SPECIAL REPORT : Part 50
November 18, 2014, 6:01 pm
The assassination of President Kumaratunga, three days before the Dec 21, 1999, presidential poll, was meant to achieve several objectives, both political and military. Prof. Peiris, who had been conducting secret negotiations with the Norwegians, on behalf of President Kumaratunga, was among those wounded in the suicide attack. One of the main objectives of the LTTE suicide mission was to ensure the victory of UNP candidate, Ranil Wickremesinghe, thereby bring an end to the Norwegian-led negotiations with her government. Prabhakaran obviously believed that he could enter into a fresh round of negotiations with the new executive, under the Norwegian auspices. Prabhakaran’s strategy, in Dec 1999, had been very much similar to that of Oct 1994 when the terrorist leader assassinated the then UNP presidential election candidate, Gamini Dissanayake, to enable Mrs Kumaratunga to win.
by Shamindra Ferdinando
Having helped the then Chief Minister of the Western Province, Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga to win the presidential election, on Nov 9, 1994, the LTTE made an attempt to prevent her re-election bid at the Dec 21, 1999, poll.
The suicide blast, directed at Mrs. Kumaratunga, on the night of Dec 18, at the conclusion of the final rally of the then SLFP-led People’s Alliance (PA), claimed the lives of 35 persons. Over 100 received injuries, including President Kumaratunga. She received a slight injury to her face and the right eye.
It would be pertinent to discuss the attempt on Mrs. Kumaratunga’s life, with the focus on secret tripartite negotiations, involving the PA, the LTTE and Norway, at the time of the Dec 18 suicide blast. The talks were meant to facilitate resumption of negotiations between the two parties, under the auspices of Norway.
Mrs. Kumaratunga was the first politician to survive an LTTE suicide attack. The attempt on the President reflected the diabolical nature of Velupillai Prabhakaran, the so-called undisputed leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.
Norwegian International Development Minister, Erik Solheim, discussed the Norwegian role, in the secret three-way negotiations, at an interview with NGO guru, Dr. Kumar Rupesinghe, years later (Negotiating Peace in Sri Lanka: Efforts, Failures and Lessons). Solheim’s interview was among several other interviews/opinion expressed by various personalities, involved in the peace process, accommodated in this particular volume, edited by Dr. Rupesinghe. One of the major recipients of overseas financial assistance, Dr. Rupesinghe has received the backing of Norwegian and Sri Lankan Foreign ministries and the Berghof Foundation for the project.
The trilateral discussions had been initiated by the LTTE, in October 1998, to explore the possibility of having the then LTTE ideologue, Anton Balasingham, safely moved from the Vanni region to an overseas medical facility to undergo an emergency kidney operation.
Solheim, in his interview with Dr. Rupesinghe, claimed that only a few people, including President Kumaratunga, and the then Foreign Minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar, and top LTTE representatives, knew of the negotiations. Having acknowledged that as Norway couldn’t facilitate Balasingham’s transfer from the Vanni, the kidney patient had to leave by other means. Solheim said: "Throughout the peace process, there have been absolutely no leaks from Norway and only a handful of people knew about it at all. So we maintained secrecy at all times until Chandrika decided to go public right after the LTTE attempted to assassinate her, just before the election, in the New Year 1999/2000. She revealed, in an interview with the BBC, that Norway had been involved as a facilitator for a long time. This came as a complete surprise to Norway. Later she apologized for announcing it before informing us, but there were no problems as a result though and I think it was better that way than having it leaked by the press or in any other way."
Dr. Rupesinghe conveniently failed to inquire from Solheim whether the LTTE bid to assassinate the Sri Lankan leader surprised Norway. The Chairman of the Foundation for Co-Existence, Dr. Rupesinghe, never queried from Solheim whether Norway demanded an explanation from Prabhakaran, as regards the assassination, attempt or whether the group offered an apology. In hindsight, perhaps, Norway knew that the LTTE had no intention of returning to the negotiating table as long as President Kumaratunga remained at the helm and the negotiations were intended to evacuate Balasingham. Prabhakaran wouldn’t have forgiven Mrs. Kumaratunga for inflicting a humiliating battlefield defeat, in Dec 1995, on the LTTE. Mrs Kumaratunga had the courage to launch the largest ever combined security forces offensive, codenamed, Riviresa, in August, 1995, to being the entire peninsula under government control. The then SLFP leader shouldn’t be deprived of the credit for giving resolute political leadership that enable the army to evict the LTTE.
Although she couldn’t further exploit the situation, to the advantage of her government, due to a string of battlefield debacles on the Vanni front, consequent to the disastrous Operation Jayasikurui, meant to restore the Kandy-Jaffna overland Main Supply Route (MSR), the Jaffna peninsula remained under military control.
Regardless of Norway’s failure to arrange the transfer of Balasingham, from the Vanni, Oslo accepted an invitation from Mrs. Kumaratunga, in May, 1999, to mediate between the two warring parties. The President move coincided with her untiring efforts to secure support from major political parties to devolution proposals. In fact, President Kumaratunga picked Norway from among five countries proposed by Prabhakaran as possible mediators. Prabhakaran assassinated TULF great, Neelan Tiruchelvam, MP in Colombo, to discourage those supporting President Kumaratunga to make her devolution proposals. The government continued with its efforts in spite of Tiruchelvam’s assassination. He was quickly forgotten. On behalf of President Kumaratunga, both ministers, Lakshman Kadirgamar, and Prof G.L. Peiris, secretly met Norwegian officials, tasked with facilitating talks between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. The Norwegians also met President Kumaratunga in Colombo.
Amidst bloody battles, on the Vanni front, the tripartite negotiations continued. President Kumaratunga remained confident of reaching an understanding with Prabhakaran, though an influential section of the PA administration felt uneasy. The military top brass realized that the LTTE wouldn’t suspend large scale offensive operations regardless of the negotiations. The LTTE relentlessly attacked the army on the Vanni front. By Dec 1999, residential areas, in the Jaffna peninsula, had been under artillery and heavy mortar fire with the strategic Elephant Pass base targeted. The defenders at Elephant Pass struggled to save the base. By then, the LTTE had driven the army out of all areas it liberated since 1997, thereby gaining the upper hand on the northern front. The navy and the air forces lacked the resources to ensure required military supplies to the Jaffna peninsula. The army, based in Jaffna, didn’t have the wherewithal to meet the LTTE challenge.
The assassination of President Kumaratunga, three days before the Dec 21, 1999, presidential poll, was meant to achieve several objectives, both political and military. Prof. Peiris, who had been conducting secret negotiations with the Norwegians, on behalf of President Kumaratunga, was among those wounded in the suicide attack. One of the main objectives of the LTTE suicide mission was to ensure the victory of UNP candidate, Ranil Wickremesinghe, thereby bring an end to the Norwegian-led negotiations with her government. Prabhakaran obviously believed that he could enter into a fresh round of negotiations with the new executive, under the Norwegian auspices. Prabhakaran’s strategy, in Dec 1999, had been very much similar to that of Oct 1994 when the terrorist leader assassinated the then UNP presidential election candidate, Gamini Dissanayake, to enable Mrs Kumaratunga to win.
There couldn’t have been such manipulation, perpetrated by a terrorist organization, in any part of the world, except Sri Lanka. Idiotic politicians acted as if they enjoyed being manipulated by Prabhakaran always believing the LTTE favoured them over their political rivals. President Kumaratunga was no exception. She wouldn’t have realized Prabhakaran deception until an attempt was made on her life.
In an exclusive interview with the former BBC correspondent in Sri Lanka, George Arney, posted on Dec 30, 1999, president Kumaratunga revealed international mediation meant to broker a peace deal with the Tigers was in progress for over two years.
The first attempt was by the Commonwealth Secretary General Chief, Anyoku, followed by the Norwegian Government.
Both attempts proved fruitless, the BBC quoted President Kumaratunga, who had been in London to undergo medical treatment, as having said. Had she not revealed the Norwegian intervention here who would have done so. Minister Kadirgamar or Prof. Peiris wouldn’t have spoken unless they were authorized by President Kumaratunga, hence Prabhakaran’s treachery wouldn’t have come to public domain at that time.
In BBC Breakfast with Frost interview posted on Oct 28, 2001, President Kumaratunga said: "Well in my case it was the Tamil terrorists quite clearly, I was at the last presidential election rally in ‘99 December and it was a young female suicide bomber who blasted herself, obviously in the hope of doing me in, 26 people were killed, I escaped with serious injuries and lost the sight of one eye."
President Kumaratunga refrained from revealing the Norwegian role when she first addressed the nation, over Rupavahini, on the night of Dec 20, 1999. President Kumaratunga used her first appearance since the assassination bid to urge the Tamil speaking civilian population to throw their weight behind the PA. Addressing the nation from Temple Trees on the day before the presidential poll, President Kumaratunga requested the LTTE fighting cadre to quit the organization.
Prabhakaran never responded to Kumaratunga’s allegations. The well-funded Colombo based peace lobby, too, remained silent. Western powers continued to turn a blind eye to LTTE terrorism with the British government allowing the LTTE to run a major propaganda operation from London. The UK, based LTTE International Secretariat coordinated a major overseas campaign against Sri Lanka. The UK allowed the LTTE to issue media statements as regards military operations, conducted by terrorists in Sri Lanka, particularly the major assault on Elephant Pass.
Having survived the LTTE assassination bid, President Kumaratunga comfortably secured a second term. Wickremesinghe suffered a heavy defeat, though President Kumaratunga polled a lot less than at the Nov 9, 1994, presidential poll.
The PA candidate polled a staggering 4,709,205 votes (62.28%) whereas her rival, Vajira Srimathi Dissanayake, managed to obtain 2,715,285 votes. Srimathi never had a chance, though the UNP named her as the successor to her assassinated husband, Gamini Dissanayake. Mrs. Kumaratunga would never have received such a huge mandate if the LTTE interfered with the electoral process. At the time of the poll, Kumaratunga, in her capacity as the newly elected premier had been engaged in direct talks with the LTTE.
At the Dec 1999, presidential polls, the incumbent President obtained 4,312,157 (51.12%) whereas Ranil Wickremesinghe polled 3,602,748.
Had Prabhakaran succeeded in assassinating President Kumaratunga, the PA would have plunged into unprecedented crisis. The PA would have had time to inform Elections Commissioner of Kumaratunga’s replacement. Wickremesinghe would have emerged victorious with whoever fielded by the PA coming a distant second. It would be important to keep in mind that Kumaratunga’s replacement would never have been Mahinda Rajapaksa, the then Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Development Minister. The bottom line is that whoever succeed Kumaratunga, his fate would have been not different from that of Vajira Srimathi Dissanayake.
What would have happened if Wickremesinghe emerged victorious? Would he have continued with the Norwegian facilitation? What would have happened to the PA?
Let me recollect a brief statement the then UNP Batticaloa District MP, Seyed Ali Moulana, gave to the writer in response to a query a few days before the Dec 21, 1999, presidential poll. Moulana said that the people had received the blessings of the LTTE to exercise their franchise in support of Wickremesinghe. The MP attributed the LTTE’s decision to Kumaratunga’s failure to solve the national issue.
Moulana, who had been leading Wickremesinhe’s campaign in both the government and LTTE-held areas, said that Wickremesinghe could comfortably win the election with the support extended by the Tamil speaking people at the behest of the LTTE. Moulana declared that the Tamil speaking people, not only in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, but living in the South as well, wouldn’t take notice of the TULF efforts to discourage them from voting for either Kumaratunga or Wickremesinghe. The UNPer revealed that the LTTE allowed the UNP to hold political meetings, in areas under its control, though President Kumaratunga couldn’t campaign in the northern and eastern districts due to LTTE threats (LTTE gives the green light to vote in favour of Ranil-UNP Batticaloa District MP says-The Island, Dec 16, 1999).
Moulana emphasized that there was absolutely no basis for PA claims that Wickremesinghe had reached an agreement with the LTTE. However, Moulana didn’t mince his words when he declared that the Tamil speaking people would make a significant contribution to Wickremesinghe victory, though the then SLMC leader Ashraff had been working overtime to cause ethnic tensions in the region.
Moulana captured the limelight, in early 2004, after his friendship with Karuna Amman was revealed in the immediate aftermath of a damaging split in the organization. Moulana had to quit his parliamentary seat at the behest of Wickremesinghe, consequent to the LTTE accusing the MP of helping Karuna Amman to reach Colombo. Fearing an LTTE attempt on Moulana’s life, he was sent out of the country. Subsequently, he switched his allegiance to President Rajapaksa.
Due to negligence on the part of successive governments, the state never made an effort to examine Prabhakaran’s strategies though from time to time the military engaged in some costly operations. In the absence of an overall strategy, vis a vis political situation, as well as status of the military status, the LTTE always had the upper hand with the UNP as well as the SLFP-led coalitions, struggling to cope up with crisis on the ground. Their policies were intended to appease the LTTE at the expense of national security interests and political stability.
