SPECIAL REPORT : Part 394
Ranil declares US energy deal illegal
By Shamindra Ferdinando
UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe, over the last weekend, declared the much disputed Framework Agreement (FA) with the US Company New Fortress Energy illegal.
National List MP Wickremesinghe, who had served as the Prime Minister on several occasions emphasised: “any agreement that violated the country’s laws is illegal. This agreement has violated the laws of the country. Therefore, it is illegal.
Raising a privilege issue in Parliament the day after Basil Rajapaksa, in his capacity as the Finance Minister, delivered the Budget for 2022, Wickremesinghe explained that the FA violated the Provisions of the Parliament (Powers and Privileges) Act and its Standing Orders.
The UNP Leader urged Speaker Mahinda Yapa Abeywardena to declare that the FA had violated the powers, privileges and immunity of Parliament.
Lawmaker Wickremesinghe’s declaration should be examined taking into consideration his conduct as the Premier during the 2001-2004 and 2015-2019 periods.
Did Wickremesinghe, in his capacity as the Premier, follow the advice he gave the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) in respect of the FA with the company listed in the NASDAQ? Did Wickremesinghe consult Parliament or the Cabinet of Ministers before finalising contentious agreements, like the CFA that he signed with the LTTE, in total secrecy, or the treacherous motion moved against one’s own country in Geneva? Wickremesinghe, during his premiership never bothered, to consult Parliament or discuss the issues at hand with relevant stakeholders.
Perhaps, Wickremesinghe felt that his party can exploit the growing crisis over the FA with the US enterprise. Having being reduced to just one National List slot in the Parliament, following the 2020 parliamentary election, the beleaguered UNP leader will simply do anything to gain some political mileage. Wickremesinghe’s stand on this matter should be examined against the backdrop of a section of the government, led by three Cabinet Ministers, namely Vasudeva Nanayakkara, Wimal Weerawansa and Udaya Gammanpila, declaring the deal inimical to the country.
Let me discuss the Norway, arranged Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on Feb 21, 2002. The then Premier disregarded Parliament. The UNP leader didn’t bother to properly consult the armed forces top brass. Their concerns weren’t heeded. Instead, Norway prepared the CFA, taking into consideration the LTTE’s concerns. The one-sided agreement facilitated the LTTE’s despicable project. The LTTE swiftly moved into armed forces held areas, where the group violated the CFA at will. In fact, the CFA facilitated the despicable terror project.
Wickremesinghe gave the go ahead for the 99-year-lease on the strategic Hambantota harbour in 2017 under controversial circumstances. Did Wickremesinghe consult Parliament before co-sponsoring an accountability resolution at the Geneva-based United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) or entering into ‘Comprehensive Partnership’ agreement with Japan, both in Oct 2015?
Former ministers, Mahinda Samarasinghe (now Sri Lanka’s Ambassador in Washington), Dayasiri Jayasekera (State Minister) and Sarath Fonseka (MP) in response to queries raised by the writer acknowledged that the Cabinet never formally approved co-sponsorship of the Geneva resolution. Wickremesinghe never contradicted what his ministers’ said.
It would be pertinent to mention that on the eve of the CFA, the Navy and the Sea Tigers fought two battles off Mullaithivu. The Sea Tigers triggered the battle by engaging two Fast Attack Craft (FACs) off Chalai. The Navy had to call in Katunayake-based jets in support of the units under attack off the northern coast. The UNP never considered the real threat posed by the LTTE. In fact, the top leadership slept as the LTTE flexed its muscles. The rapid build-up of firepower, within range of the strategic Trincomalee harbour, threatened to overwhelm the armed forces. The LTTE went to the extent of assassinating the then Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar on the night of August 12, 2005 at his heavily fortified Bullers Lane residence.
UNP strategy
The UNP never took the then President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga into confidence. She was never properly briefed nor her consent obtained before Wickremesinghe signed the CFA. On behalf of the LTTE, the late Velupillai Prabhakaran signed the document prepared in Oslo. Prof. G.L. Peiris, the then top minister in Wickremesinghe’s administration, declared President Kumaratunga skipped Cabinet on two consecutive sittings just before the signing of the CFA therefore she couldn’t receive briefing as regards the provisions of the CFA. Wickremesinghe secured Cabinet approval on Feb. 20, 2002. However, Presidential Spokesman the late Janadasa Peiris, declared the President didn’t attend the Cabinet meet on Feb 20 as she was told that nothing significant was going to take place (Kept away ‘as nothing important was to be discussed’-The Island, March 1, 2002).
Prof. Peiris led the government peace negotiating team, whereas the late Anton Balasingham, a British national of Sri Lankan origin, managed the LTTE team. The talks collapsed in April 2003 after six rounds, at overseas venues, as the LTTE abruptly quit the negotiating table as part of its overall strategy as it launched an unprecedented initiative to build up a formidable political base.
In line with that strategy, a coalition of Tamil political parties, called Tamil National Alliance (TNA) recognised the LTTE as the sole representative of the Tamil speaking people. The TNA remained committed to the LTTE’s separatist project until the very end.
Now that MP Wickremesinghe has declared that the New Fortress Energy deal violated the Provisions of the Parliament (Powers and Privileges) Act and its Standing Orders, wouldn’t it be interesting to examine how Wickremesinghe finalised the CFA.
Dr. John Gooneratne, who had been with the government Peace Secretariat, from its inception in January 2002 to May 2006, explained serious shortcomings in the CFA over a year after the conclusion of the conflict in May 2009. Appearing before the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) on Sept. 15, 2010, Dr. Gooneratne revealed that four key matters, proposed by the government, weren’t included in the CFA. (A) There had been no reference to the requirement to use the CFA to pave the way for talks to find a negotiated settlement. (B) Specific reference to the prohibition of unlawful importation of arms, ammunition and equipment was not included. (C) Although the LTTE was allowed to engage in ‘political work’ in government controlled areas, other political parties weren’t given access to areas under the LTTE control (D) Forcible conscription of personnel to the LTTE’s fighting cadre was also not added to the list of prohibited activities.
Dr. Gooneratne, a veteran career diplomat, faulted the then UNP government as well as the Norwegians for being hasty in their approach. Dr. Gooneratne said: “What lessons can we learn from this experience? Firstly, negotiating on such security and military matters should have been a more inclusive format than by just the party in power. Secondly, in negotiating documents such as the CFA, thoroughness should be the standard, and not just the speed.”
One-time Norwegian peace envoy to the Sri Lankan peace process, Erik Solheim claimed that he drafted the CFA, signed by Wickremesinghe and Prabhakaran. Solheim said so in an interview with Dr. Kumar Rupesinghe, one of the beneficiaries of the Norwegian project (Negotiating Peace in Sri Lanka: Efforts, Failures and Lessons – Volume II edited by Dr. Rupesinghe – first published in February 2006).
Asked by Dr. Rupesinghe to explain the circumstances under which the CFA came into being, Solheim said that having had extensive discussions with LTTE theoretician, Anton Balasingham as well as ministers, G. L. Peiris (SLPP Chairman and Foreign Minister) and Milinda Moragoda (Sri Lanka’s High Commissioner in New Delhi), he drafted a new proposal. That process had taken about two months. Prof. Peiris nor former Minister Moragoda had ever questioned Solheim’s assertions.
Need for proper negotiating mechanism
During the yahapalana administration (2015-2019) the US negotiated ACSA (Access and Cross Servicing Agreement), SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement) and MCC (Millennium Challenge Corporation) Compact with Sri Lanka. Did Wickremesinghe and then President Maithripala Sirisena consult Parliament, or the Cabinet of Ministers, regarding the three agreements?
President Sirisena, in his capacity as the Defence Minister authorised the ACSA. The President had the tacit support of the UNP. The government never disclosed the finalisation of the ACSA until the writer raised the issue with President Sirisena at a media briefing held at the President’s House. Having repeatedly vowed not to allow the UNP to enter into agreements with the US, at the expense of the country’s national security, President Sirisena had no option but to admit his role in authorising ACSA.
The SLFP leader, now a member of the SLPP parliamentary group, quietly allowed the finalisation of the ACSA in early August 2017. The ACSA, first signed by the then Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, during Mahinda Rajapakas’s first tenure as the President, received Sirisena’s approval, though he subsequently vowed any agreement, inimical to Sri Lanka, wouldn’t be allowed as long as he enjoyed executive powers. This declaration was made at a meeting with editors of national newspapers and senior representatives of both the print and electronic media. When the writer sought a clarification regarding the ACSA, Sirisena acknowledged the finalisation of the agreement, in the first week of August 2017. The UNP never found fault with Sirisena for giving the go ahead for the ACSA finalisation. As far as the yahapalana policy, vis-à-vis the US, both Sirisena and Wickremesinghe took one stand though sometimes, Sirisena tried to distance himself from Wickremesinghe’s Geneva policy.
When Sri Lanka entered into ACSA way back in 2007, the first Rajapaksa administration didn’t bother to consult the government parliamentary group or Parliament.
Talks on SOFA were suspended later. But the possibility of the US taking it up can never be ruled out whereas Sri Lanka abandoned the MCC project on the recommendations made by the Gunaruwan Committee.
Lanka-Singapore trade agreement
Controversy surrounds the circumstances in which the yahapalana administration entered into the Sri Lanka – Singapore Free Trade Agreement (SLSFTA) on Jan. 23 2018. The agreement was brought into operation with effect from 1 May 2018. Sirisena who had been present at the signing of the agreement in Colombo, declared in Dec of the same year that it was rushed without proper consent of stakeholders. Sirisena said so after receiving a report prepared by retired economics Professor W.D. Lakshman, who studied the agreement. The UNP and the SLFP should be ashamed of the way they handled trade negotiations with Singapore where disgraced Central Bank Governor Arjuna Mahendran secured refuge in early 2018. Professor Lakshman succeeded Mahendran’s successor Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswamy soon after the 2019 presidential poll. Did the yahapalana leaders consult cabinet of ministers or Parliament as regards SLSFTA?
UNP MP Wickremesinghe owes the country an explanation as to how SLSFTA came into being. Did MP Wickremesinghe follow the advice he recently gave the SLPP in respect of the New Fortress Energy deal?
Successive governments have been utterly irresponsible in finalising key agreements with foreign governments. There cannot be a better example than the deal on the Hambantota port. One-time Ports and Shipping Minister Arjuna Ranatunga recently discussed the failure on the part of the country to adopt a common stand in matters of national importance. Ranatunga said so when the writer sought his opinion on the controversy over the Colombo Port City Economic Commission Bill enacted in last Oct and the 99-year leasing of the Hambantota port to the Chinese.
Ranatunga compared the handing over of the Hambantota port to China, in July 2017, with the Colombo Port City project to be managed in terms of the Colombo Port City Economic Commission Act.
The former lawmaker said that he gave up the Ports and Shipping Ministry as he didn’t want to endorse the disputed agreement under any circumstances.
Ranatunga contested the Gampaha district, on the UNP ticket, at the last general election, but couldn’t win like all other party candidates, barring for a solitary National List seat, which Wickremesinghe grabbed though it should have rightfully gone to John Amaratunga, who was on top of the party’s National List or at least to one of those National List nominees.
Ranatunga pointed out that the Port City Project, too, had been under the purview of the ports and shipping ministry. But the yahapalana administration, following consultations with him, brought the Port City project under the then Megapolis Minister Patali Champika Ranawaka’s purview.
Ranatunga was replaced as Ports and Shipping Minister by SLFP Vice President and Kalutara District MP Mahinda Samarasinghe.
The former World Cup winning national cricket captain emphasised that he gave up the ministry after the yahapalana government rejected a proposal prepared in consultation with the ministry and the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA). It was discarded by those bent on pursuing an agenda inimical to Sri Lanka, he charged.
The then SLFPer Samarasinghe finalised the agreement on July 29, 2017.
Former minister Ranatunga said that he was quite surprised by the rejection of his proposal as he presented a sensible solution which addressed concerns of both countries. Ranatunga said that he didn’t want to remain as the Ports and Shipping Minister at any cost.
Acknowledging some support provided by the then Cabinet colleague Dr. Wijeyadasa Rajapakse PC, as he struggled to thwart a plan inimical to the country, Ranatunga claimed that the Joint Opposition (SLPP now) backed the deal on the Hambantota port. Ranatunga pointed out that some tend to conveniently forget both the Hambantota and Port City projects were initiated during the previous Rajapaksa administration.
The Hambantota port project was initiated in 2007 at the height of the war, whereas the Port City got underway in late 2014.
Appreciating the investments made by China in Sri Lanka, over a period of time, Ranatunga stressed that the country couldn’t afford to enter into agreements detrimental to its interests. The former minister urged lawmakers, both opposed to the project as well as those backing, it to be cautious in their approach.
Noting that the Bar Association of Sri Lanka (BASL) had been among those who petitioned the Supreme Court against the Colombo Port City Economic Commission Bill, Ranatunga said that the handling of the Hambantota port agreement revealed how the country was being manipulated. “In spite of the Hambantota port coming under the purview of the Ports and Shipping Ministry, it didn’t really have a say. That is the undeniable truth,” Ranatunga said.
The former MP questioned the rationale in reclaiming land adjacent to the Galle Face Green at such a huge cost as the project could have been set up in some other suitable location.
Ranatunga said that he was not aware of the current status of the cases filed against the Hambantota port. Among those who filed cases was the then MP Vavudeva Nanayakkara. However, none of the 19 petitioners who moved the Supreme Court against the Colombo Port City Economic Commission Bill, including BASL, conveniently failed to figure in the legal challenge thrown against the Hambantota port deal.
Ranatunga said due to the failure on the part of Parliament to take remedial measures the country seemed to be repeating mistakes. The former minister regretted the overall failure to address contentious issues, such as major foreign investment which might threaten the country’s stability. The government and the main Opposition should bear the responsibility for both Hambantota and Port City projects as they proceeded with both.
