Fonseka fails to thwart a second term for Mahinda

SPECIAL REPORT : Part 53

December 9, 2014, 5:51 pm 

by Shamindra Ferdinando

The UNP-JVP combine, that backed war hero, Gen. Sarath Fonseka, at the January 26, 2010, presidential poll, lacked courage to examine the heavy defeat suffered by its candidate at the hands of incumbent President, Mahinda Rajapaksa.

Instead, the political grouping accused President Mahinda Rajapaksa of ‘computer jilmmart’ that enabled him to secure a second term. Rajapaksa secured 6,015,943 votes (57.88%) whereas Fonseka managed to obtain 4,173,185 votes (40.15%).

The then Prime Minister Rajapaksa narrowly won the Nov 17, 2005 presidential poll. Rajapaksa obtained 4,887,152 votes (50.29 %) against UNP presidential candidate Ranil Wickremesinghe. The UNPer polled 4,706,366 (48.43%).

Fonseka couldn’t achieve victory, in spite of him having the largest ever political grouping, comprising the UNP, JVP, TNA, as well as the SLMC, pledging to repeal the executive presidency immediately after Rajapaksa’s defeat. In fact, there hadn’t been any other issue at the first poll after the eradication of the LTTE. Essentially, the Opposition leadership declared that abolition of the executive presidency would be the panacea for Sri Lanka’s ills.

The military finished off the LTTE, on the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon, on May 19, 2009.

Had the electorate took the Opposition’s vow seriously, Rajapaksa wouldn’t have polled a staggering 1.8 mn votes over Fonseka - undoubtedly Sri Lanka’s best army commander.

Obviously, the Opposition fielded Fonseka to deprive Rajapaksa of credit for the LTTE’s annihilation. Fonseka’s defection had been as surprising as Maithripala’s due to their close relationship with the Rajapaksas during Eelam War IV. The UNP and the JVP quite rightly realized that there couldn’t have been a better choice than Fonseka, widely credited for executing the war. The conclusion of the war, as well as the role played by the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), in the capture of LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran’s successor, Kumaran Pathmanathan alias ‘KP’, in Malaysia, in early August 2009, brought further accolades for the military. Fonseka faced Rajapaksa at the height of his popularity, though he suffered a stunning defeat.

The Rajapaksas remained confident, regardless of Fonseka having a formidable team, including media specialists. Fonseka commanded the vote bases of four major political parties, namely, the UNP and Marxist JVP, as well as two major political parties representing the Tamil-speaking people - the TNA and Rauf Hakeem’s SLMC. Twice-President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, too, supported Fonseka. An influential section of the Colombo-based diplomatic community, and business elite, threw their weight behind the former Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). The tough talking General had the admiration of over 200,000 from the army, though some, in the military, despised his approach towards the war as well as politics. Interestingly, Fonseka had the backing of the NGOs, primarily due to the US tacitly approving Fonseka’s candidature.

Fonseka seemed to have an invincible political grouping, whereas Rajapaksa had only the JHU (quit the UPFA to back Maithripala Sirisena) and the breakaway JVP faction, namely the National Freedom Front (NFF) ably led by Minister Wimal Weerawansa. The left parties, as well as MEP though being with Rajapaksa, didn’t make a real impact on the electorate. However, MEP leader, Minister Dinesh Gunawardene had tirelessly campaigned for the President.

Why did Fonseka failed in his political mission? What went wrong at the final phase of his campaign though, at one-time, Opposition strategists asserted Fonseka could overwhelm the Rajapaksas, regardless of them being at the height of their power? Did the Opposition grouping take any remedial measures? And, lastly, did Fonseka realize the shortcomings on the part of the political group backing him before it was too late?

SF receives CBK’s backing

Mrs. Kumaratunga announced her support for Fonseka’s candidature on January 23, 2010, three days before the election. On Kumaratunga’s invitation, Fonseka visited her ancestral home at Horagolla, Nittambuwa, after having paid floral tributes at the Bandaranaike Samadhi. Mrs Kumaratunga’s move was meant to split the SLFP vote at the expense of Rajapaksa. At the Nov, 2005 presidential election campaign, both Mrs Kumaratunga and her brother, the late Anura Bandaranaike, went out of their way to sabotage Rajapaksa’s propaganda campaign. The then Rupavahini Chairman, M. M. Zuhair, PC, would be able to shed light on the Bandaranaikes’ efforts against Rajapaksa. The former PA National List MP earned the wrath of Anura Bandaranaike for ensuring coverage for Rajapaksa (Zuhair, Sri Lanka’s former ambassador in Teheran, recently signed the ‘Common People’s Agenda for Just, Democratic and People-Friendly Governance’, at Vihara Maha Devi park. Zuhair formed a new political outfit-National United Front (NUF) to promote the interests of all communities. Zuhair alleged that the country was facing an unprecedented crisis due to: (1) the total breakdown of the Rule of Law, (2) the erosion of democratic institutions essential for governance, (3) an unprecedented widening of social disparities and social injustices and (4) severe strains on co-existence between different ethnic and religious communities and increasing disharmony and distrust. Zuhair echoed Opposition that the country wanted to see the back of Rajapaksas, who thrive in post-war Sri Lanka at the expense of the national economy.

Campaign goes awry

Fonseka’s declaration that Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa ordered the then General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the celebrated 58 Division, Maj. Gen. Shavendra Silva, to execute surrendering LTTE cadres, carrying white flags, on the Vanni east front, during the third week of May, 2009, almost crippled his campaign. The claim, made in an interview with Frederica Jansz, the then editor of The Sunday Leader, caused furore among the vast majority of the electorate. The Sunday Leader exclusive, headlined ‘Gota Ordered Them To Be Shot’, of Dec 13, 2009, caused irreparable damage to Fonseka’s campaign. The celebrated soldier’s decision to take a risk with The Sunday Leader had been surprising, given its constant inimical reportage of the war effort against the LTTE throughout Eelam War IV.

Obviously, that particular statement was meant to appease the Tamil electorate. That controversial declaration made things easy for the TNA, who campaigned for the Opposition candidate in the northern and eastern electoral districts, as well as in Colombo. Fonseka overwhelmingly won all northern and eastern electoral districts, though he suffered heavily in the predominately Sinhala areas. In fact, Fonseka lost his home base, the Ambalangoda electorate, by a staggering majority of 12,297 votes. Rajapaksa polled 33,488 (62.79%) and against 19,191 obtained by Fonseka. The TNA and SLMC delivered Jaffna, Vanni, Batticaloa, Digamadulla (Ampara) and Trincomalee districts. Fonseka also won Nuwara Eliya with a majority of 30,000 votes, due to support extended by the Tamil voters, to increase his tally to six electoral districts. Rajapaksa secured 16 electorates.

Outspoken politician Mano Ganeshan’s Western People’s Front (WPF) played an important role in Fonseka’s campaign, particularly in Colombo. Had the TNA, SLMC and WPF failed, Fonseka would have experienced a far bigger defeat.

Mrs Kumaratunga couldn’t deliver her power base, Attanagalle, nor Gampaha district, to Fonseka. SLFP rebel, Mangala Samaraweera, who, in the run-up to the poll, declared he would take over the SLFP after Rajapaksa’s defeat, failed to ensure Fonseka’s triumph in his home base, Matara. Samaraweera, one-time Foreign Minister of the Rajapaksa government, pledged his support to Wickremesinghe after having quit the UPFA, in 2007, over differences with Mahinda Rajapaksa and Gotabhaya Rajapaksa.

Desertions by former national cricket captain, Arjuna Ranatunga, as well as one of the most respected UPFA politicians, Wijeyadasa Rajapakshe, in the run-up to January, 2010 poll, didn’t cause any problems to Rajapaksa.

At the Nov 2005, presidential poll, Wickremesinghe and Rajapaksa shared 11 districts each. Wickremesinghe secured Colombo, Batticaloa, Digamadulla, Badulla, Mahanuwara, Trincomalee, Jaffna, Nuwara Eliya, Matale, Vanni and Puttalam. Rajapaksa won Galle, Anuradhapura, Gampaha, Matara, Polonnaruwa, Kalutara, Hambantota, Moneragala, Kurunegala, Ratnapura and Kegalle.

The Rajapaksa camp exploited some speeches made by Fonseka to undermine the former army chief’s campaign. The government succeeded in causing fear and dismay among the voters by highlighting Fonseka’s controversial statements threatening those who dared to challenge him. The government strategy largely succeeded in the backdrop of damning The Sunday Leader interview.

Fonseka’s electoral pact with the TNA had been made at the expense of the Sinhala Buddhist and Sinhala Catholic voters.

Another minus factor had been the severe UNP criticism of Fonseka’s conduct during Eelam War IV. The UNP went to the extent of alleging the army chief of running a death squad in the immediate aftermath of The Sunday Leader editor, Lasantha Wickremetunga’s assassination in Colombo. Although the UNP and Fonseka swiftly sank their differences, for political reasons, the UNP accusations remained fresh in the minds of the electorate.

Fonseka suffered a massive setback on the afternoon of January 26, 2010, when the state media declared that Fonseka could not exercise his franchise due to inexcusable failure to register himself as a voter. State run television stations, as well as radio, interrupted their programmes to announce Fonseka’s plight. The state media blitz, launched three hours before the closure of voting, at 4 p.m. stunned the electorate. Many voters, waiting to exercise their franchise in the afternoon, would have skipped the vote, though Fonseka, UNP Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe and former a Chief Justice Sarath Nanda Silva made a desperate bid, through Sirasa, to thwart the state media operation. The government relished on Fonseka’s predicament.

In hindsight, Fonseka, as well as Opposition strategists, could have avoided an unprecedented crisis if they took the electorate into circumstances and explained the Sinha Regiment soldier’s failure to get on the 2008 electoral register. People would have accepted such an explanation, given Fonseka’s spearheading role in the war. Did Gen. Fonseka brief the UNP or the JVP about not being on the electoral register? Did he seek legal advice as regards his status? Sarath Nanda Silva could have explained the situation if Fonseka sought his advice.

Appearing on Sirasa, Fonseka confirmed that he could not exercise his franchise as he was not on the June, 2008, electoral register. The four-star Gen emphasized that it would not in any way hinder his first bid at a presidential election. Wickremesinghe and Sarath Nanda Silva declared, over Sirasa, that failure to vote was not a legal impediment to Fonseka being next president, if he obtained over 50 per cent of the vote. An irate Fonseka declared that no one dared to question him as regards his voting rights when he served in the army for four decades. Fonseka alleged that the Rajapaksas propagated lies to the effect that he couldn’t be elected as President because they feared defeat. The Election Secretariat, too, confirmed that Fonseka’s inability to his cast vote wouldn’t be an issue in case he polled more than Rajapaksa.

Wickremesinghe later accused the government of sending an SMS claiming that the Fonsekas weren’t registered voters in Sri Lanka.

Fonseka accused some unruly elements, in the army, of trying to disrupt polling in the Jaffna peninsula. The veteran alleged that several artillery rounds had been fired to scare the voters.

On the eve of the presidential poll, the then Elections Commissioner, Dayananda Dissanayake, requested both camps not to make foolish excuses in case their candidate failed. Urging the media not to manipulate the electoral process, Dissanayake explained the measures in place to ensure a free and fair election. The polls chief addressed the media in the wake of claims and counter claims that Rajapaksa and Fonseka could influence the electoral process.

SF’s relationship with JVP

It would be pertinent to discuss an attempt by the JVP to divide the army over President Rajapaksa’s decision to retire Fonseka, soon after the conclusion of the conflict, during the third week of May, 2009. The JVP made its bid about a week after Fonseka caused himself irreparable damage by accusing Defence Secretary Rajapaksa of issuing extra judicial directive to Maj. Gen. Shavendra Silva.

JVP General Secretary, Tilvin Silva, and MP Vijitha Herath alleged that the country, entering into Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA), in early, 2007, with the US, had been inimical to Sri Lanka’s interests, as well as that of India. They alleged Defence Secretary Rajapaksa was promoting the US because of his US citizenship. Having attacked the Rajapaksa brothers, over signing of a security agreement with the US, the JVP declared that Fonseka was deprived of an opportunity to continue as the army chief on the advise of the then Manmohan Singh’s administration. Quoting the Pakistani media, the JVP said that India had warned the Rajapaksas of a situation similar to that of Pakistan and Bangladesh had Fonseka remained in command of the army. The JVP also alleged that the US and India hadn’t backed Sri Lanka’s war against terrorism. The JVP made a foolish attempt to defend its position, when the writer queried whether the General Secretary Silva and Propaganda Secretary weren’t aware of India providing Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) to supplement the SLN fleet, comprising US and Israeli vessels, to hunt down floating arsenals belonging to the LTTE. They also couldn’t explain the US providing intelligence required to track down four such floating arsenals, thereby helping Sri Lanka to bring the war to a successful conclusion. JVP spokesmen declined to comment on the LTTE having had a range of weapons of Chinese origin, including assault rifles, mortars, artillery pieces and anti-aircraft guns (JVP breathes fire at India and America-The Island, Dec 21, 2009).

At the same briefing, the JVP revealed that the party had been in touch with Fonseka, even before he quit his post as Chief of Defence Staff, on Nov 12, 2009. The JVP unwittingly exposed its clandestine relationship with Fonseka when the media was told of the war hero consulting the party over the phone in late Oct-early Nov 2009 from the US. Over the phone consultation took place in the wake of the US seeking to record a statement from Fonseka as regards to the war crime allegations (JVP reveals SF consulted them from US-The Island, Dec 21, 2009) The US made its move weeks ahead of Fonseka’s damning interview published in the Dec 13, 2009, issue of The Sunday Leader, as well a US cable originating from the US diplomatic mission 10 days before the poll. Interestingly, that particular cable categorized Fonseka as a war criminal.

The then US Ambassador, Butenis, in this cable, dated January 15, 2010, dealt with the contentious issue of war crimes accountability. Butenis implicated President Rajapaksa, his brothers, Gotabhaya and Basil, and Gen. Sarath Fonseka. Butenis pointed out "that responsibility for many of the alleged war crimes rests with the country’s senior civilian and military leadership, including President Rajapaksa and his brothers and opposition candidate.

US examines Gen Fonseka’s candidacy

Jan 2010 prez poll

SPECIAL REPORT : Part 52

December 2, 2014, 5:39 pm 

By Shamindra Ferdinando

The then Chief of Defence Staff General Sarath Fonseka claimed that he didn’t want to lose his popularity, within 24 hours, by seeking a political career.

The Sinha Regiment veteran was responding to a query, at a packed media conference, at the Joint Operations Headquarters, situated within the army headquarters premises, on the morning of July 15, 2009. The writer was among those present on the occasion.

The war-winning army chief was meeting the media after having handed over the command to the then Vanni Commander, Maj. Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya, under acrimonious circumstances. In fact, an officer, at the behest of Gen. Fonseka, queried the newly appointed army commander, whether his briefing could be cut short to enable the newly appointed CDS to address the media. Having being promoted to the rank of Lt. Gen, over nearly a dozen Majors General, a confident Jayasuriya continued with his scheduled briefing. The armoured corps officer revealed that he hadn’t been aware of President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s decision to name him as Gen. Fonseka’s successor, until the evening of July 11, 2009.

Gen. Fonseka’s choice had been the then Chief of Staff and one-time Jaffna Commander, Maj. Gen. G.A. Chandrasiri, incumbent Governor of the Northern Province.

Gen. Fonseka reminisced the fate of two of his senior colleagues, Maj. Gen. Lakshman Algama (assassinated on the night of Dec 18, 1999, at the final UNP rally, held in Ja-ela, in support of its candidate, Ranil Wickremesinghe) and Maj. Gen. Janaka Perera (on the morning of Oct 6, 2008, in Anuradhapura). LTTE suicide cadres carried out both attacks ("Politics not for me," says Gen. Fonseka-The Island, July 19, 2009).

For want of a better strategy to deprive incumbent President Mahinda Rajapaksa of a second-term, the Opposition fielded a disgruntled Fonseka at the January 26, 2010 presidential election. Enticing Gen. Fonseka had been a stunning political coup that caused panic at the highest level, though President Rajapaksa and Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa resorted to immediate damage-control measures. The defection sent shock waves through political and military establishments.

With the UNP-led Opposition, again engineering another high level defection (SLFP General Secretary Maithripala Sirisena), ahead of the January 8, 2015 presidential, it would be pertinent to examine the last presidential election.

MR called ‘tinpot’ dictator

Having publicly ruled out a political career, on July 15, 2009, Gen. Fonseka announced his candidacy for the January 26, 2010, poll at a media briefing, at JAIC Hotel, on the morning of November 29, 2009. Gen. Fonseka informed President Rajapaksa of his decision to leave the army at a one-on-one with the President on Nov 11. There had never been such a mega press conference, with Sirasa giving live coverage of the event from the venue - JAIC Hotel. Fonseka didn’t mince his words when he lambasted President Rajapaksa for failing to take advantage of the LTTE’s defeat to win over the Tamil community. Calling President Rajapaksa a ‘tinpot dictator’, Gen. Fonseka declared that he was ready to work closely with UNP leader, Ranil Wickremesinghe, and UNP, MP Mangala Samaraweera, in spite of having serious differences with them during the Eelam War IV. Emphasising his readiness to work with anyone, to ensure a regime change, Gen. Fonseka declared that he would even accept the support of Prabhakaran’s parents to see the back of the Rajapaksas. The first four-star General revealed that the JVP extended an invitation to him on behalf of those political parties, opposed to President Rajapaksa. (Fonseka ready to secure even support of Prabhakaran’s parents to defeat MR-The Island, November 30, 2009).

Responding to a query, raised by the writer, at the media briefing, Gen. Fonseka said that far reaching constitutional amendments were required to prevent MP’s from switching allegiance for personal gain. The retired Gen acknowledged that crossovers caused political instability, therefore constitutional measures were needed to address the issue (Fonseka promises to prevent crossovers-The Island, November 30, 2009).

Consequence of US visit

Even before President Rajapaksa proclaimed the presidential election, during the third week of November, 2009, the US approached the then CDS Gen. Fonseka in a bid to obtain a statement from him that could be used against Defence Secretary, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa. The war veteran, a long term permanent resident of the US, had been visiting the country (late Oct-early Nov, 2009). The US felt that Gen. Fonseka’s statement could be used to implicate Defence Secretary in ordering Maj. Gen. Shavendra Silva (General Officer Commanding 58 Division) to execute surrendering LTTE cadres on the Vanni east front. Fonseka had been contacted by the Department of Homeland Security to obtain a special statement on Nov 4, 2009. Sri Lanka thwarted the US attempt (US seeks info on Gota from Fonseka, The Island, Nov 2, 2009).

The Department of Homeland Security had contacted Fonseka on Oct 28, 2009, whereas he alerted Defence Secretary, Rajapaksa, on Oct 30, 2009. (Gota says Gen. Fonseka alerted him to US move, The Island, Nov 3, 2009). Fonseka returned to Colombo on Nov 4, 2009.

In spite of failing to obtain a statement from Gen Fonseka, as regards an alleged execution order given by Defence Secretary Rajapaksa, the US had been closely involved in the ‘events’, leading to the nomination of the former army commander as the Opposition common candidate.

Thanks to Wiki Leaks, Sri Lanka knows the US involvement in the Opposition project at the January, 2010, presidential election. The whistle-blowing website, in collaboration with international media agencies, commenced releasing confidential US diplomatic cables, in November, 2010 much to the dismay of the administration. Among them were classified documents that dealt with the January, 2010, presidential election and related matters, including accountability issues. Possibly, one of the most important cables, originating from the US mission in Colombo, was dated Nov 6, 2009.

The classified missive revealed that the US Embassy had been exploring ways and means of uniting Opposition forces for a specific project, meant to deprive President Rajapaksa of a second-term. It would be important to keep in mind that discussions between US diplomatic staff and leaders of Opposition political parties had taken place many days before Gen. Fonseka informed President Rajapaksa of his decision to quit the defence establishment. In other words, Sri Lanka’s top soldier had been talking politics, while being in uniform.

Unfortunately, the government did not make a genuine effort to examine diplomatic cables, relating to Sri Lanka. Due to the lethargic attitude of the External Affairs Ministry, the country missed a golden opportunity to study US perspective. In fact, the Lakshman Kadirgamar Institute for International Relations and Strategic Studies (LKIIRSS) should have closely examined the US cables, relevant to Sri Lanka, in accordance with overall strategy, to meet post-war challenges. Even five years after the conclusion of the war, LKIIRSS hadn’t made a cohesive attempt to conduct a thorough study on international dimensions of the conflict.

Let me examine the Nov 6, 2009, dated US diplomatic cable, titled ‘Muslim Congress leader on elections, Fonseka and Tamils’

US told of SLMC strategy

SLMC Chairman and Eastern Provincial Council Opposition leader, Basheer Segudawood, had told the Political Officer, at the US Embassy, in Colombo, that President Rajapaksa could be deprived of a second-term by forming a broad coalition, that included the UNP, for the specific purpose of abolishing the executive presidency. Segudawood had been confident of securing the support of minority political parties, and Tamil Diaspora, for the project. Segudawood expressed support for Gen. Fonseka’s candidature, during his covert meeting with the US Embassy representative.

Interestingly, Segudawood had discussed the signing of a political pact, involving the UNP, SLMC Mangala Samaraweera’s Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP-Mahajana), Mano Ganeshan’s Western People’s Front, as well as 19 other organizations. Segudawood declared that the UNP-led grouping had the backing of many Tamil political parties, including the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) and other Tamil groups.

An understanding on the abolition of the executive presidency, and the restoration of the parliamentary system of governance, paved the way for the grand coalition. The UNP and MP Mangala Samaraweera’s outfit had publicly declared their support for the coalition, wheres the SLMC was silent. However, Segudawood pledged SLMC’s support to defeat President Rajapaksa at the January, 2010, presidential poll.

Segudawood had stressed that UNP leader, Ranil Wickremesinghe, couldn’t defeat President Rajapaksa, though the minorities liked him. The then US Ambassador, Butenis, too, endorsed Segudawood’s ascertain. Butenis said: "SLMC Chairman underscored UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe’s popularity with minorities but echoed the sentiment, expressed privately by many political observers in Colombo of Wickremesinghe not being the ideal candidate to beat President Rajapaksa. Segudawood also discussed the pivotal importance of having a common strategy, instead of the Opposition making disputed statements at the expense of the coalition against the Rajapaksas.

MR and SF compared

Gen. Fonseka’s Sinhala nationalistic ideology was similar to that of the Rajapaksas, Segudawood said, emphasizing that there couldn’t be a better person to be fielded at the presidential poll. Interestingly, Segudawood had claimed that the major Opposition political parties and minorities would throw their weight behind Gen Fonseka, depending on an agreement to do away with the executive presidency, within 90 days.

According to Segudawood, Gen. Fonseka had sought clarifications from the Opposition as regards two matters. The war veteran had queried about his future, following the abolition of executive presidency and his security, as well as safety and security of his family. Gen. Fonseka had feared that the Rajapaksas would resort to violence to prevent him from contesting the poll, Segudawood said. Segudawood discussed a JVP effort to guarantee security of retired senior military officials by moving a bill in parliament.

Commenting on the Tamil Diaspora, Segudawood said those living away from Sri Lanka would play a critical role in the presidential election.

Butenis, is on record, as having said that she wanted to meet TNA leader, R. Sampanthan, before the Trincomalee district leader left for the UK to attend a two-day conference, on Nov 12-13, to discuss post-LTTE future of the Tamil community in Sri Lanka. Butenis was reacting to Segudawood commenting on the forthcoming meeting in London. There had been an exchange of views regarding the Tamil-speaking electorate and how the Diaspora could be used to influence a national election here.

Segudawood also revealed the possibility of engineering two defections from the UPFA to the UNP to undermine President Rajapaksa’s campaign. The SLMC Chairman asserted that had the Opposition succeeded in convincing two members (undoubtedly, he was talking about members of parliament) to switch their allegiance, more UPFA members could revolt. (UPFA National List MP, Wijeyadasa Rajapakshe, switched his allegiance to the UNP on Dec 2, 2009).

Segudawood declared that people resented President Rajapaksa repeating the war propaganda. Due to growing unpopularity of President Rajapaksa, among the Tamils and Muslims, the SLFP needed at least 75 per cent of votes from the Sinhalese electorate, according to Butenis’s cable to Washington.

While expressing the belief that Gen. Fonseka could eat into President Rajapaksa’s vote base, Segudawood stressed that the common candidate’s success would largely depend on the Tamil and Muslim voters.

Butenis advised Washington that the Tamil community would find it extremely difficult to exercise their franchise for Gen Fonseka, who had conducted the war, though the community disliked the Rajapaksas, too. Butenis, however, admitted that Gen. Fonseka was the only one who could split the Sinhala vote and also deprive Rajapaksas of using the war victory to their advantage. Butenis quoted TNA leader, R. Sampanthan, as having said he (TNA) would support the Rajapaksas as they were lesser of the two evils.

Butenis asserted that the difficulties experienced on the political front, as well as other issues, including GSP plus, and Gen Fonseka coming forward, as his main rival, may prompt President Rajapaksa to drop plans for early polls. Butenis was wrong. President Rajapaksa declared presidential poll on Nov. 15, as planned.

Butenis made another significant miscalculation on the basis of Sampanthan’s statement. The five-party TNA supported Gen. Fonseka, at the January, 2010, presidential election, in spite of its earlier decision to back President Rajapaksa. Had the TNA given a free hand to the Tamil electorate, it could have had much better relations with President Rajapaksa.

At the Nov. 2005, presidential election, the LTTE-TNA combination engineered the defeat of UNP presidential candidate, Ranil Wickremesinghe, that led to the bloodiest phase of the conflict. The grouping deprived Wickremesinghe of the Tamil vote, especially in the Jaffna peninsula.

At the last presidential poll, the TNA told Tamils to vote for the senior most army officer who executed the war, at the expense of President Rajapaksa, who gave the political leadership.

In another classified cable, dated January 15, 2010, Butenis dealt with the contentious issue of war crimes accountability. Butenis implicated President Rajapaksa, his brothers, Gotabhaya and Basil, and Gen. Sarath Fonseka. Butenis pointed out "that responsibility for many of the alleged war crimes rests with the country’s senior civilian and military leadership, including President Rajapaksa and his brothers and opposition candidate.

Presidential poll 2005 Prabhakaran's fatal mistake

SPECIAL REPORT : Part 51

November 25, 2014, 12:00 pm 

by Shamindra Ferdinando

Having assassinated UNP presidential election candidate, Gamini Dissanayake on the night of Oct 23, 1994 to ensure PA candidate, Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s victory at the Nov 9, 1994 presidential election, the LTTE made an attempt on Mrs. Kumaratunga’s life three days before the Dec 21, 1999 presidential election. The abortive suicide mission was meant to guarantee UNP leader, Ranil Wickremesinghe’s victory. Having survived the assassination bid, Mrs. Kumaratunga won a second term by polling 4,312,157 (51.12%). Wickremesinghe obtained 3,602,748 votes, while JVP candidate, M. D. Nandana Gunathilake secured 344,173 votes.

Had the LTTE succeeded in its suicide mission, Wickremesinghe would have comfortably won the election. The UNP leader would have definitely reiterated Sri Lanka’s commitment to Norwegian facilitation to explore ways and means of bringing the LTTE back to the negotiating table. It would be pertinent to mention that Mrs. Kumaratunga engaged Norway in May 1999 to initiate a dialogue with the LTTE. The invitation followed consultations involving the government, the LTTE and the Catholic Church.

In spite of losing to Mrs. Kumaratunga, Wickremesinghe engineered a spate of crossovers, including that of Prof. G. L. Peiris in late 2001 to bring down Mrs. Kumaratunga’s government. The crossovers took place in the wake of SLMC leader M. H. M. Ashraff’s assassination on September 16, 2001 leading to his predecessor, Rauf Hakeem deserting the ruling coalition. Parliamentary election on Dec 5, 2001 resulted in victory for Wickremesinghe’s coalition. The UNP leader lost no time in inviting Norway to continue with its initiative. Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka released in September 2011 appreciated the Wickremesinghe approach. "The Norwegian team is aware of, and worried about the fragile power balance caused by political cohabitation in Colombo and the struggles it is likely to bring about, but the UNP victory also creates a much-needed breakthrough in the deadlocked process. The UNP is seen to be more flexible and pragmatic when it comes to the peace process. Building on the earlier back-channel dialogue with both Norway and the LTTE, Wickremesinghe moves quickly. On the night of his election, he calls Norwegian ambassador in Colombo Westborg and preparations resume. Wickremesinghe’s victory clears the way to proceed as the LTTE had advocated: start with a ceasefire, normalization and confidence building measures, while pushing the core substantive political issues backwards."

Wickremesinghe and Prabhakaran reached a Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) on February 21, 2002.

After having six rounds of talks under the auspices of Norway, Prabhakaran quit the negotiating process on April 21, 2003.Amidst the deteriorating security situation, Mrs Kumaratunga on Nov 4, 2003, stripped Tilak Marapone, John Amaratunga and Imitiaz Bakeer of defence, interior and information portfolios. Mrs. Kumaratunga dissolved parliament on February 7, 2004 leading to early elections on April 2, 2004, the third general election in four years.

Sarath N Silva thwarts

CBK’s move

Having routed the UNP at the parliamentary poll, Mrs. Kumaratunga felt confident that she could continue till November 10, 2006 on the basis that her second term commenced on November 10, 2000, though the election took place on Dec 21, 1999. The then Chief Justice Sarath Nanda Silva declared that Mrs. Kumaratunga’s term would end on December 22, 2005, when Ven. Omalpe Sobitha thera on behalf of the JHU filed a fundamental rights application seeking Supreme Court opinion.

The constitutional provision that needed interpretation was 31(3)d(i) which stipulated that if an incumbent president was re-elected for a second term, he/she will: "hold office for a term of six years commencing on such date in the year in which that election is held (being a date after such election) or in the succeeding year, as corresponds to the date on which his first term of office commenced, whichever date is earlier."

Having sent Mrs. Kumaratunga home, Sarath Nanda Silva, now one of the fiercest critics of the Rajapaksa brothers, paved the way for a presidential election on November 17, 2005.

Having lost to Mrs. Kumaratunga at December 21, 1999, poll, Wickremesinghe remained supremely confident of defeating the UPFA candidate, the then Prime Minister, Mahinda Rajapaksa. Wickremesinghe had the backing of Western powers, the so-called civil society groups as well as the five-party Tamil National Alliance (TNA), an appendage of the LTTE. Wickremesinghe felt confident that the LTTE wouldn’t interfere with the electoral process in the then temporarily-merged Northern and Eastern Provinces. The support extended by the SLMC and the CWC further strengthened Wickremesinghe, whereas Rajapaksa received the backing of nationalist political parties. Those who had been supportive of efforts to resume negotiations with the LTTE felt Wickremesinghe could kick start the stalled peace process. In fact, the TNA had assured the UNP leadership of Tamil speaking peoples’ support to defeat Rajapaksa amidst a propaganda blitz meant to portray Rajapaksa as a warmonger. Wickremesinghe had a formidable coalition which represented all three communities and he also commanded the support of the Catholic Church.

Most importantly, Wickremesinghe had the backing of an influential section within the then ruling SLFP. Mrs. Kumaratunga went to the extent of publicly endorsing Wickremesinghe’s policy vis a vis the national issue and was also in agreement with the UNP leader on the resolution of the national issue on the basis of a federal concept. The then Foreign Minister Anura Bandaranaike worked overtime to undermine Rajapaksa’s government. Bandaranaike attacked those who courageously backed Rajapaksa’s candidature. Wickremesinghe brought one-time UNP General Secretary, B. Sirisena Cooray and influential businessman Thilanga Sumathipala to run his campaign in the North Central Province comprising Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa districts. They didn’t make any impact there.

CBK appeals to Norway

Mrs Kumaratunga, in her capacity as the president, requested the then Norwegian Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondvik to ensure the LTTE didn’t interfere with the electoral process. The request was made on the sidelines of UNGA sessions in New York in late September 2005 (Norway to facilitate presidential poll-The Island September 2005).

Yogarajan speaks to LTTE leaders

Contrary to the expectations of the UNP, the LTTE deprived Wickremesinghe of the northern vote to ensure his defeat. Veteran politician, R. Yogarajan, MP in a brief interview with this writer on Nov 22, 2014 explained the LTTE move as well as the UNP’s efforts to persuade the LTTE not to interfere with the electoral process. Had the LTTE listened to reason, perhaps, eelam war IV would never have taken place, Yogarajan asserted. "We knew something was amiss when the LTTE ordered public servants not to exercise their franchise at postal voting during the first week of November, 2005. All of us were seriously concerned. On the advice of the CWC leader, Arumugam Thondaman, I requested LTTE political wing leader, Thamilchelvam not to interfere with the electoral process. Thamilchelvam declined to cooperate. He also turned down my request for an urgent meeting with LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran to discuss the matter. I was to accompany Thondaman. But Thamilchelvam insisted there is no point in visiting Kilinochchi as the decision cannot be changed under any circumstances. Thamilchelvam faulted the UNP for not making a formal request to the LTTE leader. We never wanted the LTTE to tell the people to vote for the UNP candidate. The UNP expected the freedom for those who wanted to exercise their franchise to do so. Subsequently, we met a senior delegation of TNA representatives at the CWC headquarters to discuss ways and means of convincing the LTTE. Though the TNA realized our plight, it couldn’t do anything. TNA MP Nadaraja Raviraj raised the issue with the LTTE on the UNP’s behalf. Raviraj made a genuine effort. But the LTTE ignored our plea."

An unidentified gunman shot Raviraj, a human rights lawyer, at close range at around 8.30am on November 10, 2006 as he got into his car after giving a TV interview in Colombo.

The MP died later in hospital. His bodyguard was also killed. The TNA blamed the government for the killing.

Yogarajan revealed that the UNP expected as much as 500,000 votes from the Northern Province to enable Wickremesinghe to secure a 375,000 majority. Responding to a query, Yogarajan said he explained to Thamilchelvam the LTTE’s decision wasn’t fair by Tamil speaking people living in the South. "They yearned for Wickremesinghe’s victory though the LTTE strategy didn’t take that into consideration."

The political stalwart asserted that the LTTE may have felt that had Wickremesinghe won the November 2005 presidential poll with a comfortable majority, it couldn’t have justified the resumption of hostilities. Obviously, the LTTE believed Wickremesinghe’s strategy was meant to entrap the organization.

The TNA, on behalf of the LTTE, announced the decision to boycott the presidential poll. The announcement was made on November 10, 2005 in Kilinochchi. Confirming the LTTE directive, TNA Batticaloa District MP Joseph Pararajasingham and Trincomalee District MP and TNA leader R. Sampanthan told the writer on the night of November 15, 2005, that nothing worthwhile could be achieved by supporting either of the two leading candidates (TNA refuses to change polls boycott stance-The Island November 16, 2005).

Some blamed the then UNP MP Milinda Moragoda for causing Wickremesinghe’s defeat. They felt Wickremesinghe earned the wrath of Prabhakaran due to his close associate and colleague, Milinda Moragoda’s declaration that the Norwegian led peace process caused the split between Prabhakaran and Karuna. But the LTTE wouldn’t have engineered Wickremesinghe’s defeat merely on the basis of an interview given by a former member of Wickremesinghe’s negotiating team. Instead, Prabhakaran undoubtedly believed that Rajapaksa would unwittingly created the conditions for him to resume a large scale offensive across the northern frontlines. Prabhakaran seemed to have believed that he could overwhelm the army in about two years during Rajapaksa’s presidency.

Malik Samarawickrema on LTTE move

An angry Malik Samarawickrema, the then Chairman of the UNP said that Wickremesinghe could have easily won the election if the northerners were allowed to exercise their franchise. Samarawickrema queried the absurdity in allegations as regards a secret agreement between Wickremesinghe and Prabhakaran in the backdrop of the LTTE depriving the UNP leader of a sure victory (LTTE action belies ali-koti pact-The Island November 21, 2005).

During the last week of November, 2005, Moragoda came under fire at a meeting of the decision making Working Committee over his controversial interview about a week before the presidential poll. Moragoda was accused of causing Wickremesinghe’s defeat (Hot air at Sirikotha over LTTE polls boycott order-The Island December 1, 2005).

Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka commented on the LTTE project that led to Wickremesinghe’s defeat and the eventual annihilation of the once proud LTTE conventional fighting force. The Norwegian report: "Ironically, Wickremesinghe’s defeat is determined in the Vanni. The LTTE decides to enforce a boycott among Tamil voters, thus tipping the balance to Rajapaksa, who wins with a margin of less than two per cent."

Authors of the Norwegian report, while admitting they weren’t certain of what caused the LTTE to engineer Wickremesinghe’s defeat, mentioned three probable reasons, namely taking revenge on Wickremesinghe for snaring the group in an international peace trap, realization that only a hardliner could enforce change in southern politics and a possible financial or other arrangement with the then Prime Minister Rajapaksa ahead of the polls. The report quoted President Rajapaksa in January 2006 as having told the then Norwegian peace envoy Erik Solheim to thank Prabhakaran on his behalf for helping him to win the election. Solheim did as he was told when he met Prabhakaran in Kilinochchi just a few days after his meeting with the President in Colombo.

Rajapaksa polled 4,887,152 votes (50.29%) to win the election with Wickremesinghe coming a close second. The UNP leader obtained 4,706,366 votes (48.43%).

The following results of electorates in Jaffna district is evidence of the devastating consequences of Prabhakaran’s order. Wickremesinghe polled 98 votes in Kayts (total registered voters 52,986), 91 in Vaddukkoddai (total registered 62,781), 148 in Kankesanthurai (total registered 67,133), 256 in Maipaly (total registered 68,783), 267 in Kopay (total registered 63,752), 52 in Udupiddy (total registered 55,499), 25 in Point Pedro (total registered 47,188), 33 in Chavakachcheri (total registered 62022), 198 in Nallur (total registered 70,251), 301 in Jaffna (total registered 62,089), and 100 in Kilinochchi (total registered 89,454). Wickremesinghe also obtained 1405 postal votes. Of a staggering 701,938 registered voters in the Jaffna electoral district, only 8524 risked their lives to exercise their franchise. Wickremesinghe could obtain only 5523, though according to Yogarajan UNP/Opposition strategists believed their man could obtain as many as 500,000 votes. Rajapaksa polled 1967 votes.

Although the situation in the neighbouring Vanni electoral district had been much better when compared with the Jaffna electoral district. Of 250,386 registered voters in Mannar, Vavuniya and Mullaitivu electorates only 85874 exercised their franchise. However, the situation in the LTTE stronghold of Mullaitivu, was as bad as Jaffna with the Mullaitivu electorate in spite of having 66,596 registered votes recording 902 votes.

The extremely low vote in Mullaitivu underscored Prabhakaran’s hold on Mullaitivu. In the Vanni electoral district Wickremesinghe polled 65,798, whereas Rajapaksa obtained 17,197 votes.

In the Eastern Province, Wickremesinghe received overwhelming support though the LTTE-TNA boycott order discouraged some people from exercising their franchise at the expense of Wickremesinghe. Even in Batticaloa electoral district where Wickremesinghe obtained 121,514 votes, only 154,615 had exercised their franchise though there were 318,728 registered voters. Rajapaksa managed to obtain 28,836 votes in the Batticaloa district.

Had the LTTE allowed the northern electorate to vote, Wickremesinghe would have emerged victorious at the November 2005 presidential election. It had been a grave miscalculation on the part of the LTTE that led to the demise of an organization which even stood up to the mighty Indian army during Oct. Interestingly, the LTTE’s operation had been tremendous as it achieved what it desired: ensured Wickremesinghe’s defeat. Prabhakaran helped Rajapaksa, in the mistaken belief that the new Commander-in-Chief could be isolated and finished off, perhaps within two years as Kumaran Pathmanathan aka KP told the writer soon after he was brought to Colombo from Malaysia. According to Pathmanathan, Prabhakaran believed he could secure a militarily unbeatable position within two years. Instead, a relentless combined security forces campaign led to the eradication of conventional LTTE fighting capability in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, within two years and 10 months.

P’karan’s bid to deprive CBK of a second term goes awry Dec 1995 presidential poll:

SPECIAL REPORT : Part 50

November 18, 2014, 6:01 pm 

The assassination of President Kumaratunga, three days before the Dec 21, 1999, presidential poll, was meant to achieve several objectives, both political and military. Prof. Peiris, who had been conducting secret negotiations with the Norwegians, on behalf of President Kumaratunga, was among those wounded in the suicide attack. One of the main objectives of the LTTE suicide mission was to ensure the victory of UNP candidate, Ranil Wickremesinghe, thereby bring an end to the Norwegian-led negotiations with her government. Prabhakaran obviously believed that he could enter into a fresh round of negotiations with the new executive, under the Norwegian auspices. Prabhakaran’s strategy, in Dec 1999, had been very much similar to that of Oct 1994 when the terrorist leader assassinated the then UNP presidential election candidate, Gamini Dissanayake, to enable Mrs Kumaratunga to win.

by Shamindra Ferdinando

Having helped the then Chief Minister of the Western Province, Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga to win the presidential election, on Nov 9, 1994, the LTTE made an attempt to prevent her re-election bid at the Dec 21, 1999, poll.

The suicide blast, directed at Mrs. Kumaratunga, on the night of Dec 18, at the conclusion of the final rally of the then SLFP-led People’s Alliance (PA), claimed the lives of 35 persons. Over 100 received injuries, including President Kumaratunga. She received a slight injury to her face and the right eye.

It would be pertinent to discuss the attempt on Mrs. Kumaratunga’s life, with the focus on secret tripartite negotiations, involving the PA, the LTTE and Norway, at the time of the Dec 18 suicide blast. The talks were meant to facilitate resumption of negotiations between the two parties, under the auspices of Norway.

Mrs. Kumaratunga was the first politician to survive an LTTE suicide attack. The attempt on the President reflected the diabolical nature of Velupillai Prabhakaran, the so-called undisputed leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

Norwegian International Development Minister, Erik Solheim, discussed the Norwegian role, in the secret three-way negotiations, at an interview with NGO guru, Dr. Kumar Rupesinghe, years later (Negotiating Peace in Sri Lanka: Efforts, Failures and Lessons). Solheim’s interview was among several other interviews/opinion expressed by various personalities, involved in the peace process, accommodated in this particular volume, edited by Dr. Rupesinghe. One of the major recipients of overseas financial assistance, Dr. Rupesinghe has received the backing of Norwegian and Sri Lankan Foreign ministries and the Berghof Foundation for the project.

The trilateral discussions had been initiated by the LTTE, in October 1998, to explore the possibility of having the then LTTE ideologue, Anton Balasingham, safely moved from the Vanni region to an overseas medical facility to undergo an emergency kidney operation.

Solheim, in his interview with Dr. Rupesinghe, claimed that only a few people, including President Kumaratunga, and the then Foreign Minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar, and top LTTE representatives, knew of the negotiations. Having acknowledged that as Norway couldn’t facilitate Balasingham’s transfer from the Vanni, the kidney patient had to leave by other means. Solheim said: "Throughout the peace process, there have been absolutely no leaks from Norway and only a handful of people knew about it at all. So we maintained secrecy at all times until Chandrika decided to go public right after the LTTE attempted to assassinate her, just before the election, in the New Year 1999/2000. She revealed, in an interview with the BBC, that Norway had been involved as a facilitator for a long time. This came as a complete surprise to Norway. Later she apologized for announcing it before informing us, but there were no problems as a result though and I think it was better that way than having it leaked by the press or in any other way."

Dr. Rupesinghe conveniently failed to inquire from Solheim whether the LTTE bid to assassinate the Sri Lankan leader surprised Norway. The Chairman of the Foundation for Co-Existence, Dr. Rupesinghe, never queried from Solheim whether Norway demanded an explanation from Prabhakaran, as regards the assassination, attempt or whether the group offered an apology. In hindsight, perhaps, Norway knew that the LTTE had no intention of returning to the negotiating table as long as President Kumaratunga remained at the helm and the negotiations were intended to evacuate Balasingham. Prabhakaran wouldn’t have forgiven Mrs. Kumaratunga for inflicting a humiliating battlefield defeat, in Dec 1995, on the LTTE. Mrs Kumaratunga had the courage to launch the largest ever combined security forces offensive, codenamed, Riviresa, in August, 1995, to being the entire peninsula under government control. The then SLFP leader shouldn’t be deprived of the credit for giving resolute political leadership that enable the army to evict the LTTE.

Although she couldn’t further exploit the situation, to the advantage of her government, due to a string of battlefield debacles on the Vanni front, consequent to the disastrous Operation Jayasikurui, meant to restore the Kandy-Jaffna overland Main Supply Route (MSR), the Jaffna peninsula remained under military control.

Regardless of Norway’s failure to arrange the transfer of Balasingham, from the Vanni, Oslo accepted an invitation from Mrs. Kumaratunga, in May, 1999, to mediate between the two warring parties. The President move coincided with her untiring efforts to secure support from major political parties to devolution proposals. In fact, President Kumaratunga picked Norway from among five countries proposed by Prabhakaran as possible mediators. Prabhakaran assassinated TULF great, Neelan Tiruchelvam, MP in Colombo, to discourage those supporting President Kumaratunga to make her devolution proposals. The government continued with its efforts in spite of Tiruchelvam’s assassination. He was quickly forgotten. On behalf of President Kumaratunga, both ministers, Lakshman Kadirgamar, and Prof G.L. Peiris, secretly met Norwegian officials, tasked with facilitating talks between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. The Norwegians also met President Kumaratunga in Colombo.

Amidst bloody battles, on the Vanni front, the tripartite negotiations continued. President Kumaratunga remained confident of reaching an understanding with Prabhakaran, though an influential section of the PA administration felt uneasy. The military top brass realized that the LTTE wouldn’t suspend large scale offensive operations regardless of the negotiations. The LTTE relentlessly attacked the army on the Vanni front. By Dec 1999, residential areas, in the Jaffna peninsula, had been under artillery and heavy mortar fire with the strategic Elephant Pass base targeted. The defenders at Elephant Pass struggled to save the base. By then, the LTTE had driven the army out of all areas it liberated since 1997, thereby gaining the upper hand on the northern front. The navy and the air forces lacked the resources to ensure required military supplies to the Jaffna peninsula. The army, based in Jaffna, didn’t have the wherewithal to meet the LTTE challenge.

The assassination of President Kumaratunga, three days before the Dec 21, 1999, presidential poll, was meant to achieve several objectives, both political and military. Prof. Peiris, who had been conducting secret negotiations with the Norwegians, on behalf of President Kumaratunga, was among those wounded in the suicide attack. One of the main objectives of the LTTE suicide mission was to ensure the victory of UNP candidate, Ranil Wickremesinghe, thereby bring an end to the Norwegian-led negotiations with her government. Prabhakaran obviously believed that he could enter into a fresh round of negotiations with the new executive, under the Norwegian auspices. Prabhakaran’s strategy, in Dec 1999, had been very much similar to that of Oct 1994 when the terrorist leader assassinated the then UNP presidential election candidate, Gamini Dissanayake, to enable Mrs Kumaratunga to win.

There couldn’t have been such manipulation, perpetrated by a terrorist organization, in any part of the world, except Sri Lanka. Idiotic politicians acted as if they enjoyed being manipulated by Prabhakaran always believing the LTTE favoured them over their political rivals. President Kumaratunga was no exception. She wouldn’t have realized Prabhakaran deception until an attempt was made on her life.

In an exclusive interview with the former BBC correspondent in Sri Lanka, George Arney, posted on Dec 30, 1999, president Kumaratunga revealed international mediation meant to broker a peace deal with the Tigers was in progress for over two years.

The first attempt was by the Commonwealth Secretary General Chief, Anyoku, followed by the Norwegian Government.

Both attempts proved fruitless, the BBC quoted President Kumaratunga, who had been in London to undergo medical treatment, as having said. Had she not revealed the Norwegian intervention here who would have done so. Minister Kadirgamar or Prof. Peiris wouldn’t have spoken unless they were authorized by President Kumaratunga, hence Prabhakaran’s treachery wouldn’t have come to public domain at that time.

In BBC Breakfast with Frost interview posted on Oct 28, 2001, President Kumaratunga said: "Well in my case it was the Tamil terrorists quite clearly, I was at the last presidential election rally in ‘99 December and it was a young female suicide bomber who blasted herself, obviously in the hope of doing me in, 26 people were killed, I escaped with serious injuries and lost the sight of one eye."

President Kumaratunga refrained from revealing the Norwegian role when she first addressed the nation, over Rupavahini, on the night of Dec 20, 1999. President Kumaratunga used her first appearance since the assassination bid to urge the Tamil speaking civilian population to throw their weight behind the PA. Addressing the nation from Temple Trees on the day before the presidential poll, President Kumaratunga requested the LTTE fighting cadre to quit the organization.

Prabhakaran never responded to Kumaratunga’s allegations. The well-funded Colombo based peace lobby, too, remained silent. Western powers continued to turn a blind eye to LTTE terrorism with the British government allowing the LTTE to run a major propaganda operation from London. The UK, based LTTE International Secretariat coordinated a major overseas campaign against Sri Lanka. The UK allowed the LTTE to issue media statements as regards military operations, conducted by terrorists in Sri Lanka, particularly the major assault on Elephant Pass.

Having survived the LTTE assassination bid, President Kumaratunga comfortably secured a second term. Wickremesinghe suffered a heavy defeat, though President Kumaratunga polled a lot less than at the Nov 9, 1994, presidential poll.

The PA candidate polled a staggering 4,709,205 votes (62.28%) whereas her rival, Vajira Srimathi Dissanayake, managed to obtain 2,715,285 votes. Srimathi never had a chance, though the UNP named her as the successor to her assassinated husband, Gamini Dissanayake. Mrs. Kumaratunga would never have received such a huge mandate if the LTTE interfered with the electoral process. At the time of the poll, Kumaratunga, in her capacity as the newly elected premier had been engaged in direct talks with the LTTE.

At the Dec 1999, presidential polls, the incumbent President obtained 4,312,157 (51.12%) whereas Ranil Wickremesinghe polled 3,602,748.

Had Prabhakaran succeeded in assassinating President Kumaratunga, the PA would have plunged into unprecedented crisis. The PA would have had time to inform Elections Commissioner of Kumaratunga’s replacement. Wickremesinghe would have emerged victorious with whoever fielded by the PA coming a distant second. It would be important to keep in mind that Kumaratunga’s replacement would never have been Mahinda Rajapaksa, the then Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Development Minister. The bottom line is that whoever succeed Kumaratunga, his fate would have been not different from that of Vajira Srimathi Dissanayake.

What would have happened if Wickremesinghe emerged victorious? Would he have continued with the Norwegian facilitation? What would have happened to the PA?

Let me recollect a brief statement the then UNP Batticaloa District MP, Seyed Ali Moulana, gave to the writer in response to a query a few days before the Dec 21, 1999, presidential poll. Moulana said that the people had received the blessings of the LTTE to exercise their franchise in support of Wickremesinghe. The MP attributed the LTTE’s decision to Kumaratunga’s failure to solve the national issue.

Moulana, who had been leading Wickremesinhe’s campaign in both the government and LTTE-held areas, said that Wickremesinghe could comfortably win the election with the support extended by the Tamil speaking people at the behest of the LTTE. Moulana declared that the Tamil speaking people, not only in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, but living in the South as well, wouldn’t take notice of the TULF efforts to discourage them from voting for either Kumaratunga or Wickremesinghe. The UNPer revealed that the LTTE allowed the UNP to hold political meetings, in areas under its control, though President Kumaratunga couldn’t campaign in the northern and eastern districts due to LTTE threats (LTTE gives the green light to vote in favour of Ranil-UNP Batticaloa District MP says-The Island, Dec 16, 1999).

Moulana emphasized that there was absolutely no basis for PA claims that Wickremesinghe had reached an agreement with the LTTE. However, Moulana didn’t mince his words when he declared that the Tamil speaking people would make a significant contribution to Wickremesinghe victory, though the then SLMC leader Ashraff had been working overtime to cause ethnic tensions in the region.

Moulana captured the limelight, in early 2004, after his friendship with Karuna Amman was revealed in the immediate aftermath of a damaging split in the organization. Moulana had to quit his parliamentary seat at the behest of Wickremesinghe, consequent to the LTTE accusing the MP of helping Karuna Amman to reach Colombo. Fearing an LTTE attempt on Moulana’s life, he was sent out of the country. Subsequently, he switched his allegiance to President Rajapaksa.

Due to negligence on the part of successive governments, the state never made an effort to examine Prabhakaran’s strategies though from time to time the military engaged in some costly operations. In the absence of an overall strategy, vis a vis political situation, as well as status of the military status, the LTTE always had the upper hand with the UNP as well as the SLFP-led coalitions, struggling to cope up with crisis on the ground. Their policies were intended to appease the LTTE at the expense of national security interests and political stability.