SPECIAL REPORT : Part 407
By Shamindra Ferdinando
A section of the international media pounced on Finance Minister Basil Rajapaksa’s declaration that Sri Lanka procured weapons from North Korea during the Eelam War IV (2006-2009). Sri Lanka’s ‘Independence Day’ parade, too, drew public attention after The Tamil Guardian, UK reported how a military float, carrying the war wounded, was decorated with a photograph of LTTE cadres. The Tamil Guardian revelation caused quite a controversy. The inclusion of that particular picture is nothing but a slip-up.
The war-winning Army shouldn’t be overly concerned over some sections of the media, both here and abroad, and other interested parties seeking to exploit a simple mistake.
Let us not give an opportunity to those who cannot stomach Sri Lanka’s triumph over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to gloat over a blunder.
The image in question is among a set of photographs released by the LTTE in early Sept. 2008 to the media. The pictures captured by an LTTE photographer on Sept 2, 2008 were of fighting at Vannearikku’lam, west of Kilinochchi. The Army suffered heavy losses in the Vannearikku’lam battle but the LTTE couldn’t prevent the fall of the village and the subsequent collapse of their much larger Nachchikudah defences.
The Tamil Guardian
, in Feb 05, 2022 revealed the mistake made by the Army in a report headlined ‘Saluting the LTTE? Sri Lankan military features LTTE commandos in Independence Day parade.’
Whoever had been tasked to choose the required photographs has been quite clearly careless as the combatant, carrying a Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) launcher, wore a short sleeved shirt.
What really astonished the writer is in spite of the military float being there for several days, in the run-up to the Independence Day parade, no one recognised the pic of two LTTE’ers – the lead person wearing slippers carrying a RPG launcher, probably of Chinese origin, and the other person armed with a sniper weapon.
The Tamil Guardian
headline described the two men as LTTE commandos though the TamilNet report, headlined ‘Tigers locate 29 SLA bodies, 75 SLA killed, 100 wounded in Vanni’, posted online on Sept. 2, 2008, did not make any reference to LTTE commandos. There had been three other TamilNet reports, headlined ‘Fighting intensifies at Vannearikku’lam (Sept. 2, 2008), ‘LTTE confronts, recovers seven bodies (Sept. 2, 2008) and ‘Tigers seize a large number of SLA in Vanni clashes’ (Sept. 3, 2008). Those reports, too, didn’t make any reference to LTTE commandos. The reportage of the action along Nachchikudah-Vannearikku’lam-Akkarayan kulam line indicated that the LTTE believed the Army could have been overwhelmed.
headline described the two men as LTTE commandos though the TamilNet report, headlined ‘Tigers locate 29 SLA bodies, 75 SLA killed, 100 wounded in Vanni’, posted online on Sept. 2, 2008, did not make any reference to LTTE commandos. There had been three other TamilNet reports, headlined ‘Fighting intensifies at Vannearikku’lam (Sept. 2, 2008), ‘LTTE confronts, recovers seven bodies (Sept. 2, 2008) and ‘Tigers seize a large number of SLA in Vanni clashes’ (Sept. 3, 2008). Those reports, too, didn’t make any reference to LTTE commandos. The reportage of the action along Nachchikudah-Vannearikku’lam-Akkarayan kulam line indicated that the LTTE believed the Army could have been overwhelmed.In spite of fierce resistance, the LTTE couldn’t hold Vannearikku’lam. The collapse of LTTE defences at Vannearikku’lam and then Nachchikudah escalated overall deterioration of their conventional fighting capability on the Vanni west region. Now that The Tamil Guardian staff had earned the appreciation of the like-minded persons for highlighting the LTTE’s success at some of the confrontations at Vannearikku’lam, it would be pertinent to discuss the operations undertaken by the 58.2 Brigade to capture the village on Oct 20th, 2008. The 58.1 Brigade brought Nachchikudah under its control on Oct. 29, 2008. The two Brigades were assigned to the 58 Division.
Present Army Commander General Shavendra Silva, commanded the 58 Division (initially known as Task Force 1). The celebrated Division, having launched operations in Sept. 2007 under the command of the then Brigadier Chagi Gallage, played a significant role in the overall campaign, both west and east of the Jaffna-Kandy A9 road until the war was brought to a successful end. The Division engaged in some of the fiercest fighting for Vannearikku’lam and Nachchikudah. (Gallage was replaced by Shavendra Silva soon after the capturing of Silavathurai. The change took place after Gallage suffered a heart attack)
Battle for Vannearikku’lam
The LTTE had strong defences that included an earth bund that extended from Nachchikudah on the north-west coast to Akkarayan kulam via Vannearikku’lam. The LTTE defences comprised dense minefields and booby traps. Constructed in a zig zag line, the earth bund posed a huge challenge as those attacking the enemy positions were constant target of the artillery and mortars. The 58.2 troops fought several hundred defenders for several weeks. In spite of the 58.2 assigned the task, the 58.1 and 58.2 Brigades, too, were brought in to neutralise enemy positions. Still, the three Brigades couldn’t evict the defenders, who fought back, fiercely. In fact, they made several unsuccessful attempts to overrun the LTTE line.
Finally, the 9th battalion of the Gemunu Watch (9GW) made the breakthrough. After fierce confrontations, the 9 GW captured about 300 meters, west of Vannearikku’lam. During a period of five days, the LTTE made 18 abortive attempts, backed by heavy artillery and mortar fire, to overrun the positions held by 9 GW. Then, the troops of the 10 battalion of the Gajaba Regiment (10 GR) fought their way into the area west of the 300 meters seized by 9 GW and stabilised the newly captured area. The 10 GR achieved success five days after the breakthrough made by the 9 GW.
Demoralised defenders pulled back as troops of 11 SLLI (11 battalion of Sri Lanka Light Infantry), 6 GW and 12 GW overran the earth bund east of the Vannearikku’lam. For the first time during the Vanni offensive, the LTTE carried out gas attacks on 12 GW troops though it could not prevent the fall of Vannearikku’lam. Troops of 6 GW, 9 GW and 12 GW finally brought Vannearikku’lam under government control.
Why on earth did the Army peruse the social media for pictures from the conflict zone? Had the Army checked their own albums and video footage, they could have found plenty of action pictures from different theatres and major operations conducted over the years. Pictures of ‘Operation Liberation,’ ‘Riviresa’ Jayasikurui, ‘Balavegaya’et al could have been included. Instead, pictures were selected from the internet, obviously. There is no doubt in previous years, too, pictures were selected that way. Perhaps, one or two pictures of LTTE cadres had been displayed in previous years, too.
It would be pertinent, at least, to briefly discuss the battle for Nachchikudah that brought offensive action, directed at the earth bund, extending from the northwest coastal town to Akkarayan kulam via Vannearikku’lam, to a successful conclusion. Actually, the collapse of the LTTE defence line by the last week of Oct 2008 opened the remaining Vanni west region to the advancing Army. The 58.1 Brigade had been engaged in action for over two months against LTTE positions at Nachchikudah before entering the village on Oct 29, 2008. The 11 SLLI (11battalion, SLLI) played a crucial role in the operation. The 11 SLLI successfully attacked the earth bund from the direction of Mulankavil, in spite of heavy artillery, mortar, 12.7 mm and General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG).
LTTE loses Vanni west
The Vanni campaign reached a crucial point on June 30, 2008 (four months before the total collapsing of the Nachchikudah-Akkarayan kulam defence line via Vannearikku’lam) when the 58 Division linked up with the 57 Division southwest of Periyamadu. That created the largest ever battlefront on the western flank in the entire Eelam war. Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka tasked Maj. Gen. Jagath Dias’s 57 Division to liberate Kilinochchi whereas the 58 Division was to sweep the Vanni west. Having linked up, the 57 Division pursued its objective. The 58 Division advanced towards the northwestern coast. After a series of fierce confrontations, troops captured the strategically located Sea Tiger base at Vidathalthivu on July 16.
The fall of Vidathalthivu and Nachchikudah in mid-July and late Oct, 2008, respectively set the stage for the 58 Division to rapidly advance towards the Jaffna lagoon. The 57 and 58 Divisions launched in early March 2007 and early Sept 2007, respectively began making territorial gains in April 2008.
Task Force I (58 Division)
* Adampan on May 9
* Mullikkandal, Minnaniranchan and Marattikannaddi situated north of Adampan on June 24.
* Mannar ‘Rice Bowl’, an area extending over 120 square kilometres on June 29 thereby bringing Alankulama, Andankulama, Alakaddiveli, Parappakandal, Parappukadatan, Papamoddai, Odupallam, Neduvarampu, Kannaputtukulama and Vannakulama.
* On June 30 TF I links up with 57 Division southwest of Periyamadu creating the largest ever battlefront on the western flank in the entire Eelam war.
* Vidathalthivu on the northwestern coast on July 16
* Illuppaikkadavai on July 20.
* Vellankulam on August 2.
* Mulankavil and Pallavarayankaddu on August 12.
* Maniyankulama on October 16.
* Vannerikkulam on October 20.
* Nochchimodai on October 28
* Jeyapuram on October 29.
* Nachchikuda on October 29
* Kiranchi on November 10
* Devil’s Point and Vallaipadu on November 13
* Pooneryn regained on November 15
* Paranthan regained on January 1 and 2, 2009 (almost simultaneously Elephant Pass and Kilinochchi north, too, were brought under control)
57 Division
* Madhu church complex on April 24
* Palampiddi on May 16
* Mundumurippu on May 23
* Periyamadhu on June 15
* Naddankandal on July 11
* Kalvilan on August 13
* Thunukkai and Uilankulam on August 22
* Mallavi on September 2
* 29 October troops dominate Akkarayankulam tank bund
* Overrun Akkarayankulam built-up in Kilinochchi on November 5
* Kokavil on December 1
* Terumurikandy junction regained on Dec 10
* Iranamadu junction liberated on January 01, 2009
* Kilinochchi on January 2
North Korean weapons
Some sections of the international media exploited Basil Rajapaksa’s declaration of Sri Lanka acquiring North Korean weapons. Foreign Minister Prof. G.L. Peiris was compelled to deny media reports based on an interview given by the Finance Minister to Shyam Nuwan Ganewatte of Divaina. Perhaps, the SLPP founder and political strategist felt such a claim would have helped to justify the existence of unauthorised foreign exchange setups. There hadn’t been any issue with Ganewatte’s reporting, certainly an expert in financial matters. Those who had been waiting for an opportunity to discredit Sri Lanka, particularly ahead of the 49th sessions of Geneva-based United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), seized the opportunity.
Sri Lanka never bought weapons from North Korea during any phase of the war against Tamil terrorist groups (1983-2009) though several Fast Attack Craft (FACs) were brought from South Korea. There was no requirement to do so as major military powers, including China, the US, Russia, Pakistan and Israel, provided a range of arms, ammunition and equipment required by the Sri Lankan military. Other suppliers included Czechoslovakia and India. At the onset of the war, India strongly opposed weapons supply to Sri Lanka. However, India quietly gave up its opposition after its disastrous military mission in Sri Lanka (1987-1990) and the assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi at Sriperumbudur in May 1991.
The LTTE used funds raised in the West to procure weapons from various sources after India stopped supplying weapons. The LTTE even targeted the US. The US revealed attempts made by the LTTE to procure a range of weapons, including shoulder fired anti-aircraft missiles, night vision devices and machine guns. Among those who had been arrested for the abortive bid to procure US weapons were several foreigners, including a retired Indonesian Marine Corps General. However, the LTTE succeeded in procuring Chinese weapons over a period of time. The weapons, the LTTE had acquired from China, were routed through North Korea over a period of time quiet successfully. The procurement of Chinese weapons, moved via North Korea, came to light after the Navy acting on information provided by the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), intercepted LTTE floating arsenals on the high seas.
Western powers conveniently turned a blind eye to uninterrupted sea supply route though they knew that funds raised in their countries were used to procure weapons. The LTTE arsenal included a range of artillery and mortars of Chinese origin. They also had ZPU type dedicated anti-aircraft guns as well as heat seeking missiles. But, it would be necessary to stresses that China hadn’t been the only source and absolutely no official involvement. China acted swiftly and decisively after Sri Lanka brought the clandestine weapons route to their notice. China detained a shipload of weapons bound for the LTTE. The LTTE had used North Korea to transfer weapons on the basis of false end-user certificates. Acting on specific information provided by the DMI and satellite images provided by the US, subsequently, the Navy hunted down LTTE floating arsenals. The LTTE suffered a debilitating setback due to the disruption of the sea supply route. Interested parties have sought to exploit Minister Rajapaksa’s unsubstantiated claim to cause further trouble for Sri Lanka.
