SPECIAL REPORT : Part 436
The 51 sessions of the Geneva-based United Nations Human Rights Council is underway. Sri Lanka is again in the focus with Western powers and their lackeys targeting the war-winning Sri Lanka military.
Successive Sri Lankan governments, including the incumbent administration, failed to address core issues. Their failure to counter accusations that over 40,000 Tamil civilians died in the hands of the military is inexcusable. The Foreign and Defence Ministries, without further delay, should review Sri Lanka’s strategy or fall victim to unceasing Western machinations against the country for militarily crushing the LTTE, against their advice.
By Shamindra Ferdinando
Lankadeepa journalist Ratnapala Gamage had been with the late General Rohan de S. Daluwatte, Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), in Sept. 2001 at the latter’s Colombo office when the one-time Army Commander (May 1996-Dec 1998) was informed of the killing of Vaithilingam Sornalingam alias ‘Colonel’ Shankar.
At the time of his death the 51-year-old former Air Canada employee commanded the ‘Air Wing’ and ‘Marine Division’ of the LTTE.
The 20-minute call interrupted the exclusive interview Gamage was having with the CDS as Daluwatte had to rush for a meeting which was also to be attended by the then President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga.
Ex-Lankadeepa journalist Gamage, now domiciled in Switzerland, dealt with the high profile ‘hit’ carried out by the LRRP (Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol) aka DPU (Deep Penetration Unit) in the eastern part of the Vanni region. The raid carried out so deep, within the LTTE-held territory, sent shock waves through not only the enemy’s rank and file but the Colombo-based diplomatic community as well. Gamage in his maiden book ‘Rana Bimaka Panhinda’ (Notes from the battlefield) discussed the war that was brought to a successful conclusion in May 2009, with the focus on his experiences and visits to operational areas. The launch of ‘Rana Bimaka Panhinda’ took place at the J.R. Jayewardene Centre on Sept 13 with the presence of Lankadeepa Editor Siri Ranasinghe. The gathering was told a Tamil translation of the book would be available later this year. Gamage had an opportunity to meet one of those intrepid men who participated in that particular operation on the Oddusuddan-Puthikudirippu road, east of Kandy-Jaffna A9 hi-way on the morning of Sept. 26, 2001. Gamage reveals his failed bid to convince one of those Long Rangers to give him one of the four pictures he had of the ‘hit’ on Shankar, one of Prabhakaran’s closest associates. Gamage explained as to why the soldier declined to give him a photograph. At the time the LRRP unit triggered the claymore mine that blasted the heavily guarded vehicle, the attackers had believed Velupillai Prabhakaran was on the move in it. Operations behind enemy lines that developed over the years involved elite men, including Muslim military personnel and ex-LTTE cadres. During the Eelam War IV, the Air Force, on more than one occasion, evacuated several teams of Long Rangers who had got trapped in enemy territory. Did such highly successful operations carried out behind enemy lines prompt Prabhakaran to return to the negotiating table in Feb 2002? The Norwegians finalized the one-sided Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) that included a clause specifically meant to halt all LRRP/DPU operations. Due to an oversight on the part of Gamage, the unprecedented crisis caused by the raid on a safe house at Athurugiriya Millennium City housing scheme, operated by those conducting operations behind enemy lines, didn’t receive the attention it deserved. The UNP government crippled the clandestine operation in spite of assurances given by no less a person than the then Army Commander Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle that LRRP/DPU didn’t target UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe.
Interestingly, Gamage wasn’t at the launch of his book. The ex-Lankadeepa defence correspondent addressed the gathering from his home at Aarburg, Switzerland at the onset of the event attended by several retired military officers. Retired Maj. Gen. Sanath Karunaratne, who led the defence of the Elephant Pass base way back in July 1991, in his then capacity as a Major, was among the guests at the launch. Gamage discussed the heroic defence of Elephant Pass base and the largest ever sea-borne operation ‘Balavegaya’ launched to save those trapped therein.
The beleaguered men of the sixth battalion of the Sinha Regiment (6SR) under Karunaratne’s command held the strategic base till seaborne ‘Balavegaya’ troops fought their way in from the Mullaitivu coast to break the siege. ‘Balavegaya’ involved 10,000 men and was considered the largest action undertaken before ‘Operation Riviresa’ (Oct-Dec 1995) that brought Jaffna and its suburbs under government control.
If not for the successful suicide attack on an advancing armour-plated LTTE bulldozer carried out by Lance Corporal Gamini Kularatne, the garrison could have probably fallen before the Army launched Operation ‘Balavegaya.’ Kularatne received Sri Lanka’s highest gallantry award ‘Parama Weera Vibhushana’ for the supreme sacrifice he made on the battlefield. Kularatne was the first recipient of the decoration.
Referring to the fall of Kokavil detachment south of Elephant Pass in June 1990, Gamage quite rightly blamed the military top brass for the shortcomings. The second recipient of the highest decoration was Captain Saliya Upul Aladeniya also of the Sinha Regiment. Aladeniya commanded besieged Kokavil detachment established for the protection of the Rupavahini transmission tower there. However, the LTTE attacks on isolated detachments along the A 9 road north of Vavuniya up to Elephant Pass should be examined against the backdrop of the then President, late Ranasinghe Premadasa’s foolish attempts to reach a consensus with the LTTE by even transferring truckloads of arms to it. In June 1990 the government lost control of the A 9 road north of Vavuniya up to Elephant Pass. That stretch of the road overland route remained inaccessible to the government until the Army systematically liberated it in the final phases of the war in January 2009.It would be pertinent to mention that though 6 SR valiantly held Elephant Pass base in 1991 with less than a battalion of troops, a Division plus troops couldn’t repulse multiple LTTE attacks on Yakachchi and Elephant Pass base in late April 2000. The 54 Division abandoned the base and retreated in all directions. The LTTE killed well over 1000 officers and men. The then Army Commander Lt. Gen. Balagalle made a vain attempt to portray the humiliating Elephant Pass defeat as a strategic withdrawal. Many fighting personnel also perished as they ran out of potable water after the LTTE destroyed their sole water source at Yakachchi
Keith Noyahr’s commendation among the well-wishers who couldn’t attend the book launch but chose to issue a recorded statement commending Gamage’s work was Keith Noyahr, the Deputy Editor of now defunct ‘The Nation. Noyahr recalled his close association with Gamage during the conflict and when he earlier worked at the Daily Mirror, the sister paper of Lankadeepa. Noyahr fled the country following his abduction and subsequent release in May 2008. The then Mahinda Rajapaksa administration was accused of targeting ‘The Nation’ journalist over his column ‘Military Matters’ that questioned the conduct of war-winning Army Commander the then Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka. Unidentified persons abducted Noyahr on the night of May 22, 2008 in the wake of a provocative piece titled ‘An Army is not its Commander’s private fiefdom’ on May 11, 2008. Noyahr wrote the column under the pseudonym ‘Senapathi. ’Fearing Noyahr’s fate would also befall him, Gamage quietly left the country with his only son in Dec, 2008. His wife died a few years earlier and in spite of political changes never returned to the country. The then joint Opposition comprising UNP-JVP-TNA-SLMC-CWC backing Fonseka at the 2010 presidential election must have been quite a shock for those who criticised Fonseka ‘s controversial strategies, that however brought about the unbelievable crushing of the LTTE in the battlefield, which many a pundit claimed was not within Sri Lanka’s military capability.
Gamage declared in his foreword, his close working relationship with the then Daily Mirror Editor Lalith Alahakoon (having joined The Island in June, 1987, the writer worked under Alahakoon who was the Night News Editor at that time) and his Deputy at the Daily Mirror Noyahr.
Acknowledging his weekly contribution to the Sunday Lankadeepa greatly enhanced his capacity, Gamage appreciated the opportunity and support extended by both Alahakoon and Noyahr for him to do a weekly article that dealt with ‘Military Matters. According to Gamage, it had been a joint effort by him and Noyahr. By the time, Noyahr was targeted ‘Military Matters’ was penned by Noyahr for ‘The Nation.’
Having joined Lankadeepa in late 1993, Gamage moved overseas as Fonseka’s Army was making headway on the Vanni east front. Close on the heels of Gamage’s departure on Dec 18, 2008, the 59 Division brought Mullaitivu, once considered impregnable, under its control. Mullaitivu had been under LTTE control since July 1996 after the LTTE massacred well over 1,000 officers and men in a devastating assault on that isolated base shook the country.
Gamage hadn’t been with the Lankadeepa to report the last phase of the combined security forces campaign that brought the LTTE to its knees.
Wijeweera’s execution
Gamage hadn’t even thought of joining the staff of the Lankadeepa at the time the UNP battled the second JVP inspired insurgency. The government brought the counter
insurgency campaign to an end in late 1989 early 1990 with the elimination of the JVP leadership.
Controversy surrounds the circumstances, the late Somawansa Amarasinghe escaped with the help of an Army officer. The rest, including the Marxist Party’s leader, Rohana Wijeweera were apprehended and summarily executed.
Gamage recalled him raising Wijeweera’s execution with the late Brigadier Janaka Perera (the much decorated officer was killed in an LTTE suicide attack in early Oct. 2008 at Anuradhapura as he came to address an election rally after having retired as a Major General) at his quarters within the then Army headquarters (the war winning Mahinda Rajapaksa government sold that land. The Yahapalana government (2015-2019), too, sold the adjoining land).
Brigadier Perera had been the head of one of the three teams that were assigned the task of eliminating Rohana Wijeweera. Then DIG Premadasa Udugampola (He passed away in January 2019), the late Maj. Gen. Lakshman Algama (killed in LTTE suicide blast in Dec 2001) and the then Colonel Janaka Perera had been in charge of the teams that eventually hunted down the JVP leadership. Gamage recounted his stimulating conversation with Perera while sipping wine. Gamage was there on the invitation of the officer to share a meal with him. The arrest of a JVPer in the Dehiowita area by an officer attached to Perera team, his interrogation that led to the capture of JVP politburo member Disanayake Mudiyansalage Nandasena alias D.M. Ananda who revealed Wujeweera’s hideout at Ulapone. Did Janaka Perera participate in the execution of the JVP leader? What was the assurance the celebrated the army officer gave Wijeweera soon after he placed a pistol at the JVP leader’s head? Where did Janaka Perera detain Wijeweera? Who accompanied the then Army Chief Cecil Waidyaratne when he visited Wijeweera? Gamage answered all these questions and also revealed why Janaka Perera accompanied the journalist to meet a soothsayer in Anuradhapura. This was years before Gnana Akka’s entry into the scene. Gamage’s reportage of LTTE leader Prabhakaran’s press conference in the Vanni on April 10, 2002 captures the attention of the readers. How a police intelligence officer infiltrated the LTTE defences on the pretext of being a journalist from Colombo assigned to cover the much-touted media briefing and unprecedented security measures that were in place therein to prevent an attempt on Prabhakaran’s life was certainly exciting. Gamage discussed how the LTTE turned the media briefing to a propaganda exercise by non-stop screening of footage of their battlefield victories. The stunning attack on Pooneryn-Nagathivanthurai base established in the early 90s to intercept boat movements across the Jaffna lagoon spurred the LTTE. Those directly responsible for the failure weren’t punished though Army Chief Lt. Gen. Waidyaratne resigned after having accepted responsibility. The LTTE smashed the base in early Nov 1993.
A visit to Vanni
Among other issues addressed by Gamage, perhaps one of the most important was the deficiency in the infantry. The ex-Lankadeepa journalist underscored the extreme difficulties experienced by the Army for want of sufficient men under arms. Gamage dealt with the issue against the backdrop of a visit organized by the Army for a group of Colombo-based journalists, including photographers to visit Army lines in the Vanni during Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s presidency. Ravi Ladduwahetti had been on The Island editorial at that time and was among those were taken there. Veteran journalist Ladduwahetti who had served many English newspapers passed away last week. He was 64 years old. The then Divaina Defence correspondent late Sirimevan Kasthuriarachchi and former UNL photographer Siripala Halwala were also in that media team.
Kasthuriarachchi, whose brother, an officer of the Vijayaba Infantry Regiment (VIR) died in the July 1996 Mullaitivu battle, had covered the conflict extensively and was one of those who always joined such arranged visits.
Like many other journalists Gamage, too, experienced flying with bodies of military personnel killed in action, when he was returning to Colombo from Palaly. The writer experienced the same on more than one occasion over the years.
Gamage shared his experience in flying to Palaly after the LTTE brought down two Avros with heat-seeking missiles on consecutive days in late April 1995. Among those who perished in missile attacks were three Lake House journalists. Gamage was lucky to avoid a Sam 7 hit as in spite of speaking to the then Commander of the Air Force he couldn’t secure a seat on an ill-fated Avro that flew out from Ratmalana air base. Instead, the Commander had offered him the opportunity to board the flight at the Anuradhapura air base when the Avro touched down there. Perhaps the second Avro disaster could have been avoided if the Air Force didn’t take the risk of flying there the day after the mysterious destruction of an Avro while taking off from Palaly.
There had been several other books on the conflict since the eradication of the LTTE’s conventional military capability. The books authored by our Permanent Representative in Geneva C.A. Chadraprema (Gota’s War) and the late Subramaniam Sivakamy alias ‘Col’ Thamilini (‘Thiyunu Asipathaka Sevana Yata’/In the Shadow of a Sharp Sword) are must read. Sinhala translation of ‘Oru Koorvaalin Nizhalil’, life story of high ranking LTTE cadre, ‘Col’ Thamilini, took place at the Sri Lanka Foundation Institute (SLFI) on May 13, 2016.Oru Koorvaalin Nizhalil’ was launched on March 19, 2016, in Kilinochchi, the one-time LTTE bastion.
Gamage’s coverage of UNP presidential candidate Gamini Dissanayake’s assassination should be examined taking into consideration his assessment that the LTTE did so to facilitate Kumaratunga’s victory. At the following presidential election in 1999, the LTTE tried to assassinate Kumaratunga to pave the way for Wickremsinghe to secure the presidency and in 2005 engineered polls boycott to help Mahinda Rajapaksa to win the presidential poll.
Gamage refrained from commenting on why the LTTE helped Mahinda Rajapaksa to win. Perhaps, the LTTE miscalculated Mahinda Rajapaksa’s capacity.
Chief of LTTE procurement ‘KP’ in his first interview with the media given to this writer in the ‘custody’ of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) declared the LTTE calculated they could take an irreversible upper hand in the battlefield within two years
