her efforts of war through a powerful propaganda machinery to make it appear as a justified ‘war for peace’, as a war against terrorism, and at the same time conducting it on the ground as a war behind closed doors closed to all local or international media, amounts nothing less than a genocide with an international license."

Rev. Dr. Emmanuel went on to allege: "While retaining the old international credential, and accolade, which she received as she came to power with promises to end the war and create peace, she has turned 180 degrees to conduct the mother of all wars in the name of peace."

The five-party Tamil National Alliance (TNA), led by Illankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK) has accused President Mahinda Rajapaksa of conducting a genocidal war, targeting Tamil-speaking people. In fact, a group of TNA provincial council members representing the Northern and Eastern Provincial Councils, in August this year, requested the UN to inquire into the genocidal war conducted by President Rajapaksa. The TNA move, against President Rajapaksa, should be examined in the backdrop of longstanding accusation made against his predecessor, Mrs. Kumaratunga.

For want of a cohesive strategy, successive Sri Lankan governments pathetically failed to counter separatist propaganda. The UK-based LTTE International Secretariat conducted a highly successful propaganda drive to justify Prabhakaran’s decision to resume hostilities. Mrs. Kumaratunga’s government couldn’t match the LTTE operation, as well as propaganda projects, undertaken by those who had brazenly accepted the LTTE as the representatives of an aggrieved and oppressed people. Rev. Dr. Emmanuel hadn’t minced his words in Lucerne, in July, 1997, when he declared: "Mrs Kumaratunga’s government did not understand the LTTE as the representatives of an aggrieved and oppressed people. Nor did they recognize the LTTE demands as the demands of the people."

Subsequently, the TNA went to the extent in declaring the LTTE as the sole representative of the Tamil speaking people. The LTTE received the TNA recognition in the run-up to Eelam War IV.

Could there be anything as ridiculous as those who had, perhaps at gunpoint, recognized the LTTE as the representative of the Tamil speaking people, demanding accountability on the part of President Rajapaksa? Would anyone be foolish enough to believe that the LTTE waged war on behalf of the Tamil speaking people?

Those who represented the interests of the LTTE justified war as long as they felt Prabhakaran could achieve Eelam at any cost. A case in point is the large scale use of children as combatants by the LTTE. The Tamil political leadership, as well as the so-called civil society organizations, never opposed the forcible recruitment of children. In support of a high profile mobilization campaign, during the Norwegian peace process (2002-2004), TNA members participated in passing out parades on many occasions.

Rev. Dr. Emmanuel explained events leading to the LTTE withdrawing from the negotiating process on April 19, 1995. The priest recalled Thamilselvam, who led the LTTE delegation for the fourth round of talks with Mrs Kumaratunga’s representatives, in Jaffna, on April 10, 1995, reiterating Prabhakaran’s decision to quit the negotiating process unless all its demands were met.

Dr. Rev. Emmanuel said: "The LTTE announcement of its withdrawal from the peace process was not unexpected as is being made out. As early as March 16, 1995, in releasing 14 prisoners of war, LTTE leader, Prabhakaran, sent a letter to President Kumaratunga, specifically stating that if the outstanding issues, between the two parties, were not resolved before March 28, 1995, they would be compelled to take a decision to withdraw from the peace process. The government choose to ignore the deadline. Realizing that the time frame might be too short and, particularly, because of what the LTTE noted to be a positive response from the President indicating the lifting on the ban on fuel and fishing rights, the LTTE put off the deadline, by three weeks, for April 19, 1995."

Although Rev. Dr. Emmanuel accused Mrs. Kumaratunga of conducting the ‘mother of all wars’ in the name of peace, the priest conveniently forgot at least, to recollect the LTTE resuming Eelam War III with devastating attacks. The LTTE blew up two Chinese built gunboats, anchored at the Trincomalee harbour, on the night of April 19, 1995. On April 27, 1995, the LTTE mounted a sea borne attack on the army, based at the Kayts island, killing 18 soldiers. The LTTE also opened a new phase in the conflict with a heat seeking missile attack on an SLAF transport aircraft, taking off from the isolated Palaly air base. Within 24 hours, the LTTE brought down another SLAF transport aircraft, coming to land at Palaly. Nearly 100 security forces officers and men died in the twin missile strikes. The LTTE had reversed the situation in the Jaffna peninsula. Isolated Jaffna security forces bases were under siege. The Jaffna crisis brought Mrs Kumaratunga under immense pressure with the LTTE building up strength to overrun Palaly. Under tremendous pressure, on the Palaly front, the army, in August 1995, launched Operation Riviresa, undoubtedly Sri Lanka’s most successful combined security forces campaign during Eelam Wars I, II and III. In spite of fierce resistance, the LTTE ended up losing Jaffna town during the first week of Dec, 1995. Shortly, thereafter, the army brought the entire Vadamarachchi under government control. A series of counter-insurgency operations in the Jaffna peninsula resulted in the army killing scores of infiltrators. Although the LTTE launched some devastating attacks on the army, in the Vanni theater, it couldn’t destabilize the Jaffna peninsula, with the army consolidating its hold on the Jaffna theater.

Obviously, the LTTE’s gamble failed with devastating consequences to its position on the ground. To the credit of Mrs Kumaratunga’s administration, it resorted to strong response to Prabhakaran’s conventional military challenge. Had the LTTE not laid siege to the the Jaffna peninsula, with missile attacks on aircraft, in late April 1995, perhaps Kumaratunga’s government wouldn’t have felt the requirement to bring the peninsula under its control. In hindsight, Operation Riviresa created the ground conditions necessary to conduct a large scale military offensive in the Vanni region - comprising the administrative districts of Vavuniya, Mannar, Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu.

Operation Jayasikurui launched in early 1997, to restore an overland Main Supply Route from Vavuniya to the Jaffna peninsula, collapsed with disastrous consequences. In fact, massive losses suffered on the Vanni front nearly brought down Mrs Kumaratunga’s government. The President sought re-election at the Dec. 1999, presidential poll after having suffered a spate of battlefield debacles on the Vanni front. Mrs. Kumaratunga struggled both on the political and military fronts, with the LTTE poised to further intensify its campaign.

After having assassinated Gamini Dissanayake, to ensure Mrs Kumaratunga’s victory, at the Dec 9, 1994, presidential polls, the LTTE almost succeeded in thwarting the lady from seeking re-election at the Dec 1999 presidential election. The LTTE wanted to ensure UNP candidate Ranil Wickremesinghe’s victory, in an obvious bid to resume a fresh round of negotiations.

Kumaratunga narrowly escaped an assassination attempt on the night of December 19, 1999, by a suicide bomber at the final election rally, of her People’s Alliance, at the Colombo Town Hall.

Kumaratunga sustained injuries to her right eye and face and was discharged from hospital two days later. The blast claimed the lives of 36 people, including Kumaratunga’s driver, two bodyguards, a senior Deputy Inspector General of Police and the bomber. Over a hundred were injured, including three cabinet ministers—G.L. Peiris, Kingsley Wickramaratna and Alavi Moulana. The government immediately clamped a curfew on the districts of Colombo and Gampaha.

In a statement, Kumaratunga, who was standing for a second term of office, said that the presidential election would proceed as planned.

Although the LTTE operation failed, it was the second attempt by Prabhakaran to influence the outcome of a presidential poll. The murderous bid to change Kumaratunga’s destiny should be examined in the backdrop of the LTTE thinking that she wouldn’t give in to their unreasonable demands. Prabhakaran eliminated Gamini Dissanayake for the same reason. It would be interesting to recollect Rev. Dr. Emmanuel opinion in July 1997, on CBK-Prabhakaran talks (two years before the attempt on Mrs Kumaratunga’s life): "Even after the resumption of hostilities, the LTTE has reiterated its stance by declaring through the press and through international conferences that the doors are open for future peace talks. Going by its experience of talks, both with President Premadasa and with President Chandrika, they are insisting on a third party mediation. Tamils have experienced, as the aggrieved partner, long decades of deception, death and destruction. Pacts have been unilaterally torn and promises repeatedly unfulfilled by governments. With President Chandrika, they hoped for a better future. But that hope has proved to be the worst of deceptions." Rev. Dr. Emmanuel added: "Is not this war against the Tamils ‘behind close doors’, though proclaimed to be a ‘war for peace and against terrorism’ not a deception of the whole world and a travesty of truth?"

Unfortunately, Rev. Dr. Emmanuel had chosen to ignore the LTTE’s grand strategy. The GTF leader is definitely not alone in believing in Prabhakaran’s capacity to achieve Eelam through military means. The LTTE had been among about half a dozen Sri Lankan Tamil terrorist groups, established by the government of India in the early 80s. Having militarily crushed all other groups by 1987, the LTTE demanded recognition from India to be considered the sole representative of the Tamil speaking people. Having created the conditions for Indian military intervention here, in July, 1987, the LTTE declared war against the Indian army in Oct 1987, reached a clandestine understanding with the then President Ranasinghe Premadasa, in May 1989, forcing Premadasa to call for Indian withdrawal. In June 1990, just three months after the Indian pullout, the LTTE resumed hostilities, caused immense losses before killing President Premadasa, on May Day, 1993. In the following year, the LTTE, facilitated Mrs Kumaratunga’s victory at the parliamentary polls in August and then went onto assassinate Gamini Dissanayake to ensure Mrs Kumaratunga’s victory at the Dec 1994 presidential election. When Mrs Kumaratunga refused to dance to its tune, Prabhakaran made an attempt to thwart her re-election bid in Dec 1999. Had he succeeded, UNP candidate Ranil Wickremesinghe would have definitely won the election.

The LTTE directed an almost simultaneous suicide attack at a UNP rally at Ja-ela, killing one-time Army Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Lakshman Algama. The LTTE not only intended to help Wickremesinghe win the presidential election, it also wanted to destabilize the entire country. Let me emphasize that the UNP couldn’t have been involved in Prabhakaran’s conspiracy in anyway. But, the LTTE strategy was meant to influence the electorate, particularly the Tamil speaking voters, to throw their weight behind Wickremesinghe. The timing of Mrs Kumaratunga’s assassination bid was crucial to the LTTE’s overall strategy. The PA presidential candidate’s assassination, just 48 hours before the election, wouldn’t have given time for the ruling coalition to make a proper announcement as regards Mrs Kumaratunga’s successor.

Had President Kumaratunga perished at Town Hall, who would have been the PA’s choice? It would be pertinent to mention that when the LTTE assassinated Gamini Dissanayake, the UNP decided to field the slain leader’s wife, Srima, though many believed Wickremesinghe should have been given the opportunity. Mrs Kumaratunga polled a staggering 62 per cent vote at the Nov, 1994, poll due to the LTTE’s message to the Tamil speaking electorate that it favoured Kumaratunga. The message to the Tamil electorate was nothing but the high profile assassination of Gamini Dissanayake.

Rev. Dr Emmanuel on collapse of CBK-P’karan talks

SPECIAL REPORT : Part 48

November 4, 2014, 5:43 pm 

Rev. Dr. Emmanuel

by Shamindra Ferdinando

Within weeks after the then President, Chandrika Kumaratunga, and LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, agreed to cease hostilities, on January 5, 1995, Kumaratunga called for secret external engagement to facilitate the process.

Kumaratunga was of the view that the involvement of an external power was nothing but a necessity to ensure the success of talks between her government and the LTTE. The President believed that the LTTE would accept her suggestion, meant to facilitate political negotiations, whereas the LTTE’s requirement at that time was purely military.

The previous article dealt with Prabhakaran’s bid to exploit cessation of hostilities, to advance his strategy, by forcing Kumaratunga, in her capacity as the Commander-in-Chief of armed forces, to quit Pooneryn.

Kumaratunga pushed for whom she called a neutral and uncommitted person who could function as an intermediary, between her government and the LTTE. In a letter, dated February 20th, 1995 Sent to Prabhakaran, through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Kumaratunga proposed a retired French diplomat, Francois Michael, as the go-between. Kumaratunga had the backing of the French government. In fact, the French government had proposed Michael, one-time ambassador to Haiti and Ethiopia, as the intermediary, following Kumaratunga’s request for help.

For want of a clear understanding of Prabhakaran’s strategy, Kumaratunga seemed to have believed that the terrorists would accept her offer. The President was so naive she invited the Frenchman to Colombo, even before Prabhakaran’s consent could be secured. The President suggested that Prabhakaran could meet the Frenchman, in Jaffna or any other area, under his control. Kumaratunga suggested (as the Frenchman was in Colombo), Prabhakaran could meet him before February 27, 1995. Kumaratunga wrote: "In view of the paramount importance and confidentiality of this mission it would be appropriate that you receive him personally."

In a letter, dated February 25, 1995, Prabhakaran rejected Kumaratunga’s suggestion. The terrorist called for an open dialogue between his organization and the government. Kumaratunga reacted angrily. She accused the LTTE of opposing mediation by a foreign country. The government attacked the LTTE’s position.

The LTTE counter-attacked. LTTE ideologue, Anton Balasingham briefed the media in Jaffna, while the, LTTE International Secretariat, in London, explained Prabhakaran’s position. The LTTE accused Kumaratunga of seeking undue advantage by having a Frenchman, whom the organization called a close friend of the President, as an intermediary. The LTTE refused to accept Kumaratunga’s nominee as a French government representative. Much to her discomfort, the LTTE tagged the Frenchman as a close associate whose selection was nothing but controversial. The LTTE alleged that Kumaratunga was seeking secret negotiations, whereas the group believed in an open dialogue.

Kumaratunga responded, on March 9, 1995, to the LTTE’s media statement issued from London. Recollecting her letter, dated February 20, 1995, Kumaratunga said: "That intermediary, suggested by the French government, is a private individual and that he was a close friend of mine is wholly unfounded. In fact, he was not known to me at all. He was selected by the French government and I met him for the first time when he arrived in Colombo. In these circumstances the government regrets that the LTTE appears to have misconstrued the facts, on the basis of a non-existent letter."

The dispute, between Kumaratunga and Prabhakaran, over the former’s suggestion to involve France in the negotiating process, caused irreparable damage to the peace process. Although Kumaratunga still believed that differences with the LTTE could be ironed out, the military realized that the country was heading for a major war. Kumaratunga, and some of her close associates, believed that the government should go ahead with planned reconstruction and rehabilitation projects, regardless of the consequences. In fact, President Kumaratunga, on February 16, 1995 (four days before she suggested a former French diplomat as an intermediary), informed Prabhakaran of her readiness to launch some of the previously discussed projects, meant to improve living conditions in the Jaffna peninsula. Kumaratunga was of the opinion that there was no harm in launching rehabilitation and reconstruction projects, even though an agreement couldn’t be reached on the transformation of cessation of hostilities to a formal ceasefire.

Kumaratunga’s proposal to involve a Frenchman, in negotiations, should be examined in the backdrop of Prabhakaran’s demand that a formal ceasefire was a prerequisite for political negotiations. Kumaratunga could never have met Prabhakaran’s demand without jeopardizing the military strategy meant to suppress the LTTE in Jaffna. Prabhakaran demanded the withdrawal of the army base, at Pooneryn, to facilitate a formal ceasefire.

Faced with the collapsed of her much - touted peace project, launched at the expense of UNP presidential candidate, Gamini Dissanayake, President Kumaratunga, in her capacity as the Commander-in-Chief, authorized a major re-adjustment to the forward defence line of the Pooneryn base. The army declared its readiness to pull back its positions by 500 meters. The announcement was made on February 24, 1995. The unexpected move was made amidst the simmering controversy over Kumaratunga’s bid to involve a Frenchman in the negotiating process. The government also reiterated its willingness to allow civilians to use the Elephant Pass causeway. The government move was meant to intensify pressure on the LTTE. The government felt that the LTTE’s per-conditions could be circumvent by unilaterally giving access to civilians, to and from the Jaffna peninsula. The negotiating process was at grave risk. The government desired to go ahead with the opening of the overland route, as well as the one across the Jaffna lagoon, though it realized that the LTTE would never allow civilians to use either routes. The LTTE couldn’t have shown any weakness, on its part, as it struggled to prevent Kumaratunga from consolidating her position. Resumption of large scale hostilities seemed inevitable, though some still believed that the negotiating process could be saved. Those who still felt that the government should address Prabhakaran’s concern, even at the risk of jeopardizing military strategy, never comprehended the overall thinking of Prabhakaran and his top aides.

Strongly opposing Kumaratunga’s efforts to facilitate civilian movements, between the Jaffna peninsula and the Vanni mainland, Prabhakaran, in a letter dated February 25, 1995, accused the President of giving priority to what he called strategic interests of the occupational army, over and above the urgent needs of the Tamil civilian masses.

Kumaratunga struggled to cope up with Prabhakaran’s new demands/conditions. Prabhakaran warned of catastrophe unless Kumaratunga gave into his demands: (A) Lift the embargo on goods transported to the Northern Province (B) transformation of cessation of hostilities into a permanent ceasefire (C) setting up of a joint authority to implement reconstruction projects (D) total removal of restrictions on fishing and free movement in the north-eastern seas (E) Freedom to those deployed in the Eastern Province to carry weapons.

Rev. Dr. S. J. Emmanuel, leader of the UK headquartered Global Tamil Forum (GTF), reacted to recent articles which dealt with the assassination of UNP presidential candidate, Gamini Dissanayake, on the night of October 23, 1994 and subsequent events, with the focus on negotiations between Kumaratunga and Prabhakaran. Rev. Dr. Emmanuel, who had occasionally provided to the writer valuable perception, as regards significant conflict-related events, made available to The Island his presentation at a conference organized by the International Alert, way back in July, 1997. Rev. Dr. Emmanuel dealt extensively with the Kumaratunga-Prabhakaran talks during 1994-1995 period. (GTF came into being at the conclusion of the war in May 2009. The LTTE would never have allowed the formation of the grouping, with branches in major countries if it survived the military onslaught and managed to work out an arrangement with the government of Sri Lanka on its own).

Jaffna - born Rev. Dr. Emmanuel had been a visiting scholar, at the University of London, at the time he got involved in the International Alert project, held in Lucerne, Switzerland. Among those who had participated in the event, on the invitation of NGO guru, Dr. Kumar Rupesinghe, the then Secretary General of the International Alert, were one-time Indian High Commissioner in Colombo J.N.Dixit, top public servant, Bradman Weerakoon, the then Editor of the Lanka Guardian and TLUF veteran, R. Sampanthan, among others.

Rev. Dr. Emmanuel’s piece, titled ‘Why Chandrika-Prabha Talks Failed? Was meant to place the blame squarely on Kumaratunga for the collapse of talks, in April, 1995, leading, to what the priest called, the most destructive war in Sri Lanka’s history. Having decried the international players for promoting their interests at the expense of those at the receiving end of the state military aggression, the priest also blamed the southern electorate for turning a blind eye to the suffering of the Tamil speaking people.

Alleging that Kumaratunga’s much touted promise of no more war but peace was nothing but a lie, the priest asserted that the Tamil speaking people would think a thousand times before they allowed another southern leader to deceive them with the promise of peace.

Today, the GTF is at the forefront of a high profile international campaign demanding accountability for atrocities committed during Eelam War IV. The GTF insists that Sri Lanka’s political leadership, too, should be held responsible for excesses committed by the military.

Rev. Dr. Emmanuel condemned Kumaratunga’s government for turning a blind eye to the suffering of the Tamil speaking people, particularly those trapped in the northern province. The priest alleged that Kumaratunga’s motive was political and ignored the Tamils’ thirst for peace.

Unfortunately, Rev. Dr. Emmanuel conveniently ignored Prabhakaran’s mindset. Having got rid of the Indian army, with the help of President Ranasinghe Premadasa, in March, 1990, before blowing him up in Colombo, on May Day, 1993, Prabhakaran felt that he had the wherewithal to achieve Eelam. Although Prabhakaran had experienced battle field difficulties, during the 1994/1995 period, due to a relentless siege on the Jaffna peninsula, he remained confident of ultimate victory. Obviously, Prabhakaran felt that he could reverse the ground situation if the siege on the Jaffna peninsula was to end, courtesy Kumaratunga. Prabhakaran eliminated Gamini Dissanayake as the UNPer was considered a tough negotiator and not a person easy to fool with.

In fact, those who had considered Prabhakaran as a military genius, believed his capability to turnaround the battlefield situation even after the military liberated Kilinochchi on the first of January, 2009.

Rev. Dr. Emmanuel faulted Kumaratunga for not recognizing the LTTE as the de facto leadership of the Tamil speaking people. Let me reproduce verbatim what Rev. Dr. Emmanuel said on the relationship between the Tamil speaking civilians and the LTTE: "The talks were held between the government delegation and the LTTE. Forgetting the fact that the same LTTE was involved in the fighting, as well as in the talking, the government failed to recognize the political face of the LTTE and talked to them only as a militant, if not a ‘terrorist’ group. This is a misapprehension. The government will do well, even concurrent to their understanding of a militant leadership, to clearly recognize, not only the peace aspirations of the Tamil people, but also that of their de facto leadership-the LTTE Here arises the important question for the government: Were they having peace-talks with the LTTE, taking them only as a terrorist group, divorced from the people, and hell-bent on destroying the country? Or were they talking to a de facto militant leadership that carried forward the basic aspirations of a people for peace with justice? Does the government naively usurp the idea that only those outside the war zone, namely the South and the foreigners, are genuinely interested in peace while those dying, in war, want more war?

Rev. Dr. Emmanuel went on to suggest that meaningful talks wouldn’t be possible as long as the government didn’t recognize the LTTE’s capacity for political negotiations.

Evidently, Rev. Dr. Emmanuel had accepted the LTTE as the Tamils de facto leadership, way back in the mid 90s, though the TULF was very much active at that time. The Illankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi - led five-party Tamil National alliance (TNA), recognizing the LTTE as the sole representative of Tamil speaking people, in 2001, should be examined in the backdrop of Rev. Dr. Emmanuel’s assertion years ago. Had those demanding accountability, on the part of the government, for alleged atrocities committed during the last phase of the conflict, urged Prabhakaran to act sensibly, he wouldn’t have ended up a corpse on the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon. In fact, none of those shedding crocodile tears, for the Tamil civilians today, didn’t even bother to voice their concern at Prabhakaran using the entire Tamil speaking community to achieve his military objectives.

It would be interesting to reproduce what Rev. Dr. Emmanuel said about the LTTE’s demands, which the writer had mentioned above. "The government did not understand the LTTE as representatives of an aggrieved and oppressed people. Nor did they recognize the LTTE’s demands as the demands of then people." Could anything be further from the truth. The priest went onto say: "The government overlooked the fact that in talking to the LTTE, they were actually talking to the people they represent."

Post-CBK victory at Nov 1995 presidential poll: Pooneryn factor

SPECIAL REPORT : Part 47

October 28, 2014, 12:00 pm 

by Shamindra Ferdinando

Having assassinated UNP presidential candidate, Gamini Dissanayake, on the night of October 23, 1994, LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, and the then President, Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga reached agreement on cessation of hostilities, on January 5, 1995.

Kumaratunga signed the document, in Colombo, whereas Prabhakaran signed it in Jaffna. Remember, Jaffna had been firmly under LTTE control with the military positioned at Palaly, Kankesanthurai and Elephant Pass. Jaffna islands, too, had been under military control.

The agreement was to be operational on January 8, 1995.

Two consecutive articles on Oct 15 and Oct 22, 2014, extensively dealt with the circumstances under which the then President DB Wijetunga had brought Dissanayake back to the UNP, depriving one-time Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe from an opportunity to contest the presidential election on November 9, 1995, the assassination of the popular politician, simmering crisis over Wickremesinghe being denied the opportunity to be at least Dissanayake’s substitute, Srima Dissanayake’s entry into politics, and the signing of the first formal agreement between an elected President and a leader of a terrorist group.

Although Kumaratunga’s predecessors, JRJ, Ranasinghe Premadasa, as well as DB Wijetunga, had reached agreements/understanding with the LTTE, there was never a formal written agreement between the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, until January 5, 1995.

Why did Prabhakaran order Dissanayake’s assassination? Did any external factors contribute to Prabhakaran’s decision? Who made the initial move to establish contact between Kumaratunga and the LTTE?

Interestingly, the seven point agreement, reached on January 5, 1995, conveniently refrained from making any reference to the LTTE demands. The omission was surprising in the backdrop of the LTTE asserting, during the second round of talks, held on January 2, 1995, in Jaffna, that Prabhakaran expected lifting of restrictions on movement between the Jaffna peninsula and the Vanni mainland. President Kumaratunga included two senior representatives from the military, namely Brigadier, Siri Peiris and Captain Rajaratne, in her delegation for the January 2 talks.

For want of a thorough examination of ground realities, the Kumaratunga administration never realized Prabhakaran’s strategy. Although the government and the LTTE had been engaged in a dialogue, courtesy the International Committee of Red Cross, and through mutual contacts, major differences surfaced at the third round of talks, held in Jaffna on January 14, 1995. The government pushed for discussions on substantive political issues, parallel to humanitarian issues, whereas the LTTE demanded an immediate end to restrictions placed by the military on the Jaffna peninsula. In other words, Prabhakaran wanted the military to pull out troops from Pooneryn and Nagatheranthurai pronto to facilitate the negotiating process. Prabhakaran’s move placed Kumaratunga in an unenviable position. The terrorist leader upped the ante by demanding a formal ceasefire in place of cessation of hostilities. Prabhakaran declared that political negotiations would be subjected to a formal ceasefire.

The LTTE demanded the unhindered access to and from the Jaffna peninsula and across the Jaffna peninsula. In fact, the LTTE assassinated Gamini Dissanayake to ensure Kumaratunga’s victory at the November 9, 1994, presidential poll as it realized that the UNP would never give up siege on the Jaffna peninsula. The LTTE obviously believed that Kumaratunga would succumb to its pressure. In spite of all major population centers, including Jaffna town and its suburbs, Chavakachcheri and Point Pedro-Valvettiturai, being under its control, the LTTE experienced severe difficulties due to the military controlling two major entry/exit points to and from the Jaffna peninsula.

Having failed to evict the army from the isolated Elephant Pass base, in mid 1991, the LTTE prohibited civilians from crossing the Elephant Pass causeway under any circumstances. Instead, the LTTE used the Jaffna lagoon as its main supply route. People, too, were ordered to use the same route. In accordance with the overall military strategy, the navy set up a base at Nagathevanthurai, on the Vanni mainland, to intercept boat movements. The architect of the naval strategy, Vice Admiral Clancy Fernando, received the wrath of the LTTE. The LTTE assassinated the navy chief on the morning of November 16, 1992, at Galle Face, opposite hotel Taj Samudra. Fernando was the first service commander to die in a terrorist attack.

The military threw a cordon around Jaffna peninsula, in late 1991, in accordance with its overall strategy to cut off LTTE entry/exit points, to and from the peninsula. Sea borne troops established a new army base at Pooneryn, while the navy moved to nearby Nagathevanthurai. The navy was tasked to intercept illegal boat movements across the Jaffna lagoon. Civilians, too, perished in the naval action. The Military action caused severe difficulties to both the LTTE and the civilian population.

Although the army couldn’t launch a major offensive, meant to bring the Jaffna peninsula under its control, in the wake of the LTTE killing war veterans, the then Northern Commander, Maj. Gen. Denzil Kobbekaduwa and Brigadier Wijaya Wimalaratne on the morning of August 8, 1992, the military relentlessly targeted LTTE movements across, Jaffna lagoon.

A UN agency, deployed in Sri Lanka held a series of talks with the LTTE commencing late 1992, to explore ways and means of opening the Pooneryn-Sangupiddy route, across the Jaffna peninsula. Dr. Peter Nicholas, the then senior protection officer of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the agency’s regional legal advisor, Bo Schack, met LTTE representatives in Jaffna on Dec 9, 1992, to pursue the matter. In spite of several rounds of tripartite, talks involving the government, the LTTE and UNHCR, the much touted bid failed due to Prabhakaran demanding the immediate withdrawal of troops from Pooneryn and Nagathevanthurai.

The military strongly opposed the LTTE move. The then President Ranasinghe Premadasa acknowledged concerns expressed by the military leadership. Regardless of international pressure, Prabhakaran refused to cooperate with the UNHCR.

In late September/early October, 1993, the army launched ‘Operation Yal Devi’ to clear the LTTE/civilian boat launching point at Kilaly, in the Jaffna peninsula. Yal Devi was nothing but a disaster. Although the then army leadership portrayed Yal Devi as a resounding success, the poorly planned large scale offensive pathetically failed to make a dent in the LTTE. Within four weeks, after the army called off Yal Devi, the LTTE launched a devastating multi-pronged assault on Pooneryn and Nagathevanthurai, killing several hundred army and navy personnel. The then army chief Lt. Gen. Cecil Waidyaratne, quit after having accepted responsibility for the humiliating battlefield losses. The battlefield disaster shook the then President Dingiri Banda Wijetunga’s government.

Although the navy abandoned Nagathevanthurai, the army reinforced Pooneryn to ensure the siege on the Jaffna peninsula continued. The UNP ruled out vacating Pooneryn under any circumstances. The LTTE struggled to move supplies, across the Jaffna lagoon, in spite of the navy no longer having a base at Nagathevanthurai.

The CBK-Prabhakaran agreement, on cessation of hostilities, finalized on January 5, 1995, as well as the latter’s demand for the removal of the army base at Pooneryn, made at the third round of talks, on January 14, 1995, should be examined in the backdrop of the failed bid to re-open the Main Supply Route (MSR) through the Jaffna lagoon, during the 1992-1993 period. Prabhakaran had been so desperate to ensure a safe entry/exit point without compromising his deployment of units, Gamini Dissanayake was assassinated to pave the way for fresh round of negotiations. The LTTE obviously believed that the cessation of hostilities could facilitate its imitative to manoeuvre CBK to vacate Pooneryn. The LTTE offered to transform cessation of hostilities to a formal ceasefire to pave the way for political negotiations if CBK gave up Pooneryn. Although an influential section of the government wanted to accept the LTTE’s offer, the military strongly opposed. Prabhakaran indicated, in no uncertain terms, that he wouldn’t proceed with the peace initiative unless CBK sacrificed Pooneryn. Vacation of Pooneryn would have facilitated LTTE movements across the Jaffna lagoon, thereby increasing the threat on isolated military bases in the Jaffna peninsula. Prabhakaran needed unhindered access to and from the Vanni mainland to guarantee continuous MSR between the peninsula and the Vanni mainland. It was purely a military requirement.

The LTTE refused to allow special committees tasked to deal with the violations of cessation of hostilities. When an irate CBK accused Prabhakaran of blocking special committees, hence sabotaging the agreement on cessation of hostilities, the terrorist leader declared that the committees couldn’t be allowed to function unless their foreign heads briefed him. Prabhakaran wanted Audun Holm (Norway), Johan Gabrielson (Norway), Lt. Colonel Paul Henry Hosting (Holland) and Maj. Gen. C. Miller (Canada) to meet him in Jaffna. The air force flew them to Jaffna where they briefly met Prabhakaran, on February 5. Even after that, the LTTE didn’t allow monitoring committees to function. The LTTE called for modification of the agreement, on cessation of hostilities, to address several other issues, such as mobility of LTTE cadres in the Eastern Province, comprising the districts of Ampara, Batticaloa and Trincomalee, LTTE movements in coastal waters as well as fishing rights. The LTTE insisted on the right of its cadres to carry weapons in the Eastern Province. The LTTE emphasized that monitoring committees wouldn’t be allowed to function unless the government met its additional demands. The LTTE ignored the government stand that the organization couldn’t put forward new demands after having agreed to set up monitoring committees in accordance with cessation of hostilities, finalized on January 5, 1995. These demands were made in addition to the primary condition that the Pooneryn base should be vacated.

January 5, 1995 agreement on
cessation of hostilities

The following is the text of the agreement for a specific period:

(A) There will be no offensive operations by either party during this period. An offensive operation will be considered a violation of the agreement.

(B) The security forces and the LTTE will maintain their present position on the ground, keeping a minimum of 600 metres between each other. However, each party would receive the right of movement within 100 metres from their own bunker lines, keeping a minimum of 400 metres in between. Any party moving in the restricted areas would be considered an offensive operation.

(C) The Navy and the Air Force will continue to perform their legitimate tasks for safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, from external aggression, without in anyway engaging in offensive operations against the LTTE, or causing any obstructions to legitimate and bonafide fishing activity in specified areas.

(D) Acts such as sabotage, bomb explosions, abductions, assassinations and intimidation directed at any political party, party or any individual will amount to an offensive operation.

(E)

* It is suggested that committees to deal with violations of this agreement be set up to inquire into any instances of violation of the above terms of agreement. These committees could be set up in areas of Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Mullaitivu, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara and any other areas deemed necessary.

* It will be the responsibility of these committees to take immediate action on complaints made by either party to this agreement to inquire into and resolve such disputes.

*These committees could comprise of representatives drawn from Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, ICRC and from among retired judges or public officers, religious heads and other leading citizens; all appointed by mutual agreement.

* Each committee could consist of five members, two from the government, two from the LTTE and a foreign country who will be chairman.

* Freedom of Movement for committees to perform their tasks will have to be ensured by both parties to this agreement.

* Facilities for the committees to act swiftly and impartially will have to be provided by mutual agreement.

(F) Recommend establishment of communication link between security forces and the LTTE military commanders which will enable them to sort out problems expeditiously, locally.

(G) Cessation of hostilities will continue until notice of termination is given by either party. Such notice should be given at least 72 hours before termination.

Could there be anything as ridiculous as agreeing to suspend sabotage, bomb explosions, abductions, assassinations and intimidation after the LTTE having massacred nearly 60 people, including Gamini Dissanayake. Kumaratunga or her advisers, were naive to believe that permanent peace was feasible with the LTTE, though it maintained a formidable conventional military capability. They never realized that Prabhakaran always utilized negotiations to consolidate his position on the ground or remove whatever impediments, which undermined his strategy. Prabhakaran’s initiative, in 1994, was meant to break the crippling siege on the Jaffna peninsula after having failed to dislodge the army base at Pooneryn in November, 1993. Had it not for the daring sea borne landings, carried out in the immediate aftermath of the assault on Pooneryn, the LTTE would have totally annihilated those deployed there. Although a Court of Inquiry exposed those guilty of negligence, leading to the worst debacle up to that time, the government didn’t take punitive action against top officers, though some disciplinary action was taken.

By mid March, 1995, the agreement on cessation of hostilities was on the verge of collapse. Kumaratunga struggled to cope up with the rapidly deteriorating situation. The government was reluctant to publicly accept that the much hyped peace initiative was about to unravel. A desperate President tried to end the stalemate by bringing in an external player into the process. The President, as well as her close circle of friends, obviously couldn’t comprehend the mindset of Prabhakaran

Chaos leading to CBK-P'karan pact of January 5, 1995

SPECIAL REPORT : Part 46

October 21, 2014, 4:41 pm 

by Shamindra Ferdinando

The assassination of UNP presidential candidate, Gamini Dissanayake, on the night of October 23, 1994, plunged, both the UNP and the SLFP-led People’s Alliance into unprecedented crisis.

Nearly 60 men and women died in the blast caused by an LTTE woman suicide cadre, at a UNP campaign rally, at Thotalanga, in the Kotahena police area.

The LTTE timed the blast to cause chaos in the country, in the wake of the PA forming a new government, under the leadership of newly elected Premier, Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. Having won the August 16, 1994, parliamentary poll, the PA needed to win the presidential election to consolidate its position. The UNP had to somehow retain the presidency to exploit the constitutional provisions to go for an early general election.

Dissanayake’s assassination threatened to undermine both major parties. It was a diabolical project of the LTTE, meant to cause political uncertainty.

UNP dilemma

Within hours after the Thotalanga massacre, the then Elections Commissioner, Chandrananda de Silva, requested the UNP to name a substitute for the slain candidate, by October 27 (1994). Dissanayake’s widow, Srima, as well as former First Lady, Hema Premadasa, were proposed as possible substitute, while many felt that one-time premier, Ranil Wickremesinghe shouldn’t be deprived of the opportunity to join the presidential fray. They reminded that Wickremesinghe should have been the presidential candidate, though the decision - making Working Committee of the party favoured Dissanayake. The simmering issue of substitute sharply divided the party (Srima’s surprise nomination: Shock-waves through UNP-The Island, October 27, 1994). In spite of this grave injustice, Wickremesinghe acted sensibly in a bid to avoid a further controversy in the run-up to the presidential poll. Those supporting Srima’s candidature harassed Wickremesinghe. A case in point was a violent protest organized outside Sirikotha on the late afternoon of November 1, 1994, to discourage Wickremesinghe from attending a crucial Working Committee meeting. Protests shouted Apita Srima madam ona (We want Madam Srima). Some of the protesters surrounded Wickremesinghe’s vehicle and acted in a threatening manner. The meeting was to be chaired by President Wijetunga. The then Wickremesinghe’s chief security officer, SP Dharmasiri Lawrence Vithana, lodged a complaint with the Mirihana police on the following day (Ranil threatened outside Siri Kotha, pro-Srima slogans shouted’ (The Island, November, 1994).

Soon after Srima received presidential nomination, she requested President Wijetunga to accommodate Hema on the National List. Srima expressed the opinion that Hema could fill one of the vacancies caused by the assassination of National List members - UNP General Secretary, Dr. Gamini Wijesekara, and G. M. Premachandran. They were among over 50 persons who perished along with Dissanayake on the night of October 23, 1994. President Wijetunga ignored Srima’s plea. It would be pertinent to recollect an attempt to swear in Hema as the president, before the Chief Justice immediately after the May Day 1993 assassination of President Ranasinghe Premadasa. But an influential section acted swiftly and decisively to pave the way for the then premier Wijetunga to succeed Premadasa and the Leader of the House, Wickremesinghe, to assume premiership.

Premadasa’s assassination caused turmoil in the party. The worst affected was the UNP power base, Colombo. Hema resented post-Premadasa changes. In the run-up to the parliamentary poll on August 16, 1994, Hema locked horns with those she felt were responsible for depriving her of an opportunity to enter active politics. The former First Lady ordered the cancellation of a meeting scheduled to take place at Sucharitha to discuss the campaign in the UNP stronghold, Colombo electorate. She reacted angrily to the then Colombo Central Organizer calling for Sucharitha meeting (UNP meeting to discuss campaign in Colombo Central cancelled-The Island, July 11, 1994). In spite of the crisis in Colombo Central, Wickremesinghe earned the support of the vast majority of UNPers in the Colombo electoral district.

The dispute led to the exit of Hema from the Colombo District. Hema found her name removed from the nomination list when she arrived at the Colombo kachcheri to hand over nominations. The then The Island staff photographer, Sri Lal Gomes, captured Hema bitterly complaining to Wickremesinghe. Seated next to Wickremesinghe was one-time Speaker, Stanley Tillekaratne. She queried the circumstances under which she was replaced with suspended Colombo Mayor, Ratnasiri Rajapaksa. Hema signed the nomination papers on Friday though she initially indicted she wasn’t keen to join the fray (UNP ditches Mrs. Premadasa-The Island, July 1994).

Despite trouble at Colombo Central, the UNP comfortably won the electorate with a majority of 8,076 at the August 16, 1994, parliamentary election. The vote reflected the confidence that the multi-ethnic electorate had in Wickremesinghe and its chief organiser, B. Sirisena Cooray. But the situation deteriorated over the next few months due to disputes among key players. The PA took advantage of the situation at the Colombo Central electorate to inflict a devastating blow on the UNP at the November 9, 1994, presidential election, just three months after losing the same to the UNP. Under Kumaratunga’s leadership, the PA secured the electorate with an overwhelming majority of 22,395 votes. Hema had been the Colombo Central organiser, successfully led by the late Premadasa, followed by Cooray and Wickremesinghe. In fact, Wickremesinghe had been in charge of the electorate at the August 16, 1994, parliamentary poll, though Hema stepped in between the August and November 1994 national level polls. In addition to the defeat, the UNP which polled 50, 136 at the August poll, obtained 33,824 in November, a sharp drop within a three-month period. The result at Colombo Central reflected the general mood in the country as Kumaratunga scored a stunning victory over Srima at the presidential election. The PA candidate polled a record 62.28 per cent of the vote and it remained the best performance by any candidate since the first presidential, on October, 1982. JRJ obtained 52.91, whereas the second best performance was recorded by incumbent President Mahinda Rajapaksa, at the last presidential, when he secured 57.88 per cent of the vote.

The UNP’s defeat at the November 9, 1994, presidential poll permanently dashed Hema’s hopes of an active political career. Srima didn’t even bother to attend a meeting at the Election Secretariat to announce the final result.

CBK in quandary

After having led the PA to resounding victories at both parliamentary and presidential polls, in August and November, 1994, President Kumaratunga faced unenviable task in resuming the peace initiative. In the backdrop of Dissanayake’s assassination, some accused the PA of conspiring with the LTTE to eliminate the UNP candidate. Although nothing could have been further from the truth, some went to the extent in putting up posters, accusing Kumaratunga of teaming up with the LTTE. In spite of Kumaratunga calling off the second round of talks, scheduled for October 24, 1994, in the wake of Dissanayake’s assassination, the country knew of the PA-LTTE deliberations which commenced in the run-up to the parliamentary election in August, 1994. A desperate bid by the PA to secure the LTTE’s endorsement, in the run-up to the parliamentary poll didn’t materialize. But the PA remained supremely confident of securing the LTTE’s approval before the presidential poll. The PA’s confidence grew in the wake of the first round of talks, held in Jaffna on October, 13-14, 1994. Kumaratunga received a massive boost by way of an agreement on the second round of talks, on October 24, 1994, two weeks before the presidential. The LTTE wouldn’t have ordered Dissanayake’s assassination had it felt Kumaratunga could win. Although the LTTE never endorsed Kumaratunga’s candidature publicly, the assassination sent a strong message to the Tamil speaking people, not only in the then temporarily-merged Northern and Eastern Province, that Prabhakaran preferred a PA victory. Kumaratunga would never have received 62.88 per cent of the vote, if a substantial number of Tamils did not exercise their franchise in support of the PA candidate.

The LTTE facilitated Kumaratunga’s efforts by declaring a week-long unilateral truce with effect from November 12, 1994, to coincide with the newly elected president taking oaths. The PA reciprocated by proposing a two-week long cessation of hostilities. The proposal was made on November 19, 1994. The following day, the LTTE demanded an explanation from the government regarding the circumstances under which the army killed a senior LTTE cadre, holding the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, during the unilateral ceasefire declared by the group. The PA promptly assured the LTTE of initiating a Court of Inquiry process into the killing which occurred in the Kokkuthuduwai area. Regardless of the LTTE’s unilateral ceasefire, the army conducted routine operations in the NE Province.

The PA leadership didn’t, at least bother to raise Dissanayake’s assassination with the LTTE, though it was ready to inquire into the conduct of the army. The PA ignored concerns expressed by the Dissanayake family, as well as the UNP, over failure on the part of the government to conduct a proper investigation. In fact, on the day before the PA delivered the letter (November 19, 1994), The Island dealt with Srima and President’s Counsel, Daya Perera taking up the issue. Having expressed concern over the status of the local investigation, Srima called for Indian experts to join in the inquiry. Both Srima and the UNP firmly believed that New Delhi couldn’t turn a blind eye to what was happening in the wake of Dissanayake’s assassination. Perera lambasted the government for not taking tangible action to bring down Indian experts. Perera was representing the interests of the Dissanayakes (India unlikely to send experts for probe-The Island-November 18, 1994).

Having exchanged many letters, commencing the second week of November and December (1994), government and LTTE delegations met in Jaffna on the morning of January 2, 1995. The second round of talks effectively brought an end to the investigation. Kumaratunga upgraded her negotiating team by including two military personnel, Brigadier Siri Peiris and Captain Prasanna Rajaratne. The PA never realized the diabolical nature of the LTTE. The PA interpreted its victory at the parliamentary poll in August and the presidential in November, 1994 as double mandate for peace. Those surrounding Kumaratunga voiced that the government should go ahead with the peace process whatever the shortcomings and risks. PA members didn’t dare to caution Kumaratunga whose criticism of the military leadership received heavy media coverage. Former Air Force Commander, Harry Goonetilleke, was one of the few persons bold enough to caution Kumaratunga publicly. India Today in its November 30, 1994 edition quoted Gonnetilleke as having said: "I hope President Kumaratunga does not misread the presidential election result as a mandate from the Sinhalese people to talk peace with the LTTE at any cost. But there appeared to be no doubt that the overwhelming support she received from all communities reflected the desire of the majority of the people for an end to the war and restoration of peace."

The LTTE mounted several major attacks on the navy, between the parliamentary and presidential polls, in August and November, 1994, though it was engaged in negotiations with the government. Regardless of the embarrassment it had caused to the government, the LTTE wanted to resume negotiations from a position of strength. The easiest way to achieve supremacy, at the negotiating table, was to cause significant losses to the military. On the night of September 19, 1994, suicide cadres blasted SLNS Sagarawardene off Mannar. On October 9, 1994, less than a week before the first round of peace talks between the PA and the LTTE in Jaffna, the LTTE sank the Merchant Vessel Ocean Trader carrying supplies to the North. The LTTE mounted major attacks on the eve of parliamentary and presidential polls. In the early hours of August 16, 1994, the LTTE sank two vessels - a navy surveillance command ship and a tug belonging to Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA). The LTTE made an abortive bid to blow up an SLN landing craft at Vettilaikerni, east of Elephant Pass, on the eve of the presidential poll (Navy blasts LTTE boats carrying suicide bombers-The Island, November 9, 1994).

Kumaratunga gave the go ahead with the signing of a formal declaration of cessation of hostilities. President Kumaratunga and LTTE leader Prabhakaran signed the agreement on behalf of the GoSL and the LTTE, respectively on January 5, 1995. They finalized the agreement within just three days after the conclusion of the second round of talks. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) functioned as an intermediary to facilitate the project. The cessation of hostilities was to come into operation on January 8, 1995.

An assassination in the run-up to a presidential election

SPECIAL REPORT : Part 45

October 14, 2014, 12:00 pm 

by Shamindra Ferdinando

In the run-up to presidential poll on Nov 09, 1994: People’s Alliance candidate Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga and her rival Gamini Dissanayake at the Election Secretariat at Rajajiriya to hand over nominations

Having failed to convince the then Elections Commissioner, Chandrananda de Silva, not to hold the August 16, 1994, parliamentary election, in the Jaffna electoral district, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) moved the Court of Appeal against the polls chief, Jaffna Government Agent, as well as the Attorney General.

Jaffna electoral district comprises Jaffna and Kilinochchi. While the military controlled a small part of the Jaffna district, Kilinochchi was under 100 per cent LTTE control. The then TULF President, M. Sivasiththamparam, petitioned the court on July 8, 1994. Attorney-at-law, A.W.D. Silva, annexed a report by the writer published in the July 5, 1994, issue of The Island, to back the TULF’s call for cancellation of the Jaffna poll. The exclusive front-page report headlined, LTTE refuses to allow Jaffna, GA to leave Jaffna dealt with the crisis.

It would be pertinent to examine how the LTTE influenced the electoral process during the conflict, particularly after the departure of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in March, 1990, amidst speculation the country is heading for an early presidential election early next year (2015). India deployed troops here, in accordance with Indo-Lanka peace accord, signed on July 29, 1987. Some have conveniently forgotten the circumstances under which national elections had to be conducted due to LTTE interventions.

In the run-up to the August 16, 1994, parliamentary poll, the then Premier, Ranil Wickremesinghe, requested Tamil political parties to submit a common list for the Jaffna electoral district as the LTTE controlled a large part of the electorate. Wickremesinghe made the appeal at a meeting held at Temple Trees. The then Defence Secretary, Hamilton Wanasinghe, was on hand to explain the ground situation in the Jaffna peninsula as well as in the Jaffna islands. Wickremesinghe’s proposal was meant to pave the way to elect members of parliament, uncontested. Among those who had been invited to attend the meetings were leaders of the TULF, All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC), Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS) and the Eelam People’s Democratic People (EPDP). ACTC leader, Kumar Ponnambalam, strongly objected to Wickremesinghe’s proposal made on behalf of the government. Ponnambalam insisted that people shouldn’t be deprived of their right to elect members of parliament. If a free and fair election couldn’t be held in the Jaffna electorate, there was no point in electing members uncontested, Ponnambalam asserted. The TULF, too, opposed the proposal (Moves by government to get Tamil parties to submit common list for Jaffna district, ‘The Island’, July 5, 1994).

The government was compelled to shift the Jaffna election secretariat from Jaffna town to Tellippalai, an area under army control. The government also dispatched the then Director General of Combined Services, W. D.L. Perera, to Tellippalai, to run the election secretariat in the wake of the LTTE warning the then Jaffna GA, K. Manickavasagar, not to function as the chief returning officer of the Jaffna district. In fact, Manickavasagar couldn’t leave Jaffna for consultations with Elections Commissioner, Chandrananda de Silva, without LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran’s approval. The LTTE prevented Manickavasagar from attending a meeting chaired by the polls chief in Colombo, on June 29, 1994.

For want of overland transport, Manickavasagar had no option but to depend on a vessel chartered by the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) to leave Jaffna via Point Pedro.

Special status received by the EPDP, particularly in some Jaffna islands, irked other Tamil political parties. The EPDP exploited its close relationship with the UNP to its advantage, much to the anger of rival political parties, particularly the EPRLF. The UNP simply ignored the EPRLF’s demand to either disarm the EPDP or relocate them during the parliamentary election campaign as the group was essentially an integral part of the government security set-up in the Jaffna sector. The deployment of the EPDP was in line with the overall security strategy, which involved the deployment of all Indian trained terrorist groups against the LTTE. The EPDP operated alongside the navy in the northern region. At the time of the August 16, 1994, parliamentary poll, the EPDP had armed contingents in all Jaffna islands, except Nainathivu. The EPDP moved into Jaffna islands in 1990, in a big way, shortly after the outbreak of Eelam War II, in June, 1990.

At the time, the then President Dingiri Banda Wijetunga, called for parliamentary election, there hadn’t been police presence, except in Kayts. The President dissolved parliament on June 24, 1994. Nominations were to be received from July 4 to 11, 1994. The TULF’s petition to the Court of Appeal revealed the pathetic situation on the ground. Having explained circumstances under which the party had secured representatives in the Jaffna electoral district, at the 1989 parliamentary poll, the TULF told court that the government controlled maximum 20 per cent of the land area in the Jaffna electoral district. The court was also told the judiciary didn’t function in the Jaffna electoral district. The TULF also pointed out that registered political parties hadn’t been able to engage in political activity in the area since the outbreak of Eelam War II. Political parties couldn’t exercise what the TULF called their statutory right for broadcasting facilities for want of electricity. The TULF pointed out the absurdity in having an election in the Jaffna electoral district as only about 10 per cent of the population lived in the area, under government control, whereas the rest lived with the LTTE. The TULF also brought to the notice of the court that communities lived in isolation due to ongoing hostilities, and that nominations couldn’t be accepted at the Jaffna kachcheri though it was the practice, Jaffna GA couldn’t function, recognized political parties couldn’t even conduct interviews in Jaffna to pick candidates and the election register of 1986 was to be used, thereby depriving all those who had attained 18 years of age, after 1986, the opportunity to exercise their franchise (TULF makes application in court to prohibit holding of polls in Jaffna, ‘The Island’, July 11, 1994).

A couple of weeks after the TULF petitioned the Court of Appeal, the LTTE allowed Jaffna GA Manickavasagar to leave for Colombo. After having arrived in Colombo, in ICRC chartered ship, Manickavasagar told the writer that he received explicit instructions that he shouldn’t participate in the electoral process under any circumstances. A visibly shaken official said that he was ordered not to return to Jaffna if he acted contrary to the instructions received in Jaffna (LTTE permits GA to leave with strict orders, with strap line, No dabbling in election work, he was told, The Island, July 23, 1994)

Manickavasagar briefed Defence Secretary, Gen. Wanasinghe and Public Administration Secretary Austin Fernando (held the post of Defence Secretary during Ranil Wickremesinghe’s premiership during the Norwegian arranged ceasefire), as regards the situation in the Jaffna peninsula.

The judiciary ignored the TULF’s concerns. The government was allowed to go ahead with the polls.

The EPDP, which fielded candidates, only in the Jaffna electoral district, secured nine seats by polling just 10,744 votes (1%).

Just ten days ahead of the August 16, 1994, election, Defence Secretary, General Wanasinghe, warned political parties of a possible LTTE assassination attempt. Addressing senior officials of political parties in the fray, at the Defence Ministry, Wanasinghe asserted that the LTTE would strike before the day of the election to cause chaos. Among those present were Dr. Gamini Wijesekera, (UNP), Dharmasiri Senanayake (SLFP) and Rauff Hakeem (SLMC). The then Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Gerry de Silva, army Chief of Staff, Major General Lucky Algama, and DIG Merril Gunaratne, attended the conference. Although a major LTTE operation didn’t materialize, in the run-up to the general election, the LTTE assassinated UNP presidential candidate, Gamini Dissanayake, on the night of October 23, 1994 at Thotalanga, in the Kotahena police area. Ironically, among the victims of the Thotalanga massacre, caused by a suicide cadre, was Dr. Gamini Wijesekera, who received General Wanasinghe’s warning. Close on the heels of Chandrika Bandaranaike assuming the premiership, a section of the media accused some senior army officers of a ‘plot’ on the day of the election. Among those, whose names transpired in unsubstantiated media reports, were the then Brigadier Sarath Fonseka, Colonel Gamini Gunasekera, and Lt. Col. Asoka Thoradeniya and Lt. Col. M. R. W. Soysa. Alleging that there was absolutely no basis for accusations against them, they requested President Wijetunga to initiate an inquiry.

Army Chief of Staff Lucky Algama, too, sought presidential intervention to clear his name consequent to media reports pertaining to his alleged involvement in the plot. Algama was responding to a report carried in a tabloid, Yukthiya, in its August 28, 1994, edition as regards the alleged coup. Algama forwarded a letter, dated August 27, 1994, to President Wijetunga, through Lt. Gen. Gerry de Silva. The media also linked one-time army Commander, Lt. General Cecil Waidyaratne with the plotters. (Alleged army conspiracy on election day with strap line Algama asks President for probe, ‘The Island’, August 30, 1994).

Even Colombo based international news agencies took unsubstantiated reports, as regards the alleged coup, seriously. Reuters, in a Colombo datelined report, declared that Deputy Defence Minister, Anuruddha Ratwatte, had initiated an inquiry into the coup days before the August 16, 1994, general election. The agency quoted the then cabinet spokesman, Minister Dharmasiri Senanayake, as having said Ratwatte was looking into the coup.

Minister Senanayake was speaking in the wake of President Wijetunga directing the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) to inquire into the alleged army plot.

In the wake of the People’s Alliance (PA) victory, achieved under Kumaratunga’s leadership, the LTTE obviously felt that it could reach an understanding with her in case she won the presidential election that was to follow the parliamentary poll. In accordance with the LTTE plan to facilitate Kumaratunga’s victory, it ordered the assassination of the UNP presidential candidate. It would be important to realize that the decision was meant to take out the UNP candidate whoever secured the party’s support to be the UNP presidential candidate. In hindsight, that particular decision was probably taken after Kumaratunga’s victory, in August, and in the run-up to the presidential election, on November 9, 1994.

What would have been Prabhakaran’s decision if the UNP picked Wickremesinghe as its presidential candidate? In spite of Wickremesinghes giving resolute leadership to the party, during the severe political crisis, caused by the rebel Lalith-Gamini group, President Wijetunga called for a secret vote, among the UNP parliamentary group, to pick the leader of the parliamentary group. The President, in his capacity as the party leader, decided on a secret vote as he felt it could be advantageous to Dissanayake. President Wijetunga declared Dissanayake as the winner after having held the secret ballot at the presidential secretariat, much to the opposition of some seniors, who felt that the process could be manipulated to the advantage of Dissanayake. Immediately after President Wijetunga declared that Dissanayake had polled more votes than Wickremesinghe, the latter, who was seated next to Wijetunga got up from his seat and offered it to his rival. Having consolidated his position as the UNP parliamentary group leader, Dissanayake, swiftly secured the UNP’s endorsement as its presidential candidate (Gamini tipped to be UNP presidential candidate, The Island, September 2, 1994). The President ignored Wickremesinghe, in spite of him being former Prime Minister and the fact that he never deserted the party during the crisis caused by the bid to impeach President Ranasinghe Premadasa.

The LTTE would have studied the clandestine project, conducted by President Wijetunga, at the behest of Dissanayake to clear the way for the one-time DUNF rebel to win the next presidential poll. The perception that Dissanayake would have had New Delhi’s support, too, prompted the LTTE to target Dissanayake. In early September, the UNP indicated that Dissanayake’s candidature could be officially announced at the first working committee meeting of the party since the defeat at the August 16, 1994, parliamentary poll (Gamini UNP presidential candidate, The Island, September 6, 1994).

Prabhakaran would have ordered a hit on Dissanayake soon after the UNP campaign got underway. The LTTE could have ensured a fresh round of negotiations with a new government leadership only if Dissanayake’s defeat could be guaranteed, hence the decision to do away with him. Wickremesinghe would have been in Prabhakaran’s gun-sight had he been allowed to assume his rightful place in the party at the correct time.

Having assured the LTTE, in the run-up to the parliamentary, poll that a new PA government would be ready for direct negotiations with the LTTE, the opposition grouping requested the LTTE not to interfere with the August, 1994, election. The PA was making overtures to the LTTE, while the TULF and other Tamil political parties, except the EPDP, pushed for the cancellation of Jaffna poll. In an obvious bid to secure the LTTE’s support, Kumaratunga told Wasantha Raja, the then producer and presenter of the BBC’s Sandeshaya: "I’m prepared to invite the LTTE for unconditional talks. I am willing to expand the Northern Province to include Tamils areas in the East and make a single unit. I will redefine the Eastern Province and devolve more power." Wasantha Raja received Kumaratunga’s assurance before he left for Jaffna, where he met LTTE leaders. But the LTTE refused to cooperate with the PA’s plan. Prabhakaran ordered people to boycott the electoral process. The LTTE, probably felt that throwing its weight behind Kumaratunga’s campaign could be disadvantageous to its overall strategy. In spite of that, Kumaratunga declared her intentions to go ahead with talks soon after taking the premiership. The new Premier chose the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) an an intermediary to proceed with negotiations. The PA never realized the LTTE strategy. As always, the LTTE wanted to deal with the government from a position of strength. It realized the simmering internal crisis in the UNP, over President Wijetunga’s move to deprive Wickremesinghe of an opportunity to contest the next presidential poll, as well as the rumblings in the PA over Kumaratunga’s rapid rise.

The LTTE knew whatever the shortcomings in the political strategy, the military remained a formidable force, capable of facing its conventional military challenge. In an obvious bid to underscore its prowess, the LTTE, on the night of September 19, 1994, blew up SLNS Sagarawardene in the Gulf of Mannar. On Oct 9, 1994, the LTTE sank cargo ship, Ocean Trader carrying supplies to Jaffna peninsula. In spite of grave provocations, Kumaratunga went ahead with the first round of talks on Oct 13, 14, 1994, in Jaffna. The ICRC quickly arranged the two parties to meet again in Jaffna, on Oct, 24, 1994. Although, President Wijetunga, remained Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, he didn’t intervene. Both the LTTE and the PA realized that Kumaratunga’s presidential election campaign received a massive boost due to the Jaffna talks. Kumaratunga went out of her way to appease the LTTE, as well as those who felt the LTTE conventional military capability was far superior to that of the military. In an interview with the BBC, in Colombo, Premier Kumaratunga lambasted the military leadership, which she said has ‘reigned supreme’ for 11 years. Kumaratunga accused the military leadership of trying to act as a ‘government unto themselves’ and seeking to sabotage her peace initiative.

Perhaps, the LTTE felt that UNP presidential candidate, Dissanayake, still could pull it off, in spite of Kumaratunga campaigning on a peace platform. Dissanayake was blown up on the night of October 23, 1994, about eight hours before Kumaratunga’s delegation was to leave for Jaffna. Dissanayake’s assassination compelled Kumaratunga to put off the second round of talks, but it ensured her victory at the Nov 9, 1994, presidential poll. Kumaratunga received a staggering 62 per cent of the vote, though the UNP fielded Gamini Dissanayake’s widow, Srimathi to attract the sympathy vote. The LTTE welcomed Kumaratunga’s victory in a statement issued on November 12, 1994. Prabhakaran also declared a one-week unilateral ceasefire with effect from November 12, the day Kumaratunga assumed presidency. Kumaratunga initiated talks on November 19, 1994, regardless of Dissanayake’s assassination.