Tragedy in the wake of victory at Valvettiturai

War on terror revisited : Part 91

January 8, 2013, 7:06 pm


by Shamindra Ferdinando

Having liberated Vadamarachchy within a week, the army prepared to launch the second stage of Operation Liberation to regain Jaffna. Newly created, but under strength brigades, commanded by Brig. Denzil Kobbekaduwa and Col. Wijaya Wimalaratne, were given the unenviable task. Although the army was elated over its success in liberating Vadamarachchy, its failure to trap LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, and his senior lieutenants caused anxiety among senior officers. The army was also severely upset over the death of one of its officers’ holding the rank of Maj, due to friendly fire soon after the liberation of Valvettiturai. The first phase was launched at first light, on May 26, 1987.

Among those present at a meeting presided over by the then President JRJ at the National Security Council, where a detailed briefing took place before the launch of the offensive, were National Security Minister, Lalith Athulathmudali, General Officer Commanding Joint Operations Command Gen. Cyril Ranatunga, service chiefs, presidential security advisor Ravi Jayewardene, and presidential secretary W. M.P. B. Menikdiwela.

‘Canada bunker’ overrun

In an interview with this writer recently, the then Brigadier, Gerry H. de Silva, explained the difficulties experienced by the army in overrunning what he called ‘Canada bunker’ which covered Prabhakaran’s birth place Valvettiturai from the sea-beach, at the western entrance to the beach east of the town. "It was the most elaborate network of fortifications faced by the army at that time," de Silva said, adding, "in the run-up to the presidential elections in late 1994, I told UNP presidential candidate, Gamini Dissanayake, how the LTTE had secured empty steel containers from Canadian contractors, involved in the construction of the Maduru Oya dam in the Mahaweli System C, for use as part of their fortifications at Valvettiturai. Mr. Dissanayake was surprised to hear the LTTE using discarded containers. The LTTE reinforced the containers with concrete."

Valvettiturai was secured by Col. Wimalaratne’s Brigade, which included 1 Gemunu Watch (1GW) and 1 Gajaba Regiment (1 GR) commanded by Lt. Col. Vipul Boteju and Maj. Gotabaya Rajapaksa, respectively. Soon after liberating Valvettiturai, tragedy struck Col. Wimalaratne’s brigade.

Decorated officer killed in ‘friendly fire’

Gemunu Watch veteran and one-time Sri Lanka’s High Commissioner in Islamabad, retired Gen. de Silva recalled the circumstances under which one of the most promising army officers, Maj. R.P.H.S. Wijesinghe of the GR died due to friendly fire. Wijesinghe, decorated as well as admired by both colleagues and superiors for battle field performance, was with 1 GR at the time of his death. Although a section of the army claimed that Wijesinghe was shot dead by an LTTE sniper, de Silva said that Wijesinghe was hit by a 40 mm grenade round during a major exchange of fire between Col. Wimalaratne’s and Brig. Kobbekaduwa’s brigades. The battle erupted due to Brig. Kobbekaduwa’s troops making an unexpected move prompting the other brigade to open fire. Breakdown of communications between formations aggravated the situation leading to troops on the southern flank firing at Wijesinghe, who succumbed to his injuries while being evacuated to Colombo by air. Wijesinghe had also served the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF).

Although there had been previous cases of friendly fire, the death of Wijesinghe devastated the army. Former army Commander de Silva was of the opinion that the unfortunate confrontation between troops on the northern and southern flanks deprived them of an opportunity to trap top LTTE cadres. During the chaos, Prabhakaran and his trusted lieutenants escaped. The army was helpless as the SLAF could not carry out casualty evacuation due to inclement weather. The evacuation was delayed by several hours as the offensive came to an unexpected halt. The failure on the part of the army to effectively plug two big gaps, due to absence of required troop strength, caused irreparable damage. "We had to block the Valipuram gap that led to the famous sand dunes of Kath Kovilam and the Elephant Pass-Vettilaikerni stretch. As there was a serious shortage of troops, we decided to plug the Elephant Pass Vettilaikerni stretch and deployed a group of mobile troops to cover Valipuram. But they managed to escape through Valipuram. Although commandos were deployed on the Valipuram sector, they could not prevent the LTTE moving across to the Vanni mainland"

In his memoirs, A most noble profession launched in 2011, de Silva revealed how Wijesinghe had rushed to the assistance of troops on the southern flank, believing they were under fire by the LTTE. At that time he was hit, he did not have a helmet, nor body armour. Wijesinghe earned the praise of Gajaba Regiment veteran Col. Wimalaratne on many occasions. Officers and men still talked about how Wijesinghe spearheaded the defence of the beleaguered Kokilai army base, when it came under heavy attack by the LTTE, de Silva said, adding that he displayed extraordinary courage during his tenure as a Lieutenant and a platoon commander. Wijesinghe was one of those who could have contributed to our victory over the LTTE, the retired general said.

Operation Liberation II

gets underway

Brigades, led by Brig. Kobbekaduwa and Col. Wimalaratne, were to assault Jaffna, keeping the Palaly-Jaffna road as the axis of advance. Brig. Kobbekaduwa’s troops were on the western flank, whereas Col. Wimalaratne’s troops advanced on the eastern flank. President JRJ ordered the army to halt the advance at the behest of India soon after Kobbekaduwa’s formation secured Tellipallai, whereas Wimalaratne’s troops regained Achchuveli.

Commenting on the Indian threat to intervene unless the army stopped the offensive, Gen. de Silva recalled a call received by him as troops were consolidating Tellipallai and Achchuveli. "As the senior officer stationed in Jaffna, I was called to the operations room where I received instructions from the then General Officer Commanding Joint Operations Command Gen. Cyril Ranatunga. We were ordered to stop the offensive and consolidate our positions. Gen. Ranatunga warned of immediate Indian intervention unless we stopped the offensive."

Although India despised the LTTE for killing hundreds of rival members of groups run by premier Indian intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the regional super power did not want to see JRJ destroying the most powerful group. Had India allowed the army to go ahead with the offensive, it could have liberated Jaffna town and its suburbs before launching the third phase of the offensive to regain Jaffna islands. Completion of the third phase would have paved the way for the army to lay siege until the remaining LTTE combat units in the peninsula were neutralized. The army could have achieved its objectives had India allowed JRJ administration to proceed with the strategy. Unfortunately, India felt it could not let Sri Lanka triumph over terrorism as destabilization plot was part of its overall project to deter JRJ from forging an alliance with US, Pakistan and Israel.

India steps up pressure

The global community turned a blind eye to what was going in Sri Lanka. Two days after the navy turned away a flotilla of Indian fishing craft, carrying food for the people of Jaffna, the Indian air force jets escorted five transport planes which dropped food over Vadamarachchy. India warned JRJ not to interfere with what it called relief operation or face the consequences. Gen. de Silva in his memoirs revealed the military was ordered by the government to treat them as friendly aircraft. It was nothing but a joke.

Sri Lanka did not have the wherewithal to challenge the Indian action. India felt it could get away with flagrant violation of Sri Lanka’s sovereignty. The country could not have engaged French built Mirage 2000 fighters even if they were considered hostile aircraft. The SLAF lacked jets or anti-aircraft weapons capable of engaging such advanced aircraft.

Responding to a query by The Island, Gen. de Silva alleged the Indian military and intelligence personnel had accompanied the Indian Red Cross involved in the transfer of food stocks from India to Kankesanthurai harbour in late June 1987. The Indian military was on a mission, though the army never realized at that time that India was seeking to deploy its troops in Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka under an agreement. The LTTE, too, took advantage of the situation to infiltrate government-held areas on the pretext of being employees of various co-operative societies, tasked to distribute Indian food stocks.

Nelliady attack

Due to Indian intervention, the army stopped all offensive action in both provinces. The army was engaged in consolidating its positions, in newly captured areas, whereas the LTTE was planning a major suicide attack. The first Black Tiger, Vallipuram Vasanthan, on July 5, 1987, drove an explosives-laden truck into a government school in Nelliady, in Vadamarachchy, paving the way for a frontal assault. A section of the media propagated that Operation Liberation was called off due to the Nelliady assault.

Vasanthan was the son of Thurairatnam, a prominent TULF politician who represented the Jaffna electoral district.

The LTTE stormed Nelliady School after blocking off all access routes. The then Jaffna Commander de Silva arrived at Nelliady at first light on the following day. The soft spoken officer told The Island: "As the helicopter carrying me was about to land at close proximity to the targeted school, we saw men in Black uniform firing at the chopper. The newly raised 4 Gemunu Watch (4 GW) at that time was deployed at Nelliady. 5GW was raised on the field with the then Lt. Col. Wasantha Perera as its commanding officer."

Subsequent to the Nelliady attack, the LTTE and those supportive of its macabre cause propagated that as many as 300 soldiers died in the suicide attack, though the actual number of death was far less. Almost 15 years later Colombo based journalists visiting Jaffna after the signing of the Norwegian arranged Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) was told how Black Tiger Vasanthan a.k.a Captain Miller brought Operation Liberation to an abrupt end with his devastating suicide attack.

"There was no truth in these reports," the Sandhurst-trained batch-mate of war veteran Kobbekaduwa said, stressing such erroneous reports tend to give an entirely wrong picture of the events leading to the Indo-Lanka accord in July, 1987. "Surely it was a part of their propaganda strategy. They wanted people to believe the offensive was called off due to heavy enemy resistance."

De Silva was commissioned as a Second Lieut on August 3, 1962. "I was with the Sinha Regiment and joined the GW a year later." However, when officers reach the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, they shed their regimental (unit) identity. He assumed command of the army on January 1, 1994 and relinquished the post on April 30, 1996. Four months later he was appointed High Commissioner to Islamabad and was there for two years.

"The Nelliady blast claimed the lives of less than 20 personnel", he said, adding that the 4 GW did not have the required number of officers and men to call it a battalion.

There had been about 100 4 GW soldiers, a troop of armor (about 35 men, one armoured car and two scout cars) and a few others, including army engineers at the targeted school. Lt. Col. Perera had been at the school when the LTTE struck. Most of the troops were watching Rupavahini’s 8 p.m. Sinhala news bulletin when the blast occurred. Twelve 4 GW personnel were among the 17 killed in the blast triggered by the suicide cadre who drove in an explosive-laden truck. It was similar to the attack staged on the Dalada Maligawa many years later.

"Now they talk of hundreds being killed. Newspapers inadvertently carry erroneous reports. The sad thing is people believe in them. Obviously it was a part of the Tigers’ strategy. Such tales always attracted recruits to the ranks of terrorists."

Indians arrive

"Were you in Jaffna when the IPKF flew in? Were you aware of the Indo-Lanka agreement and its impact on the security forces"? "As the Jaffna security forces commander, I welcomed Gen. Harkirat Singh, General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the 54th Independent Airborne Assault Division when the Indians flew in. It was a humiliating experience as we knew they forced their way here. Soon after they landed in Palaly, they simply asked the SLAF personnel to shift and took over the control tower. Our camps and detachments were cut off. Within hours they were in charge."

It was a ridiculous situation. The army was not even made aware of the Indo-Lanka agreement. "We were in the dark. We were informed of it about three days later. The Indians did not even bother to tell us that the agreement guaranteed the right to move, particularly the logistical convoys until the LTTE completes the surrender of weapons. It was to be done in just 72 hours.

There were many contentious issues. The Indians and the Sri Lankan forces did not agree on many issues. But relations improved and reached an excellent level when the LTTE resumed hostilities by launching indiscriminate attacks on the Indians about 10 weeks after their triumphant arrival in the northeast. India lost over 1500 men. Over two thousand were wounded, some of them maimed for life. "They paid a heavy price for failing to identify the LTTE and its methods."

India thwarts Operation Liberation

War on terror revisited : Part 90

January 6, 2013, 8:46 pm

From left to right: Lt Col. Vipul Boteju, Lt Col. Sarath Jayawardane, Col. Wijaya Wimalaratne, Brig. Denzil Kobbekaduwa and Maj Gotabaya Rajapakse


By Shamindra Ferdinando

In response to the growing threat, particularly in the Jaffna peninsula, the army gradually expanded its bases in areas vulnerable to attacks. The then JRJ government brought in foreign instructors to train the army while officers were also sent abroad for specialised training. In spite of the army build-up and the formation of the elite Special Task Force (STF) in 1983 to quell terrorism in the Jaffna peninsula, by early 1987 Tamil militant groups posed a major threat to major army bases in the Northern Province. Of the five terrorist groups sponsored by India, the LTTE was the most efficient and it had the wherewithal to engage any military base in the Northern Province.

The government shifted the STF from the Jaffna peninsula to the Eastern Province in late 1984 giving the army an opportunity to concentrate on security in the area. By 1987 the STF was in a commanding position in the Ampara and Batticaloa districts, though the LTTE remained active.

LTTE emerges as dominant

group in Jaffna

In late March 1987 LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran launched a multi-pronged attack on troops based at the Jaffna Fort and nearby army-held telecommunications building. The LTTE also launched simultaneous attacks on troops deployed at Kayts and Mandaitivu. Although the army managed to repulse these attacks, the LTTE showed its capability to engage the army simultaneously on multiple fronts. The army was struggling in the Jaffna peninsula. The police could not meet the terrorist threat on their own in the Jaffna peninsula. The army was compelled to protect police stations.

In early April 1987, the LTTE sent shock waves through the government when it attacked the army base at Valvettiturai. Although it could not overrun the camp, the assault highlighted the LTTE’s growing strength as well as its emergence as the dominant group in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The army bases at Thondamannarru and Point Pedro had to fire artillery in support of the beleaguered Valvettiturai camp.

In the third week of April 1987, the LTTE mounted a major attack on the army detachment at Kankesanthurai. The deployment was in line with the security plan for Kankesanthurai harbour. The LTTE killed nearly 20 troops before calling off the attack. The army realised that the LTTE was rapidly building up its firepower for a major showdown in the Jaffna peninsula.

LTTE attacks in March and April 1987 attracted many new cadres to the LTTE with a section of the media highlighting the LTTE as the dominant Tamil group battling the army. The police were no longer capable of conducting normal law enforcement operations. The LTTE maintained a permanent presence outside all police and security forces bases in the Jaffna peninsula. The army was trapped in the Jaffna peninsula. Movements between bases were increasingly vulnerable to attacks. By early 1987, the LTTE had the upper hand in the Jaffna peninsula. It could also conduct operations elsewhere. Although the army and the STF conducted limited operations in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, respectively, the LTTE could not be subdued.

The LTTE posed a formidable challenge to the army which was struggling to come to terms with the growing sophistication of the LTTE as well as other groups. The army felt threatened inside its well fortified bases in the Jaffna peninsula. The LTTE could never have challenged the army on its own. Within a four-year period since the killing of 13 soldiers at Thirunelveli, Jaffna on July 23, 1983, the LTTE had developed into a force with a semi conventional fighting capability thanks to India. It also developed a capacity to produce some of its own ammunition such as ‘baba’ mortars.

Although India resented Prabhakaran’s efforts to establish superiority over other Tamil groups, the LTTE chief didn’t alter his strategy. The LTTE gradually isolated outfits such as TELO, which at that time was the organisation favoured by India. The LTTE conducted a series of operations in the Jaffna peninsula targeting rival groups, though India strongly objected to the LTTE project. Having crushed the rivals, the LTTE emerged as the dominant Indian trained group in the Jaffna peninsula by early 1987.

Terrorists receive

training in Lebanon

Terrorists received military training in Lebanon many years before India launched its destabilisation project targeting Sri Lanka. One-time PLOTE commander Uma Maheswaran was among those who benefited from military training in Lebanon subsequent to contacts UK-based Tamils made with the Palestinians. But, the training received in terrorist bases in Lebanon was nothing compared to the clandestine Indian project. They blew up a brand new Hawker–Siddeley (Avro) 748 turboprop aircraft belonging to Air Ceylon on Sept. 7, 1978 at the Ratmalana airport. An explosion caused a fire in the aircraft shortly after it arrived from Palaly airport carrying a group of passengers. One of the passengers was believed to have left an explosive device. It was the first major terrorist attack carried out five years before the Black July riots in the immediate aftermath of the killing of 13 soldiers in Jaffna.

JRJ’s response

Fearing a further deterioration of security situation in the Jaffna peninsula in the wake of attacks directed at bases at Jaffna, adjoining telecommunications building, Kayts, Mandaitivu, Valvettiturai and Kankesanthurai, the government felt a large scale military offensive was necessary to dislodge the LTTE from the Jaffna peninsula. The government felt that the LTTE units in the Jaffna peninsula could be annihilated, though some would be able to take refuge in the Vanni mainland. JRJ’s priority was restoring civil administration in the Jaffna peninsula. Although the army had conducted many operations since the escalation of the conflict, it was not conversant with the deployment of Brigade-level formations. The military leadership felt that two Brigades could carry out the first phase of the operation launched at first light on May 26, 1987. The then Brig. Denzil Kobbekaduwa and Col. Wijaya Wimalaratne commanded the two formations. It was the army’s first operation, involving Brigade sized fighting formations, though both were under strength. Although an infantry Brigade comprised three battalions, the formations under Brig. Kobbekaduwa and Col. Wimalaratne had two infantry battalions each and other support elements.

India supports SLA

In the run-up to Operation Liberation, the army received Indian support to train young officers. One-time army Commander Gen. Gerry H. de Silva (1994-1996) in his memoirs, A most noble profession, launched in 2011 discussed Indian support to expand the army before New Delhi threw its full weight behind terrorist groups. During the tenure of General Tissa Weeratunge (1981-1985) as Commander of the army,India trained SLA officer corps. Training of officers of the Short Service Commissioned (SSC) in batches of 50 was carried out in Chennai. They were deployed in operational areas as soon as they returned from Chennai. In a brief interview with this writer last Friday (Jan.4, 2013), Gen. de Silva asserted that they had to be given command responsibility though six months of military training was wholly inadequate to meet the challenging task.

On a suggestion by de Silva, the then Commandant of the Combat Training School (CTS) at Ampara, the army chief authorised an additional six months training for those returning from Chennai in conventional warfare and counter insurgency operations. Training at the CTS was followed by four weeks training at the commando training school.

From the CTS, de Silva moved to Minneriya as the first Commandant of the Infantry Training Centre. In his memoirs, de Silva recalls with respect the role played by the then Majors P. W. Jayantha de Silva, Vipul Boteju and Hiran Halangoda in their capacity as chief instructors at training facilities at Ampara and Minneriya. Training was the key to our ultimate success, Gen. Silva said.

SLA alters battle plan

Gen. Silva explained the circumstances under which the army had launched Operation Liberation in the Jaffna peninsula. Due to reluctance on the part of the JRJ administration to increase the strength of the army, Operation Liberation had to be altered drastically. Although the government wanted to restore civil administration in the Jaffna administrative district, it refused to make available ground forces required to meet operational comments. Operation Liberation was to be implemented in four phases. The first phase envisaged liberation of Jaffna municipal limits in an eight-day operation. The army planned to launch two brigades from Palaly straddling Palaly-Jaffna road. The two formations were to be commanded by Brig. Kobbekaduwa and Col. Wimalaratne. The two brigade commanders and Brig. de Silva were given an opportunity to meet JRJ to discuss the plan in early 1987. Much to the disappointment of the army, JRJ turned down the plan soon after Brig. Silva explained that a Brigade (three battalions) was needed to hold the Jaffna municipal limits. The political leadership ruled out the possibility of additional funds for the expansion of the army. The army was directed to come up with an alternative plan which could be implemented with available assets. The political leadership also overrated the power of the SLAF. The UNP was of the opinion that heavy SLAF bombing campaign targeting terrorist bases in the Jaffna peninsula could facilitate ground operations. According to Gen. Silva, JRJ had inquired why the army needed eight days to march from Palaly to Jaffna – a distance of 11 miles when SLAF could ‘carpet bomb’ the area to pave the way for ground forces to advance swiftly. Although the SLAF gradually developed into a lethal force and played a crucial role in Eelam War IV, it never had the capacity to carpet bomb the Jaffna peninsula comprising Valigamam, Thennamarachchy and Vadamarachchy divisions. Jaffna is situated in Valigamam.

Having received a directive to revise the battle plan, the army decided to liberate Vadamarachchy division.

Operation gets underway

Col. Wimalaratne was on the northern front. The Gajaba Regiment (GR) veteran was to secure the Thondamannar-Point Pedro road. Brig. Kobbekaduwa’s formation was to take Puloly-Point Pedro road. Col. Wimalaratne’s Brigade was tasked to capture Valvettiturai, whereas Brig. Kobbekaduwa was to capture Nelliady. Phase I of the Operation Liberation envisaged restoring civil administration in Vadamarachchy.

Col. Wimalaratne’s Brigade included 1st GR commanded by Maj. Gotabhaya Rajapaksa and 1 GW (Gemunu Watch) commanded by the then Lt. Col Vipul Boteju. Brig. Kobbekaduwa’s formation included 2 GR and I CLI (Ceylon Light Infantry a.k.a Sri Lanka Light Infantry) commanded by Lt. Col. Sathis Jayasundera and Lt. Col. Narada Wickremeratne.

The then Lt. Shavendra Silva was Maj. Rajapaksa’s adjutant. The Gajaba Lt. survived in spite of being seriously wounded during Operation Liberation to command army’s most successful fighting formation Task Force I (TF I) subsequently named 58 Division (Sept 2007-May 2009). At the height of Eelam War IV, the then Brig. Shavendra Silva commanded almost two dozen battalions.

The two formations were to trap the enemy combatants within Vadamarachchy. It was a daunting task due to absence of adequate troops to plug gaps. Although the army deployed elite commandos in support of regular troops to prevent the enemy fleeing the area, the army could not achieve the desired results.

The army feared the possibility of the LTTE mounting major attacks in areas outside Vadamarachchy soon after Col. Wimalaratne and Brig. Kobbekaduwa went on the offensive. In line with the overall strategy to meet any eventuality, Brig. de Silva, in his capacity as the senior officer in the peninsula, was responsible for both defensive and offensive action in areas outside Vadamarachchy. Troops under Brig. de Silva engaged in action to camouflage the army’s real objective.

The army launched offensive action at Palaly, Kankesanthurai, Thondamannar, Keeramalai, Jaffna Fort, Navatkuli, Karainagar, Mandaitivu, Pooneryn and Elephant Pass in a bid to conceal the two-pronged thrust.

The operation launched from Jaffna Fort claimed the lives of 28 LTTE personnel, including eight women. It was conducted by the then Lt. Col. Asoka Jayewardene. Jayewardene served the army for many years, mostly in operational areas before retiring in the rank of Maj. Gen. Subsequently he was appointed Defence Secretary by President Chandrika Kumaratunga before being replaced by Lt. Col. Gotabhaya Rajapaksa in Nov 2005.

The first phase of Operation Liberation was concluded within five days. The army took a break ahead of the launch of the second phase.

Eelam War I: Emergence of Indian destabilisation plot

War on terror revisited : Part 89

January 1, 2013, 6:41 pm

By Shamindra Ferdinando

One-time UN bigwig as well as head of Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP), Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala’s submissions before the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) on Aug. 25, 2010 as regards accountability on the part of the international community should be considered against the backdrop of observations made by Jyotindra Nath Dixit (1985-1989) India’s High Commissioner in Colombo in his memoirs, Makers of India’s Foreign Policy.

The LLRC was inquiring into the eelam conflict in the wake of the defeat of the LTTE in May 2009.

Dhanapala dealt with countries promoting terrorism (using non-state actors) to undermine other countries. Dhanapala, in his submissions said: "Now I think it is important for us to expand that concept to bring in the culpability of those members of the international community who have subscribed to the situation that has caused injury to the civilians of a nation. I talk about the way in which terrorist groups are given sanctuary; are harboured; are supplied with arms and training by some countries with regard to their neighbours or with regard to other countries. We know that in our case this has happened, and I don’t want to name countries, but even countries who have allowed their financial procedures and systems to be abused in such a way that money can flow from their countries in order to buy arms and ammunition that cause the deaths, the maiming and the destruction of property in Sri Lanka are to blame and there is therefore a responsibility to protect our civilians and the civilians of other nations from that kind of behaviour on the part of members of the international community. And I think this is something that will echo within many countries in the Non-Aligned Movement, where Sri Lanka has a much respected position and where I hope we will be able to raise this issue."

Dixit launched Makers of India’s Foreign Policy in 2004 during his tenure as India’s National Security Advisor, having excelled as Foreign Secretary.

India G’s foreign policy blunders

In a chapter titled An Indocentric Practitioner of Realpolitik, Dixit didn’t mince his words when he discussed the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s foreign policy blunders. Dixit faulted Premier Gandhi for two foreign policy decisions, namely India’s ambiguous response to the then Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan in Dec 1979 and active support to terrorists (Dixit called them Tamil militants), during the tenure of the then President JRJ.

The writer received a copy of Makers of India’s Foreign Policy courtesy India’s External Affairs Ministry during a visit to New Delhi in 2006. Dixit asserts that Premier Gandhi couldn’t have antagonised the Soviet Union due to India’s dependence on defence supplies and technologies. Commenting on her decision to destabilise Sri Lanka, Dixit, having alleged nearly five decades of Sinhalese discrimination against Tamils, admits that particular operation was prompted by domestic security concerns. He says: "Similarly, she could not afford the emergence of Tamil separatism in India by refusing to support the aspirations of Sri Lankan Tamils."

Dixit gives another reason for the Indian destabilisation operation targeting the JRJ administration. He asserts that Sri Lanka’s emerging security relationship with the US, Pakistan and Israel threatened India. Chinese and Pakistani ‘operations’ in Nepal and Bangladesh, too, contributed to India’s anxiety, Dixit alleges. The US and Pakistan, according to Dixit, created a ‘politico-strategic’ pressure point in Sri Lanka against India.

India’s response to US-Pak-Israel alliance

Obviously, India’s decision to subvert Sri Lanka was part of her overall security and political strategy in the wake of the growing threat posed by the US-Pakistan and Israel alliance. Although China was not aligned with the alliance, Dixit argues that China worked closely with Pakistan to undermine India in response to Indian backing for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. India made the destabilisation of Sri Lanka an integral part of a security project to safeguard Indian national interests.

The TULF and Tamil armed groups were nothing but mere tools in the hands of Indian officials who spearheaded a campaign of death and destruction. Tamil groups would never have had an opportunity to gain expertise in the art of war without Indian help.

Contrary to the general belief that India intervened in the wake of the Black July 1983 riots, Indian military/intelligence agencies provided material assistance to one of the Tamil groups, the LTTE, to mount an unprecedented attack on Sri Lanka’s ceremonial army. The troops went on the rampage in the Jaffna peninsula in the immediate aftermath of the loss of 13 personnel in an ambush at Tinnaveli, Jaffna close to midnight on July 1983. The army also encouraged mob attacks on innocent Tamil speaking people in Colombo, while the JRJ administration turned a blind eye to what was going on. A section of the Tamil media propagated the theory that the LTTE had targeted the army patrol launched from Gurunagar army camp to avenge the death of Charles Anthony aka Seelan killed in a chance encounter on July 15, 1983. Even if the LTTE had wanted to retaliate it couldn’t have confronted a mobile army patrol without a proper plan and armaments. The LTTE fired guns and threw hand grenades at the patrol comprising two vehicles carrying 15 personnel after exploding a landmine. The army lost 13 men, including the Second Lieutenant leading the patrol. The Tinnaveli operation was meant to trigger a massive backlash which would create an environment conducive for Indian intervention. The July 1983 riots had the desired impact as envisaged by those spearheading the destabilisation plot targeting Sri Lanka.

The Tinnaveli operation and subsequent developments paved the way for India to intensify its anti-Sri Lanka project. India encouraged Sri Lankan Tamils to cross the Palk Straits in fishing craft. The India media accused Sri Lanka of indiscriminate attacks on civilians. While thousands of families sought refuge in camps in Tamil Nadu, the youth were transferred to training facilities. The stage was set for a large scale destabilisation project. At the same time, India also stepped up diplomatic efforts to bring the Sri Lankan government, the TULF and Tamil terrorist groups to the negotiating table.

LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, in an interview with Anita Pratap on March 11, 1984, rejected the assumption that the Tinnaveli attack had caused riots. Anti-Tamil riots had taken place on several occasions and it wouldn’t be right to say that the Tinnaveli attack triggered the massacre of Tamils, he argued.

Western powers ignore Sri Lanka’s plight

Western powers turned a blind eye to what was happening in Sri Lanka and across the Palk Strait. The army was not geared to fight a well trained enemy with access to a range of arms, ammunition and equipment. At the behest of Indian instructors, militant groups effectively used landmines and anti-personnel mines against security forces and the police. Within months after the Black July riots, Tamil groups were in control in the Northern Province, whereas in the Eastern Province they still maintained a low profile. The JRJ administration experienced severe difficulties in obtaining required arms, ammunition, equipment as well as training for expanding the army. The US and UK turned their back on Sri Lanka, though under the auspices of the Reagan administration, Israel threw its weight behind Sri Lanka. The Israeli government remained a major arms supplier throughout the eelam conflict. China and Pakistan, too, provided valuable support during the conflict. Sri Lanka secured ‘Buffel’ armoured personnel carriers from South Africa at the onset of counter-insurgency operations. At an early stage of the conflict, Sri Lanka acquired Italian and Argentine built attack aircraft––they cannot be considered attack aircraft by today’s standards––and transport aircraft from China. Security forces struggled to meet the LTTE threat against tremendous odds. Although troops mounted many operations, Tamil groups always had an edge over them during the 1983-late 1985 period. The militants mastered the landmine technology, whereas troops remained committed to conventional operations. At the onset of the campaign, the army was no match for Tamil groups, though by early 1987 it was ready to liberate Jaffna. The army could have succeeded if not for India coming to the rescue of terrorist groups.

Multi-pronged strategy

India recruited, trained and deployed five terrorist groups, which carried out attacks in line with their overall strategy. Simultaneously, India mediated between JRJ and terrorist groups. To facilitate their strategy, India blocked Sri Lanka’s efforts to strengthen its armed forces. Having experienced severe difficulties in meeting rapidly growing requirements, JRJ was compelled to obtain the services of former British Special Air Services (SAS) personnel to train troops in special operations. India also used the TULF to exert pressure on JRJ, thereby interfering with military operations as well as counter insurgency action, particularly in the Jaffna peninsula.

Gen. Cyril Ranatunga in his memoirs titled, From peace to war, insurgency to terrorism, reveals how the then US government offered to sell armoured cars without guns while the British declined to supply ammunition for Saladin armoured cars brought from them.

India also facilitated a major propaganda effort against Sri Lanka. Retired Brigadier H. F. Rupesinghe discussed India’s role in the propaganda blitz during the 80s in an interview with The Island during eelam war IV. "I received information about the ‘media operation’ directed from Chennai way back in 1986. I was the senior officer in charge of Jaffna at that time and had to deal with foreign correspondents. It is quite apparent that the then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi threw his weight behind the LTTE at the behest of the LTTE’s Chennai-based Advisory Committee, which functioned as the headquarters for the LTTE and a key agency for the Tamil Diaspora in quest of a nation for the Tamils the world over. During a conversation with an American journalist, I expressed shock and regret over an influential section of the international media being biased towards Tamil terrorist groups, while being critical of the Sri Lankan security forces. The American revealed the existence of the Chennai-based Advisory Committee of the LTTE and its monthly meetings with the participation of many correspondents of various print and electronic media, including the wire services. The American admitted that he participated in two meetings in Chennai, where they discussed an anti-Sri Lanka propaganda campaign. The American revealed that the LTTE looked after the journalists well."

Asked whether the then government allowed foreign journalists to visit Jaffna in the pre-IPKF period, Rupesinghe said: "It wasn’t long after the American’s visit, that a BBC correspondent accompanied by an Australian, who was introduced to me as the BBC man’s understudy, arrived in Jaffna. They contacted the Jaffna Command and inquired whether the Security Forces Commander in Jaffna wanted to meet them. They were told that I wasn’t interested in meeting them, unless they wanted a meeting. That was part of their strategy to step up pressure on the government. I knew they represented the interests of the LTTE. As the BBC correspondent was setting his voice recorder, I inquired from the Australian whether he had been to Chennai recently. The Australian blushed and turned towards the BBC correspondent, who grudgingly admitted their sojourn in Chennai 10 days ago."

Rupasinghe said that the then government had never realised the importance of countering the propaganda war. For want of a cohesive strategy, influential international media networks justified terrorism on the basis of atrocities committed by the police and the military. They portrayed terrorists as freedom fighters taking on the undisciplined Sri Lankan army. Recalling prompt Indian military assistance to quell the April 1971 JVP insurgency, Rupesinghe said that if India had not intervened here, Tamil groups would never have been the means to challenge the government.

Dixit’s India’s Foreign Policy Makers is proof that bloodshed in Sri Lanka over three decades was caused by New Delhi’s response to threat the emanating from the US in the battle for supremacy between Western powers and the Soviet Union.

Aftermath of historic battlefield victory

War on terror revisited : Part 88

December 30, 2012, 7:52 pm


By Shamindra Ferdinando

As the army was clearing the last patch of LTTE-held territory at Vellamullivaikkal in the Mullaitivu District, one of Sri Lanka’s major arms suppliers called for an international inquiry in to the conduct of government security forces.

Israel made its move in Geneva on May 18, 2009, on the first day of a five-day meeting of the World Health Assembly in Geneva at the WHO headquarters.

Unfortunately, the government failed to realize the significance of the Israeli move which was made amidst UN launching a war crimes inquiry into military action during operations (Dec. 27, 2008-Jan 18, 2009) in Gaza.

The Israeli proposed to send a combined UN and WHO team to investigate the conduct of the Sri Lankan security forces during eelam war IV.

Israeli delegation called for an immediate investigation after Sri Lanka received overwhelming backing to chair the conference attended by representatives from 192 countries. The Jewish State said that Sri Lanka, too, should be subjected to an inspection similar to the one carried out in the Gaza strip.

Opposing the then Sri Lankan Health Minister Nimal Siripala de Silva’s appointment as the Chairman of the World Health Assembly, the Israeli delegation demanded an international investigation. Israel went to the extent of accusing Sri Lanka of indiscriminate military action and violations of human rights in the guise of fighting LTTE terrorism.

The surprising move came hours before the Army finished off what was left of the LTTE’s conventional fighting forces. During that confrontation LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran was trapped in the Nanthikadal lagoon where he died on the morning of the following day.

Sri Lanka re-established diplomatic relations with Israel shortly after the LTTE overran the strategic Elephant Pass base in April 2000. Successive Israeli governments backed the military effort against the LTTE, though Sri Lanka didn’t have diplomatic ties.

Israel was one of the key suppliers of military hardware including Fast Attack Craft (FACs), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Kfir multi-role fighters and rockets which helped the Sri Lanka Navy to destroy many Sea Tiger craft in the northern waters. The rockets mounted on Inshore Patrol Craft (IPC) helped the SLN to overwhelm the Sea Tigers off the Mullaitivu coast. Sri Lankan security forces have also benefitted by Israeli expertise.

The Israeli government took on SriLanka as hundreds of LTTE supporters held a violent anti-Sri Lanka protest at the WHO premises (Israel in shocking move demands human rights probe on Lanka-The Island May 26, 2009).

The UN inquiry targeting both Israel and Hamas got underway in April 2009. The investigating team led by South African jurist Richard Goldstone, handed over its report to the UN on Sept. 15, 2009.

At the time Israel called for a war crimes inquiry, the LTTE rump hadn’t launched its own project to influence the UN to haul Sri Lanka up before international war crimes tribunal. Although Israel has managed to neutralize the damning UN report with the help of the US, Sri Lanka is still under heavy Western pressure. Sri Lanka’s case will again come up for discussion in March 2013 at the 20th sessions of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in Geneva. Under pressure by Israel and its allies, Goldstone retracted his own report, though three other investigators strongly reiterated their confidence in it.

Unceasing Tsunami I and II

The three-year military campaign was called a humanitarian operation by politicians and military officers alike. The army didn’t even codename the operation. Immediately after being promoted to the rank of General, the war winning army chief said he would like to codename the liberation of the Eastern Province and the Vanni Region Unceasing Tsunami I (Aug. 2006-July 2007) and Unceasing Tsunami II (March 2007-May 2009).

The war veteran said that unlike in the previous phases of the war, the Army didn’t consult astrologers or delay ground operations due to the inauspicious ‘rahu’ period. "We conducted operations to meet our ground requirement," he said on May 26, 2009.

The first serving General, said that the Army hadn’t simply bothered to codename a string of operations conducted over the two years and ten months under his command. An outspoken Gen. Fonseka dismissed the assertion that major military action should be conducted in keeping with auspicious times.

Referring to the arrest of a Lt. Colonel over his alleged links with the LTTE, the Army Chief recalled that the officer had retreated with his troops based at Thanankilappu to Palaly in a matter of hours in 2000 when LTTE attacked Thanankilappu. After being detected taking three calls to a Tamil person during a major battle at Muhamalai during eelam war IV, the suspect had been through the Directorate of Military Intelligence and questioned, Gen. Fonseka said, adding that a couple of Army and Police officers had been taken into custody over their alleged links with the LTTE. An officer holding the rank of Major had been sentenced to death by a Military Tribunal. The President had commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment, he said.

Gen. Fonseka said that once the Lt. Col. had aroused the suspicion of army top brass, he hadn’t been given an opportunity to command troops on the ground.

Commenting on the pivotal role played by Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa in the war effort, Gen. Fonseka accused some previous governments of having turned a blind eye to the needs of the security forces. He recalled a top level conference during the tenure of then President Ranasinghe Premadasa, when the then Defence Secretary questioned the army’s requirement for a large stock of ammunition for training purposes, Gen. Fonseka said that the then Defence Secretary had pointed out that there was no basis for such a stock as there were only 2,000 LTTE cadres. Gen. Fonseka at that time holding the rank of Colonel, had represented army headquarters.

He had trained and equipped the army to engage in jungle warfare, Gen. Fonseka said. The LTTE had to depend on earth bunds cum ditches to deter the army, but troops overwhelmed the enemy and made a historic victory possible in less than three years.

The Sinha Regiment veteran declared that under his command, the army had taken on the LTTE in the latter’s strongholds. There wouldn’t have been any point in raising the national flag in an area not militarily important to the enemy, he said, adding that as the army had gradually stepped up pressure on several fronts, the LTTE was forced to give up some areas.

Sri Lanka’s most successful service commander said that the entire LTTE leadership had been wiped out. Had the army taken LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran alive during a last ditch attempt by the leader to escape, the army could have reminded him of what he did over the past three decades. The Army Chief regretted the troops’ failure to take him alive.

Gen. SF on P’karan’s death

Commenting on the confrontation with Prabhakaran on the morning of May 19, 2009, Gen. Fonseka said that Prabhakaran, his body guards and suicide cadres had been among about 70 LTTE cadres killed after being trapped in the Nanthikadal lagoon. At the time of the confrontation, the Army hadn’t been certain of Prabhakaran’s presence among the group, he said, adding that altogether the LTTE had lost about 450 cadres in three major engagements during the last 48 hours.

Dismissing the possibility of an LTTE threat again, he said that the army was strong enough to meet any challenge. He said that the army had expanded to 200,000 officers and men and it could be as big as 300,000. The army had deployed about 60 battalions in the Kilinochchi area alone, he said.

Gen. Fonseka said that the army had sealed off the north-eastern coast before the launch of the final phase of the offensive to thwart any attempt by the LTTE leadership to escape by boats.

Referring to a reversal suffered on the Muhamalai front in 2008, Gen. Fonseka said that he publicly acknowledged the loss of 130 officers and men. The LTTE, too, lost about 250 cadres, he said, emphasizing that he was confident of meeting the challenges. could have distracted me."

SLA destroyed 95 % of LTTE fighting cadre

Gen. Fonseka said that the army had destroyed about 95 per cent of the LTTE fighting strength. He emphasized that the Army had caused heavy losses to the Sea Tigers and captured seven LTTE runways. He praised the SLAF for strongly backing the ground offensive.

Gen. Fonseka slammed those who repeatedly tried to throw lifelines to the sinking Tigers. He targeted three MPs for being critical of the war effort. Recalling a jibe that he wasn’t even suitable to lead the Salvation Army, Gen. Fonseka said that he had proved what he could do.

He said that the LTTE had managed to bring in military supplies in boats as late as last December. Quoting two LTTE cadres captured by the Army at Iranamadu, he said the LTTE had a steady supply of arms, ammunition and equipment.

Had the enemy been denied a sea supply route, the offensive could have been completed sooner, he said. According to him, among the armaments brought from abroad and captured by the army were one main battle tank, two armoured personnel carriers, about 25 pieces of artillery and a range of other weapons, including 30 mm, 27 mm, 23 mm and multi-purpose machine guns. The Army had also recovered about three hundred 60 mm mortars and 11,000 T-56 assault rifles, he said.

Gen. Fonseka said that he hadn’t appointed an OOC (Overall Operations Commander) to oversee the offensive as he felt he didn’t have the right man. He said that had he had handled the OOC job. "I did what a conservative didn’t. I pushed ground commanders and in some instances shouted at them," he said, stressing that all officers at all levels who commanded fighting formations had been handpicked.

Gen. Fonseka said that over 5,000 officers and men had sacrificed their lives in the offensive. Even if the had simply defended its camps over three years, it would have lost a similar number, he said.

The army lost 2,174 and 2,350 officers and men during 2008 and 2009, respectively. The SLA categorized the number of missing at 113.

Sri Lanka paid a heavy price to defeat terrorism. During eelam war I, it battled several Indian trained Tamil groups, including the LTTE. Towards the end of the 80s, the LTTE emerged as the only group remained committed to the macabre eelam project.

Eelam War III worst

In terms of officers and men killed, eelam war III (April 1995 to Dec 2001) was undoubtedly the worst. In fact, all three services suffered the highest losses during eelam war III, with the army losing 420 officers and 9,028 men, whereas 93 officers and 2,625 were men categorized as missing. The number of wounded army officers and men was placed at 492 and 11,906, respectively.

The number of navy officers and men killed, missing and wounded during eelam war III was placed at 349, 254 and 241, respectively.

The SLAF lost 208 officers and men during eelam war III, while the number of wounded was placed at 116.

 During eelam war I (1983-1987) the army lost 52 officers and 881 men, whereas one officer and four men were categorized as missing. The number of wounded army officers and men was placed at 6 and 152, respectively.

The number of navy officers and men killed and wounded during eelam war I was placed at 41 and 8, respectively.

The SLAF lost 52 officers and men and while 14 were wounded during eelam war I.

Eelam war II was fought between June 1990 and April 1995 with the LTTE making major military gains, particularly in the Vanni region. The army lost 140 officers and 3,399 men, whereas 19 officers and 586 men were categorized as missing. The number of wounded army officers and men was placed at 80 and 2,449, respectively.

The number of navy officers and men killed, missing and wounded during eelam war II was placed at 117, 136 and 74, respectively.

The SLAF lost 138 officers and men during eelam war II, while the number of wounded was placed at 68.

In spite of eelam war IV lasting two years and ten months, the army lost 217 officers and 5,527 men, whereas 10 officers and 93 men were categorized as missing in action. The number of wounded officers and men was placed at 518 and 18, 120, respectively.

The number of navy officers and men killed, missing and wounded during eelam war IV was placed at 210, 56 and 108, respectively.

The SLAF lost 37 officers and men during eelam war IV, while the number of wounded was placed at 36.

FAMED 58 Div TO THE FORE

War on terror revisited : Part 87

December 28, 2012, 8:16 pm

By Shamindra Ferdinando

The 58 was Sri Lanka’s most successful fighting Division during the conflict. It was not only the best but the youngest Division which fought alongside eight other formations on the Vanni front during eelam war IV to pave the way for the final battle on May 18, 2009 at Vellamullivaikkal adjoining the Nanthikadal lagoon.

The then Army chief, Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka launched seven new fighting formations, namely the 57 (Maj. Gen. Jagath Dias), Task Force I (Brig. Shavendra Silva), the 59 (Brig. Nandana Udawatte), Task Force II (Brig. Rohana Bandara), Task Force III (Brig. Sathyapriya Liyanage), Task Force IV (Col.Nishantha Wanniarachchi) and Task Force VIII (Col. G.V. Ravipriya) exclusively for an unprecedented multi-pronged Vanni offensive (March 2007 to May 2009). The newly formed formations were joined by the longstanding 53 (Brig. Kamal Gunaratne) and 55 (Brig. Prasanna Silva) Divisions, deployed in the Jaffna peninsula.

Lt. Gen. Fonseka upgraded Task Force I (TF I) to the status of a Division immediately after the liberation of Paranthan and the southern part of the Kilinochchi town by Jan 1, 2009. It would be pertinent to mention that TF I had the strength of a Division at the onset of the offensive on the western flank. A TF comprises two Brigades (six infantry battalions) whereas a Division consisted of three Brigades (nine infantry battalions). Each Brigade comprises three infantry battalions. During the last phase of the offensive, Brig. Silva had nearly two dozen battalions under his command.

Chagi’s role

Brig. Chagi Gallage, who was Lt. Gen. Fonseka’s first choice as TF I commander had to leave the battlefield to undergo heart surgery, though he returned to the field later. Although he commanded 53 briefly during the absence of its commander and subsequently led 59 in the wake of the Feb. 2009 debacle south of Puthukudirippu, Brig. Prasanna Silva succeeded him just ahead of the final battle. The change of command took place in early May 2009.

The 53 was the most senior formation involved in the offensive. Established in early 1990, the 53 consisting Commandos, Special Forces and Air Mobile Brigade played important roles in major operations including Riviresa in late 1995 to liberate the Jaffna peninsula. The army raised the 55 Division in 1996 for the disastrous Jayasikuru offensive. Although 53 and 55 Divisions changed their mode of operations from defensive to offensive in Nov, 2008, they undertook major offensive operations in the second week of Jan. 2009.

The 51 and 52 Divisions which spearheaded the Riviresa offensive, remained in the Jaffna peninsula.

Three major tasks

Of the nine fighting formations, the 57 launched in March 2007, TF II (Sept 2007) and the 59 (Jan 2008) were given the daunting task of liberating Kilinochchi, Pooneryn and Mullaitivu, respectively. Kilinochchi was liberated on Jan 1, 2009, Pooneryn on Nov 15, 2008 and Mullaitivu on Jan 25, 2009. In the case of Kilinochchi, the northern part of the town was liberated by TF I, whereas the 57 captured the southern section. All nine fighting formations contributed to the crushing defeat of the LTTE, with Task Force VIII killing Prabhakaran and a group of his trusted bodyguards on the morning of May 19, 2009, almost 24 hours after the 58 Division finished off the LTTE conventional fighting forces in a bloody battle at Vellamullivaikkal. The battle for the last patch of LTTE held territory was led by Brig. Shavendra Silva, one of the Gajaba Regiment veterans handpicked by Lt. Gen. Fonseka for the Vanni offensive. It was the finest hour for Lt. Gen. Fonseka’s over the 200,000 strong army. Over 80,000 of them were recruited during eelam war IV subsequent to a decision taken by President Mahinda Rajapaksa on the advice of Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksha, another Gajaba Regiment veteran. If the Rajapaksa brothers didn’t provide the wherewithal, the army would never have achieved its battlefield objectives.

58 Division

Brig. Shavendra Silva commanded Task Force I/58 Division throughout the offensive, though he was once given the opportunity to join the Haiti bound Sri Lankan peacekeepers. But Silva felt it would be a mistake on his part to leave the battlefield at the height of operations. Although many expected Lt. Gen. Fonseka to suspend the Haiti mission, he sustained the deployment much to the surprise of the UN. The army maintained over a battalion of troops in Haiti throughout the campaign. The Sri Lankan military still maintains a contingent of 1,000 officers and men under UN command in Haiti. Since the conclusion of the conflict, the army deployed another peacekeeping contingent in Southern Lebanon. Ironically, Maj. Gen. Silva, in his capacity as Sri Lanka’s Deputy Permanent Representative in New York, now oversees Sri Lankan peacekeepers deployed under the UN command.

The 58 Division lost 30 officers and 1,353 soldiers during the campaign (Sept 1, 2007 to May 18, 2009). The Division estimated the number of LTTE cadres killed in combat with its troops at 7,014 and thousands wounded. Col. Suraj Bansajayah (58.1 Brigade), Col. Wanigasekera (58.2 Brigade) and Col. Deshapriya Gunawardena (58.3) functioned as Brigade Commanders, while the 2 Commando, too, was attached to the 58. Depending on ground requirements, Lt. Gen. Fonseka authorized the deployment of 1 Special Forces in support of operations undertaken by the 58 Division. Interestingly, all three Brigade Commanders of the now famous 58 Division are Gemunu Watch veterans. Although all five infantry regiments contributed to Brig. Shavendra Silva’s success, the majority of the infantry comprised Gemunu Watch, Gajaba Regiment and the Sri Lanka Light Infantry.

Longest march

The 58 Division fought its way from the Mannar rice bowl to Vellamullivaikkal on the north-eastern coast-a distance of 201 kms. No other fighting formation had even come close to challenging the 58 Division’s record, though the battlefield success was due to the combined efforts of the armed forces. Had the navy and the air force failed to deliver, ground forces would never have been able to eradicate the LTTE’s conventional fighting power. In spite of limitations, the navy and the air force caused immense battlefield damage in line with the overall military strategy, while taking targets on their own.

Having liberated Adampan on May 9, 2008, the then TF I linked-up with the 57 Division south-west of Periyamadu on June 30, 2008. The 58 captured Vidattaltivu (July, 2008), Illuppaikkadavai (Aug. 2008), Vellankulam (Aug. 2008), Nachchikudah (Aug. 2008), Maniyankulam (Oct. 2008), Vannerikkulam (Oct. 2008), Nochchimoddai (Oc.t 2008), Kiranchi (Nov. 2008), Devil’s Point and Vallaipadu (Nov. 2008), Pooneryn (Nov. 2008), Sinna Paranthan (Dec. 2008), Paranthan (Jan. 2009), Murasumoddai (Jan. 2009), Dharmapuram (Jan. 2009), Vishvamadhu (Jan. 2009), Thevipuram (Feb. 2008), Iranapalai (March 2009), Anandapuram (April 2009), Puthukudirippu (April 2009) and Vellamullivaikkal (May 2009).

Brig. Shavendra Silva achieved his primary objective when his troops liberated the Pooneryn-Sangupiddy area on Nov. 15, 2008, thereby denying the northwestern shoreline to the LTTE. The sea route between the Vanni mainland and Tamil Nadu caused a debilitating setback to the LTTE. Having secured Pooneryn, victorious troops turned eastwards on the Kandy-Jaffna A9 road. They liberated Paranthan situated on the A9 and rapidly advanced along the Paranthan –Mullaitivu road destroying LTTE fortifications, before changing course as the army chief paved the way for Brig. Silva’s troops to wage the final battle.

Unfortunately, soon after the conclusion of the war, once strong relationship between the army chief and the 58 Division commander turned sour as the Sinha Regiment veteran eyed the Office of President. The situation deteriorated rapidly with the army chief accusing once his favoutite commander of executing surrendering LTTE cadres on a directive given by Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa. Many felt that the Defence Secretary, himself a one-time commanding officer of the first battalion of the Gajaba Regiment, too, was supportive of Brig. Silva.

Those who accused the Defence Secretary of throwing his weight behind a fellow Gajaba Regiment officer conveniently forgot how he influenced President Mahinda Rajapaksa to elevate Sarath Fonseka to the rank of Lt. Gen. at the expense of the then Army chief Lt. Gen. Shantha Kottegoda. Had Gotabhaya Rajapaksa not intervened, Fonseka would never have received an opportunity to command the army. But at the same time, the LTTE couldn’t have been militarily defeated without the tough talking Lt. Gen. Fonseka’s leadership. In fact, it would be pertinent to mention that the Defence Secretary, Army Commander and the 58 Division Commander exploited the media to the hilt throughout the campaign. All three used the media as a tool to undermine the enemy and consolidate the government’s position. Actually, their use of the media was very similar to the LTTE strategy.

The 58 Division’s raid on the LTTE held Puthumathalan was undoubtedly the world’s largest civilian rescue operation. But perhaps the 58 Division’s biggest achievement was the unprecedented operation at Anandapuram, where it killed over 600 LTTE cadres, including the most experienced LTTE commanders. The operation conducted in the first week of April, with the active participation of the 53 Division, enabled the army to hasten the collapse of the LTTE.

US report on Sri Lankan

military

Sri Lanka’s battlefield success should be viewed against a US study, which dealt with the status of government forces during the premiership of Ranil Wickremesinghe. The US Department of State undertook the study subsequent to Wickremesinghe’s appeal to President George W. Bush in July 2002, a couple of months after the signing of the Norwegian arranged Ceasefire Agreement (CFA). US experts examined operations, doctrine, procurement, training and professional military education before releasing a bulky report, which the then government didn’t want to be discussed. The report pointed out that in spite of having the advantage of manpower and equipment in relation to the LTTE, the army couldn’t defeat the terrorists DUE TO THE ARMY’S LEADERSHIP FAILING TO APPLY ANY OF THE TENETS OF COMBAT OPERATIONS. The US warned, due to shortcomings on the part of the leadership, the government faced ‘probable defeat in the Northern Province and possible defeat in the Eastern Province’ in case of eelam war IV.

The US report highlighted the strength of the fighting forces. Pointing out that training and institutional base is marginal, the US stressed that the quality of soldiers is not an issue. "In fact, the major strength of the army is their impressive soldiers who endure tremendous hardship, while maintaining a fighting spirit that has prevented more drastic defeats."

LTTE checkmated

War on terror revisited : Part 86

December 23, 2012, 6:43 pm


By Shamindra Ferdinando

Army chief, Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka was on an official visit to China when Brig. Shavendra Silva’s celebrated 58 Division prepared to launch the final clearing operation targeting the cornered Tigers taking refuge among civilians in a two-square-kilometre patch of land in Vellimullivaikkal. Brig. Silva was confident of wiping what remained of the LTTE’s military wing.

 Although the Army Commander was away for about a week, he was in touch with field commanders. President Mahinda Rajapaksa, too, was abroad as the army surrounded Vellimullivaikkal.

 Having finalized preparations for the assault, the 58 Division chief was at his headquarters when a lagoon borne LTTE group overran a section of the frontline held by the 53 Division. The LTTE operation got underway at 3 a.m. on May 17, 2009. Although the LTTE managed to overrun army defences, it couldn’t sustain the assault until it could clear a path for their leader Velupillai Prabhakaran and his family to escape into the nearby jungles. Unbeknownst to the army, Prabhakaran, his family and a team of close protection personnel were trapped either in the Nanthikadal lagoon or the two square km area. A section of the army top bass feared Prabhakaran had escaped amidst battlefield chaos. (The previous piece dealt with two abortive LTTE attempts to escape through the area held by the 53 Division).

 The 58 Division had no option but to suspend the final assault and stabilize the situation in the neighbouring area. Brig. Silva spearheaded the stabilization effort. The absence of Sinha Regiment veteran Lt. Gen. Fonseka worsened the situation. The ground commanders faced the unenviable task of explaining the failure on their part to prevent Prabhakaran’s escape. What they didn’t know at that time was that the leader was still alive and kicking. The 58 Division blocked all land access to the 2 square km area, where the LTTE leader was believed to be trapped, while leaving the lagoon front open.

 At one point Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa directed the SLAF to operate an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) in support of ground forces even after its operating hours. He emphasized that all support should be given to ground forces to achieve their goal event at the risk of losing the precious UAV.

Last minute change in 58 Div command proposed

President Rajapaksa returned to the country on the morning of May 17, 2009 from Jordan. Lt. Gen. Fonseka returned from China close to midnight also on the same day. The hot tempered Army Chief flayed those responsible for the setback. Having reviewed the ground situation, Lt. Gen. Fonseka wanted Brig. Shavendra Silva to handle the crisis caused by the LTTE attack. He suggested that Brig. Silva hand over the command of the 58 Division to Brig. Prasanna Silva, at that time the commanding officer of 59 Division. The proposal was made before the LTTE made its second escape bid in the wee hours of May 18, 2009. Brig. Silva promptly assured the Army chief that he could handle both and went on to launch the final assault. Within hours, the 58 Division cleared the last LTTE pocket. The then Vanni Security Forces Commander Maj. Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya (present Army Commander), too, spoke to Lt. Gen. Fonseka on Brig. Silva’s behalf.

In the second week of May, 2009, Lt. Gen. Fonseka shifted Brig. Silva from the 55 Division to the 59 Division. He succeeded Brig. Chagi Gallage.

58 Div overruns last LTTE pocket

Troops cleared the area around 11. 30 a.m. on May 18, 2009. The Tigers died fighting advancing troops, while some triggered massive explosions killing themselves in the process. Having cleared the area, Brig. Shavendra Silva phoned Lt. Gen. Fonseka to declare that the army had wrested control of the entire area. A jubilant Shavendra Silva told the army chief, "Sir you can now declare that the war is over". Although the body of Prabhakaran wasn’t found, the army declared that ground operations were over on the afternoon of May 18, though troops remained on alert to face possible threats from residual LTTE elements hiding in the area. The army realized the possibility of some Tigers hiding in the Nanthikadal lagoon.

 The government was concerned about the failure to recover the bodies of Prabhakaran and intelligence wing leader Shanmugalingam Sivashankar alias Pottu Amman as well as Sea Tiger leader Thillaiyampalan Sivanesan alias Soosai. During clearing operations during the day, troops recovered over 350 bodies. The army was able to identify bodies of about 30 senior LTTE cadres, though the most wanted men were still missing. However, the army couldn’t point a finger at the navy, though in the run-up to the final phase some alleged the LTTE could escape via the sea. At the conclusion of major ground operations, the 58 Division got down to the task of organizing the gun silencing ceremony. Brig. Shavendra Silva picked the beach close to FARAH III to hold the unprecedented ceremony. The Vanni Commander Maj. Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya was the chief guest on that occasion.

Confrontation in the lagoon

Task Force VIII commanded by then Colonel G.V. Ravipriya (present army spokesman) was given the task of clearing the last remaining patch of mangroves which lies south of the causeway at Karayamullavaikkal. In fact, Prabhakaran was hiding in the mangroves behind the 4 VIR (Vijayaba Infantry Regiment) frontline. The battalion was commanded by Lieutenant Col. Rohitha Aluwihare. Army commandos and 4 VIR launched the clearing operation at 8.30 a.m. on May 19, 2009. As army commandos had cleared a large part of mangroves the previous day, the army believed the clearing operation could be completed swiftly. In fact, the army didn’t expect Prabhakaran to be hiding in the mangroves. Had the top brass believed the LTTE leader’s presence in that particular spot, elite troops would have been ordered to clear the patch the previous day itself. Otherwise, troops would have moved at first light.

An eight-man contingent of 4 VIR Bravo company was deployed for the clearing operation. The team, led by Sergeant S.P. Wijesinghe, faced small arms fire as they advanced towards the mangroves. After the confrontation, Sgt. Wijesinghe’s team recovered five bodies. Among the dead was Vinodhan believed to be one of Prabhakaran’s escorts. Subsequently, two groups comprising 12 men also from 4 VIR Bravo company were deployed. Of them, the eight man team was led by Sergeant TM Muthubanda.

Troops exchanged fire with the Tigers hiding in the mangroves for about one hour. Suddenly, the resistance stopped. Troops cautiously approached the mangroves, where they found bodies of 18 persons, including that of Prabhakaran. He was in civilian attire. The army didn’t find a cyanide vial hanging around the LTTE chief’s neck. Instead, a dog tag bearing the number 001 dated 16.09.95 hung around his neck. Prabhakaran’s ‘Eelam’ identity card with his picture bearing number 01543301002 issued on 01.01.2007 with his personal details, date of birth - 26.11.1954, place of birth - Velvettiturai and occupation - Leader of the LTTE, was in his shirt pocket.

Two rescue bids thwarted, P’karan trapped in lagoon

War on terror revisited : Part 85

December 20, 2012, 12:00 pm


by Shamindra Ferdinando

The final battle was fought for four days (May 16-May 19, 2009) in a 4 square km area. The combat zone was a narrow stretch of land opening to the sea from the east and to the Nanthikadal lagoon from the west. According to the then Brigadier Shavendra Silva, the commanding officer of the 58 Division there had been an open beachhead on the east, a scrubby land in the middle and a waterlogged stretch full of mangroves on the west.

The 58 (Brig. Shavendra Silva), 53 (Maj. Gen. Kamal Gunaratne) and 59 (Maj. Gen. Prasanna Silva) Divisions surrounded the LTTE group hiding on a thin neck of land on the Mullaitivu coast. Task Force VIII (Col. G.V. Ravipriya) was also deployed under the operational command of the 53 Division.

Although ground commanders had massive firepower at their command, the 58 Division, tasked to clear the remaining LTTE held area, was deprived of air, artillery and armour support. Had the government authorized utilization of all available assets, the final battle wouldn’t have lasted four days. But in line with an assurance given by President Mahinda Rajapaksa to western powers and India, the army was directed not to deploy heavy weapons due to terrorists still using civilians as human shieds. The army estimated the number of civilians trapped in the area at about 75,000. Troops were instructed to use only small arms, even at the risk of their lives.

Mavilaru to Mullivaikkal

Eelam war IV began in July 2006 in the immediate aftermath of the LTTE closing the sluice gates of Mavilaru in the East. The then army chief, Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka launched operations on the Vanni front in March 2008, even before the campaign in the East was brought to a successful conclusion. Having cleared the Eastern Province by July 2008, Lt. Gen. Fonseka intensified the campaign in the Vanni, where ten fighting formations battled the LTTE for 14 months, with Task Force VIII being the last to join the battle as late as Feb 8, 2009.

At the onset of the Mavilaru battles in July 2006, the LTTE held almost 15,000 square kms. By May 16, 2009, Prabhakaran held 4 square kms. The army estimated the strength of the LTTE group trapped on Mullaitivu coast at 900.

Final challenge

The 58 and 53 Divisions and Task Force VII were involved in the final battle. Brig. Shavendra Silva’s troops marched southwards along the A-35 (Paranthan-Mullaitivu road) axis dominating the ground stretching from the road to the coast, whereas Maj. Gen. Kamal Gunaratne’s troops marched on the same axis, dominating the ground stretching from the A-35 to the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon.

Having crossed the Vadduvakal causeway during the second week of May 2009, Maj. Gen. Prasanna Silva’s troops remained defensive holding a line immediately south of the no fire zone. The 59 Division’s move enabled the army to rescue a large group of civilians.

The army pushed the LTTE from the North, East and South leaving only the lagoon bank on the West open for the terrorists.

Int’l effort to save Tigers goes awry

Western powers worked overtime to save Prabhakaran. They made a last minute effort to involve the ICRC to throw a lifeline to Prabhakaran, though the government was not interested in any third party mediated effort to end fighting. President Mahinda Rajapaksa and Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa ruled out a further role for the international community in the conflict at the expense of national interests. By late May 16, 2009, the LTTE knew the government wouldn’t succumb to international pressure and the army was on the verge of storming the defended area. Maj. Gen. Shavendra Silva, Sri Lanka’s Deputy Representative at the UN, says the LTTE could have died defending the area it still controlled or made an attempt to escape and seek refuge in the dense Muthiyankaddu jungles. By then, the Sea Tigers had lost the wherewithal to fight their way through a massive naval cordon off Puthumathalan. The LTTE chose to smash through the army cordon west of the Nanthikadal lagoon.

Norway cancelled its annual garden party on May 17, 2009 to mark the country’s national day due to the situation in Northern Sri Lanka. The party at the Maitland Crescent residence of the Norwegian ambassador attracted many politicians, NGO personalities and almost the entire TNA parliamentary group.

In the north, the army intercepted a message from the LTTE leadership to ordinary cadres to destroy whatever assets left in the battle zone to prevent them falling into the hands of the army (Signs of giving up: Destroy assets, Tiger leaders told-The Island May 15, 2009). In fact, the LTTE began destroying its major assets, including Sea Tiger craft shortly before the 58 Division fought its way through strong LTTE positions to link up with the 59 Division on May 15, 2009, on the Puthumathalan beach.

P’karan’s first bid to escape thwarted

As anticipated by the army, Prabhakaran made his move in the early hours of May 17, 2009. Using all available Sea Tiger craft, the LTTE launched an attack across the Nanthikadal lagoon targeting troops deployed at Keppularu on the western back of the Nanthikadal lagoon, jointly held by the 53 Division (5 VIR-Vijayaba Infantry Regiment)) and 59 Division (19 SLLI-Sri Lanka Light Infantry). Amidst a fierce attack by boats, an LTTE group overran some of the positions held by troops, though they couldn’t sustain the offensive. The LTTE was trying to secure a foothold on the eastern bank of the Nanthikadal lagoon and open up an escape route to the Muthiyankaddu jungles. Soon after the battle ended, this writer was able to contact Gajaba Regiment veteran, Maj. Gen. Kamal Gunaratne, who stressed that the LTTE leadership never had an opportunity to escape, though they went on the offensive. A confident Gunaratne declared that the army could clear the remaining area in a day, adding that during confrontations on May 17, 2009, troops killed Swarnam and Sashi Master in the Vellamullivaikkal area. In the wake of the abortive attack, newly appointed head of the LTTE International Secretariat, Kumaran Pathmanathan a.k.a ‘KP’ declared that the group was ready to silence its weapons on a request made by the international community (Beaten Tigers offer to silence guns at last-The Island May 18-2009).

Defence Secretary Rajapaksa rejected Pathmanathan’s offer, emphasizing that there was no time or space for negotiations on the last day of a 30-year-old war.

At the conclusion of the battle, 5 VIR recovered nearly 50 LTTE bodies, whereas 19 SLLI collected nearly 100 bodies.

In Colombo, Foreign Secretary Paliha Kohona strongly defended continuing military action. Addressing a packed media conference on May 17, Kohona ridiculed the threat to drag Sri Lanka’s political and military leadership before an international war crimes tribunal. Kohona said that like any other country Sri Lanka had a legal responsibility to rescue hostages held by terrorists. The Sri Lankan government couldn’t be held responsible for taking measures to save those held at gunpoint by the LTTE. While Kohona was meeting the media, the army rescued the remaining hostages, bringing an end to the hostage rescue mission. Those resisting the advancing army were killed.

On the late afternoon of May 17, 2009, the LTTE was trapped in an area not more than 600 x 500 meters. The army still kept the western banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon open.

On the night of May 17, 2009, the 58 Division troops and Special Forces began advancing into the area defended by the LTTE. They moved in from the southern edge and gradually pushing back the LTTE.

P’karan’s second attempt to escape foiled

Having failed in his first attempt to reach the Muthiyankaddu jungles, Prabhakaran devised a second plan. The LTTE leader made an attempt to escape with his family and personal bodyguards, while the remaining LTTE force fought the army to the last man. His son Charles Anthony was asked to escape with several senior cadres. Prabhakaran most probably felt that he could have fled the battle zone amidst chaos.

A group of terrorists disguised as civilians approached troops manning defences at Karayamullivaikkal on the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon at 2.30 a.m. on May 18, 2009. The area was held by 17 GW (Gemunu Watch) attached to Task Force VIII. The group wanted to enter the army held area. In line with instructions, 17 GW, commanded by Colonel Keerthi Kottachchi, had declined to allow them in, though they pleaded with troops. The group claimed that there were many civilian wounded among the group. The army feared the possibility of mass scale suicide attacks. Although those manning the point hadn’t been aware at that time, there had been a large, heavily armed LTTE group hiding in a nearby islet.

17 GW troops refused to accommodate the group in civilian attire as ground commanders at that time were of the opinion that there couldn’t be any civilians in the area. When the group made an attempt to move towards the entry point at about 3 a.m. in spite of a directive to stay in the water, troops fired in the air to restore control. As soon as troops fired in the air, about 200 LTTE cadres, including those in civilian attire, opened fire. The battle began.

Although troops deployed in the entire sector were ready to face any eventuality, the LTTE quickly overran two army strong points, opening a narrow gap. But the LTTE couldn’t sustain the assault as troops spearheaded by Commandos killed over 100 attackers. Some of them died in the lagoon. At the conclusion of the battle, the army trapped those who had survived the action. The area was surrounded by the 53 and 58, Divisions. The 53 Division held the northern and southern defence lines across the A-35 whereas the 58 Division held the eastern line along the A-35. The army quickly reinforced the northern defence line with Special Forces and Commandos. During a series of confrontations, the LTTE lost at least 90 per cent of its force. Among the dead was the group headed by Charles Anthony. Prabhakaran’s son died at the hands of the 5 GW troops.

The 58 Division dealt with terrorists on the coastal side of A-35, whereas over 100 other LTTE cadres hiding in the mangroves were killed by the commandos, Special Forces and the infantry.

Another group comprising over 100 LTTE cadres was annihilated north of Vadduvakkal early dawn on May 18. By the evening of the same day, the army had completed land clearing operations. Although many felt that Prabhakaran had been killed, the army was yet to find his body. In spite of that, the army felt that there couldn’t be a further challenge, though the lagoon needed to be cleared.

While the army was clearing the last pockets of terrorists, President Rajapaksa, returned to the country on the morning of May 17, 2009, from Jordan.

President Mahinda Rajapaksa, President of Sri Lanka and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces was to officially declare the liberation of the country in Parliament on May 19, 2009. But the LTTE leader’s body was yet to be found.


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Capt. Wasantha Jayaweera captured this scene a few days before the conclusion of the conflict on the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon on May 19, 2009. Jayaweera, formerly of the Special Forces accompanied the 58 Division from Mannar on the northwestern coast to Puthumathalan on the Mullaitivu coast.

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Brig. Shavendra Silva. Col. Ramesh Fernando of the Sinha Regiment stands next to Brig. Silva. Pic was taken by Capt. Wasantha Jayaweera during opertaions at Puthukudirippu in early 2009.

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Maj. Gen. Kamal Gunaratne, General Officer Commanding (GoC) 53 Division. The Gajaba Regiment veteran commanded the formation during its advance from Jaffna peninsula to Nanthikadal (Jan 2009-May 2009).