P’karan loses ‘Land of Black Tigers’

War on terror revisited : Part 79

December 6, 2012, 12:00 pm


By Shamindra Ferdinando

The fall of LTTE strongholds at Dharmapuram and Vishvamdu along the Paranthan-Mullaitivu A-35 road set the stage for one of the most important operations undertaken by the 58 Division on the Vanni front.

Having launched operations on the western flank in Sept. 2007, troops under the then Brig. Shavendra Silva liberated the north-western coast by Nov. 15, 2008 with the capture of Pooneryn before turning eastwards. Pooneryn was their primary target. Their next target was Paranthan on the Kandy-Jaffna A-9 road. They achieved the second objective within six weeks. Troops regained the Pooneryn-Paranthan A-34 road by Dec. 31, 2008 night, entered the area east of the A-9 and cleared the A-35 road up to Vishvamadu by the third week of Jan. 2009. Their next target was Suwandirampuram, situated 10 km north-west of Puthukudirippu.

Brig. Shavendra Silva was in a hurry to finish off the LTTE on the Vanni East front. The 58 Division advanced relentlessly into LTTE strongholds causing heavy damage to the enemy. The LTTE fought on multiple fronts as it retreated towards the Mullaitivu coast.

The then army Chief Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka saturated the Vanni East with ground forces. On Feb. 8, 2009, shortly after an LTTE counter attack caused heavy damage to the 59.3 Brigade deployed south of Puthukudirippu, the army chief raised Task Force VIII (TF III). The then Col. G.V. Ravipriya (currently army headquarters spokesman) was placed in command of the new fighting formation. It was the last outfit set up to carry out the final maneuvers on the ground. Having served the 57 Division commanded by Maj. Gen. Jagath Dias as one of Brigade Commanders until the liberation of Akkarayankulam, the artillery officer was placed in charge of an area south of Puthukudirippu.


The LTTE faced five divisions namely 57 (Jagath Dias-Gajaba Regiment), 59 (Nandana Udawatte) 58 (Shavendra Silva), 53 (Kamal Gunaratne-Gajaba Regiment) and 55 (Prasanna Silva) as well as four smaller formations, TF II (Rohana Bandara––Engineers), TF III (Sathyapriya Liyanage), TF IV (Nishantha Wanniarachchi) and TF VIII (G.V. Ravipriya––Artillery).

However, subsequent to the heavy defeat suffered by the 59.3 Brigade south of Puthukudirippu in the first week of Feb. 2009, an angry Lt. Gen. Fonseka sent Brig. Chagi Gallage to take over the Division. Brig. Nandana Udawatte was brought to Anuradhapura as the Overall Operations Commander. Regardless of the Feb. 2009 debacle, the 59 Division, including disgraced 59.3 Brigade under Brig. Udawatte’s command fought under extremely difficult conditions to achieve significant battlefield victories on the eastern flank. Although the 59 Division didn’t attract the media attention, it caused immense losses to the enemy in seemingly impregnable Andankulam and Nagacholai forest reserves. Although the 59 Division was slow in achieving its primary objective Mullaitivu, the formation could be proud of its role in the defeat of LTTE terrorism.

Brig. Gallage was a key strategist in the army chief’s team. In fact, Gallage was Lt. Gen. Fonseka’s first choice as TFI/58 Division commander, though he had to take leave due to a surgical operation immediately after the liberation of Arippu and Silavathurai in Aug. 2007. Gallage, who had played a leading role in the liberation of the Eastern Province (Aug. 2006 to June 2007) was back in command of a fighting Division at a crucial stage of the offensive.

Land of Black Tigers

Suwandirampuram was a major LTTE stronghold defended by some of its best fighting units. But, they couldn’t halt the 58 Division advancing on the village. As troops pushed towards the village defenders retreated burying their weapons all over the area even without identification tags. Suwandirampuram was considered the ‘land of black Tigers’ where a major training facility was situated within a high security zone. It was a fully fledged training base used to transform ordinary LTTE cadres into mindless assassins tasked with taking military and political targets. Those who targeted Lt. Gen. Fonseka (April 25, 2006) and Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa (Dec 1, 2006) had been trained at the Black Tiger training facility. A little distance away from the training base, troops found a short airfield used by LTTE to launch fixed wing aircraft to bomb Colombo. It was the second airfield captured by the 58 Division.

The LTTE moved hundreds of MAHAVEER families to Suwandirampuram from areas north of Mannar as well as Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu districts in the face of relentless army operations west of the A-9. Although MAHAVEER families as well as ordinary people could have easily surrendered to the army and sought refuge in the government held-area, the LTTE forced the vast majority of people to retreat across the A-9.

The 58.1 Brigade tasked to liberate Suwandirampuram found another major LTTE training facility situated north of the village where troops later recovered a large haul of buried armaments. Having cleared the training base, the 58.1 Brigade comprising Sinha Regiment (7SR) and Gemunu Watch (GW and 12 GW) moved in to Suwandirampuram, where they came across those starving under LTTE administration. During the battle for the ‘Land of Black Tigers’ the LTTE lost over 200 cadres, whereas the 58.1 Brigade lost 14 personnel.

Army snipers facilitate ground advance

The 58.2 Brigade pushing towards the A-35 road encountered an LTTE defence line built along the banks of Teravil aru extending from Udayarkattukulam to Chundikulam lagoon. Troops faced strong resistance with the LTTE deploying experienced cadres to stall the advancing army. The effective deployment of army snipers facilitated the ground assault on the LTTE defence line. Snipers played a critically important role in taking targets along the LTTE defence line, thereby facilitating the overall strategy during the final phase of the conflict. While the battle was raging for the A-35 road, the 58 Division and TF IV linked up hence further increasing pressure on the LTTE.

Bloodbath at IDP centre

On Feb. 9, 2009, an LTTE woman suicide cadre, probably one trained at Suwandirampuram Black Tiger training facility entered an IDP centre manned by the 58 Division in the Thevipuram area to carry out an attack. She targeted civilians. It was a dastardly attempt by Prabhakaran to discourage the people from seeking refuge in the liberated area.

The blast claimed the lives 12 Tamil civilians, including children. Eighteen army personnel, including an officer, too, perished in the suicide blast at the IDP center.

Former General Officer Commanding (GOC) and Sri Lanka Deputy Permanent Representative in New York Maj. Gen. Shavendra Silva told The Island that the eelam war IV lasted nearly three years because of the civilian factor. Had civilians managed to reach the government held area, ground forces could have finished off the enemy much earlier. Ambassador Silva said that there couldn’t have been a better example than the suicide attack on the IDP center to underscore the LTTE brutality. The woman tasked to carry out that particular attack could have unknowingly killed her parents or friends, Ambassador Silva said.

The Maj. Gen. pointed out that the 58.3 Brigade had deployed two kilometres southeast of Muruthapiti near Thevipyram was responsible for facilitating IDP movements. "Don’t forget the woman suicide cadre was disguised as a refuge. Maybe she was forced to carry out the attack at gun point. Maybe Prabhakaran threatened her loved ones with death unless she attacked her own community fleeing the murderous LTTE," Ambassador Silva said.

LTTE strikes back

In a desperate attempt to stall the 58 Division, the LTTE launched a lightning assault on army positions on a small island situated between Chalai and Vanni mainland. The raiding party comprising about 400 attackers took control of the island as the army retreated. Some feared the LTTE could bring in additional forces to exploit the situation on the ground. Having deployed Israeli Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) to obtain real time intelligence, the army mounted a massive artillery barrage on the island where the majority of attackers perished. It was one of the most successful artillery assaults directed at a particular LTTE target causing maximum damage. Soon after the artillery attack Special Forces and Commandos moved in to clear the island. As many as 400 LTTE cadres were believed to have been killed in army counter attack. Although the LTTE carried out several daring counter offensives, it couldn’t sustain action due to the army responding to the enemy threat decisively and swiftly. The LTTE couldn’t exploit battlefield success south of Puthukudirippu in the first week of Feb, 2009 and the latest on an island between Chalai and Vanni mainland, though it retained sufficient combat forces even at that time. When the LTTE made a stunning breakthrough south of Puthukudirippu, Special Forces moved in swiftly to thwart the enemy. Had the Special Forces failed, it could have caused an irreparable setback leading to a catastrophic situation.

The army had the capacity to meet the LTTE threat head on due to overwhelming superiority in firepower as well as Special Forces and Commandos remaining ready to intervene in support of the infantry at short notice. The Special Forces and Commandos played a key role in Lt. Gen. Fonseka’s grand strategy to overwhelm the LTTE in the Vanni region, where the LTTE maintained strong forces capable of fighting on multiple fronts for almost two years (Sep 2007 to May 2009).

59 Div suffers stunning setback after M’tivu victory

War on terror revisited : Part 78

December 4, 2012, 12:00 pm

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Having fought a series of bloody battles since Jan, 2008, the 59 Division deployed on the eastern flank aka the Weli Oya front was ready to enter Mullaitivu town on the night of Jan. 24, 2009. Liberating Mullaitivu was the 59 Division’s primary task. The then Brig. Nandana Udawatte’s fighting formation had taken one year to fight its way across Anandakulam and Nagacholai forest reserves, which stood as natural defences for the LTTE stronghold, Mullaitivu.

The LTTE captured Mullaitivu on July 18, 1996 wiping out two infantry battalions (Sinha Regiment and Vijayabahu Infantry Regiment) and support units attached to the 25 Brigade headquartered there. The isolated Brigade was deployed on a narrow stretch of a land between the Nanthikadal lagoon and the sea. The base occupied a 2,900m long and 1,500 m wide area with a perimeter of about 8,500 m bordered by the sea on one side. A joint rescue operation involving three forces spearheaded by the Special Forces ended disastrously with reinforcements, too, taking heavy losses.

Over the years, the LTTE turned the town into its strongest base, from where they coordinated a large scale smuggling operation to bring in supplies from abroad.

Gemunu Watch in ‘silent’ operation

Two small groups of the 7th Gemunu Watch (7GW) battalion under cover of darkness of Saturday night silently crossed the Nanthikadal lagoon to enter the Mullaitivu town. The raiders consisted of two eight man teams, which took up positions in the town. They were followed by some elements of 12 and 15 battalions of the Sri Lanka Light Infantry (SLLI). The 59.3 Brigade commanded by the then Lieut. Col. Jayantha Gunaratne comprised 7 GW, 12 SLLI and 15 SLLI.

The 7GW was commanded by Lieut. Col. Chaminda Lamahewa, whereas 12 SLLI and 15 SLLI fought under the command of Maj. Wasantha Perera and Maj. Sujeewa Hettiarachchi, respectively.

The crossing of Nanthikadal lagoon took place while troops battled strong LTTE forces south of town. The LTTE launched fierce attacks taking cover of a massive earth bund across Alampil-Mullaitivu road.

The 59 Division brought Mullaitivu town under its control on the morning of Jan. 25, 2009. The liberation of the coastal town marked an important milestone in the battle against the LTTE.

The 59 Division waged a series of fierce battles with elite LTTE units before scoring its first major victory on May 30, 2008 when the LTTE abandoned its Munagam base. The 59 Division captured bases codenamed Michael (July 4), Sugandan (July 27) and Jeevan (August 16) before reaching the area west of the Nayaru lagoon. On Oct. 23, the 59 Division secured Gajabapura and on Nov. 11 moved into Kumulamunai village. The LTTE lost Otiyamalai on Nov. 29 before being evicted from Mulliyawalai on Dec. 26, 2008.

Fighting alone on the eastern front

The 59 Division paid a heavy price to liberate Mullaituvu. While the 57 Division and Task Force I (TFI) fought on the central and western flanks, respectively, west of the Kandy-Jaffna A-9 road, the 59 Division fought alone on the eastern front. The 57 Division launched operations in March 2007, while TFI commenced its northwards advance from Mannar in Sept 2007. The then army chief Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka launched TFII and TF III from south of Palamoodai and Vannivilankulam also west of the A-9 road. TF II commenced operations in June 2008 whereas TF III began its march in Nov 2008. Both formations manoeuvred along the west-east axis across the A-9 road. But, the army opened a second front east of the A-9 road in Dec. 2008 with the launch of TF IV under the command of Col. Nishantha Wanniarachchi. Having launched operations in the general area Nedunkerni, TF IV brought Nedunkerni under its control on Dec 19, 2008, Oddusuddan on Jan. 4, 2009 and Keridattadu on Jan. 12, 2009.

The 59 Division evicted the LTTE from villagers, including Alampil south of Mullaitivu by the end of Jan. 2009. Alampil situated 12 km south of Mullaitivu was one of the major Sea Tiger strongholds. The fall of Alampil demoralised the LTTE with some units rapidly retreating northwards to take up position in Mullaitivu.

By the first week of Jan. 2009 TF III and TF IV completely dominated the Mankulam-Oddusuddan A-34 road.

Tigers trapped in 360 sq. km area

At the time, the 59 Division liberated Mullaitivu, eight fighting formations conducted operations east of the A-9 road. In fact, the army found it difficult to conduct large scale ground operations by all formations due to the gradual shrinking of the area held by the LTTE. The LTTE deployed in Mullaitivu was pressed by the 59 Division and the then Brig. Prasanna Silva’s 55 Division advancing southwards along the coastal road. By end of Jan, 2009, the LTTE had been restricted to approximately 360 sq. km area east of the A9, with ground forces pressing defenders on multiple fronts.

SF praises MR, GR

The liberation of Mullaituvu prompted Lt. Gen. Fonseka to declare that 95 per cent of the battle was over. In a televised speech over the national television, the Sinha Regiment veteran paid a glowing tribute to President Mahinda Rajapaksa and Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa for their unwavering support. The army chief also commended the support given by the air force, though he ignored the navy’s contribution to the war effort. It was no secret that Lt. Gen. Fonseka and navy Chief the then Vice Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda were not on talking terms. Lt. Gen. Fonseka publicly questioned the navy’s ability as well as capacity to prevent the LTTE from evacuating its leadership. The army chief also ridiculed the navy top brass for allowing Sea Tigers to operate under their noses hence bringing in vast quantities of arms, ammunition and equipment.

Indian Foreign Minister in Colombo

 The fall of Mullaitivu fueled large scale protests in Tamil Nadu with its Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi pushing the central government to intervene in Sri Lanka. At the behest of the LTTE facing defeat on the battlefront, Karunanidhi wanted India to take tangible action to save Prabhakaran. The then Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee met President Rajapaksa at Temple Trees to discuss the situation, the Defence Secretary Rajapaksa reiterated government’s commitment to finish off the LTTE (Lanka won’t halt offensive––The Island Jan 28, 2009).

Gajaba troops recover

152 mm artillery piece

While the 59 Division consolidated its position at Mullaitivu, 10 Gajaba battalion attached to Brig. Shavendra Silva’s 58 Division recovered one 152 mm artillery piece buried north-east of Vishvamadu on Jan 28, 2009. 10 GR was under the command of Maj. Janaka Udowita. Having examined the weapon of Chinese origin, the army declared it was in perfect working condition.

ICRC facilitates transfer of sick and wounded

On Jan. 29, 2009, the LTTE allowed the ICRC to transfer 226 sick and wounded people from the LTTE-held area to Vavuniya hospital. The overland



movement took place following a tripartite agreement involving the ICRC, the army and the LTTE. The LTTE gave in to international pressure, though it had earlier thwarted an UN/ICRC attempt to move 300 sick and wounded people along with a group of UN employees and their dependents. The detained UN employees included two expatriate workers. Although the LTTE allowed the expats to leave, local UN workers and their dependents had no option but to remain in the war zone (Gajaba troops recover 152 mm artillery piece on M’tivu front––The Island Jan 30, 2009).

A section of the local media continued to undermine the war effort with some openly backing the LTTE propaganda blitz against the government. Army headquarters strongly protested after a Colombo-based news agency photographer, having visited Mullaitivu in the immediate aftermath of the 59 Division liberating the town had released pictures with false captions to the effect that a large group of civilians had perished due to an artillery attack carried out by the army. Many an eye brow was raised as the media visit had been organised by the President’s media team

Last major LTTE counter attack

The LTTE mounted a massive counter attack on the 59 Division in the first week of December causing heavy losses. The LTTE operation got underway as Defence Secretary Rajapaksa rejected a joint appeal by Tokyo Co-Chairs to Sri Lanka’s peace process namely Japan, US, Norway and the EU to halt the ongoing offensive to pave the way for talks. The grouping wanted the government and the LTTE to negotiate for the surrender of Prabhakaran’s arms. An irate Defence Secretary Rajapaksa declared nothing short of an unconditional surrender of arms and cadres could bring an end to the offensive on the eastern front (Lanka rejects move to throw lifeline to LTTE––The Island Feb 5, 2009). The LTTE offensive quickly developed into an all-out attack on the 59 Division with the 59.3 Brigade deployed south of Puthukudirippu suffering a heavy defeat. Brig. N. A. Dharmaratne told Defence seminar, ‘Defeating terrorism: Sri Lanka experience’ in May/June 2011, how the LTTE had wrongfooted the 59.3 Brigade in a lightning strike. The 59.3 Brigade was pushed back about five kms by the attacking force before Special Forces and Commandos moved in to thwart the offensive. The Feb. 2009 offensive was the fiercest of three major counter attacks mounted by the LTTE before the group suffered the single worst battlefield defeat due to an unprecedented joint operation conducted by the 58 Division and the 53 Division on the Vanni east front.
















In the immediate aftermath of the liberation of the Eastern Province in July 2007, army Commander Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka told this writer that the army had never had an overall plan before the launch of the eelam war IV in August 2006. "We never had a cohesive strategy earlier. Of course, we conducted operations and major security forces campaigns. But unfortunately they were isolated action. There was never an overall action plan on our part. In some instances, we were only reacting to LTTE actions,"

The army chief asserted that a combination of negligence on the part of the top brass, absence of a cohesive battle plan and a ridiculous system that ensured promotions solely on the basis of seniority had had a catastrophic impact on the armed forces. Lack of political will to finish off the LTTE, too, had contributed to the gradual transformation of the LTTE from a terrorist group to formidable conventional fighting force with what he called ‘a sea and air capability.’ The war veteran declared that the LTTE had lost capacity to wage major battles on the Vanni east front (High intensity fighting tapering off––The Island Feb. 1, 2009). But the LTTE regrouped in the first week of Feb. 2009 to carry out a debilitating attack on the 59 Division, though it couldn’t derail the army offensive.

Tigers trapped east of A-9

War on terror revisited : Part 77

December 2, 2012, 8:03 pm

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Sri Lanka’s most successful fighting formation Task Force I (TFI) was elevated to the status of a permanent Division in the immediate aftermath of the then Brig. Shavendra Silva’s troops liberating LTTE stronghold Paranthan at midnight Dec. 31, 2008, and the northern part of Kilinochchi the following day. Army Chief Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka announced the transformation of TFI to 58 at a meeting called at the Vanni Security Forces headquarters, in Vavuniya, close on the heels of magnificent battlefield victories. The 58 was the last fighting Division formed by Lt. Gen. Fonseka, the Sinha Regiment veteran, who oversaw the doubling of the army’s strength during President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s first term (2005- 2010).

The decision to double the strength of the army (from 100,000 to over 200,000) was taken by President Rajapaksa with the concurrence of Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa. The decision was in line with Lt. Gen. Fonseka’s plea for additional troops. The navy and the air force, too, were given the green light to rapidly expand.

Change of command

Having liberated Silavathurai and Arippu, south of Mannar on Sept 1, 2007, Lt. Gen. Fonseka directed TFI to liberate Mannar ‘Rice Bowl.’ Lt. Gen. Fonseka picked the then Brig. Chargi Gallage as TFI commander.

Brig. Gallage assigned the daunting task of liberating Parappakadaththan to the 58.1 Brigade, Adampan to the 58.2 Brigade and Andankulam to the 58.3 Brigade. TFI’s first task was to capture sluice gates of the Giant Tank at the eastern border of the Rice Bowl on Sept. 22, 2007. TFI was battling it out on the eastern front when Brig. Gallage had to undergo urgent surgery. The army chief named Brig. Silva as Gallage’s successor. Under Silva’s command, TFI liberated Adampan on May 9, 2008, Rice Bowl on June 29, 2008 before linking up with the 57 Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Jagath Dias on the afternoon June 30, 2008.

TFI’s primary task was to clear the coastal road from Mannar to Pooneryn-Sangupiddy. The 57 Division was given the uphill task of liberating Kilinochchi.

TFI captured Vellankulam on Aug 12, 2008, and rapidly advanced towards its primary target and brought Pooneryn under its control on Nov. 15, 2008. Having bagged Pooneryn, TFI turn eastwards. TFI advanced eastwards straddling Pooneryn-Paranthan B-69 road to enter Paranthan on the night of Dec 31, 2008. Having wrested control of Paranthan, Brig. Silva’s troops fought their way into the northern part of Kilinochchi town, where they secured the LTTE headquarters complex, the most modern building in the entire Vanni built during the Norwegian arranged Ceasefire Agreement. The Army headquarters directed Brig. Silva to halt further southwards advance. He was asked to turn northwards of Kilinochchi to take Elephant Pass.

On Jan.9, 2009, TFI troops linked up with the 53 and 55 Divisions north of Elephant Pass. TFI liberated Elephant Pass, where the army had suffered a humiliating battlefield defeat in the third week of April 2000. Elephant Pass was headquarters to the fully fledged 54 Division, which held Elephant Pass-Kilinochchi section of the A-9 road and overland supply route from Elephant Pass to Vettilaikerni on the east coast. The linking up of TFI and 53 and 55 Division troops effectively restricted what was left of the LTTE’s conventional fighting power to the east of the A-9.

It was the Gemunu Watch (9GW) which crossed the Elephant Pass lagoon to seize the narrow causeway which linked the Vanni mainland with the Jaffna peninsula. The national flag was hoisted along with divisional and regimental flags in the presence of the then Vanni Security Forces Commander, Maj. Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya and Security Forces Commander, Jaffna, the then Maj. Gen. Mendaka Samarasinghe.

Troops turn heat on Tigers

The LTTE regrouped quickly as the 58 Division opened a new front. The 58 Division advanced eastwards of Paranthan on the Paranthan-Mullaitivu road (A-35) targeting Murasumoddai.

In the immediate aftermath of the Kilinochchi debacle, the LTTE made an attempt to target Air Force Chief Air Marshal Roshan Gunatilleke in Colombo. But, the plan went awry. A male suicide cadre exploded himself as he was pursued by people when his presence aroused suspicions. The assassin was waiting near SLAF headquarters at Sir Chittamplam Gardinar Mawatha at the time people surrounded him.

Buoyant by major battlefield achievements, the 58 Division within a week overran Murasumoddai, an LTTE stronghold situated 5.5 km away from Paranthan along the A-35 road. The operation was the first since the 54 Division during the third phase of operation Sath Jaya in Sept. 1996 ventured into the area. Although the LTTE resisted fiercely, it couldn’t stop the 58 Division troops. In a dawn operation, Sinha Regiment (7SR) commanded by Lt. Col. Kithsiri Liyanage stormed Musasumoddai causing heavy damage to the LTTE. Defenders withdrew leaving bodies of their colleagues. The 5th Armoured Regiment facilitated the ground assault by deploying T-55 main battle tanks as well as T-63 tanks.

Having liberated Murasumoddai, the 58 Division eyed Dharmapuram aka Tharmapuram also on the A-35 road. The township, situated 15 km east of A-9 was considered one of the most important LTTE centres. Many INGOs had operated in the area, though they vacated the region in Sept. 2008. After a series of bloody confrontations, the 58 Division liberated Dharmapuram on Jan.15, 2009. The battle for Dharmapuram was spearheaded by the Gajaba Regiment (10GR) and the Sri Lanka Light Infantry (11 SLLI). During the battle army engineers thwarted an LTTE attempt to blow up a bridge near Pulathi aru on the A-35 road. The fall of Dharmapuram paved the way for the 58 Division to push towards Vishvamadu. Before the fall of Paranthan, the LTTE exploited the civilian population living in Dharmapuram to deceive the international community.

The LTTE propaganda operation received the backing of some INGOs, NGOs and certain Colombo-based diplomats.

On Jan. 17, 2009, the 57 Division captured Ramanathapuram situated east of the A-9 road. The LTTE suffered heavy losses in its attempts to thwart the 57 Division. Once the 57 Division consolidated Ramanathapuram, it launched operations targeting Vishvamadu.

The 58 Division conducted operations north of Paranthan-Mullaitivu road whereas the 57 Division engaged targets south of the road. The road divided the two Divisions. Both advanced in the general direction of Mullaitvu.

Gotabhaya rules out truce

The fall of Murasumoddai, Dharmapuram and Ramanahapuram in quick succession prompted international calls for an immediate truce. A section of the international community pushed hard for a ceasefire on the Vanni front. The Tamil National Alliance (TNA) and some foreign-funded NGOs urged President Rajapaksa to halt the offensive immediately. Close on the heels of the liberation of Dharmapuram, Defence Secretary Rajapaksa declared that the offensive wouldn’t be stopped under any circumstances. The Gajaba Regiment veteran, who had fought the LTTE at the onset of major operations in the Eelam conflict insisted that the government wouldn’t offer a general amnesty to hardcore LTTE terrorists.

Prabhakaran and his chief lieutenants would be tried for crimes they committed here and overseas, an obvious reference to the LTTE assassination of one-time Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi   at Sriperumbudur on 21 May 1991. Even if the top LTTE leadership surrendered to the army, the government would go ahead with legal proceedings, Rajapaksa said. The government wouldn’t consider extradition of Prabhakaran and his chief lieutenants to India. The Defence Secretary was responding to India’s request for the extradition of Prabhakaran over the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. India also wanted Kumaran Pathmanathan a.k.a ‘KP’ (Gota rules out amnesty to LTTE leadership––The Island Jan. 16, 2009).

Battle for Vishvamadu

The 58 and 57 Divisions advanced towards the next major LTTE target Vishvamadu. Prabhakaran and some prominent Tigers had houses there. The LTTE had extremely strong defences with both sides of the road which heavily mined. The LTTE also destroyed a bridge over Nethali Aru close to Vishvamadu in a bid to delay the advancing troops.

The 58 Division fought a series of battles as it advanced towards LTTE earth bund east of Puliyanpokkunai. The 58 Division troops (11 SLLI and 6 GW) made the largest single recovery of armaments in a day on the Vanni front in the last week of Jan. 2009. The recovered items included US-built guns capable of firing chemicals, thermo baric weapons and nine mortar launchers of different caliber (US-made guns capable of firing chemicals found––The Island Feb 2, 2009)

The LTTE blasted the Kalmadu tank bund but failed to prevent troops from capturing Vishvamadu. Both fighting Divisions had to face raging waters of the Kalmadu tank. The LTTE blasted the tank bund after 11 SLLI troops crossed Nethali Aru in spite of the LTTE blowing up the bridge. The LTTE move isolated the 11 SLLI troops, who had to fight on their own. Prabhakaran threw all available units at the 582 Brigade as he made a determined bid to dislodge the army from Vishvamadu.

For about eight hours 11 SLLI faced the enemy alone until reinforcements moved in around 4 p.m. About two hours later the LTTE deployed an armoured fighting vehicle in support of the infantry. Still the 58 Division held on. Units deployed for counter penetration action played a critical role in thwarting the LTTE counter offensive. Having defeated the LTTE attempt to regain Vishvamadu, 11 SLLI engaged in clearing operations came across a luxury house complex frequented by Prabhakaran. The complex included a large air conditioned underground bunker, a vehicle yard, firing range and a massive court yard where Prabhakaran had met visitors.

Role of Security Forces

HQ Vanni

Unlike his predecessors, Lt. Gen. Fonseka refrained from appointing an Overall Operations Commander (OOC) to conduct large scale military operations on the northern front. Instead Security Forces HQ Vanni supervised the offensive action both east and west of the A-9, while Lt. Gen. Fonseka personally conducted the overall campaign.

The then Maj. Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya functioned as the Vanni Security Forces Commander throughout the campaign. Having returned from the National Defence College (NDC), Jayasuriya prepared to take over one of the Divisions deployed in the Jaffna peninsula, though the army chief changed his mind at the last moment. Instead, Maj. Gen. Jayasuriya was appointed Vanni Security Forces Commander on Aug 7, 2007. The appointment was made about a week after troops secured Arippu and Silavathurai. TFI was yet to launch its victorious offensive on the western flank in support of the 57 Division deployed on the central front.

Jayasuriya remained Vanni Security Forces Commander in Vanni until he succeeded Gen. Fonseka at the conclusion of the conflict in May 2009. The then Colonel Jayasuriya commanded 56.3 Brigade during disastrous Jayasikuru offensive and was seriously wounded in a mine blast at Olumadu, east of the A-9 on Mar. 1998. Interestingly, the 56 Division based in Vavuniya region wasn’t even deployed for offensive action during the eelam war IV.

President’s ‘daydream’ comes true

War on terror revisited : Part 76

November 29, 2012, 7:43 pm

By Shamindra Ferdinando

For Prabhakaran struggling to stall a relentless multi-pronged ground offensive, the unprecedented raid in the last week of Nov. 2008 on Mumbai couldn’t have come at a worse time.

Terrorists struck India’s financial capital Mumbai where they massacred over 160 civilians, including foreigners shortly before Prabhakaran’s plea for immediate Indian Intervention was made. In his much anticipated Heroes’ Day speech, beleaguered Prabhakaran pleaded with India to come to his rescue. What Prabhakaran and his followers here and overseas wouldn’t have anticipated was a massive terrorist attack in India.

The Mumbai massacre derailed an LTTE attempt to force India to throw its weight behind a UN move to arrange a truce. The sea-borne raid embarrassed the Indian leadership. India didn’t want to interfere in Sri Lanka, while vowing to deal with those who had carried out the commando-raid on Mumbai.

President Mahinda Rajapaksa assured the armed forces chiefs that the ongoing war against terrorism wouldn’t be stopped under any circumstances. He faced a fresh battle on the political front with the UNP striving to engineer crossovers from the government. The UNP wooed Karu Jayasuriya’s ‘Democratic Group’, which supported the war effort. Jayasuriya returned to the UNP’s fold in the second week of Dec. 2008 in the wake of the army’s failure to liberate Kilinochchi ahead of Prabhakaran’s Heroes’ Day speech on Nov. 27, 2008. Both the UNP and the JVP felt that the offensive was on the verge of collapse. The Colombo based diplomatic community, too, believed that the army was overstretched on the Vanni front.

In spite of strong opposition, General Officer Commanding (GoC) 57 Division, Maj. Gen. Jagath Dias remained confident of liberating Kilinochchi. The Gajaba Regiment veteran spearheaded operations on the Central front in line with the then Army Chief, Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka’s overall plan. His task was to liberate Kilinochchi at any cost. Under Fonseka’s gifted leadership, the army brought the war very much closer to an end.

Karu J switch sides again

Karu Jayasuriya made his move in the second week of Dec. 2008 while the UNPwas alleging that the army had been forced to fight according to a political agenda and major battlefield setbacks were due to political interference. The UNP also lambasted Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa for bungling the war effort and corrupt practices. Addressing the media at Sirikotha on Dec. 10, 2008, the newly appointed UNP Deputy Leader declared that he had left the government as he could not bring himself to serve what he called the dictatorial Rajapaksa regime. Much to the embarrassment of the UNP leadership, MP Jayasuriya, in response to a query by The Island, admitted that President Rajapaksa’s government had the strength to finish off the LTTE. Having cleared the Eastern Province, the war was coming to a rapid end, Jayasuriya said. His remark ran counter to the UNP’s claim that the government was bungling on the military front. (New UNP dy. Leader says forces on the verge of finishing off Tigers–The Island Dec 11, 2008).

Breakthrough on central front

Having suffered heavy losses, the LTTE abandoned Therumurukandi Junction on Dec. 10, 2008. The LTTE continued to offer strong resistance to the 57 Division tasked with liberating Kilinochchi. The LTTE thwarted three major assaults mounted by the 57 Division on Kilinochchi but by the last week of Dec. 2008 Prabhakaran was no longer in a position to face two major assaults simultaneously. Although the LTTE realised Task Force I (TF I) and the 57 Division were about to launch major operations targeting Paranthan and Kilinochchi, it couldn’t move in reinforcements. In fact, the LTTE didn’t have any reserves at that time. And it was facing a severe shortage of ammunition. The LTTE made a desperate bid to replenish its military supplies on Dec. 20, 2008. The navy intercepted a 35 to 40-metre-long fast moving LTTE vessel off Mullaitivu. The LTTE was trying to bring in fresh supplies through Alampil-Nargarkovil stretch along the northeastern coast. The Dec. 20, 2008 battle was the first confrontation between the navy and vessel carrying ammunition since the destruction of the last of the LTTE’s big ships on the high seas on Oct 7, 2007 (Navy sinks LTTE supply ship off Mullaitivu coast––The Island Dec 21, 2008).

Paranthan, Kilinochchi, Elephant Pass

liberated

Having consolidated Sinna Paranthan, TF I engaged LTTE positions both south and north of Pooneryn-Paranthan (A 35) road. The LTTE couldn’t organise a successful defence due to rapid movements made by the TF I. The infantry and the 2 Commando Regiment fought side by side to destroy LTTE units defending Paranthan. The 9 Gemunu Watch (9GW) and 2 Commandos advanced towards Paranthan amidst fierce enemy resistance in the night. TF I troops also consolidated positions along the southern edge of the Jaffna lagoon. They threatened LTTE fortifications at Elephant Pass. TF I troops spearheaded by 11 Sri Lanka Light Infantry (11 SLLI) attacked LTTE positions between Paranthan and Kilinochchi. The Tigers under tremendous pressure in Paranthan gradually abandoned their positions north of Kilinochchi between Kilinochchi and south of Paranthan. On the midnight of Dec. 31, 2008, 9GW and 2 Commando Regiment cut off the A-9 road two kilometres north of Paranthan. TF I troops, including 6 GW, 12 GW and 17 GW crossed earth bund to enter Paranthan. The liberation of Paranthan dashed LTTE hopes of saving the remaining sections of the A-9 road under its control. The LTTE had no option but to withdraw from the area south of Paranthan. The LTTE retreated towards the east. While battling LTTE units on the northern edge of Kilinochchi, TF I rapidly pushed towards Elephant Pass, north of Paranthan.

The LTTE was in total chaos. Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka’s army was about to regain the A-9 road. 11 SLLI fought its way across open paddy lands destroying several enemy strong points to reach Kilinochchi. Having dislodged the LTTE from the road between Paranthan and Kilinochchi, 11 SLLI crossed Karadipokku Bridge to seize the LTTE headquarters complex in the heart of Kilinochchi town. It was the venue for many meetings between the LTTE and visiting foreign diplomats, particularly Norwegian diplomats as well as members of the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM) during 2002-2004 period. TF I also secured one-time LTTE political wing leader, S. P. Thamilselvam’s house. The LTTE’s Kilinochchi court, too, was secured by TF I.

On the night of Jan. 1, 2009, the 57 Division fought its way in to Kilinochchi town forcing the LTTE to vacate the town, hence bringing the entire A-9 road between Vavuniya and Paranthan under the army. The 57.1 Brigade troops (4 Sinha Regiment and 9 Vijayabahu Infantry Regiment) were the first to enter Kilinochchi. On the afternoon of Jan. 1, 2009, the 57.4 Brigade (8 Sri Lanka Light Infantry and 7 Sri Lanka Light Infantry) liberated Iranamdu area. The main body of the 57 Division entered Kilinochchi in the afternoon.

The ditch-cum bund, which was breached by the army extended from the edge of the Jaffna lagoon via Akkarayankulam to Iranamadu, west of the A-9. The army suffered heavy damage in overcoming the obstacle. The 57 Division had breached a section of the bund about a week before TF I liberated Paranthan. The four Brigades attached to the 57 Division were commanded by Col. Herendra Ranasinghe (57.1), Brig. Senarath Bandara (57.2), Col. Dhammika Jayasundera (57.3) and Col. Senaka Wijesuriya (57.4). Brig. Aruna Wanniarachchi functioned as the Deputy to Maj. Gen. Dias. The SLAF stationed Air Commodore Sumangala Dias assigned to the 57 Division at the height of the battle for Kilinochchi to coordinate air operations.

Lt. Gen. Fonseka directed TF I to secure Elephant Pass immediately after the formation liberated Paranthan. TF I regained Elephant Pass swiftly as the Tigers withdrew towards the east leaving their second line of defence to face 53 and 55 Divisions. They overran the LTTE’s first line of defence during the third week of Nov. 2008. On Jan. 5, 2009, they crushed the second LTTE defence line to link up with TF I which liberated Elephant Pass. The link-up took place on Jan. 9, 2009. It was a turning point for the army. During President Ranasinghe Premadasa’s administration, the army lost control of the A-9 in June 1990. During President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s tenure, the army made an attempt to regain the A-9. Operation Jayasikuru launched in May 1997 to restore the overland supply route ended in disaster.

President appeals to LTTE again

President Rajapaksa reiterated his call for the LTTE to surrender immediately after restoration of the A-9 road. He urged LTTE fighting cadre to desert its leadership and surrender. Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, too, asked the LTTE combatants to give themselves up. However, the government insisted that there would be no role for a third party to arrange a ceasefire on the Vanni front. Defence Secretary Rajapaksa told this writer on several occasions at the height of the war that the government wouldn’t give in to pressure for a ceasefire under any circumstances.

The fall of Kilinochchi demoralised the LTTE beyond measure. It had established Kilinochchi as its main administrative centre in the early part of 1996 after the army liberated the Jaffna peninsula. It was the army’s biggest achievement during the CBK’s presidency. Unfortunately, the army couldn’t exploit its success for want of a cohesive strategy. The LTTE overran the army base at Mullaitivu on July 18, 1996, which herald a new phase in LTTE operations in the Vanni mainland. The army took years to recover from the Mullaitivu debacle.

Prabhakaran’s last interview

Prabhakaran remained confident of his ‘earth bund’ strategy to thwart Lt. Gen. Fonseka’s efforts to liberate Kilinochchi. The LTTE military command felt that massive earth bunds could prevent the army from seizing Elephant Pass, Paranthan and Kilinochchi. In Nov. 2008, Prabhakaran went on record saying he would never allow Kilinochchi to fall come what may. In an e-mail interview with Chennai-based Tamil magazine Nakkeeran, Prabhakaran, while admitting that the army had entered LTTE held areas, declared that capturing their ‘administrative capital’ Kilinochchi was still a distant dream for the government. "Sri Lankan forces have entered parts of our homeland and are stationed in close proximity to Kilinochchi town. But, capturing Kilinochchi is just a day dream of Mahinda Rajapaksa."

SF on ‘Rain of mortars and artillery’

Lt. Gen. Fonseka, in response to a query by this writer immediately after the liberation of Kilinochchi, said that the army conducted operations under a ‘rain of mortars and artillery’ since the launch of the 57 Division on the central front in March 2007. During the Vanni battles, both east and west of the A-9 road, some 12,000 officers and men were wounded due to intense mortar and artillery fire. The LTTE couldn’t have liberally fired mortars and artillery if it hadn’t had a steady supply of arms, ammunition and equipment. Had there been an effective blockade on supplies, the army could have liberated the LTTE held areas with relative ease, Lt. Gen. Fonseka said. The Sinha Regiment veteran paid a glowing tribute to the SLAF for backing fighting formations throughout the eastern campaign as well as the ongoing Vanni offensive. The army chief declared that the LTTE was now trapped in an area smaller than Thoppigala (Mahinda’s ‘daydream’ comes true––The Island Jan 3, 2009).

Lt. Gen. Fonseka was of the opinion that the LTTE could never have waged high intensity battles without having a secure supply route. He pointed out that regardless of sinking LTTE arms ships on the high seas, the enemy had plenty of ammunition and explosives to inflict heavy damage on the army. On many occasions, an irate Lt. Gen. Fonseka queried how his troops could constantly come under ‘rain of mortars and artillery’ if the LTTE’s supply line had been cut off.

Tigers retreat on all fronts

War on terror revisited : Part 75

November 27, 2012, 12:00 pm

By Shamindra Ferdianndo

Having restored the Mannar-Pooneryn overland road (A-32) by Nov 15, 2008, the then Army Chief Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka opened a new front targeting Mankulam, 30 km north of Vavuniya on the Kandy-Jaffna A-9 road. Newly raised Task Force III (TF III) liberated that township on Nov. 17, 2008 following a series of confrontations with LTTE units.

The LTTE captured Mankulam on Nov. 5, 1999 during a major offensive, which brought the army to its knees in the Vanni during President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s presidency (Mankulam regained, progress on the Jaffna front –The Island Nov, 18, 2008). The army suffered the debilitating setback following the collapse of its own offensives on the Vanni theatre.

TF III was commanded by Brig. Sathyapriya Liyanage launched operations from Vannivilankulam, west of A-9. It was the second fighting formation to manoeuvre along with west-east axis across A-9. The first was Task Force II (TF II) commanded by Brig. Rohana Bandara. Although TF II launched operations in June 2008, it was TF III which first overran an LTTE base on A-9. TF I was yet to reach A-9. Having completed operations on the western flank with the liberation of Pooneryn, TF I was positioned about ten kilometres west of Paranthan, while the 57 Division continued to consolidate its position at Kokavil, 12 km south of Kilinochchi on A-9 road. The LTTE overran Kokavil detachment in July 1990 during Ranasinghe Premadasa’s presidency. The base fell due to the army’s failure to move reinforcements to save two platoons commanded by Lt. Saliya Upul Aladeniya.

‘Colonel’ Swarnam’s truck captured

TF III captured an armour plated truck during the battle for Mankulam. Swarnam and his elite bodyguards fled leaving the vehicle behind when TF III troops fired at it. The liberation of Mankulam threatened LTTE fortifications along with the Mankulam-Mullaitivu road.

Although several offensive formations threatened the A-9 road in Nov. 2008, the LTTE deployed bulk of its forces to defend the Kilinochchi town and therefore the 57 Division deployed on the central front faced heavy resistance. The LTTE went to the extent of declaring that the liberation of Kilinochchi would be only a daydream of President Mahinda Rajapaksa. The LTTE felt that a devastating attack on the 57 Division could change the ground situation in the Vanni. But the army stepped up pressure with TF III and 53 and 55 Divisions launching operations in Nov. 2008.

But the LTTE faced the biggest threat from Brig. Shavendra Silva’s TF I, which was now in a position to direct operations at LTTE fortifications at Elephant Pass and northwards of the gateway to the Jaffna peninsula, Paranthan as well as Kilinochchi.

Progress on eastern flank

On the eastern flank or the Weli Oya front, the 59 Division was in a commanding position by late Nov. 2008. The 59 Division consolidated its positions at Kumalamunai, a fishing village about 13 km south of Mullaitivu. Since the launch of operations east of A-9, in January 2008, the 59 Division fought under extremely difficult conditions to reach Kumalamunai, having secured Munagam base (May 30, 2008), Michael base (July 4, 2008), Sugandan base (July 27, 2008), Jeevan base (Aug. 16, 2008), west of Nayaru lagoon (Aug. 21, 2008), Gajabapura (Oct 23, 2008) and Otiyamalai (Nov 29, 2008).

By end of Nov. 2008, the LTTE was struggling on all fronts. But it still remained confident of Western powers and India coming to its rescue. At the behest of Prabhakaran, a section of the international community brought pressure to bear on President Mahinda Rajapaksa and Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa to halt the offensive. The Rajapaksa brothers ignored their pleas. They insisted that nothing short of an unconditional surrender could save the LTTE fighting forces. The government committed all available forces for the final phase of the offensive. By the third week of Nov. 2008 all fighting formations both east (59 Division) and west (57 Division, TF I, TF II and TF III) as well as Jaffna front (53 and 55 Divisions) were engaged in offensive actions. The government realized the urgent need to finish off the LTTE in view of growing international pressure to call of the offensive. The LTTE pushed hard for a third party intervention in an effort to secure a truce before the 57 Division captured on the town. But the successful conclusion of operations on the western flank paved the way for the opening of a front, which hastened the collapse of the LTTE power on the Vanni east.

Tigers overwhelmed at

northern FDL

The 53 and 55 Divisions launched a concentrated attack on the enemy’s first line of defence on Nov. 14, 2008 as the TF I was moving towards Pooneryn. The LTTE abandoned an 800-meter deep and eight-kilometre wide complex of fortifications in the early hours of Nov. 20, 2008 following a weeklong assault. An earth bund built across a 12-kilometre stretch of land extending from Kilaly to Nagarkovil via Muhamalai failed to thwart the combined assault. It was the fourth attempt made by Lt. Gen. Fonseka to overcome the LTTE on the Jaffna front. Three previous abortive attempts claimed the lives of about 500 officers and men and caused injuries to several hundred. Of the three failed attempts, the first was the worst with the Air Mobile Brigade troops suffering a major setback (Gateway to Elephant Pass opened-The Island Nov. 21, 2008).

Fall of Kokavil on Nov. 5, 2008 and Mankulam on Nov. 17, 2008 as well as TF I taking up position 10 km west of Paranthan brought Kilinochchi under immense pressure. The LTTE no longer had reserves to meet troops advancing on multiple fronts. Although the then army top brass never publicly appreciated the role played by the Navy, a series of successful operations on the high seas (Sept. 2006-Oct. 2007) deprived the enemy of the much-needed ammunition. The LTTE was running out of ammunition with the collapse of its international sea supply route (Mankulam the key for strategic push into Tiger heartland-The Island Nov. 23, 2008). In spite of having some improvised runways east of A-9, the LTTE never succeeded in airlifting at least one load of ammunition. The SLAF mounted several attacks on runways both east and west of A-9 to prevent Air Tigers from launching small fixed wing aircraft against military and economic targets. The SLAF also wanted to prevent the LTTE from bringing ammunition by air. The then SLAF Chief Air Marshal Roshan Goonetilleke remained confident that his forces could thwart LTTE attempt to replenish their depleted arsenal. Air Marshal Goonetilleke was responding to an article headlined, Fight and Fight-The LTTE’s air cargo ambitions in Jane’s Nov. 13, 2008 issue

(Time running out for LTTE runways—The Island Nov 24, 2008).

Olumadu captured

TF III captured Olumadu, situated about five kilometres north-east of Mankulam along 40-kilometre Mankulam-Mullaitivu A-34 road as an LTTE counter attack caused heavy losses among TF I and 57 Division troops west of A-9 road. Army headquarters placed the number of dead and missing at 30 and 80, respectively, though actual figures were much higher. But their offensives couldn’t be derailed (Bloody battles for Kilinochchi-Paranthan stretch-The Island Nov. 25, 2008). The army lost both Olumadu and Karapaddamurippu on Nov. 5, 1999 (Army bags Olumadu-The Island Nov. 26, 2008).

President’s call for surrender

In the immediate aftermath of the liberation of Pooneryn President Mahinda Rajapaksa urged the LTTE to surrender to bring fighting to an end. The LTTE turned down the offer. None of those wanting an international inquiry into accountability issues in Sri Lanka urged the LTTE to accept the President’s offer. Instead they stepped up pressure on President Rajapaksa to call off the offensive. The Tamil National Alliance (TNA) remained strongly supportive of the LTTE’s efforts to force a stalemate on the battlefront. Had Prabhakaran responded positively to the President’s proposal, the government would have been forced to negotiate for an organized surrender. As the LTTE ignored the President’s offer, the army went ahead with its offensive action.

Another offensive formation launched

Army Commander Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka launched Task Force IV (TF IV) on Dec 10, 2008. Colonel Nishantha Wanniarachchi commanded TF IV, which was the second fighting formation to launch operations east of the A-9. The 59 Division was the first to begin offensive action on the eastern flank in January 2008. TF IV brought Nedunkerny, south of Olumadu, on Dec 19, 2008.

Paranthan, Kilinochchi

targeted

The successful conclusion of operations on the western flank deprived the LTTE of its longstanding mortar and artillery launching pads at Pooneryn and Kalmunai point. The operation brought great relief to civilians living in the Jaffna peninsula. Having ignored President Rajapaksa’s offer, the LTTE deployed all its available forces to meet the rapidly growing threat on Paranthan and Kilinochchi. In spite of inclement weather, TF I stepped up operations with Lt. Gen. Fonseka directing Brig. Silva to seize Pooneryn-Paranthan road (B -69). It was one of the toughest tasks given to TF I, which controlled a sizeable section of the Pooneryn-Paranthan road even before it received a directive to liberate Paranthan. TF I advanced towards Sinna Paranthan situated 19 km east of Pooneryn. The LTTE manned strong fortifications, with an earth bund extending from Jaffna lagoon to Kilinochchi being the main obstacle.

TF I launched a night operation to breach the earth bund. The task was given to 582 Brigade. The operation involved Gemunu Watch (17 GW), Gajaba Regiment (12 GR) as well as Special Forces and Commandos. Although they managed to secure a foothold at night, the LTTE mounted a major counter attack on the following day. Gemunu and Gajaba troops were compelled to move in. They dug up positions amidst heavy LTTE attacks.

TF I sustained offensive operations under extremely bad weather. The 583 Brigade deployed north of B-69 road fought a series of battles leading to the infantry breaching the earth bund from two points west of Kollan Aru with the support of armour and artillery. Amidst fierce fighting, Light Infantry troops (11 SLLI) liberated Sinna Paranthan on Dec. 17. The day after Christmas, troops seized Navanalankulam. The LTTE struggled in the face of TF I build-up, which seriously threatened not only Paranthan but LTTE fortifications north and south of the town.

Mission accomplished on western flank

War on terror revisited : Part 74

November 25, 2012, 8:12 pm

by Shamindra Ferdinando

‘Never to relax, maximum attrition 24 hours, 365 days, to keep the enemy on the run, always’, was the then Army Chief Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka’s motto. All fighting formations on the Vanni front, namely the 57 Division, Task Force I (TF I) and Task Force II (TF II) west of the Kandy-Jaffna A9 road and the 59 Division east of the road did as the Sinha Regiment war veteran directed.

Karambakulam earth bund breached

The 57 Division and TF I struggled in the face of well organised LTTE resistance. An earth bund extending from Nachchikudah to Akkarayankulam, prevented its progress on the Central and Western flanks. Both formations fought under extremely difficult conditions, though they adopted new tactics. The 57 Division, deployed on the Central front, was tasked to regain Akkarayankulam, whereas TF I, on the western flank, targeted Nachchikudah and Vannerikulam. The LTTE successfully resisted their attempts to breach the bund. Amidst mounting casualties, Lt. Gen. Fonseka ordered those commanding troops on the combined western front to breach the earth bund at any cost. The Army Chief declared that an LTTE earth bund wouldn’t be allowed to derail the ongoing offensive. Although troops intensified their efforts, the LTTE held on to its fortifications. Experienced enemy units manning gun positions along the earth bund, thwarted spirited efforts by the infantry. The troops, however, didn’t give up their offensive action until TF I made a breakthrough, at Karambakulam, to pave the way for the 57 Division to wrest control of Akkarayankulam. The much anticipated success at Karambakulam and Akkarayankulam boosted the morale of the frontline combat forces. It brought relief to those spearheading the offensive. Brig. Shavendra Silva’s TF I had given a fresh impetus to Sri Lanka’s war against the LTTE. The offensive was on track.

Special SLAF operation launched

Having breached the Karamakulam earth bund, TF I expanded its operations. Their next priority was severing the LTTE line of communications between Nachchikudah to Akkarayankulam. It was an unenviable task. Brig. Silva assigned the 581 Brigade to liberate Nachchikudah, whereas the 582 Brigade’s task was to seize Vannereikulam.

The 581 Brigade was positioned south of Nachchikudah. They made several abortive attempts to overrun Nachchikudah. The LTTE remained in control at Nachchikudah, though Kfir and MiG 27 jet squadrons, as well as the artillery, carried out a series of attacks on the town.

For the first time since the launch of operations on the Central and Western fronts, low flying jets targeted LTTE strong points atop the Karambakulam tank bund. Kfirs and MiG 27 launched from the Katunayake air base bombed enemy fortifications. On the instructions of Lt. Gen. Fonseke, jet pilots along with the then Director of Operations, Harsha Abeywickrema (present SLAF Chief), were brought to TF headquarters to finalise the joint operation. It was one of the most successful joint operations during the eelam war IV. A devastating air strike forced the LTTE to abandon some of its fortifications, hence paving the way for the infantry to regain territory.

The 582 Brigade, tasked with liberating Vannerikulam, also, experienced stiff resistance for about a period of six weeks (Sept-Oct 2008). The LTTE thwarted several attempts by the 582 Brigade to penetrate the earth bund south of Vannerikulam. Subsequently, TF I changed the direction of its operation in a last ditch attempt to breach the enemy defences. TF I battalions launched operations to test LTTE defences before making a fresh attempt to breach enemy fortifications.

Crucial breakthrough

The Gemunu Watch (9GW) succeeded in its attempt. In a daring operation, 9GW troops seized a 300 metre section of the earth bund prompting the LTTE to launch 18 counter attacks. The enemy couldn’t dislodge troops, who fought for five days continuously to help the Gajaba Regiment (10 GR) evict the LTTE from another 300-meter segment of the bund. The stage was set for 6 GW and 12 GW, to seize sections of the earth bund. The 582 Brigade brought Vennerikulam under its control on Oct. 20, 2008. The LTTE suffered heavy losses in its attempts to thwart the 582 Brigade. The success at Vannerikulam eased pressure on the 57 Division. Although the LTTE used a chemical weapon against 12 GW troops, it couldn’t derail the assault on Vannerikulam. Contrary to speculation, that was the only occasion the LTTE carried out a chemical attack targeting TF I troops. Those admitted to field hospitals recovered quickly. However during operations at Iranapalai in Puthukudirippu area in March 2009, TF I troops again experienced respiratory problems due to explosions caused by ‘chemical devices’ which the army believed was still at experimental stage.

Close on the heels of the Vannerikulam battle of the 583 Brigade, also of TF I, captured an earth bund at Pandieddikulam, situated two kilometres northwest of Vannerikulam. The army top brass believed that the LTTE would quit Nachchikudah in the wake of Vannerikulam debacle. But, much to the surprise of the army, the LTTE held onto its positions at the coastal town, the launching pad of many Sea Tiger operations in the Gulf of Mannar.

Battle for Nachchikudah

In a bid to intensify pressure on the LTTE, TF I mounted operations on multiple fronts targeting Nachchikudah. The 583 Brigade brought Madam, situated 12 km northeast of Nachchikudah along the Mannar-Pooneryn A 32 road, and Jayapuram, under its control. The LTTE offered fierce resistance in and around Jayapuram, though finally TF I neutralised the enemy positions there. While the LTTE thwarted attacks on Jayapuram, 8 GW and 11 SLLI (Sri Lankan Light Infantry) troops moved across jungle to liberate Madam. By Oct 28, 2008, 8 GW and 11 SLLI blocked A 32 to increase pressure on those defending the town. The liberation of Madam automatically made LTTE presence at Jayapuram irrelevant. The LTTE abandoned Nachchikudah as the 581 Brigade pushed Northwards of its positions to link up with 583 Brigade south of Madam. TF I liberated Nachchikudah on Oct 28, 2008. As jubilant TF I consolidated its positions at Nachchikudah, the 57 Division captured Akkarayankulam tank bund.

TF I now threatened all LTTE fortifications north of Nachchikudah as the LTTE regrouped in a bid to defend Pooneryn, its last coastal bastion north of Mannar.

Sea route to TN severed

TF I brought Devils Point under its control by Nov. 11, 2008. Although the LTTE resisted TF I troops at Nallur, situated about eight kilometres southeast of Pooneryn, it didn’t have the wherewithal to prevent the fall of Pooneryn, where Prabhakaran inflicted a massive loss on the Army way back in Nov. 1993. In fact, with the fall of Nallur, LTTE defences collapsed on the western flank. The LTTE was no longer capable of implementing a cohesive battle plan on the western flank, though it still battled the 57 Division on the Central front. The LTTE had strong forces deployed on the eastern front, where the 59 Division was making a determined effort to overcome enemy resistance. The 59 Division was tasked with liberating Mullaitivu, the LTTE’s main stronghold on the eastern coast. Having achieved a series of stunning victories, TF I entered Pooneryn without a major fight. In fact, 11 SLLI, 8 GW and 9GW advanced seven kilometres on a single day to liberate Pooneryn on Nov. 15, 2008.

TF I completed the mission with troops taking Sangupiddy and Nagathevanthurai. Brig. Shavendra Silva’s troops achieved what many felt was beyond the conventional capability of the army. Having secured Pooneryn, TF I cleared Kalmunai point on Nov 17, 2008. The LTTE used Kalmunai point as a launching pad for artillery strikes targeting vital military installations deep in the Jaffna peninsula. For the first time since the conflict erupted in 1983, the army controlled the entire coast north of Mannar hence cutting LTTE sea supply routes to and from Tamil Nadu. It dealt a massive blow to the LTTE. It could no longer depend on sea access to Tamil Nadu, one of the two major supply routes. With that, Sea Tigers ceased to operate in the Mannar waters. The army was now able to cross the Jaffna lagoon. The LTTE never recovered from losing the battle on the western flank. Operations on the western flank (Sept. 2007-Nov 2008) caused irreparable losses to the LTTE. But nothing could have been worse than losing the entire sea frontage on the western flank. The debacle eroded confidence among the fighting cadre. Long before TF I regained Pooneryn, civilians had fled across the A9 road towards Vanni east. In the immediate aftermath of the Pooneryn debacle, large groups of fighting cadres deserted the organisations, though Prabhakaran still believed he could stop the army. He hoped that India and Western powers would intervene in Sri Lanka. The LTTE waited for an international lifeline. Having achieved its primary target, TF I turned eastwards to open a new phase of operations, which would hasten the disintegration of LTTE defences on the northern front.

Tigers face three fighting

formations on Jaffna front

At the onset of the government offensive in March 2007, the LTTE would never have anticipated the army to advance from Vavuniya-Mannar defence line up to Kalmunai point and the turn eastwards. The LTTE now faced three fighting formations, namely TF I, the 53 division and 55 Divisions commanded by Brigadiers, Kamal Gunaratne and Prasanna Silva, respectively. The 53 Division was deployed south of A9 whereas 55 based north of A9. A demoralised LTTE faced the powerful grouping. LTTE forces on the northern front were demoralised. They lacked the arms and ammunition to face a confident army backed by the political leadership, which vowed to keep the offensive on track regardless of international pressure.

In mid Nov. 2008, both 53 and 55 Divisions changed their mode of operations from defensive to offensive. The army chief wanted at the onset of the campaign to open up Jaffna front, though the LTTE thwarted his plans by causing heavy losses on the army. A foray by 53 and 55 Divisions ended up disastrously. The debacle forced the army to suspend the offensive. Since then the two divisions remained on a defensive posture until TF I regained Pooneryn.

The LTTE faced defeat on the northern front.

When the going gets tough, the tough get going…

War on terror revisited : Part 73

November 22, 2012, 12:00 pm

by Shamindra Ferdinando

The Vanni military offensive launched in March 2007 was undoubtedly the single most difficult mission undertaken by the Sri Lankan military during the eelam war. The failure on the part of one fighting formation either east or west of the Kandy-Jaffna A9 road could have easily caused irrevocable damage to the entire war effort.

The 57 Division advanced on the central front, west of A9, whereas Task Force I (TF) was on the western flank. Having launched operations in March 2007 and Sept 2008, respectively, the two fighting formations continued to encounter strong enemy resistance in late July/early Aug. 2008, in spite of their linking up on June 30, 2008 to form the widest ever frontline against the LTTE.

The going was extremely tough, particularly due to the Tigers exploiting ground conditions to their advantage.

East of A9, the 59 Division tasked with destroying LTTE fortifications in the Anandakulam and Nagacholai forest reserves, which stood as natural defences for Mullaitivu, too, was facing extreme difficulties. The 59 Division had been on the move since Jan 2008.

Task Force II (TFII) given the responsibility of clearing enemy positions along the west-east axis, too, didn’t find its task easy, though it secured Navvi on July 11, 2008. TF II used south of Palamoddai as a springboard to launch offensive action in June 2008.

SLA on four fronts

By the end of July, the then Army Chief Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka had four fighting formations deployed on the Vanni front-three west and one east of the A9 road. On the northern front, two fighting formations, namely the 53 and 55 were in the defensive mode. The then Brig. Kamal Gunaratne commanded the 53 Division deployed south of A9. The 55 was under the Brig. Prasanna Silva. It was deployed north of A9. Both formations remained in defensive posture until Nov. 2008.

In spite of losing some territory on all four flanks, the LTTE still remained strong. It had the capacity to resist troops on all fronts and cause a battlefield defeat, which could have had a devastating impact not only on that particular theatre but also the entire war effort. The Army Chief was mindful of the emerging threat, though he remained supremely confident of defeating the LTTE.

Battle for Vellankulam

Having liberated Adampan (May 9, 2008), Mullikkandai, Mannar ‘rice bowl’ (June 29, 2008), Vidattaltivu (July 16, 2008) and Illuppaikkadavai (Aug 2, 2008), TF I launched the battle for Vellankulam. TF I commander, the then Brig. Shavendra Silva deployed all three Brigades for the offensive. In spite of having superior firepower, the Gajaba Regiment veteran faced an extremely difficult situation. The LTTE defences at Vellankulam interconnected with strong units deployed in adjoining Mullankavil and Pallavarayankadu.

Adampan Aug. 2008: Brig. Shavendra Silva (right) speaks with an officer

TF I couldn’t even think of targeting Nachchikudah, one of its main objectives unless it regained control of Vellankulam, Mullankavil and Pallavarayankadu. The LTTE brought in additional forces to halt TF I. Prabhakaran obviously felt if he could deliver a crippling blow to TF I, all four fighting formations deployed on the Vanni front would be demoralised.

Brig. Silva tasked 583 Brigade to clear enemy positions west of A-32 (Mannar-Pooneryn road), whereas 582 was deployed east of A-9. The remaining 581 Brigade was deployed to thwart sea borne LTTE attacks.

The advancing 582 Brigade struggled to cope with heavy LTTE resistance causing many casualties. Defenders had gun and grenade points atop two earth bunds which extended two kilometres and 500 meters to east and west of A9, respectively. Troops of 9GW (Gemunu Watch) and 12 GW fought courageously in spite of rising casualties to overcome enemy resistance. While bloody fighting was continuing, the LTTE erected another earth bund about two kilometres south of Vellankulam to halt TF I. But 9GW and 9 GR (Gajaba Regiment) cleared the second earth bund. As the LTTE retreated, 9GW troops moved into Vellankulam on the afternoon of Aug. 2, 2008 to liberate the entire Mannar administrative district from the LTTE. It was a major milestone in the battle against the LTTE.

By the end of Aug second week, TF I captured Mulankavil and Pallavarayankaddu.

Shavendra Silva speaks out

Shavendra Silva, now Sri Lanka’s No 2 in New York, says Mulankavil posed a major challenge, though TF I had the ability to take on the enemy in one of the major strongholds. The LTTE strongly defended Mulankavil as it was their second major administrative base in the Vanni region. In fact, Mulankavil was the most important civilian centre north of Mannar, Maj. Gen. Silva, who now holds ambassadorial rank asserts. The area was the home for thousands of MAHAVEER families, those who contributed their children to the LTTE. The Tigers obviously realised that the failure on its part to prevent TF I from moving into Mulankavil could demoralise the population, Ambassador Silva says. The LTTE forced the entire population to join its fighting cadre on the run, whereas the international community looked the other way, he says. Had there been a choice for the Mulankavil population, they would have definitely surrendered to TF I to save their lives, the Maj. Gen. says. Instead, they ended up providing cover to the LTTE combatants trapped on the Vanni east front in April-May 2009.

The LTTE had an elaborate administrative set up in Mulankavil. Thamileelam police maintained a strong presence in the area, with three police stations in place to manage the population. The LTTE used Mulankavil and Pallawarayankaddu to sustain clandestine sea line of communications between Vanni and Tamil Nadu. The LTTE Intelligence, too, operated in the area to prevent infiltration by government operatives. As Prabhakaran was confident of repulsing government offensive to liberate the area, it established the largest LTTE cemetery in the area. Bodies of those laying down their lives for the LTTE’s cause were buried there. During the Norwegian arranged Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) the cemetery attracted thousands of visitors, including many foreigners. Expatriates working for UN and other INGOs as well as members of the then Norwegian-led Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) visited the place. In fact, Prabhakaran’s heroes’ week celebrations took place at Mulankavil Maha Vidyalaya and the nearby Mahaveer stadium. Such events were used to attract more children to the organisation.

While TF I evicted the LTTE from Mulankavil and Pallawarayankaddu, the 57 Division regained Kalvilan. Another Gajaba Regiment veteran, Maj. Gen. Jagath Dias was spearheading the 57 Division, the first offensive formation raised by Lt. Gen. Fonseka. The Division was tasked with liberating Kilinochchi, the main LTTE administrative centre following the fall of Jaffna in Dec. 1995 to troops of Operation Riviresa. The two fighting formations relied on each other. The combined forces of TF I and the 57 Division threatened LTTE bastions west of A 9. By the second week of Aug. 2008, forward elements of TF I were far ahead of the 57 Division, which having captured Kalvilan on Aug 13, 2008, faced the daunting task of liberating strategically situated Thunukai along the Vellankulam-Mankulam road. TF I was poised to move against Nachchikudah. The Army observed rapid deployment of additional LTTE forces as well as assets to defend Nachchikudah and Thunnukai. The elite Charles Anthony ‘Brigade’ confronted the 57 Division. The Army top brass realised that the LTTE was making a determined effort to halt TF I and the 57 Division. Major battlefield defeats at Nachchikudah and Thunnukai would have helped the LTTE turn the tables on the Army.

Massive earth bund

Israeli built Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) operated by the SLAF provided real time intelligence on what was going behind the enemy lines. The footage was available to senior battlefield commanders as well as headquarters of three services in Colombo. UAV footage underscored the difficulty in the mission given to TF I and the 57 Division. Troops faced the longest earth bund erected in the Vanni. The LTTE defence line extended from Nachchikudah to Akkarayankulam through Vannerikulam. South of the defence line was heavily mined, whereas LTTE units manned strong points atop the earth bund. It was a formidable target. TF I and the 57 Division faced the prospect of a long and bloody battle across the Vanni west. The earth bund effectively thwarted TF I push towards Nachchikudah, a town situated about eight kilometres north of Vellankulam along the A-32 road.

The LTTE thwarted a series of attempts by TF I and the 57 Division to make a breakthrough. The Tigers held out in spite of air strikes. Both formations took many casualties. Having realised that existing strategy adopted to overcome the earth bund was ineffective, the Army modified the battle plan. It feared its failure to overcome the obstacle could help the LTTE launch a major counter attack.

The LTTE could have transferred a section of the forces deployed on the northern front to thwart a possible attempt by the 53 Division and the 55 Division could have been deployed for an all out assault on TF I and the 57 Division. Had the LTTE succeeded in breaking through the combined defences of the two formations, there would have been disaster.

Army compelled to modify  battle drill

Ambassador Silva says that bund crossing drill had to be amended and modified, quickly to meet the challenging task. "We deprived them of an opportunity to seize the initiative again."

In the end the LTTE’s strategy on the Vanni west front hasten the collapse of the organisation. As Prabhakaran felt that the advancing Army could be stopped at the earth bund, the organisation didn’t bother to establish elaborate defences beyond the defence line extending from Nachchikudah to Akkarayankulam.

Addressing the annual symposium 2011 ‘Challenges of post conflict Sri Lanka’ of the General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University (KDU), Maj. Gen. Dias explained the circumstances under which his Division and TF I had mounted offensive action to overcome the earth bund. Maj. Gen. Dias said that troops had adopted a new battle drill, which proved successful. Veteran of many battles, Maj. Gen. Dias declared that the capture of the earth bund was one of the major achievements during eelam war IV.