SPECIAL REPORT : Part 351
By Shamindra Ferdinando
Retired Senior Deputy Inspector General (SDIG) Merril Gunaratne quoted the then Air Force Commander Air Marshal Walter Fernando as having said at a National Security Council (NSC) meeting, chaired by the then President JRJ, in the mid-80s: “It is not a laughing matter for me.” Fernando was responding to the late Lalith Athulathmudali, the then National Security Minister whose comment on an incident in Vavuniya that claimed the lives of several airmen dismayed the Air Marshal. Gunaratne had been there as the top intelligence representative.
Fernando served as the Commander of the Air Force from May 1, 1986, to July 1, 1990. Fernando retired a few weeks after the eruption of Eelam War II. It would be pertinent to mention his only son Squadron Leader A.P.W. Fernando, was among those killed when the LTTE brought down the Chinese-built Y8 flying over the Elephant Pass area, on July 5, 1992.
The revealing anecdote was one among many such disclosures in Gunaratne’s latest book ‘Perils of a Profession’ launched this month. Gunaratne asserted that the Air Force Commander resented the Minister’s comment that apparently belittled the service.
The author of two previous books ‘Dilemma of an Island ‘ and ‘Cop in the Cross Fire,’ released in 2001 and 2011, respectively, the outspoken retired top cop couldn’t have launched his third at a better time than when the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (PcoI), into the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage, is on the verge of concluding its high profile inquiry. Gunaratne certainly didn’t mince his words when he appeared before the PCoI last year.
The question is whether perhaps the worst ever intelligence failure facilitated the coordinated suicide attacks on six targets on the morning of April 21, 2019? Or could it have been thwarted if the Attorney General’s Department acted swiftly, and decisively, when the Terrorist Investigation Division (TID) brought the growing threat, posed by the National Thowheed Jamaat (NTJ) leader Zahran Hashim, to its notice, in July 2017?
Kudos from retired Maj. Gen.
In his latest work, Gunaratne, whose illustrious career spanning 35 years included a significant period with the premier intelligence service, dealt with precision the deterioration of the once proud police service. In spite of ‘Perils of a Profession’ being rather short, the revelations, therein, are certainly explosive. There hadn’t been such disclosure in the past, by any other retired law enforcement officer.
Gunaratne’s writing skills received the acclaim of retired Maj. Gen. Lalin Fernando, an admirable writer himself. In a brief commendation of Gunaratne’s third book, Fernando asserted: “No gazetted police officer has shown his ability to write as lucidly on real concerns of the police, from professional competence to welfare of the beat constable.”
Having joined the police, in July 1965, Gunaratne served the department during a turbulent time, before leaving the service, as a Senior DIG. Sri Lanka brought the war to a successful conclusion nine years after the author’s retirement, in 2000.
‘Perils of a Profession’ dealt aggressively with the deterioration of the service, over the years, resulting in an unprecedented crisis. The writer, without hesitation, blamed the politicians and the police for the degeneration of the department to such a pathetic state that today the once proud Police Narcotics Bureau (PNB) is under investigation for dealing in heroin.
Retired Rear Admiral Sarath Weerasekera, now in charge of the police, in his capacity as the Public Security Minister, should peruse ‘Perils of a Profession’ without further delay. There hadn’t been a previous instance of the police coming under a retired military officer, though the last government made a desperate bid to secure the then President Maithripala Sirisena’s consent to Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka as Law and Order Minister. The senior partner of the yahapalana administration wanted Fonseka to replace Sagala Ratnayake, one of the beleaguered UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe’s close associates. President Gotabaya Rajapaksa not only brought the police under a retired Rear Admiral, he named retired Gen. Jagath Alwis, his first choice as the Chief of National Intelligence (CNI), as the new Secretary, Ministry of Public Order.
Against that background, another disclosure made by Gunaratne, regarding certain law enforcement officers thwarting Minister Ratnayake’s efforts at reforming the police, should be examined. That particular anecdote revealed how serving officers resented Ratnayake’s bid to secure the retired intelligence officer’s expertise. Perhaps Ratnayake hadn’t been aware of Wickremesinghe’s resentment towards Gunaratne whose controversial assessments on matters of national importance exasperated him.
‘Cop in the Cross Fire’ revealed how Wickremesinghe’s own views on national security matters clashed with those of Gunaratne during the latter’s tenure as an ‘advisor’ – 2002-2004. Gunaratne’s bold assessment, in his capacity as an ‘advisor’ on the rapid increase in the fighting cadre of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), after the signing of the highly controversial Ceasefire Agreement (CFA), finalized in Feb 2002, without the knowledge of President Kumaratunga, and much of his own government, quite angered the then Premier Wickremesinghe.
Athulathmudali’s intervention
Gunaratne questioned security/intelligence strategies that had been in place, or were in the process of development when the NTJ struck in April 2019, in spite of receiving specific information from neighbouring India. The writer dealt expertly with the weakening of the police, including the premier intelligence apparatus over the years under whatever name it was called. In Chapter 7, titled ‘Moving into intelligence from normal police work,’ Gunaratne disclosed how Athulathmudali re-named what was then called Intelligence Services Division (ISD). Whatever, the country’s premier intelligence network was called, a senior policeman had been always at its helm.
In Gunaratne’s assessment, the Special Branch (SB) of the CID and the Military Intelligence (MI) played a relatively lower role when compared with that of the premier apparatus, called the State Intelligence Service (SIS), at the time the NTJ struck. That resulted in the SIS being placed under Maj. Gen. Suresh Sally, formerly of the MI. Interestingly, the then Premier Wickermesinghe found fault with the then Brigadier Sally for the writer’s reportage of the recovery of explosives in the north and the arrest of some suspects in the early 2016. The premier intelligence service had always been under a senior police officer. At the time the NTJ struck, SDIG Nilantha Jayawardena had been at the helm of the SIS. The proceedings undertaken by the Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) and the on-going PCoI revealed the existence of a special relationship between the then President Maithripala Sirisena and the SIS Chief.
Did the close association between the Commander-in-Chief and his spy chief, too, contribute to the overall deterioration of the security setup? The PSC, in its report tabled in Parliament on Oct 23 found fault with Jayawardena for the pathetic handling of the available Indian intelligence until the NTJ terrorists went on the rampage.
Gunaratne blamed an appointment of a novice as the head of the premier intelligence service, after the 1994 presidential election, for the rapid deterioration of the apparatus. Although, the author refrained from naming the officer, the recipient of the coveted post of Director, SIS, was the late retired Senior Superintendent of Police T.V. Sumanasekera.
Nilantha Jayawardena, who is now literally on the mat for the Easter Sunday intelligence failure, too, had served the SIS even then. Gunaratne’s reference to SIS having wiretapping apparatus is certainly not necessary as the premier intelligence outfit couldn’t perform its legitimate duties without that particular capacity.
The deterioration of politics can be certainly compared with the current political setup. Having read, utterly contemptuous account of the top political leadership and members of the Parliament, the police and the Parliament seemed to be in the same predicament.
UNP faulted
According to Gunaratne, the rot had set in the wake of the UNP landslide, in 1977. The author compared his experience as SSP, Kelaniya and SSP Kurunegala during the period 1977-1978 and how some of those who were represented in parliament violated the laws of the land, misused police and political interference made at the highest levels. Among those miscreants who had been named by the retired cop was the late Minister Cyril Mathew. Gunaratne explained how the UNP cleverly used and abused the police in its diabolical project. An influential section of the police, for obvious reasons, cooperated with the then political leadership much to the dismay of those who struggled to thwart constant and belligerent political interference. Gunaratne earned the wrath of some UNP lawmakers for refusing to cooperate with the ruling party’s strategy. Some took up Gunaratne’s conduct with no less a person than JRJ and in some instances with Premier Ranasinghe Premadasa.
According to Gunaratne, the rot had set in the wake of the UNP landslide, in 1977. The author compared his experience as SSP, Kelaniya and SSP Kurunegala during the period 1977-1978 and how some of those who were represented in parliament violated the laws of the land, misused police and political interference made at the highest levels. Among those miscreants who had been named by the retired cop was the late Minister Cyril Mathew. Gunaratne explained how the UNP cleverly used and abused the police in its diabolical project. An influential section of the police, for obvious reasons, cooperated with the then political leadership much to the dismay of those who struggled to thwart constant and belligerent political interference. Gunaratne earned the wrath of some UNP lawmakers for refusing to cooperate with the ruling party’s strategy. Some took up Gunaratne’s conduct with no less a person than JRJ and in some instances with Premier Ranasinghe Premadasa.With the UNP enjoying an unprecedented 5/6 parliamentary power, the dictatorial UNP administration expected the police to fall in line. They largely did. The situation deteriorated further in the wake of the 1982, more or less, rigged referendum, that allowed the UNP to retain a monstrous overwhelming 2/3 majority, till 1988.
The late Dingiri Banda Wijetunga’s short tenure as the President during the period 1993-1994 in the wake of Ranasinghe Premadasa’s May Day 1993 assassination, never really received much public attention. Wijetunga oversaw the party in the run-up to parliamentary and presidential polls in August and November, 1994, respectively. Wijetunga thwarted Wickremesinghe by facilitating the return of rebel Gamini Dissanayake back to the party. The author refrained from discussing Wijetunga’s political moves though he dealt harshly with the President’s destructive policy as regards the police. Gunaratne explained how the successful Commandant of the elite Special Task Force (STF), the late Lionel Karunasena, failed to prevent Wijetunga’s interference. The author examined Karunasena’s failure against the backdrop of his success in convincing JRJ and Premadasa not to interfere with the elite unit.
Gunaratne’s allegation, with regard to the shortsighted increase of the DIG cadre, from 11 to 30, overnight, and the number of Senior DIGs, from three to five, contributed to the overall deterioration of law enforcement, should be thoroughly examined. The accusation that Wijetunga lacked even the basic understanding of law enforcement thereby caused chaos in the overall administrative setup, by constant interference, should prompt a reappraisal of the whole department. Successive governments played politics with the police to varying degrees. After the change of governments, those who even vacated posts, or were moved out on disciplinary grounds, manipulated the utterly corrupt system to return to the service and secure backdated promotions. Backdoor promotions were routine and so widespread, higher ranks could be secured outside, what Gunaratne called, eligibility criteria.
A righteous IGP
‘Perils of a Profession’ explained how successive governments, since the 1977 general election, contributed to the ruination of the police department. Backdoor promotions had been a major cause of concern. Having dealt how he personally took up an alleged move to overtake him in the seniority line to pave the way for another, with President Premadasa, at an STF circuit bungalow, Gunaratne paid a glowing tribute to Cyril Herath, as the only IGP who had the strength to quit the service than play politics.
Gunaratne claimed he was present when Herath turned down an offer of an ambassadorial post from the then Defence Secretary Gen. Sepala Attygalle in the wake of the former’s decision to resign.
Gunaratne has quoted Herath as having told Attygalle: “Sir, I have not come to you with my resignation letter to canvas for an ambassadorial post.”
During PSC and PCoI proceedings, the alleged offer made by President Sirisena to the disgraced IGP Pujith Jayasundera to accept the responsibility for the Easter Sunday carnage in return for a diplomatic posting, transpired. Obviously, Jayasundera declined the treacherous offer. The previous Rajapaksa administration named Mahinda Balasuriya, Sri Lanka’s Ambassador to Brazil, after he accepted responsibility for the police firing at a group of protesting Katunayake Free Trade Zone (FRZ) workers.
There certainly cannot be any other instance of a senior retired police officer coming out so strongly against the system at his own expense. Have you ever heard of any retired public servant objecting to a scheme that certainly benefited him at the taxpayers’ expense? Gunaratne discussed the controversial move to assign police personnel to retired IGPs and SDIGs for what the Association of Police Chiefs (APC) described as an effort to ‘maintain their reputation and dignity.’ The APC proposal that had been approved by the National Police Commission (NPC) on April 23, 2020, was the brainchild of retired SDIG Gamini Navaratne. The whole exercise was meant to provide a controversial facility on the basis that senior retired military officers enjoyed such a privilege.
Gunaratne’s thought-provoking opinions on law enforcement operations should be seriously examined. If the Public Security Ministry is genuinely interested in reforms, perhaps the Minister and Secretary can seek a Presidential Commission to make recommendations. Actually, Gunaratne has made some excellent proposals, first to arrest the decline and then improve the service. The police service has deteriorated to such an extent, it would be a herculean task to restore the standards to the pre-1977 period.
In fact, the blatant role the Office of the President had played, since the introduction of the JRJ Constitution in the ruination of the once public friendly service, shouldn’t be swept under the carpet. The deterioration of the police should be examined, taking into consideration extremely serious lapses on the part of the Attorney General’s Department in the run up to the 2019 Easter Sunday attacks. Although, Gunaratne never referred to the AG’s Department lapses that may have given the NTJ the time and the space to mount near simultaneous suicide attacks on six unprotected targets.
A shocking injustice
‘Perils of a Profession’ is the story of incredulity. Having suffered in the hands of the UNP as a result of him being dubbed an SLFPer, Gunaratne, in the wake of Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s victory in 1994, was targeted over his alleged role in the Batalanda torture chamber. In spite of Gunaratne being cleared by way of an investigation carried out by the police at the behest of the Presidential Commission that probed Batalanda, the top cop was placed on compulsory leave. Gunaratne speculated whether the then government sent him on compulsory leave to pave the way for Lucky Kodituwakku to succeed retiring IGP Rajaguru. Gunaratne questioned how Kodituwakku, having resigned, following a rather short career, returned in the wake of the People’s Alliance (PA) victory to take the top post.
Gunaratne had no qualms in discussing perks and privileges enjoyed by the senior officers. The top layer seems to be having a good time. With a section of the department given special status, the others appear to be going ahead with their own projects. Last year’s exposure of the Police Narcotics Bureau (PNB) dealing in heroin is a grim reminder of the appalling state of affairs. The releasing of Easter Sunday terror suspect, Riyaj Bathiudeen, held by the CID in late Oct 2020, raised many an eyebrow. Let us hope the ‘Perils of a Profession’ really jolts the Public Security Ministry.
However, some may not buy Gunaratne’s narration. Critics may find fault with Gunaratne simply because some of the people he is now freely writing about are no longer alive. The author cannot deny the fact that he enjoyed the ride as the head of intelligence, under the UNP, for quite a long period, at a time the NIB was dubbed No Information Bureau.
The police top brass cannot absolve themselves of their failure to prevent the ‘83 riots. Sri Lanka paid a very heavy price for that dastardly violence. Were the police taking orders from outside interests to cause a calamity here? The same thing happened in the run up to the Easter Sunday carnage and thereafter when Sinhala mobs went after ordinary Muslims. Both the police and the Army simply did not act even when mobs came in their hundreds on motorcycles from outside to places like Minuwangoda. Did the cops fire a single shot towards those rampaging mobs? Even our then big talking Army Commander Mahesh Senanayake did nothing.
Police had been always bumming those in power and this was a practice coming down from the colonial period. They were no angels prior to ‘77.
Whatever the shortcomings of President Wijetunga, he should receive the kudos for refusing to fix the election against Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, in 1994. Normally the UNP was famous for stealing elections up to then.
